



BRICS RESEARCH GROUP

2024 BRICS Kazan Summit Interim Compliance Report

From 25 October 2024 to 30 April 2025

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31 October 2025

Feedback, as always, is welcome and is kept anonymous.

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Preface

The BRICS Research Group has been assessing progress made by the BRICS members in implementing commitments their leaders make at each summit since the 2011 Sanya meeting. These reports monitor each member's efforts to implement a carefully chosen selection of the many commitments produced at each summit. They are offered to the general public and to policy makers, academics, civil society, the media and interested citizens around the world in an effort to make the BRICS's work more transparent, accessible and effective, and to provide scientific data to enable the meaningful analysis of the causes of compliance and the impact of this important informal international institution. Until 2023, these reports were produced in collaboration with the Centre for International Institutions Research (CIIR) of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; as of 2024, the research is carried out independently using the same methodology. Previous reports are available at the BRICS Information Centre at <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/compliance>.

The BRICS Research Group relies on publicly available information, documentation and media reports for its assessments. To ensure accuracy, comprehensiveness and integrity, we encourage comments from stakeholders. Indeed, scores can be recalibrated if new material becomes available. All feedback remains anonymous. Responsibility for the contents of this report lies exclusively with the authors and analysts of the BRICS Research Group. Please send any comments to the BRICS Research Group at brics@utoronto.ca.

John Kirton
Director, BRICS Research Group

Introduction and Summary

The 2024 BRICS Kazan Interim Compliance Report, prepared by the BRICS Research Group (based at the University of Toronto), analyses compliance performance by BRICS countries with eight priority commitments drawn from the total 134 commitments made by the leaders at the Johannesburg Summit, which was held on 23 October 2024. This report reflects the expanded composition of BRICS. This report includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, which became members as in January 2024, in addition to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

Methodology and Scoring System

This report draws on the methodology developed by the G7 Research Group, which has been monitoring G7 compliance since 1996 and adapted for monitoring G20 performance since 2008.¹ The use of this time-tested methodology provides for cross-institutional, cross-member and cross-issue consistency and thus allows compatibility and comparability of the compliance performance by different summit institutions and establishes a foundation for evidence-based assessment of the effectiveness of these institutions.²

The methodology uses a scale from -1 (0%) to +1 (100%), where +1 (50%) indicates full compliance with the stated commitment, -1 indicates a failure to comply or action taken that is directly opposite to the stated goal of the commitment, and 0 indicates partial compliance or work in progress, such as initiatives that have been launched but are not yet near completion and whose final results can therefore not be assessed.³ Each member receives a score of -1, 0 or +1 for each commitment.

The Breakdown of Commitments

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, the BRICS leaders focused on four priorities: strengthening multilateralism for a more just and democratic world order, enhancing cooperation for global and regional stability and security, fostering economic and financial cooperation for just global development, and strengthening people-to-people exchanges for social and economic development. The theme was “strengthening multilateralism for just and global development and security.” The topics discussed included reform of international finance architecture, humanitarian and peace resolution; establishing and supporting alternative payment systems as a complement or alternative to existing systems; elevation of the role and capabilities of the New Development Bank; addressing greenhouse gas emission removal; promoting financial inclusivity currency diversification and local-currency settlement; cooperation on health, food security and sustainable agriculture.

Selection of Commitments

For each compliance cycle (that is, the period between summits), the research team selects commitments that reflect the breadth of the BRICS agenda and the priorities of the summit’s host, while balancing the selection to allow for comparison with past and future summits.⁴ The selection also takes into account the breakdown of issue areas and the proportion of commitments in each one (see Table 1). The primary criteria for selecting a priority commitment for assessment are the comprehensiveness and relevance to the summit, the BRICS and the world. Selected commitments must meet secondary criteria such as measurability and ability to comply within a year. Tertiary criteria include significance, as identified by relevant stakeholders in the host country and

¹ The Compliance Coding Manual is available at <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/index.html#method>.

² Informal summitry institutions are defined as international institutions with limited membership, relatively low bureaucracy and reliance on open, flexible and voluntary approaches. Regular meetings of the heads of states and governments who engage on a wide range of international, regional and domestic politics stand at the pinnacle of such international arrangements, which involve many actors operating according to established procedures on two levels: domestic and international. Commitments contained in the collectively agreed documents are not legally binding but their implementation is stimulated by peer pressure. Among such bodies engaged in global and regional governance are G7, G20, BRICS, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and others.

³ The formula to convert a score into a percentage is $P=50 \times (S+1)$, where P is the percentage and S is the score.

⁴ Guidelines for choosing priority commitments, as well as other applicable considerations, are available in the Compliance Coding Manual.

scientific teams. Of the 134 commitments made at the 2024 Kazan Summit, the BRICS Research Group selected eight priority commitments for its compliance assessment (see Table 2).

2024 BRICS Kazan Summit Interim Compliance

This cycle the BRICS has expanded to 10 members and as such all members' compliance has been assessed. For the interim compliance period, for all eight commitments selected for analysis, BRICS members achieved an average compliance of +0 (50%) as shown in Table 3. This assessment is based on relevant, publicly available information relating to actions taken from 25 October 2024 to 30 April 2025. Country rankings are listed in Table 4 and commitment rankings are listed in Table 5. Table 6 lists compliance scores for all BRICS summits by member.

2024 BRICS Kazan Summit Interim Compliance by Member

By country, Brazil earned the highest compliance score at +0.50 (75%). China followed with a score of +0.25 (63%), followed by South Africa with +0.13 (56%), followed by Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates with 0 (50%). India had -0.13 (44%), and Indonesia, Iran and Russia had a score of -0.25 (38%) (see Table 4).

2024 BRICS Kazan Summit Interim Compliance by Commitment

By issue, the commitment on economics and finance received the highest score with +0.90 (95%). Three commitments come next with +0.20 (60%): on development regarding enhancing capacity building and knowledge, on trade in agricultural fertilizers and on strengthening the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. The regional security commitment on Palestine and Israel had -0.20 (40%), followed by the commitment on removing greenhouse gases with -0.30 (35%) and cooperation and coordination against corruption with -0.40 (30%). The lowest compliance was on the commitment on reforming the World Trade Organization, with -0.60 (20%) (see Table 5).

Table 1: Distribution of BRICS Commitments Across Issue Areas, 2009–2024

Issue Area	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Energy	5	9	1	2					6	2	2	3		2	3	3
Finance		3	1			6	6	5	9	5	1			2	3	5
Climate change		1	6	3	1	1	1	1	3		3	1	3	2	4	6
Macroeconomic policy		1	5	1	5	7	6	4	4	3	1	2	2	5	14	2
Trade	1	2	5	3	6	8	30	7	21	18	8	2	3	12	5	16
International cooperation	1	2	5	3	6	8	30	7	21	18	8	8	7	10	3	5
Socioeconomic	1	1	3	2		7	5	2		2					3	
Development	1	5	1	3	10	4	4	2	11	6	2	3	4	21	7	11
Natural disasters	1	1	1											1		2
Food and agriculture	3		1	1		1	17		5	3		2	1	3	4	1
ICT and digital economy			2			1	17	3	12	3	2	3	4	15	4	7
Science and education	1	1	1		2	5							1	4	6	8
Health			1	1		1	6	2	6	1		4	5	14	4	5
Human rights			1		1	2	5		2		1		3	5	4	7
Accountability			1													
Regional security	1		1	4	8	6	6	4	12	7	4	7	1	8	6	10
Terrorism			1	1	2	2	1	4	7	3	1	2	7	4	2	10
Culture		1				3	1	2	3			1		3	5	2
Sport		1													2	
IFI reform	1	2	1	2	9	8	3	2	5	2	2	1	1	1		5
Non-proliferation					1			1	2		1		2	7	1	1
Crime and corruption						4	10	3	8	6	10	3	7	7	6	8
Environment						1	1	1	3	3	3		2	1	7	1
Tourism							1			1					4	2
International taxation										4	5	1		2		2
Space												1				
Inter-BRICS cooperation												1			19	13
Intergovernmental organization reform													4	19	3	
Peace and security													1	6	2	
Good governance														4		2
Labour and employment														3	5	2
Infrastructure														1	1	
Gender																1
Total	15	31	38	32	47	68	130	45	125	73	49	45	58	162	127	137

Notes: ICT = information and communication technologies; IFI = international financial institution.

Table 2: 2024 BRICS Kazan Summit Priority Commitments

	Issue Area	Commitment
1	Regional Security: Palestine-Israel Two-State Solution	“We reaffirm our support for the State of Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations in the context of the unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC [United Nations Security Council] and UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative that includes the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine in line with internationally recognised borders of June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital living side by side in peace and security with Israel.”
2	Development: Enhancement of Capacity Building and Knowledge Exchange	“We support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals] and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs [emerging markets and developing countries].”
3	International Crime: Cooperation and Coordination Against Corruption	“We [commit] to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthen our coordination on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.”
4	Food and Agriculture: Trade in Agricultural Fertilizers	“We commit to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.”
5	Health: Strengthen the International Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response System	“We reiterate our support to the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.”
6	Economics and Finance: Economic Cooperation	“We reaffirm our commitment to enhance macro-economic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.”
7	Climate Change: Removal and Reduction of Greenhouse Gases	“We will strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).”
8	International Institutional Reforms: Support Necessary World Trade Organization Reforms	“We reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary WTO [World Trade Organization] reform to enhance the WTO’s resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.”

Table 3: 2024 BRICS Kazan Summit Interim Compliance Scores

	Issue	Brazil	China	Egypt	Ethiopia	India	Indonesia	Iran	Russia	South Africa	United Arab Emirates	Average	
1	Regional Security: Palestine-Israel Two-State Solution	+1	0	0	-1	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	-0.20	40%
2	Development: Enhancement of Capacity Building and Knowledge Exchange	+1	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+0.20	60%
3	International Crime: Cooperation and Coordination Against Corruption	0	0	-1	0	-1	0	0	-1	0	-1	-0.40	30%
4	Food and Agriculture: Trade in Agricultural Fertilizers	0	0	0	0	+1	0	0	+1	0	0	+0.20	60%
5	Health: Strengthen the International Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response System	+1	0	+1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	+1	+0.20	60%
6	Economics and Finance: Economic Cooperation	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+0.90	95%
7	Climate Change: Removal and Reduction of Greenhouse Gases	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	-0.30	35%
8	International Institutional Reforms: Support Necessary World Trade Organization Reforms	0	0	-1	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	-0.60	20%
		+0.50	+0.25	0	0	-0.13	-0.25	-0.25	-0.25	+0.13	0	0	50%
		75%	63%	50%	50%	44%	38%	38%	38%	56%	50%		

Table 4: 2024 BRICS Kazan Summit Interim Compliance by Member

Rank	Member	Score	Average
1	Brazil	+0.50	75%
2	China	+0.25	63%
3	South Africa	+0.13	56%
4	Egypt	0	50%
	Ethiopia		
	United Arab Emirates		
7	India	-0.13	44%
8	Indonesia	-0.25	38%
	Iran		
	Russia		

Table 5: 2024 BRICS Kazan Summit Interim Compliance by Commitment

Rank	Commitment	Score	Average
1	Economics and Finance: Economic Cooperation	+0.90	95%
2	Development: Enhancement of Capacity Building and Knowledge Exchange	+0.20	60%
	Food and Agriculture: Trade in Agricultural Fertilizers		
	Health: Strengthen the International Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response System		
5	Regional Security: Palestine-Israel Two-State Solution	-0.20	40%
6	Climate Change: Removal and Reduction of Greenhouse Gases	-0.30	35%
7	International Crime: Cooperation and Coordination Against Corruption	-0.40	30%
8	International Institutional Reforms: Support Necessary World Trade Organization Reforms	-0.60	20%

Table 6: BRICS Compliance Scores, 2011–2024

	2011 Sanya		2012 Delhi		2013 Durban		2014 Fortaleza		2015 Ufa	
	Final		Final		Final		Final		Final	
Brazil	+0.60	80%	0	50%	+0.40	70%	+0.13	57%	+0.22	61%
China	+0.60	80%	+0.40	70%	+0.80	90%	+0.63	82%	+0.67	84%
India	+1.00	100%	+0.40	70%	+0.80	90%	+0.38	69%	+0.44	72%
Russia	+0.20	60%	+0.20	60%	+0.80	90%	+0.63	82%	+0.78	89%
South Africa	0	50%	+0.40	70%	-0.40	30%	+0.25	63%	+0.67	84%
Average	+0.48	74%	+0.28	64%	+0.48	74%	+0.40	70%	+0.56	78%

	2016 Goa		2017 Xiamin		2018 Johannesburg		2019 Brasilia	
	Final		Final		Final		Final	
Brazil	+0.70	85%	+0.50	75%	+0.50	75%	+0.40	70%
China	+0.90	95%	+0.60	80%	+0.90	95%	+0.50	75%
India	+0.90	95%	+0.60	80%	+0.80	90%	+0.60	80%
Russia	+0.80	90%	+0.60	80%	+0.70	85%	+0.50	75%
South Africa	+0.60	80%	+0.70	85%	+0.60	80%	+0.20	60%
Average	+0.78	50%	+0.60	80%	+0.70	50%	+0.44	72%

	2020 Moscow				2021 Delhi		2022 Beijing				2023 Johannesburg				2024 Kazan	
	Final		Interim		Final		Final		Interim		Final		Interim		Interim	
Brazil	+0.41	71%	+0.29	65%	+0.50	75%	+0.28	64%	+0.06	53%	+0.30	65%	-0.50	25%	+0.50	75%
China	+0.41	71%	+0.41	71%	+0.85	93%	+0.50	75%	+0.28	64%	-0.10	45%	-0.40	30%	+0.25	63%
Egypt															0	50%
Ethiopia															0	50%
India	+0.65	82%	+0.35	68%	+0.60	80%	+0.50	75%	+0.22	61%	-0.50	25%	+0.20	60%	0	50%
Indonesia															-0.25	38%
Iran															-0.25	38%
Russia	+0.47	74%	+0.24	62%	+0.65	83%	+0.22	61%	-0.06	47%	-0.30	35%	-0.30	35%	-0.25	25%
South Africa	+0.24	62%	+0.18	59%	+0.35	68%	+0.44	72%	+0.28	64%	-0.40	30%	-0.30	35%	+0.13	56%
United Arab Emirates															0	50%
Average	+0.44	72%	+0.29	65%	+0.53	76%	+0.39	71%	+0.13	56%	-0.20	40%	-0.26	37%	+0.01	51%

1. Regional Security: Palestine-Israel Two-State Solution

“We reaffirm our support for the State of Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations in the context of the unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative that includes the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine in line with internationally recognised borders of June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital living side by side in peace and security with Israel.”

XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil			+1
China		0	
Egypt		0	
Ethiopia	-1		
India		0	
Indonesia	-1		
Iran	-1		
Russia		0	
South Africa		0	
United Arab Emirates		0	
Average	-0.20 (40%)		

Background

Since the mention of the Israel and Palestine conflict at the Durban Summit in 2013, the two-state solution has been addressed at every summit. Israel and Palestine have been unable to come to a solution that recognizes Palestine as a state and allows for both parties to exist alongside each other in peace. BRICS leaders have continuously reiterated the need for a solution that is based upon previous United Nations declarations, the Arab Peace Initiatives and Madrid Principles, amongst others.

At the 2013 Durban Summit, BRICS leaders called on the international community to further support the implementation of a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, due to the lack of progress on the Middle East Peace Process, urging for a solution for Palestine to exist alongside Israel as an economic and contiguous state.⁵

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to contribute to a lasting and just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict utilising internationally recognised frameworks such as the Madrid Principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and relevant United Nations resolutions.⁶ Leaders also urged Palestine and Israel to continue to negotiate for a two-state solution that leads to a Palestine that is a contiguous state viable and able to live in peace with Israel.

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, leaders called upon Israel and Palestine to resume negotiations for a two-state solution where the two states can coexist side by side in peace based on mutually agreed and internationally recognised borders based on 1967 lines, opposing Israeli settlement in the Occupied territories.⁷ The leaders encouraged that states that participated in the 2014 International Donors Conference on Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in Cairo to fulfill their pledges and call on Palestinian and Israeli authorities to channel international aid for

⁵ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 15 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

⁶ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 15 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

⁷ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 15 May 2025. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

Palestinians. Leaders welcomed the efforts of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) to aid and protect Palestine refugees.

At the 2016 Goa Summit, leaders reiterated the necessity of a two-state solution based on relevant UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, the Madrid Principles, Arab Peace Initiative and previous agreements made by both parties for Palestine that is viable, territorially contingent and independent.⁸

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, leaders urged for solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for stability and peace in the Middle East and expressed their readiness to enhance their contributions for a just and lasting resolution and supported international efforts of peace and stability in the region.⁹

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, leaders reiterated the need for renewed diplomatic efforts to achieve an Israel and Palestine settlement and that Jerusalem remains one of the final status issues to be defined in negotiations.¹⁰ Leaders reiterated their support for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution (A/RES/ES-10/20) and called for its full implementation. The leaders reiterated their support for UNWRA and its role in supporting Palestinian refugees.

At the 2019 Brasilia Summit, leaders emphasized that a two-state solution aligned with international law, notably relevant UN resolutions, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Madrid Principles, can pave the path towards a peaceful and safe coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians.¹¹

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, leaders expressed their continued commitment to a lasting peace in the Middle East, voicing that a two-state solution must be pursued in accordance with existing international legal frameworks such as pertinent UN resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative to ultimately achieve the creation of a sovereign and viable State of Palestine that coexists alongside its neighbours.¹²

At the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders called on the international community to back “direct negotiations” for a two-state solution grounded in international law, referring namely to related UNGA and UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative, with the goal of “the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine.”¹³

At the 2023 Extraordinary Summit, the BRICS Chair urged the international community to advocate for open dialogue rooted in international law, “including relevant UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative,” in pursuit of a realized two-state solution and the creation of a sovereign, viable and independent Palestinian state.¹⁴

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, now with 10 members, BRICS leaders endorsed “the State of Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations in the context of the unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative that includes the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine in line with

⁸ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 15 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

⁹ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 15 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

¹⁰ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 15 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

¹¹ Brasilia Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 15 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasil.html>

¹² XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 15 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

¹³ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

¹⁴ The Chair’s Summary of the Extraordinary Joint Meeting of BRICS Leaders and Leaders of the Invited BRICS Members on the Situation in the Middle East with Particular Reference to Gaza, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 21 November 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/231121-chairs-summary.html>

internationally recognised borders of June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital living side by side in peace and security with Israel.”¹⁵

Commitment Features

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, leaders committed to “support ... the State of Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations in the context of the unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative that includes the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine in line with internationally recognised borders of June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital living side by side in peace and security with Israel.” This commitment can be broken down into three overarching dimensions: 1) supporting the State of Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations; 2) supporting the two-state solution based explicitly on international law, including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions, as well as the Arab Peace Initiative; and 3) recognizing and supporting the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the internationally recognized borders of June 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital, living side by side in peace and security with Israel.

Definitions and Concepts

“Commitment” is understood to mean “an agreement or pledge to do something in the future.”¹⁶

“Support” is understood to mean “the action, or act of providing aid, assistance, or backing up an initiative, or entity.”¹⁷ In the context of this commitment, it refers to aid and assistance toward Palestinian sovereignty in its efforts to achieve full membership in the United Nations. This aid can include political recognition, diplomatic engagement and legal advocacy on the part of BRICS members.

“Membership” is understood to mean “the state or status of being a member.”¹⁸ In the context of this commitment, it refers to the formal recognition of a new state or government by the United Nations General Assembly through a resolution for admission, passed after a two-thirds majority vote is obtained. Within the context of Palestine “Membership” refers to full membership of the United Nations, not observer status. For compliance, BRICS members need to demonstrate support for Palestine’s membership in the UN; compliance is not contingent on Palestine actually becoming a member.

“Two-state solution” is understood to mean the “proposed framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by establishing two states for two peoples: Israel for the Jewish people and Palestine for the Palestinian people.”¹⁹ In the context of this commitment, it refers to BRICS members’ commitment to this framework in the establishing of a “sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine in line with internationally recognised borders of June 1967.”²⁰

“International law” is understood to mean “the body of legal rules, norms and standards that apply between sovereign states and other entities that are legally recognized as international actors.”²¹ In the context of this

¹⁵ XVI BRICS Summit, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

¹⁶ Commitment, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commitment>

¹⁷ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 23 May 2025.

¹⁸ Membership, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/membership>

¹⁹ Two-state solution, Encyclopedia Britannica (Chicago) 19 April 2025. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/two-state-solution>

²⁰ XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration: Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

²¹ International law, Encyclopedia Britannica (Chicago) 27 February 2025. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law>

commitment, it refers to the relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions concerning Palestinian membership in the United Nations and the Arab Peace Initiative, which calls for the full withdrawal by Israel from the occupied territories.

“UNSC” or the United Nations Security Council is an UN organ whose “primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security ... which may meet whenever peace is threatened.”²²

“UNGA” or the United Nations General Assembly is the “main [UN] policy-making organ.”²³ UNGA meets regularly and “discusses specific issues through dedicated agenda items or sub-items, which lead to the adoption of resolutions.”²⁴

“Arab Peace Initiative” is understood to mean the 2002 Saudi-led proposal endorsed by the Arab League in 2002. The Initiative includes several main points to end the Arab-Israeli conflict²⁵ including calling on Israel to choose just peace by withdrawing from 1967-occupied territories, resolving the refugee issue under UN Resolution 194 and accepting a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. In return, Arab states will end the conflict, sign peace agreements and normalize relations with Israel. The initiative rejects forced resettlement of Palestinians, urges Israel to accept this offer to secure peace and invites global support, with a committee formed to advance the initiative internationally.

“East Jerusalem” refers to the portion of Jerusalem occupied by Jordanian forces during the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War and subsequently annexed by Israel in 1980.²⁶

“1967 borders” refers to the internationally recognized borders between Israel and the State of Palestine.²⁷ It originated in the demarcation lines following the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War, with the demarcation lines between Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War becoming the internationally recognized boundaries between Israel and the State of Palestine.

“Sovereign” is understood to mean “one possessing or held to possess supreme political power or sovereignty.”²⁸

“Borders” is understood as “boundary”²⁹, contextually meaning internationally recognized lines separating the territories of states.

“Peace” is understood as “freedom from civil disturbance.”³⁰

²² What is the Security Council?, United Nations Security Council (Geneva) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/what-security-council>

²³ Workings of the General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly of the United Nations (Geneva) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.un.org/en/ga/>

²⁴ Workings of the General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly of the United Nations (Geneva) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.un.org/en/ga/>

²⁵ Text of Arab peace initiative adopted at Beirut summit, European Parliament (Strasbourg) 28 March 2025. Access Date: 25 May 2025. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/empa/dv/1_arab-initiative-beirut/_1_arab-initiative-beirut_en.pdf

²⁶ The Status of Jerusalem, United Nations (New York) 1997. Access Date: 25 March 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/The-Status-of-Jerusalem-English-199708.pdf>

²⁷ Two-state solution, Encyclopedia Britannica (Chicago) 19 April 2025. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/two-state-solution>

²⁸ Sovereign, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sovereign>

²⁹ Borders, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/borders>

³⁰ Peace, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peace>

“Security” is understood as “the quality or state of being secure: such as freedom from danger.”³¹

General Interpretive Guidelines

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to BRICS members that take strong actions addressing all three aspects of the commitment by actively supporting 1) Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations; 2) the two-state solution explicitly based on international law, relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions, and the Arab Peace Initiative; and 3) the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the June 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, coexisting peacefully and securely with Israel.

Examples of strong actions for the three criteria, respectively include voting positively on UN resolutions supporting Palestinian UN membership; actively engaging in diplomatic solutions to promote a two-state framework; explicitly advocating for or formally recognizing Palestine according to the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that take strong action on in at least one of the criteria, plus weak action on another of the three criteria, or take weak action in two or three criteria.

Weak action includes attending relevant UN meetings regarding Palestine’s membership or discussions of a two-state solution, but not openly participating in discussions (i.e. a collective statement with no public evidence of the individual members’ contribution counts towards a 0), providing symbolic support for either the two-state solution or explicit statehood recognition, such as through verbal reiterations of support (i.e. speeches, declarations) without tangible actions attached.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1, will be assigned if the BRICS members take weak action in two or fewer criteria, take no action, or take action that is directly and explicitly antithetical to the commitment, such as by opposing Palestine’s membership in the United Nations or publicly rejecting key international frameworks outlined in the commitment.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member has taken weak action in two or fewer of the three criteria to demonstrate 1) support for the State of Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations, 2) support for the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative, or 3) recognize a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital; or has taken antithetical action to all three criteria.
0	The BRICS member has taken strong action on at least one criterion and weak action on the other criteria, or has taken weak action in all three criteria.
+1	The BRICS member has taken strong action in all three criteria.

*Compliance Director: Jessica Wan
Lead Analyst: Zainab Ibraheem*

Brazil: +1

Brazil has fully complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

³¹ Security, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/security>

On 31 October 2024, Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Secretary for Africa and the Middle East Carlos Sérgio Sobral Duarte concluded Brazil's representation at the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution in Riyadh.³² Brazil's attendance at the conference reflects engagement in diplomatic dialogues in support of a two-state solution.

On 17 November 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim issued a joint statement at the G20 Summit reiterating their support for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as their support for Palestine's full membership in the UN.³³ The joint statement indicates Brazil's promotion of a two-state solution.

On 17 December 2024, Brazil voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.³⁴ By supporting this resolution, Brazil continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 18 November 2024, Brazil and the United Arab Emirates issued a joint statement at the G20 Leaders' Summit reaffirming their commitment to a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state while condemning all practices that go against international law and relevant UN resolutions concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory.³⁵ The joint statement supports the establishment of a two-state solution based on international law.

On 2 December 2024, Foreign Affairs Minister Mauro Vieira issued an address at the Cairo Ministerial Conference to Enhance the Humanitarian Response in Gaza, indicating that a two-state solution is the best way to approach the Israel-Palestine conflict.³⁶

On 3 December 2024, Brazil voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.³⁷

³² Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and from the illegality of the continued presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, United Nations General Assembly (New York) 19 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/588>

³³ Encontro entre o Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e o Primeiro-Ministro Anwar Ibrahim à margem da Cúpula do G20 – Declaração conjunta, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Rio de Janeiro) 17 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/encontro-entre-o-presidente-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-e-o-primeiro-ministro-anwar-ibrahim-a-margem-da-cupula-do-g20-2013-declaracao-conjunta

³⁴ The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

³⁵ Comunicado conjunto Brasil - Emirados Árabes Unidos por ocasião da reunião de líderes do G20, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 27 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/comunicado-conjunto-brasil-emirados-arabes-unidos-por-ocasio-da-reuniao-de-lideres-do-g20

³⁶ Address by Minister Mauro Vieira at the Cairo Ministerial Conference to Enhance the Humanitarian Response in Gaza, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 2 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs/speeches/mauro-vieira-2023/address-by-minister-mauro-vieira-at-cairo-ministerial-conference-to-enhance-the-humanitarian-response-in-gaza>

³⁷ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

On 3 December 2024, Brazil voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).³⁸ This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

On 12 December 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in response to a UNGA resolution requesting the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) advisory opinion on Israel's international obligations to the UN.³⁹ Brazil reaffirmed the importance of the UN in achieving a two-state solution with an independent and sovereign Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital and within the 1967 borders.

On 3 January 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement condemning Israeli bombings in the Gaza Strip, reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution comprised of an independent and sovereign Palestinian State within the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital.⁴⁰

On 15 January 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken note of a joint press statement by Egypt, Qatar and the US in response to progress in the implementation of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement.⁴¹ Brazil also urges all parties to respect the conditions of the ceasefire and reiterated the urgent reconstruction of civil infrastructure in the region.

On 6 February 2025, President Lula defended the establishment of a State of Palestine and the broader two-state solution during an interview with radio stations in Minas Gerais, voicing that peaceful coexistence is needed.⁴² Concerning U.S. President Donald Trump's statements about occupation in the Gaza Strip, Lula reemphasized a two-state solution and the viable existence of the State of Palestine, "we defend the creation of a Palestinian state, just like the State of Israel."

On 7 February 2025, Minister Vieira issued a statement upon receiving the Getúlio Vargas Foundation Award where he stressed the importance of defending the two-state solution between Palestine and Israel.⁴³

On 19 February 2025, President Lula and Portuguese Prime Minister Luis Montenegro issued a joint statement during the XIV Brazil-Portugal Summit reaffirming their commitment to an independent and sovereign Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with applicable UN resolutions.⁴⁴ The joint

³⁸ Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

³⁹ Solicitação à Corte Internacional de Justiça de opinião consultiva acerca das obrigações de Israel em relação às Nações Unidas, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 20 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/solicitacao-a-corte-internacional-de-justica-de-opiniao-consultiva-acerca-das-obrigacoes-de-israel-em-relacao-as-nacoes-unidas

⁴⁰ Bombings in the Gaza Strip, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 3 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/bombings-in-the-gaza-strip>

⁴¹ Implementação da primeira fase do Acordo de Cessar-fogo na Faixa de Gaza, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 31 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/implementacao-da-primeira-fase-do-acordo-de-cessar-fogo-na-faixa-de-gaza

⁴² President urges humanitarian treatment of Brazilians repatriated from U.S., Presidência da República (Brasília) 6 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/02/president-urges-humanitarian-treatment-of-brazilians-repatriated-from-u-s>

⁴³ Address by Minister Mauro Vieira on the occasion of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation Award – Rio de Janeiro, February 7, 2025, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 10 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs/speeches/mauro-vieira-2023/address-by-minister-mauro-vieira-on-the-occasion-of-the-getulio-vargas-foundation-award-2013-rio-de-janeiro-february-7-2025>

⁴⁴ Declaração Conjunta por ocasião da XIV Cimeira Brasil-Portugal Brasília, 19 de fevereiro de 2025, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 19 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-conjunta-por-ocasio-da-xiv-cimeira-brasil-portugal-brasilia-19-de-fevereiro-de-2025

statement reflects international dialogue and support for Palestinian statehood, emphasizing just and lasting peace.

On 20 February 2025, Minister Vieira spoke at the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, emphasizing the need to defend the two-state solution.⁴⁵ Minister Vieira's actions reflect Brazil's promotion of a two-state solution in intergovernmental forums.

On 23 February 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement in response to Israeli military operations in Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank, recalling the ICJ advisory opinion that determined Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory to be unlawful.⁴⁶ The statement reaffirms Brazil's commitment to a two-state solution based on international law.

On 12 March 2025, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Laura da Rocha issued an address expressing Brazil's willingness to contribute to a political process leading to an independent Palestinian state.⁴⁷

On 17 March 2025, Secretary-General da Rocha met with the State of Palestine's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates Varsen Aghabekian Shahin for the 5th Meeting of the Brazil-Palestine Mechanism of Bilateral Consultations.⁴⁸ Secretary-General da Rocha reiterated Brazil's support for initiatives that implement the UNGA Advisory opinion and Resolution ES-10/24 and for the Palestinian right to self-determination through the framework of a two-state solution.

On 4 April 2025, Brazil voted in favor of the Human Rights Council resolution 58/27 on the right of Palestinian people to self-determination during the Council's 58th session.⁴⁹ The Human Rights Council called for an immediate end to Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and affirmed the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources for Palestinians. Brazil's vote represents its recognition of Palestinian sovereignty and statehood.

On 4 April 2025, Brazil voted in favor of Human Rights Council resolution 58/28, on Israeli settlement in the Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, during the Council's 58th session.⁵⁰ The resolution reaffirmed that the settlements are considered contrary to international law, referenced relevant International Court of Justice advisory opinions and called for the cessation of settlement activities.

⁴⁵ Address by Minister Mauro Vieira on the occasion of the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting – Johannesburg, February 20th and 21st, 2025, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 20 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs/speeches/mauro-vieira-2023/address-by-minister-mauro-vieira-on-the-occasion-of-the-g20-foreign-ministers-meeting-johannesburg-february-20th-and-21st-2025>

⁴⁶ Israeli military operations in Palestinian refugee camps, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 23 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/israeli-military-operations-in-palestinian-refugee-camps>

⁴⁷ Discurso da Sra. Secretária-Geral no Jantar de Iftar – Conselho de Cooperação do Golfo - 12/03/2025, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 12 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas/secretaria-geral/discursos/maria-laura-da-rocha-2023/discurso-da-sra-secretaria-geral-no-jantar-de-iftar-2013-conselho-de-cooperacao-do-golfo-12-03-2025>

⁴⁸ Comunicado Conjunto - V Reunião do Mecanismo de Consultas Políticas Bilaterais Brasil-Palestina, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 17 March 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/comunicado-conjunto-v-reuniao-do-mecanismo-de-consultas-politicas-bilaterais-brasil-palestina

⁴⁹ Human Rights Council Resolution: Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (A/HRC/RES/58/27), United Nations The Question of Palestine (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-resolution-right-of-the-palestinian-people-to-self-determination-a-hrc-res-58-27/>

⁵⁰ Human Rights Council Adopted Resolution: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan (A/HRC/RES/58/28), United Nations The Question of Palestine. (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-adopted-resolution-israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory-including-east-jerusalem-and-in-the-occupied-syrian-golan-a-hrc-res-58-28/>

Brazil's vote reflected its position in support of the resolution's provisions and its broader approach to issues concerning the status of the territories.

On 24 April 2025, President Lula and Chilean President Gabriel Boric issued a joint statement supporting a two-state solution in line with established UN resolutions as well as the admission of the State of Palestine as a UN member state.⁵¹

On 28 April 2025, Minister Vieira spoke at the BRICS Foreign Ministers Meeting, reiterating Brazil's commitment to a two-state solution with an independent, viable Palestinian state along the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital, living side by side with Israel in peace and security.⁵²

On 29 April 2025, Brazil issued the Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of BRICS Member Countries as BRICS Chair.⁵³ The Statement reiterated the BRICS Members' commitment to a two-state solution that includes relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative, with an independent and viable Palestinian State living side by side with Israel, in peace and security, within the 1967 borders.

Brazil has fully complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Many of Brazil's initiatives constitute weak actions, as they are generally verbal statements, vague affirmations of support and diplomatic dialogues on supporting the two-state solution based on international law, supporting the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations and supporting the recognition, without clear mechanisms for the advancement of the outlined objectives. However, Brazil's affirmative votes in the UNGA resolutions A/RES/79/81 and A/RES/79/82 are strong actions supportive of the two-state solution based on international law and in line with the recognition of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Benjamin Feng

China: 0

China has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

⁵¹ Declaração Conjunta por ocasião da Visita de Estado do Presidente do Chile, Gabriel Boric, ao Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 24 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-conjunta-por-ocasio-da-visita-de-estado-do-presidente-do-chile-gabriel-boric-ao-brasil

⁵² Discurso do Ministro Mauro Vieira por ocasião da Reunião de Ministros das Relações Exteriores do BRICS – Rio de Janeiro, 28 de abril de 2025, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Rio de Janeiro) 28 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/discorso-do-ministro-mauro-vieira-por-ocasio-da-reuniao-de-ministros-de-relacoes-exteriores-do-brics-2013-rio-de-janeiro-28-de-abril-de-2025

⁵³ Declaração da Presidência da Reunião de Ministros das Relações Exteriores dos Países Membros do BRICS, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Rio de Janeiro) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-da-presidencia-da-reuniao-de-ministros-das-relacoes-exteriores-relacoes-internacionais-dos-paises-membros-do-brics

On 26 November 2024, President Xi Jinping delivered a congratulatory message at the UN commemorative meeting for the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.⁵⁴ President Xi noted the fundamental implementation of a two-state solution which would establish an independent and sovereign Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital and stressed China's support for Palestine in its bid for full UN membership.

On 3 December 2024, China voted in favor of the UNGAs resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.⁵⁵

On 3 December 2024, China voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).⁵⁶ This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

On 11 December 2024, Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Fu Cong emphasized the importance of upholding international law and utmost urgency in revitalizing the two-state solution for Palestine and Israel at the Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly.⁵⁷ Ambassador Fu declared the two-state solution as the only way to achieve peace for both nations. Ambassador Fu further urged the rejection of any unilateral measures that would erode the foundation of the two-state solution and expressed support for Palestine's full membership in the UN.

On 17 December 2024, China voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.⁵⁸ By supporting this resolution, China continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 7 February 2025, Vice-Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong reaffirmed China's support for Palestinian sovereignty and territorial governance during a meeting with diplomatic envoys of Arab countries to China.⁵⁹ Minister Chen affirmed Gaza's status as an inalienable part of Palestinian territory and offered support for the Palestinian National Authority in governing all Palestinian territories. Minister Chen also reiterated support for the realization of the two-state solution and the establishment of an independent and sovereign State of Palestine based on the 1967 border with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On 18 February 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi called for renewed focus on the two-state solution at the UN Security Council meeting Practicing Multilateralism, Reforming and Improving Global Governance.⁶⁰ Minister Wang emphasized that the unresolved Palestinian question remains central to the Gaza conflict and stressed how the two-state solution has only been partially implemented. Minister Wang reaffirmed the importance of an independent State of Palestine based on the 1967 borders and critically called upon all

⁵⁴ 习近平向“声援巴勒斯坦人民国际日”纪念大会致贺电, 共产党员网 (Beijing) 27 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.12371.cn/2024/11/27/ART11732673257142728.shtml>

⁵⁵ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

⁵⁶ Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

⁵⁷ Remarks by China's Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Fu Cong at the UN General Assembly Emergency Special Session on the Question of Palestine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 11 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zwbdt/202412/t20241218_11501358.html

⁵⁸ The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

⁵⁹ Gaza Belongs to the Palestinian People, China Says, China Daily (Beijing) 7 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202502/07/WS67a5ee25a310a2ab06eaac94.html>

⁶⁰ Wang Yi on China's Position on the Gaza Conflict, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 19 February 2025. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjzbhd/202502/t20250219_11558899.html

UN parties to accelerate the advancement of the two-state solution, establish an independent State of Palestine and admit Palestine as a full UN member. This action reaffirms China's commitment to supporting Palestine's UN membership and statehood.

On 5 March 2025, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian expressed China's support for a post-war governance plan for Gaza that is recognized by the Palestinian people and agreed upon by the Arab countries.⁶¹ Spokesperson Jian outlined that the governance should uphold the principle of self-governance for Palestinians, align with the two-state solution and promote the peaceful coexistence and shared development between Palestine and Israel.

On 7 March 2025, Minister Yi called for adherence to the self-governance principle of "the Palestinians governing Palestine" and support for the reconstruction effort in Gaza.⁶² He reiterated China's dedication to justice and development in the Middle East, supporting people's efforts to take their future into their own hands and work towards independent peace and revitalization.

On 16 March 2025, Ambassador to Egypt Liao Liqiang expressed China's support for the Gaza Strip reconstruction plan adopted by Egypt and other Arab nations.⁶³ He reiterated Foreign Minister Yi's statement that altering Gaza's status through force will lead to chaos rather than peace. Ambassador Liao also called upon the global community to uphold the principle of self-governance concerning the post-war governance of Gaza, in line with the two-state solution, to achieve the peaceful coexistence of Palestine and Israel and long-term regional stability.

On 19 March 2025, Permanent Representative to the UN Fu Cong expressed grave concerns regarding Israel's resumption of hostilities in Gaza during a UN Security Council briefing.⁶⁴ Representative Cong reiterated support for the two-state solution and named the entire West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as inseparable parts of the Palestinian state. He expressed support for the Gaza recovery and reconstruction, again emphasizing self-governance. Representative Cong further called on the international community to enhance efforts to advance the political process towards the two-state solution and restore peace in the Middle East. He concluded by urging the Security Council to take decisive action toward a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue.

On 21 March 2025, Representative Cong called for the implementation of the two-state solution for the question of Palestine and urged the international community to enhance efforts to promote the political process.⁶⁵ He expressed repeated support for self-governance in the Gaza recovery effort and condemned the forceful removal of Palestinians as well as attempts to annex Gaza or West Bank territories.

On 4 April 2025, China voted in favor of the Human Rights Council resolution 58/27 on the right of Palestinian people to self-determination during the Council's 58th session.⁶⁶ The Human Rights Council called for an immediate end to Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and affirmed

⁶¹ China supports Arab countries' efforts in promoting ceasefire in Gaza, says FM on Egypt's Gaza plan, Says FM on Egypt's Gaza Plan, Global Times (Beijing) 5 March 2025. Access Date: 4 July 2025. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202503/1329530.shtml>

⁶² China pledges to provide certainty as world grapples with turbulence, The State Council of The People's Republic of China (Beijing) 8 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202503/08/content_WS67cb7f03c6d0868f4e8f0967.html

⁶³ Envoy: Beijing backs plan to rebuild Gaza, China Daily (Beijing) 16 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202503/16/WS67d6de30a310c240449db09c.html>

⁶⁴ Chinese envoy to UN condemns Israel's latest attacks on Gaza, calls for permanent ceasefire, Global Times (Beijing) 19 March 2025. Access Date: 2 July 2025. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202503/1330412.shtml>

⁶⁵ 'Gaza Must Not Become a Battleground for Political Game,' says Chinese Envoy to UN, Global Times (Beijing) 22 March 2025. Access Date: 3 July 2025. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202503/1330623.shtml>

⁶⁶ Human Rights Council Resolution: Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (A/HRC/RES/58/27), United Nations The Question of Palestine (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-resolution-right-of-the-palestinian-people-to-self-determination-a-hrc-res-58-27/>

the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources for Palestinians. China's vote represents its recognition of Palestinian sovereignty and statehood.

On 4 April 2025, China voted in favor of Human Rights Council resolution 58/28, on Israeli settlement in the Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, during the Council's 58th session.⁶⁷ The resolution reaffirmed that the settlements are considered contrary to international law, referenced relevant International Court of Justice advisory opinions and called for the cessation of settlement activities. China's vote reflected its position in support of the resolution's provisions and its broader approach to issues concerning the status of the territories.

On 15 April 2025, the Group of Friends in Defense of the UN Charter, which China is a part of, issued a joint statement reiterating support for a two-state solution with the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict following its third meeting of national coordinators.⁶⁸

On 17 April 2025, China and Malaysia issued a joint statement announcing their opposition to the forced displacement of the people of Gaza and calling for an independent state of Palestine based on the two-state solution.⁶⁹ The two countries emphasized that Gaza is an integral part of the Palestinian territory and belongs to the Palestinian people. In their statement, both nations noted the importance of upholding Palestinian self-governance in Gaza's post-conflict governance and further called for Palestine's full membership in the United Nations.

China has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. China has undertaken weak but consistent action across all three commitment criteria, as they consist of verbal statements of support for Palestine's full membership in the United Nations during international meetings and dialogues as well as calls upon the international community to fully implement the two-state solution based on international law. China has also promoted the recognition of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with specific mention of Palestinian governance and territorial sovereignty, in addition to emphasizing the need for peaceful coexistence with Israel.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Max Wong

Egypt: 0

Egypt has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

⁶⁷ Human Rights Council Adopted Resolution: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan (A/HRC/RES/58/28), United Nations The Question of Palestine. (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-adopted-resolution-israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory-including-east-jerusalem-and-in-the-occupied-syrian-golan-a-hrc-res-58-28/>

⁶⁸ О третьей встрече национальных координаторов Группы друзей в защиту Устава ООН, иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 15 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2009284/

⁶⁹ China, Malaysia oppose forced displacement of Gaza people, China Daily (Kuala Lumpur) 17 April 2025. Access Date: 7 July 2025. <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202504/17/WS6800729da3104d9fd381ff25.html>

On 3 December 2024, Egypt voted in favor the UNGA resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.⁷⁰

On 3 December 2024, Egypt voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).⁷¹ This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

On 17 December 2024, Egypt voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.⁷² By supporting this resolution, Egypt continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 16 January 2025, President Abdel Fattah El Sisi met United Arab Emirates President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi to discuss bilateral relations.⁷³ The two leaders welcomed the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, reaffirming the urgency of delivering humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip and their commitment to pursuing efforts for a two-state solution and a comprehensive, lasting peace in the region.

On 23 January 2025, Egyptian Ambassador to Ramallah Ihab Soliman met with Palestinian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Mustafa.⁷⁴ Ambassador Soliman stressed Egypt's steadfast position in support of the Palestinian people and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with relevant international resolutions. This action shows Egypt's support for Palestinian statehood in line with international law.

On 4 February 2025, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan issued a joint statement supporting the sovereign rights of Palestine and rejecting any infringement upon the inalienable territorial rights of the Palestinian people.⁷⁵ Both countries reiterated their commitment toward achieving a just and lasting peace between Palestine and Israel based on international law, UN resolutions and the two-state solution, with emphasis on the establishment of a Palestinian State along the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On 6 February 2025, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly, during a meeting with Palestinian Prime Minister Mustafa, reaffirmed Egypt's commitment to Gaza's reconstruction and support for the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and an independent state, with East Jerusalem as its capital.⁷⁶ Prime Minister Madbouly also reiterated Egypt's strong rejection of all proposals to displace Palestinians from Gaza and

⁷⁰ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

⁷¹ Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

⁷² The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

⁷³ UAE and Egypt welcome Gaza ceasefire, emphasise humanitarian aid and peace efforts, Gulf News (Abu Dhabi) 16 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-and-egypt-welcome-gaza-ceasefire-emphasise-humanitarian-aid-and-peace-efforts-1.500017573>

⁷⁴ سفیر مصر في رام الله يلتقي برئيس الوزراء وزير الخارجية, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cairo) 23 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <https://www.mfa.gov.eg/ar/Ministers/Details/MissionsNews/1193>

⁷⁵ Joint Statement Between the Foreign Ministers of Türkiye and Egypt, 4 February 2025, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ankara) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 18 June 2025. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-between-the-foreign-ministers-of-turkiye-and-egypt.en.mfa>

⁷⁶ Egypt reaffirms commitment to Palestinian rights, Gaza reconstruction: Madbouly to Palestinian PM, Daily News Egypt (Cairo) 6 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.dailynewsegyp.com/2025/02/06/egypt-reaffirms-commitment-to-palestinian-rights-gaza-reconstruction-madbouly-to-palestinian-pm/>

commitment toward advancing Palestinian interests with the ultimate goal of establishing a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.

On 8 February 2025, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement alongside other Arab countries denouncing the Israeli Prime Minister's proposal to establish a Palestinian state in Saudi Arabia as a violation of international law and Palestinian sovereignty.⁷⁷ Egypt further emphasized protection for Palestinian sovereignty.

On 26 February 2025, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Tamim Khalaf confirmed Egypt's firm rejection of any proposals regarding its administration of the Gaza Strip.⁷⁸ Spokesperson Khalaf emphasized the Egyptian position on addressing the core of the conflict as constituting Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories and the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state.

On 3 March 2025, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Abu Bakr Hefny Mahmoud met with Director of the European Commission's Middle East, North Africa and Gulf Department Stefano Sannino in Cairo.⁷⁹ Egypt stressed the need to reach a permanent and just political solution to the Palestinian issue, asserting the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as the only path to achieving regional peace.

On 4 March 2025, Egypt reiterated at the Extraordinary Arab Summit the importance of establishing an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital and denounced the use of force and coercion in achieving peace.⁸⁰ Egypt also announced the development of a comprehensive and integrated plan for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in collaboration with the State of Palestine and international institution and urged for its adoption. Egypt cited this plan's purpose as safeguarding the Palestinian people's right to secure their enduring presence on their ancestral lands and assuring the establishment of a sovereign, viable, independent State of Palestine.

Egypt has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Egypt has undertaken consistent action, consisting of verbal statements, diplomatic collaboration with the Palestinian Authority, announcing the development of a comprehensive plan and affirmations of support for a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders. Egypt has affirmed the necessity of the two-state solution in advancing Palestinian interests and achieving regional peace but has not taken significant actions in advocating for full Palestinian membership in the UN.

Thus, Egypt receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Siya Duggal

Ethiopia: -1

Ethiopia has not complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition

⁷⁷ Arab countries decry Israeli premier's proposal to establish Palestinian state in Saudi Arabia, Anadolu Agency (Ankara) 9 February 2025. Access Date: 18 June 2025. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/arab-countries-decry-israeli-premier-s-proposal-to-establish-palestinian-state-in-saudi-arabia/3476070>

⁷⁸ Cairo Dismisses Lapid's Plan for Egyptian Control of Gaza, The Palestine Chronicle (Olympia) 26 February 2025. Access Date: 18 June 2025. <https://www.palestinechronicle.com/cairo-dismisses-lapids-plan-for-egyptian-control-of-gaza/>

⁷⁹ نائب وزير الخارجية يستقبل مدير إدارة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا والخليج بالمفوضية الأوروبية، Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cairo) 4 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <https://www.mfa.gov.eg/ar/Ministers/Details/MinistryNews/1558>

⁸⁰ The Extraordinary Arab Summit, The Arab Republic of Egypt: Presidency (Cairo) 4 March 2025. Access Date: 3 July 2025. <https://www.presidency.eg/en/الرئاسة/خطب-الرئيس/speeches432025/>

and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On 3 December 2024, Ethiopia voted in favor the UNGA resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.⁸¹

On 3 December 2024, Ethiopia voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).⁸² This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

On 17 December 2024, Ethiopia voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.⁸³ By supporting this resolution, Ethiopia continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 19 December 2024, Ethiopia voted in favor of the resolution affirming the permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources during a UN General Assembly session.⁸⁴ With this vote, Ethiopia reaffirms its commitment to the rights and sovereignty of the Palestinian people.

On 4 April 2025, Ethiopia voted against the Human Rights Council resolution 58/27 on the right of Palestinian people to self-determination during the Council's 58th session.⁸⁵ While the Human Rights Council called for an immediate end to Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and affirmed the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources for Palestinians, Ethiopia's contrary vote represents a failure to recognize Palestinian sovereignty and statehood.

On 4 April 2025, Ethiopia also voted against the Human Rights Council resolution 58/28, on Israeli settlement in the Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, during the Council's 58th session.⁸⁶ The resolution reaffirmed that the settlements are considered contrary to international law and Ethiopia's vote against highlights its opposition of the cessation of settlement activities in Palestine by Israel.

Ethiopia has not complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Ethiopia has showed some support for an independent and viable Palestinian State along 1967 borders through votes of

⁸¹ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

⁸² Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

⁸³ The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

⁸⁴ Permanent Sovereignty of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab Population in the Occupied Syrian Golan over their Natural Resources: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 19 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069882?ln=en>

⁸⁵ Human Rights Council Resolution: Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (A/HRC/RES/58/27), United Nations The Question of Palestine (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-resolution-right-of-the-palestinian-people-to-self-determination-a-hrc-res-58-27/>

⁸⁶ Human Rights Council Adopted Resolution: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan (A/HRC/RES/58/28), United Nations The Question of Palestine. (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-adopted-resolution-israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory-including-east-jerusalem-and-in-the-occupied-syrian-golan-a-hrc-res-58-28/>

support for the rights of the Palestinian people which emphasize their sovereignty and self-determination. However, Ethiopia has also voted against reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, acting directly antithetical to the commitment of recognizing Palestinian statehood. Further, Ethiopia has not provided support for full Palestinian membership in the UN or for the two-state solution.

Thus, Ethiopia receives a score of -1 .

Analyst: Max Wong

India: 0

India has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On 29 November 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in a statement for the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, reaffirmed India's support for a negotiated two-state solution and the need for a sovereign, independent and viable Palestinian state existing in peace with Israel.⁸⁷

On 3 December 2024, India voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.⁸⁸

On 3 December 2024, India abstained the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).⁸⁹ This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

On 5 December 2024, Minister of External Affairs Kriti Vardhan Singh clarified in the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) of India's long-standing policy toward Palestine as one of support for a negotiated two-state solution and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine within secure and recognised borders.⁹⁰

On 10 December 2024, Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, during the 4th India–Bahrain High Joint Commission meeting, reiterated India's position supporting a two-state solution and the peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict in accordance with international law.⁹¹

On 13 December 2024, Minister Singh reiterated in response to a Lok Sabha question that India supports the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable Palestinian state within secure and recognised borders,

⁸⁷ India Calls for Immediate Ceasefire and Two-State Solution on Palestinian Solidarity Day, The Wire (New Delhi) 30 November 2024. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-calls-for-immediate-ceasefire-and-two-state-solution-on-palestinian-solidarity-day>

⁸⁸ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

⁸⁹ Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

⁹⁰ QUESTION NO-1195 INDIA'S POSITION IN UNITED NATIONS ON THE ISRAEL–PALESTINE CONFLICT, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 5 December 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/38685/QUESTION_NO1195_INDIA'S_POSITION_IN_UNITED_NATIONS_ON_THE_ISRAELPALESTINE_CONFLICT

⁹¹ External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar's Opening Statement at the 4th India–Bahrain High Joint Commission, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 10 December 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/38738/External_Affairs_Minister_Dr_S_Jaishankar's_Opening_Statement_at_the_4th_IndiaBahrain_High_Joint_Commission

living side by side with Israel.⁹² Minister Singh also reaffirmed India's support for full Palestinian membership in the UN.

On 17 December 2024, India voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.⁹³ By supporting this resolution, India continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 20 March 2025, Minister Singh reaffirmed in a Parliamentary Question and Answer Session India's support for a two-state solution and establishment of an independent and viable state of Palestine.⁹⁴ He added that India welcomed the January 2025 agreement on hostage release and ceasefire in Gaza and detailed ongoing diplomatic outreach by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in bilateral and multilateral forums.

India has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. India has reiterated its traditional support for the two-state solution; advocated for a sovereign, independent and viable Palestinian state within recognised borders; and supported pro-Palestine resolutions at the UN. However, India has not taken proactive diplomatic measures to advocate explicitly for Palestine's full UN membership or initiated notable multilateral actions beyond its voting record and verbal statements.

Thus, India receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Tarushi Sabni

Indonesia: -1

Indonesia has not complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On 3 December 2024, Indonesia voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.⁹⁵

On 3 December 2024, Indonesia voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).⁹⁶ This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

⁹² QUESTION NO-3200 INDIA'S STANCE ON PALESTINE ISSUE, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 13 December 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/38773/QUESTION_NO_3200_INDIA'S_STANCE_ON_PALESTINE_ISSUE

⁹³ The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

⁹⁴ QUESTION NO-2316 INDIA'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 20 March 2025. Access Date: 12 July 2025. <https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/39207/QUESTION+NO2316+INDIA'S+ROLE+IN+ADDRESSING+THE+ISRAELPALESTINE+CONFLICT>

⁹⁵ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

⁹⁶ Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

On 17 December 2024, Indonesia voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.⁹⁷ By supporting this resolution, Indonesia continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 10 January 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sugiono delivered a press statement reiterating Indonesia's unwavering diplomatic support for Palestinian self-determination and emphasizing the need for a ceasefire and an independent Palestinian state.⁹⁸

On 14 February 2025, Indonesia, as part of a joint Association of Southeast Asian Nations Foreign Ministers' Statement, reaffirmed its longstanding support for Palestinian self-determination and urged all international parties to engage in meaningful dialogue toward achieving a resolution of the conflict based on the two-state solution in accordance with international law and the relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions.⁹⁹

On 28 May 2025, President Prabowo Subianto, at a press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron, mentioned that Indonesia would be willing to establish diplomatic relations with Israel if it recognised a Palestinian state.¹⁰⁰ President Prabowo reiterated Indonesia's view of the two-state solution and the freedom of Palestine as the only way to achieve true peace.

On 4 April 2025, Indonesia voted in favor of the Human Rights Council resolution 58/27 on the right of Palestinian people to self-determination during the Council's 58th session.¹⁰¹ The Human Rights Council called for an immediate end to Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and affirmed the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources for Palestinians. Indonesia's vote represents its recognition of Palestinian sovereignty and statehood.

On 4 April 2025, Indonesia voted in favor of Human Rights Council resolution 58/28, on Israeli settlement in the Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, during the Council's 58th session.¹⁰² The resolution reaffirmed that the settlements are considered contrary to international law, referenced relevant International Court of Justice advisory opinions and called for the cessation of settlement activities. Indonesia's vote reflected its position in support of the resolution's provisions and its broader approach to issues concerning the status of the territories.

On 11 April 2025, President Prabowo emphasized the importance of the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state based on the two-state solution as a viable long-term approach for resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict.¹⁰³ He remarked that rights to safety and existence should be guaranteed for both states.

⁹⁷ The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitalibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

⁹⁸ Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono: Indonesia Will Never Leave Palestine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta) 10 January 2025. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://kemlu.go.id/berita/menlu-ri-sugiono-indonesia-tidak-akan-pernah-tinggalkan-palestina?type=publication>

⁹⁹ ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on the Rights of Palestinians to Self-Determination, ASEAN Secretariat (Jakarta) 12 February 2025. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://asean.org/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-rights-of-palestinians-to-self-determination/>

¹⁰⁰ Prabowo says ready to recognise Israel if Palestinians get state, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta) 28 May 2025. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2025/05/28/prabowo-says-ready-to-recognise-israel-if-palestinians-get-state.html>

¹⁰¹ Human Rights Council Resolution: Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (A/HRC/RES/58/27), United Nations The Question of Palestine (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-resolution-right-of-the-palestinian-people-to-self-determination-a-hrc-res-58-27/>

¹⁰² Human Rights Council Adopted Resolution: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan (A/HRC/RES/58/28), United Nations The Question of Palestine. (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-adopted-resolution-israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory-including-east-jerusalem-and-in-the-occupied-syrian-golan-a-hrc-res-58-28/>

¹⁰³ Prabowo highlights Indonesia's initiatives for Palestine at ADF 2025, Antara News (Jakarta) 12 April 2025. Access Date: 12 July 2025. <https://en.antaranews.com/news/351449/prabowo-highlights-indonesias-initiatives-for-palestine-at-adf-2025>

On 29 April 2025, Indonesia's delegation led by Chargé d'Affaires Prabowo Hari participated in the UN Security Council open debate on "The Situation in the Middle East, including [on] the Palestinian Question."¹⁰⁴ The delegation reaffirmed its firm backing for a two-state solution grounded in UNSC and UNGA resolutions.

Indonesia has not complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Indonesia has issued vague diplomatic statements supporting a two-state solution based on international law and an independent Palestinian state. While it has made limited symbolic diplomatic statements in support of a two-state solution and Palestinian statehood, it has failed to take tangible actions to support any of the three outlined criteria: Palestine's full UN membership, the two-state solution and relevant international law and the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the June 1967 borders.

Thus, Indonesia receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Tarushi Sabni

Iran: -1

Iran has not complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On 3 December 2024, Iran voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.¹⁰⁵

On 3 December 2024, Iran voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).¹⁰⁶ This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

On 17 December 2024, Iran voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.¹⁰⁷ By supporting this resolution, Iran continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 9 February 2025, Iran joined Saudi Arabia in rejecting proposals calling for the displacement of the Palestinian people and urged Islamic countries to stand against the plans and protect Palestinian identity.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ 9907th meeting, United Nations Security Council (New York) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 12 July 2025.

[https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9907%20\(Resumption%201\)](https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9907%20(Resumption%201))

¹⁰⁵ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

¹⁰⁶ Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

¹⁰⁷ The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

¹⁰⁸ Iran, Saudi Arabia rejects proposal on displacing Palestinians, Hurriyet Daily News (Tehran) 9 February 2025. Access Date: 3 July 2025. <https://www.hurriyetydailynews.com/saudi-arabia-rejects-netanyahus-remarks-on-displacing-palestinians-205594>

On 8 March 2025, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi expressed Iran's preference for a one-state solution to the Gaza conflict at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.¹⁰⁹ Foreign Minister Araghchi proclaimed that the two-state solution "will not secure Palestinian rights" and emphasized support for the establishment of one state representing all the original inhabitants of Palestine. Iran also declared "uncompromising support" for Palestine's cause and called for Israel's expulsion from the UN.

On 15 April 2025, the Group of Friends in Defense of the UN Charter, which Iran is a part of, issued a joint statement reiterating support for a two-state solution with the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict following its third meeting of national coordinators.¹¹⁰

Iran has not complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Iran has not taken strong or weak action to support Palestinian UN membership or the creation of an independent and sovereign State of Palestine along 1967 borders. However, Iran has also acted contrary to the commitment by rejecting the two-state solution and the possibility that Palestine may live in peace with Israel on multiple occasions.

Thus, Iran receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Siya Duggal

Russia: 0

Russia has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On 28 October 2024, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov issued a statement to the press, following talks with Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Abdullah Ali Al-Yahya, emphasizing that a long-term settlement for the issue of Israel and Palestine may be achieved through a two-state solution which would establish a Palestinian state in accordance with UN decisions.¹¹¹ The statement reaffirms Russia's commitment to the two-state solution.

On 29 October 2024, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov met with General Secretary of the Palestinian People's Struggle Front Ahmed Majdalani, confirming Russia's unwavering support for the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹¹² This reflects Russia's ongoing diplomatic engagement with Palestinian organizations regarding the establishment of an independent State of Palestine.

¹⁰⁹ Iran rejects Arab plan, calls for one-state solution in Gaza conflict, The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem) 8 March 2025. Access Date: 3 July 2025. <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-845221>

¹¹⁰ О третьей встрече национальных координаторов Группы друзей в защиту Устава ООН, иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 15 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2009284/

¹¹¹ Выступление и ответы на вопросы СМИ Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова по итогам переговоров с Министром иностранных дел Государства Кувейт А.Аль-Яхьей, Москва, 28 октября 2024 года, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 28 October 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/1977706/

¹¹² О встрече спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с членом Исполкома ООП, Генеральным секретарем Фронта палестинской народной борьбы А.Мадждаляни, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 29 October 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1978127/

On 31 October 2024, Deputy Minister Bogdanov met once more with General Secretary Majdalani and discussed strengthening the international position of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to create a sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹¹³

On 8 November 2024, President Vladimir Putin stated during the plenary session of the Valdai International Discussion Club that Russia considers it necessary to implement all decisions of the UNSC and UNGA on Israel and Palestine to create two independent sovereign states.¹¹⁴

On 15 November 2024, Minister Lavrov held talks with United Arab Emirates Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and took part in the 15th Sir Bani Yas International Forum on Peace and Security.¹¹⁵ During the talks, the ministers called for the earliest possible resumption of a negotiation process to create an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders in accordance with international law. The statement reflects attempts by Russia to advance objectives concerning Palestinian statehood.

On 25 November 2024, Russia reiterated during the 9794th meeting of the UNSC that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations should be based solely on a two-state solution that envisions an independent, sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹¹⁶ The statement reflects Russia's support for the two-state solution during the dialogue of important international bodies.

On 2 December 2024, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Vershinin attended the International Ministerial Conference on the Humanitarian Situation in the Gaza Strip, which discussed the creation of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹¹⁷ In his speech, Minister Vershinin emphasized the lack of an alternative to a two-state solution for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the importance of protecting Palestinian rights and supporting the mandates of relevant UN structures.

On 3 December 2024, Russia voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.¹¹⁸

On 3 December 2024, Russia abstained from the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).¹¹⁹ This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

¹¹³ О встрече спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с членом Исполкома ООП, Генеральным секретарем Фронта палестинской народной борьбы А.Мадждалани, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 31 October 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1978631/

¹¹⁴ Russia believes all UN decisions on Israel, Palestine must be implemented – Putin, TASS Russian News Agency (Moscow) 7 November 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://tass.com/politics/1869351>

¹¹⁵ О рабочем визите Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В.Лаврова в Объединенные Арабские Эмираты, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 15 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/vizity-ministra/1981852/

¹¹⁶ 9794th meeting, United Nations Security Council (New York) 25 November 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025.

<https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9794>

¹¹⁷ Об участии заместителя Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Вершинина в Международной министерской конференции по гуманитарной ситуации в секторе Газа, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 3 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025.

https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1985024/

¹¹⁸ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

¹¹⁹ Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

On 6 December 2024, Deputy Minister Bogdanov met with Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Politburo Mousa Abu-Marzouk, emphasizing Russia's support for the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹²⁰

On 17 December 2024, Russia voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.¹²¹ By supporting this resolution, Russia continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 19 December 2024, President Putin reaffirmed during a press conference that the Palestinian problem can only be solved by the two-state solution set forth by the UN Security Council.¹²²

On 3 January 2025, Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN Vassily Nebenzia, during the 9830th meeting of the UNSC, reiterated Russia's firm support for a Palestinian state within 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, as the exclusive path toward achieving sustainable peace in the region.¹²³

On 16 January 2025, Deputy Minister Bogdanov reaffirmed during a telephone conversation with the leadership of Hamas the importance of resuming substantive work aimed at the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹²⁴

On 16 January 2025, Spokeswoman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova delivered a briefing lauding Israel-Hamas hostage exchange agreements as a practical step towards the goal of creating an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹²⁵

On 17 January 2025, President Putin issued a statement on the comprehensive settlement of the Israeli Palestinian conflict on a recognized international legal basis during a press conference following Russian-Iranian talks.¹²⁶ President Putin emphasized the creation of an independent Palestinian state existing in peace and security with Israel.

¹²⁰ О встрече спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с заместителем Председателя Политбюро палестинского движения ХАМАС М.Абу-Марзуком, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 6 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1986083/

¹²¹ The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

¹²² Путин рассказал о позиции России по палестино-израильскому конфликту, РИА Новости (Moscow) 19 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://ria.ru/20241219/putin-1990175352.html>

¹²³ 9830th meeting, United Nations Security Council (New York) 3 January 2025. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9830>

¹²⁴ О телефонных разговорах спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с руководством палестинского движения ХАМАС, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 16 January 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1991767/

¹²⁵ Брифинг официального представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой, Москва, 16 января 2025 года, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 16 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1991801/

¹²⁶ Путин заявил о важности урегулирования палестино-израильского конфликта, РИА Новости (Moscow) 17 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://ria.ru/20250117/putin-1994289665.html>

On 21 January 2025, Deputy Minister Bogdanov, during a telephone conversation with the Secretary-General of the PLO's Executive Committee Hussein al-Sheikh, emphasized Palestinian unity as a prerequisite to creating an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.¹²⁷

On 24 January 2025, Deputy Minister Bogdanov similarly emphasized Palestinian unity as a prerequisite to creating an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders during a telephone conversation with General Secretary Majdalani.¹²⁸ These statements show how Russia's diplomatic objectives of Palestinian unity serve to advance the goal of Palestinian statehood.

On 31 January 2025, representative Zakharova delivered a briefing reiterating Russian support for the political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on an internationally recognized legal basis.¹²⁹ Spokeswoman Zakharova emphasized the creation of an independent Palestine within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital as the ultimate goal. The statement reflects Russia's public position in support of Palestinian statehood.

On 1 February 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to the Israeli Knesset's ban on the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), issued a press release advocating for the continuance of the UNRWA until an independent, sovereign Palestinian State within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital is created.¹³⁰ Russia also condemned Israel's failure to extend sovereignty to Palestine.

On 3 February 2025, Minister Bogdanov, during a meeting with Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Politburo Abu-Marzouk, again emphasized Palestinian unity as a prerequisite to creating an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹³¹

On 4 February 2025, Minister Bogdanov, during a meeting with General Secretary Majdalani, reconfirmed Russia's support for the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹³²

¹²⁷ О телефонном разговоре спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с секретарем Исполкома Организации освобождения Палестины (ООП), членом ЦК ФАТХ Х.Шейхом, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 21 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1992368/

¹²⁸ О телефонном разговоре спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с членом Исполкома ООП, Генеральным секретарем Фронта палестинской народной борьбы А.Мадждальяни, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 24 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1992877/

¹²⁹ Брифинг официального представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой, Саранск, 31 января 2025 года, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 31 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1993990/

¹³⁰ О запрете деятельности Ближневосточного агентства ООН для помощи палестинским беженцам и организации работ (БАПОР), Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 1 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1994068/

¹³¹ О встрече спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с заместителем Председателя Политбюро ХАМАС М.Абу-Марзуком, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 3 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1994330/

¹³² О встрече спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с членом Исполкома ООП, Генеральным секретарем Фронта палестинской народной борьбы А.Мадждальяни, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 4 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1994553/

On 4 February 2025, Minister Bogdanov, during a meeting with General Secretary of the Palestinian National Initiative Mustafa Barghouti, reconfirmed Russia's continued support for the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹³³

On 4 February 2025, Minister Lavrov gave a speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club stating that the creation of a Palestinian state would be the key to solving numerous problems in the Middle East.¹³⁴ The statement reflects Russia's commitment to Palestinian statehood and the two-state solution for resolving instability in the Middle East.

On 5 February 2025, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, in response to U.S. President Trump's Gaza Strip ownership proposal, reiterated that a two-state solution is the only possible option.¹³⁵ The statement reflects diplomatic pushback by Russia against attempts to undermine the two-state solution.

On 20 February 2025, Minister Lavrov gave a speech at the G20 Foreign Ministerial Council, emphasizing that the resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict is only possible based on a two-state solution and the creation of an independent Palestine.¹³⁶

On 24 February 2025, Minister Lavrov and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan gave a speech during a joint press conference, stating their discussion on measures necessary to resume negotiations based on UNSC resolutions which provide for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.¹³⁷ The bilateral dialogue reflects attempts by Russia to work with other countries to advance the objectives of Palestinian statehood.

On 25 February 2025, Russia advocated for a swift resumption of the peace process on the internationally recognized and legal basis of the establishment of two states during the 9868th meeting of the UNSC.¹³⁸ Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Alekseyevich Nebenzia emphasized the importance of a sovereign Palestinian state for preventing further violence in the Middle East.

On 28 February 2025, Deputy Minister Bogdanov, during a telephone conversation with PLO Secretary al-Sheikh, noted the importance of the upcoming emergency summit of the League of Arab States, which would

¹³³ О встрече спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с председателем движения «Палестинская национальная инициатива» М.Баргути, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 4 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1994525/

¹³⁴ Выступление Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова на XIV Ближневосточной конференции «на полях» Международного дискуссионного клуба «Валдай», Москва, 4 февраля 2025 года, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 4 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1994459/

¹³⁵ Global Reaction to Trump's Gaza Strip takeover proposal, Reuters (London) 5 February 2025. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/trumps-call-us-take-over-gaza-draws-criticism-2025-02-05/>

¹³⁶ Выступление Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В.Лаврова на СМИД «Группы двадцати» на тему «Глобальная геополитическая ситуация», Йоханнесбург, 20 февраля 2025 года, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 20 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/1998882/

¹³⁷ Выступление и ответы на вопросы СМИ Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В.Лаврова в ходе совместной пресс-конференции с Министром иностранных дел Турецкой Республики Х.Фиданом, Анкара, 24 февраля 2025 года, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 24 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/1999535/

¹³⁸ 9868th meeting, United Nations Security Council (New York) 25 February 2025. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9868>

be devoted to the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹³⁹

On 6 March 2025, Spokesperson Zakharova reiterated during a press briefing that any Israel-Palestine peace settlement must be based on international law and make way for a two-state solution.¹⁴⁰ She reaffirmed the necessity of creating an independent, sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Spokeswoman Zakharova also reaffirmed Russia's willingness to engage in consolidated diplomatic efforts at conflict resolution and cooperation to advance peace in the Middle East.

On 16 March 2025, Deputy Minister Bogdanov held talks with Hamas officials, during which he reiterated Russia's support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹⁴¹

On 18 March 2025, First Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Dmitry Polyanskiy, during the 9881st UNSC meeting, reiterated Russia's staunch support for the two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital for ending the violence in the Middle East.¹⁴² He also declared that the Palestinian people to be given an opportunity to establish their own State, emphasizing Palestinian self-determination.

On 18 March 2025, Deputy Minister Bogdanov emphasized, during a telephone conversation with PLO Secretary al-Sheikh, the need to establish negotiations for the creation of an independent state of Palestine within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, living in peace and security with Israel.¹⁴³

On 20 March 2025, First Deputy Polyanskiy highlighted the necessity of resuming Israel-Palestine negotiations to achieve the goal of an independent Palestinian State within the 1967 borders during the 9882nd UNSC meeting.¹⁴⁴ First Deputy Polyanskiy also voiced Russia's readiness to cooperate with members of the UNSC to further this objective.

On 3 April 2025, Deputy Minister Bogdanov reiterated Russia's firm belief in the two-state solution for the Palestine-Israel conflict and the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders during a meeting with President of the US/Middle East Project Daniel Levy.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁹ О телефонном разговоре спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с секретарем Исполкома Организации освобождения Палестины (ООП), членом ЦК ФАТХ Х.Шейхом, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 28 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025.

https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2000720/

¹⁴⁰ Брифинг официального представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой, Москва, 6 марта 2025 года, иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 6 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025.

https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/briefings/2001793/

¹⁴¹ Russian envoy in conversation with Hamas urges release of Donbass native Kharkin, TASS Russian News Agency (Moscow) 16 March 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://tass.com/politics/1928991>

¹⁴² 9881st meeting, United Nations Security Council (New York) 18 March 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025.

<https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9881>

¹⁴³ О телефонном разговоре спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с секретарем Исполкома Организации освобождения Палестины (ООП), членом ЦК ФАТХ Х.Шейхом, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 19 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025.

https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2003903/

¹⁴⁴ 9882nd meeting, United Nations Security Council (New York) 20 March 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025.

<https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9882>

¹⁴⁵ О встрече спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с президентом аналитического центра «США/Ближневосточный проект» Д.Леви, иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 3 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2007027/

On 3 April 2025, First Deputy Polyanskiy reaffirmed Russia's commitment to a two-state solution during the 9891st UNSC meeting. First Deputy Polyanskiy reiterated Russia's support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital in line with previously internationally recognized legal decisions.¹⁴⁶

On 15 April 2025, the Group of Friends in Defense of the UN Charter, which Russia is a part of, issued a joint statement reiterating support for a two-state solution with the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict following its third meeting of national coordinators.¹⁴⁷

On 17 April 2025, President Putin reiterated that the two-state solution and the creation of an independent Palestinian State within the 1967 borders were necessary for the long-term peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict during talks with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.¹⁴⁸

On 20 April 2025, Deputy Minister Bogdanov, during a telephone conversation with General Secretary Majdalani, reiterated that Palestinian national unity under the PLO political platform was essential for realizing a two-state solution encompassing an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders in peaceful coexistence with Israel.¹⁴⁹

On 23 April 2025, Minister Lavrov, speaking during a press conference following his visit to Uzbekistan, called for greater efforts to address the root cause of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which he deemed to be insufficient action towards the implementation of UN resolutions regarding the creation of a Palestinian state.¹⁵⁰

On 29 April 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a media release calling for Israel and Palestine to commence direct negotiations to further the two-state solution in line with UNSC resolutions.¹⁵¹ The media release also indicated Russia's willingness to contribute diplomatically to realize this goal.

On 30 April 2025, Director Maxim Musikhin of the Foreign Ministry's Legal Department, addressing hearings on Israel at the International Court of Justice, reaffirmed Russian support for any Israel-Palestine peace negotiation grounded in internationally recognized legal frameworks that include the two-state solution.¹⁵²

Russia has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. By voting in favour of UNGA resolution A/RES/79/81, Russia has taken strong action towards advancing the two-state solution based on international law and recognition of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state along the

¹⁴⁶ 9891st meeting, United Nations Security Council (New York) 3 April 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9891>

¹⁴⁷ О третьей встрече национальных координаторов Группы друзей в защиту Устава ООН, иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 15 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2009284/

¹⁴⁸ Russia-Qatar talks, President of Russia (Moscow) 17 April 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76702>

¹⁴⁹ О телефонном разговоре спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации по Ближнему Востоку и странам Африки, заместителя Министра иностранных дел России М.Л.Богданова с членом Исполкома ООП, Генеральным секретарем Фронта палестинской народной борьбы А.Мадждаляни, иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 21 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2010410/

¹⁵⁰ Выступление и ответы на вопросы СМИ Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В.Лаврова в ходе пресс-конференции по итогам визита в Республику Узбекистан, Самарканд, 23 апреля 2025 года, иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 23 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2011037/

¹⁵¹ К ситуации в Палестине, иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 29 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2012388/

¹⁵² Russia calls for immediate launch of talks between Israel, Palestine — MFA, TASS Russian News Agency (The Hague) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://tass.com/politics/1951669>

1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Russia has also taken a large number of weak actions in the form of general verbal statements, vague affirmations of support and diplomatic dialogues with Palestinian organizations without the clear advancement of the commitment's outlined objectives. Furthermore, Russia failed to take action in support of the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations.

Thus, Russia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Benjamin Feng

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On 13 November 2024, South Africa denounced a statement attributed to Israeli Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich ordering preparations for the annexation of the occupied West Bank.¹⁵³ South Africa reaffirmed UNSC Resolution 2334 that states Israeli settlement activity as a violation of international law¹⁵⁴ and called for concrete action to revive a political process leading to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state in compliance with UN resolutions and international law.

On 18 November 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa attended Working Session II of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.¹⁵⁵ In his statement, President Ramaphosa claimed the people of Palestine have been denied their right to self-determination, encouraging members of the G20 to call for an end to the violence in Gaza and peace between Israelis and Palestinians in accordance with international law.

On 25 November 2024, the South African government commemorated the 47th United Nations International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, reaffirming the need for the two-state solution and a fully independent Palestinian State within internationally recognized parameters.¹⁵⁶ South Africa renewed their commitment to a just and lasting solution to Palestine and support for an independent Palestinian State.

On 3 December 2024, South Africa voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.¹⁵⁷

On 3 December 2024, South Africa voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).¹⁵⁸ This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the

¹⁵³ Condemnation of Israeli Government's annexation orders for the West Bank, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (Pretoria) 13 November 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2024. <https://dirco.gov.za/condemnation-of-israeli-governments-annexation-orders-for-the-west-bank/>

¹⁵⁴ Resolution 2334 (2016), United Nations Security Council (New York) 23 December 2016. Access Date: 29 Jun 2025. <https://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/SRES2334-2016.pdf>

¹⁵⁵ President Cyril Ramaphosa Delivers South Africa's Statement on Working Session II: Reform of Global Governance Institutions G20 Leaders' Summit, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, The Presidency of South Africa (Pretoria) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2024. <https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/president-cyril-ramaphosa-delivers-south-africas-statement-working-session-ii-reform-global>

¹⁵⁶ Statement by the Government of South Africa on the Commemoration of the 47th United Nations International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (Pretoria) 25 November 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2024. <https://dirco.gov.za/statement-by-the-government-of-south-africa-on-the-commemoration-of-the-47th-united-nations-international-day-of-solidarity-with-the-palestinian-people/>

¹⁵⁷ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

¹⁵⁸ Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

On 6 December 2024, President Ramaphosa offered remarks at the South Africa-Algeria Bi-National Commission, calling for the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Palestine, delivery of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip and realization of the Palestinian people's right to statehood.¹⁵⁹ He concluded with the shared understanding between South Africa and Algeria that the only lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is self-determination for the Palestinian people.¹⁶⁰

On 6 December 2024, President Ramaphosa gave an address during his visit to the Parliament of Algeria, declaring South Africa's firm support for Palestinian self-determination.¹⁶¹ President Ramaphosa also called for an end to the denial of humanitarian aid, the cessation of hostilities and for Israel to be held accountable for crimes against the people of Gaza.

On 17 December 2024, South Africa voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.¹⁶² By supporting this resolution, South Africa continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 15 January 2025, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation welcomed the ceasefire agreement reached between Israel and Hamas.¹⁶³ South Africa stated that the ceasefire must lay the basis for a just peace, which includes the establishment of a contiguous, independent and viable Palestinian State.

On 31 January 2025, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Alvin Botes attended a summit of foreign ministers convened by Progressive International to discuss a united response to the government of Israel's alleged violations of international law.¹⁶⁴ Botes affirmed that South Africa would do everything within its power to preserve the existence of the Palestinian people, end all alleged acts of apartheid and genocide against the Palestinian people and support their right to self-determination.

On 20 February 2025, President Ramaphosa attended the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa. During his remarks, President Ramaphosa reiterated South Africa's support for the ceasefire

¹⁵⁹ Opening Remarks by President Ramaphosa at the SA-Algeria Binational Commission during the State Visit to Algeria, The Presidency of South Africa (Pretoria) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/opening-remarks-president-ramaphosa-sa-algeria-binational-commission-during-state-visit-algeria>

¹⁶⁰ Press Briefing Remarks by President Ramaphosa on the Occasion of the State Visit to Algeria, The Presidency of South Africa (Pretoria) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-briefing-remarks-president-ramaphosa-occasion-state-visit-algeria>

¹⁶¹ President Cyril Ramaphosa is honoured with an address to the Parliament of Algeria, The Presidency of South Africa (Pretoria) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/president-cyril-ramaphosa-honoured-address-parliament-algeria>

¹⁶² The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

¹⁶³ International Relations and Cooperation welcomes ceasefire agreement reached between Israel and Hamas, Government of South Africa (Pretoria) 15 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/international-relations-and-coperation-welcomes-ceasefire-agreement-reached>

¹⁶⁴ Remarks by Deputy Minister Alvin Botes, High-Level Summit of Foreign Ministers convened by Progressive International, "A United Foreign Policy Response to Israel's Violations of International Law," The Hague, 31 January 2025, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (Pretoria) 31 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://dirco.gov.za/remarks-by-deputy-minister-alvin-botes-high-level-summit-of-foreign-ministers-convened-by-progressive-international-a-united-foreign-policy-response-to-israels-violations-of-intern/>

agreement reached between Israel and Hamas, declaring that it must lay the basis for peace under UN resolutions, international law and internationally agreed parameters.¹⁶⁵

On 5 March 2025, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation condemned Israeli military operations in the West Bank, claiming that they threaten Palestinian efforts to achieve self-determination and statehood.¹⁶⁶

On 4 April 2025, South Africa voted in favor of the Human Rights Council resolution 58/27 on the right of Palestinian people to self-determination during the Council's 58th session.¹⁶⁷ The Human Rights Council called for an immediate end to Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and affirmed the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources for Palestinians. South Africa's vote represents its recognition of Palestinian sovereignty and statehood.

On 4 April 2025, South Africa voted in favor of Human Rights Council resolution 58/28, on Israeli settlement in the Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, during the Council's 58th session.¹⁶⁸ The resolution reaffirmed that the settlements are considered contrary to international law, referenced relevant International Court of Justice advisory opinions and called for the cessation of settlement activities. South Africa's vote reflected its position in support of the resolution's provisions and its broader approach to issues concerning the status of the territories.

On 29 April 2025, Director-General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation Zane Dangor led South Africa's presentation of its International Court of Justice case against Israel for violations of human rights and international law.¹⁶⁹ While delivering the delegation's arguments, Director-General Dangor called for renewed efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict based on the two-state solution and urged the international community to uphold Palestinian sovereignty and human rights.

South Africa has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. South Africa has repeatedly and explicitly called for the initiation of a peace process leading to the establishment of a viable and independent State of Palestine based on the two-state solution and relevant UN resolutions, including initiating multilateral dialogue on the situation and engaged with the International Court of Justice to support the two-state solution. However, it has not expressed explicit support for Palestine's full membership in the UN.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Shane Joy

¹⁶⁵ Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa at the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, NASREC, Johannesburg, The Presidency of South Africa (Pretoria) 20 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/address-president-cyril-ramaphosa-g20-foreign-ministers-meeting-nasrec-johannesburg>

¹⁶⁶ South Africa condemns Israel's refusal to allow aid into Gaza and its ongoing military operations in the West Bank, Department of International Relations & Cooperation (Pretoria) 5 March 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://dirco.gov.za/south-africa-condemns-israels-refusal-to-allow-aid-into-gaza-and-its-ongoing-military-operations-in-the-west-bank/>

¹⁶⁷ Human Rights Council Resolution: Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (A/HRC/RES/58/27), United Nations The Question of Palestine (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-resolution-right-of-the-palestinian-people-to-self-determination-a-hrc-res-58-27/>

¹⁶⁸ Human Rights Council Adopted Resolution: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan (A/HRC/RES/58/28), United Nations The Question of Palestine. (New York) 4 April 2025. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-adopted-resolution-israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory-including-east-jerusalem-and-in-the-occupied-syrian-golan-a-hrc-res-58-28/>

¹⁶⁹ International Court of Justice: South Africa condemns Israel over Gaza 'killing field', the africa report (Paris) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 4 August 2024. <https://www.theafricareport.com/382619/international-court-of-justice-south-africa-condemns-israel-over-gaza-killing-field/>

United Arab Emirates: 0

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

On 29 October 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned the approval of two laws by the Parliament of Israel preventing United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from providing humanitarian assistance in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.¹⁷⁰ The Ministry emphasized the necessity of supporting international efforts to advance the peace process and ending practices undermining the two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

On 2 November 2024, His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, president of the UAE, held a call with the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to discuss bilateral ties and explore ways to strengthen cooperation.¹⁷¹ During their call, Sheikh Mohamed and Emir Al Thani emphasized the importance of creating a fair, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East based on the two-state solution.

On 4 November 2024, Sheikh Mohamed hosted President of Slovenia Nataša Pirc Musar in Abu Dhabi.¹⁷² During their meeting, discussions extended to hostilities in the Middle East and both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to supporting a two-state solution as a foundation for peace.

On 10 November 2024, Sheikh Mohamed and Emir of Kuwait Mishal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah held bilateral discussions in Kuwait, underscoring the importance of international efforts to halt hostilities in Gaza and working towards a path for a comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution.¹⁷³

On 3 December 2024, the United Arab Emirates voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/RES/79/81), reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution under international law and based on pre-1967 borders.¹⁷⁴

On 3 December 2024, the United Arab Emirates voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat (A/RES/79/82).¹⁷⁵ This resolution requests the Secretary-General provide the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat with the required resources to fostering awareness of international laws and UN resolutions indicating the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders.

On 15 November 2024, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan held talks with Russian Minister Lavrov during the 15th Sir Bani Yas International Forum on Peace

¹⁷⁰ UAE condemns Israeli parliament's decision to ban UNRWA's activities, Gulf News (Abu Dhabi) 29 October 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-condemns-israeli-parliaments-decision-to-ban-unrwas-activities-1.1730228314154>

¹⁷¹ UAE President and Emir of Qatar discuss bilateral relations and regional developments, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 2 November 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2024/11/UAE-President-and-Emir-of-Qatar-discuss-bilateral-relations-and-regional-developments>

¹⁷² UAE and Slovenian Presidents discuss bilateral cooperation, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 4 November 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2024/11/UAE-and-Slovenian-Presidents-discuss-bilateral-cooperation>

¹⁷³ UAE President, Emir of Kuwait explore avenues to boost bilateral ties, Gulf News (Abu Dhabi) 10 November 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-president-emir-of-kuwait-explore-avenues-to-boost-bilateral-ties-1.104625763>

¹⁷⁴ Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068138?ln=en>

¹⁷⁵ Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 12 August 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4068137?ln=en>

and Security.¹⁷⁶ During the talks, the ministers called for the earliest possible resumption of a negotiation process to create an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders in accordance with international law.

On 18 November 2024, Brazil and the UAE issued a joint statement at the G20 Summit reaffirming their commitment to a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state while firmly rejecting all practices that go against international law and relevant UN resolutions concerning the Occupied Palestinian Territory.¹⁷⁷ The joint statement supports the establishment of a two-state solution based on international law.

On 20 November 2024, Sheikh Mohamed hosted King of Jordan Abdullah bin Hussein in Abu Dhabi to discuss bilateral cooperation.¹⁷⁸ Both leaders focused on the Middle East, underscoring the importance of achieving a ceasefire in Gaza and establishing a clear path towards a comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution.

On 1 December 2024, Sheikh Mohamed hosted Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in Abu Dhabi to discuss bilateral cooperation.¹⁷⁹ The two sides stressed the importance of pursuing a comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution.

On 3 December 2024, Sheikh Mohamed held a call with King Abdullah to discuss collaboration between the UAE and Jordan.¹⁸⁰ Both leaders underscored the importance of intensifying efforts to prevent the escalation of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and establishing a clear path to a comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution.

On 17 December 2024, the United Arab Emirates voted in favor of the resolution affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination during a UN General Assembly session.¹⁸¹ By supporting this resolution, United Arab Emirates continues its commitment to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, emphasizing the importance of their sovereignty and self-governance.

On 7 January 2025, Sheikh Abdullah hosted Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel Gideon Sa'ar in Abu Dhabi to discuss bilateral relations.¹⁸² Sheikh Abdullah emphasized the importance of resuming negotiations for achieving a comprehensive peace based on the two-state solution, the release of hostages and supporting Palestinian rights to self-determination.

¹⁷⁶ О рабочем визите Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В.Лаврова в Объединенные Арабские Эмираты, Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации (Moscow) 15 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/vizity-ministra/1981852/

¹⁷⁷ Comunicado conjunto Brasil - Emirados Árabes Unidos por ocasião da reunião de líderes do G20, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 27 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/comunicado-conjunto-brasil-emirados-arabes-unidos-por-ocasio-da-reuniao-de-lideres-do-g20

¹⁷⁸ UAE President and King of Jordan discuss bilateral ties and regional developments in Abu Dhabi, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2024/11/UAE-President-and-King-of-Jordan-discuss-bilateral-ties>

¹⁷⁹ UAE President, Saudi Crown Prince meet to discuss close bilateral ties, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 1 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2024/12/UAE-President-Saudi-Crown-Prince-meet-to-discuss-close-bilateral-ties>

¹⁸⁰ UAE President, King of Jordan discuss bilateral relations, regional developments, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2024/12/UAE-President-King-of-Jordan-discuss-bilateral-relations-regional-developments>

¹⁸¹ The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-determination: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly, United Nations Digital Library (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4069726?ln=en>

¹⁸² Abdullah bin Zayed receives Foreign Minister of Israel, Gulf News (Abu Dhabi) 7 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/bhkJ9rt-abdullah-bin-zayed-receives-foreign-minister-1.500012174>

On 16 January 2025, Sheikh Mohamed welcomed the announcement of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas.¹⁸³ He stressed the importance of ending practices that undermine the two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

On 16 January 2025, Sheikh Mohamed hosted President of Egypt Abdel Fattah El Sisi in Abu Dhabi to discuss bilateral relations.¹⁸⁴ The two leaders welcomed the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, reaffirming the urgency of delivering humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip and their commitment to pursuing efforts for a two-state solution and a comprehensive, lasting peace in the region.

On 20 January 2025, Sheikh Mohamed held a call with Prime Minister of the Netherlands Dick Schoof to discuss strategic cooperation.¹⁸⁵ The two leaders focused on developments in the Middle East, welcoming the ceasefire announcement in the Gaza Strip and emphasizing the importance of advancing a comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution.

On 4 February 2025, Sheikh Mohamed held a call with Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to discuss enhancing bilateral cooperation.¹⁸⁶ Reviewing international developments in the Middle East, both leaders emphasized the importance of joint efforts to secure lasting peace based on the two-state solution.

On 5 February 2025, Sheikh Mohamed reaffirmed the importance of resolving the conflict between Israel and Palestine and establishing an independent Palestinian state through the two-state solution.¹⁸⁷ Sheikh Mohamed called on the international community, the UN and the UNSC to fulfill their responsibilities to end practices allegedly in contravention of international law.

On 5 February 2025, Sheikh Mohamed held a call with King Abdullah to discuss bilateral cooperation, with particular focus on developments in the Middle East.¹⁸⁸ Both leaders stressed the need to pursue a comprehensive peace based on the two-state solution.

On 9 February 2025, Minister of State Khalifa Bin Shaheen Al Marar strongly condemned statements by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state in Saudi Arabia.¹⁸⁹ Minister Al Marar reiterated the UAE's view that regional stability can only be achieved through a two-state solution, which ensures the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

¹⁸³ UAE welcomes ceasefire announcement in Gaza, Gulf News (Abu Dhabi) 16 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-welcomes-ceasefire-announcement-in-gaza-1.500016812>

¹⁸⁴ UAE and Egypt welcome Gaza ceasefire, emphasise humanitarian aid and peace efforts, Gulf News (Abu Dhabi) 16 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-and-egypt-welcome-gaza-ceasefire-emphasise-humanitarian-aid-and-peace-efforts-1.500017573>

¹⁸⁵ UAE President, Dutch Prime Minister discuss bilateral cooperation, regional developments, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 20 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/01/UAE-President-Dutch-Prime-Minister-discuss-bilateral-cooperation>

¹⁸⁶ UAE President, Saudi Crown Prince discuss fraternal ties, regional developments, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/02/UAE-President-Saudi-Crown-Prince-discuss-fraternal-ties-regional-developments>

¹⁸⁷ UAE affirms unwavering position to safeguard Palestinian rights, Gulf News (Abu Dhabi) 5 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-affirms-unwavering-position-to-safeguard-palestinian-rights-1.500029591>

¹⁸⁸ UAE President and Jordanian King discuss bilateral ties and regional developments, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 5 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/02/UAE-President-and-Jordanian-King-discuss-bilateral-ties-and-regional-developments>

¹⁸⁹ UAE strongly condemns, denounces reprehensible and provocative Israeli statements against Saudi Arabia, Gulf News (Abu Dhabi) 9 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/15etgb5-uae-strongly-condemns-denounces-reprehensible-1.500031811>

On 11 February 2025, Sheikh Mohamed hosted Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif in Abu Dhabi.¹⁹⁰ During their meeting, both leaders emphasized the need for international efforts to encourage a comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution.

On 12 February 2025, Sheikh Mohamed hosted President of Iraq Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, to discuss enhancing cooperation.¹⁹¹ Both leaders emphasized the need for a comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution.

On 12 February 2025, Sheikh Mohamed held a call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss strengthening bilateral cooperation.¹⁹² President Al Nahyan underscored the importance of working toward a comprehensive peace in the region based on the two-state solution.

On 19 February 2025, Sheikh Mohamed hosted Secretary Rubio during a visit to the UAE.¹⁹³ President Al Nahyan reaffirmed the UAE's rejection of any attempts to displace the Palestinian people and underscored the importance of linking Gaza's reconstruction to achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution.

On 25 March 2025, Sheikh Mohamed held a phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump to discuss strengthening bilateral ties.¹⁹⁴ During the exchange, Sheikh Mohamed reiterated the UAE's support for the two-state solution as the foundation for peace and stability in the Middle East.

On 7 April 2025, Sheikh Abdullah hosted Israel's Minister Sa'ar to discuss bilateral relations between the UAE and Israel.¹⁹⁵ During the talks, Sheikh Abdullah emphasized the importance of resuming negotiations to achieve peace based on the two-state solution and the UAE's unwavering support for Palestinian self-determination.

On 20 April 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement condemning calls from an Israeli organization for the bombings of Al-Aqsa Mosque and threats against Christians in Jerusalem.¹⁹⁶ In the statement, the Ministry called on the international community to intensify efforts to achieve a two-state solution as the basis for peace and to fulfill the desire of the Palestinians for an independent and sovereign state legitimized by international law.

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with the commitment to support the State of Palestine's full membership in the United Nations, support the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative and support the recognition and establishment of

¹⁹⁰ UAE President, Pakistani Prime Minister discuss bilateral cooperation, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 11 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/02/UAE-President-Pakistani-Prime-Minister-discuss-bilateral-cooperation>

¹⁹¹ UAE Iraqi Presidents discuss bilateral relations, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 12 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/02/UAE-Iraqi-Presidents-discuss-bilateral-relations>

¹⁹² UAE President, US Secretary of State discuss bilateral relations, regional developments, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 12 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/02/UAE-President-US-Secretary-of-State-discuss-bilateral-relations-regional-developments>

¹⁹³ During meeting with US Secretary of State, UAE President reaffirms stance opposing displacement of Palestinian people, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 19 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/02/UAE-President-reaffirms-stance-opposing-displacement-of-Palestinian-people>

¹⁹⁴ UAE, US Presidents discuss strategic bilateral relations in phone call, President of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 25 March 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/03/UAE-US-Presidents-discuss-strategic-bilateral-relations-in-phone-call>

¹⁹⁵ Sheikh Abdullah, Israeli Foreign Minister discuss latest regional developments, Gulf News (Abu Dhabi) 7 April 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/15i7mgh-abdullah-bin-zayed-israeli-foreign-minister-1.500084797>

¹⁹⁶ الإمارات تدنن بأشد العبارات دعوات التحريض المتطرفة بتفجير المسجد الأقصى وارتكاب انتهاكات بحق المسيحيين في القدس (Abu Dhabi) 20 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://www.mofa.gov.ae/MediaHub/News/2025/4/20/20-4-2025-UAE-UAE>

a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. The UAE has explicitly and regularly declared support for the establishment of an independent and sovereign State of Palestine in accordance with the two-state solution, as well as condemning Israeli settler organizations. However, the UAE has not taken action to demonstrate its commitment outside of vague, formulaic statements and has not raised the issue of the State of Palestine's full membership in the UN.

Thus, the United Arab Emirates receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Shane Joy

2. Development: Enhancement of Capacity Building and Knowledge Exchange

“We support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals] and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs [emerging markets and developing countries].”

XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil			+1
China			+1
Egypt		0	
Ethiopia		0	
India		0	
Indonesia		0	
Iran		0	
Russia		0	
South Africa		0	
United Arab Emirates		0	
Average		+0.20 (60%)	

Background

Amid persistent global inequalities and the uneven progress toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs) continue to face barriers to financing critical infrastructure and development needs.¹⁹⁷ In response, BRICS members established the New Development Bank (NDB) to strengthen their collective ability to address shared challenges, such as food insecurity, climate vulnerability and underinvestment in social infrastructure, through South-South cooperation and targeted financing.¹⁹⁸ The NDB reflects BRICS’ broader ambition to create a more inclusive and representative international development architecture, one that empowers EMDCs to govern and finance their own priorities.¹⁹⁹ As reaffirmed at the 2024 Kazan Summit, BRICS leaders are committed to enhancing the Bank’s capacity, expanding its membership and positioning it as a premier multilateral development institution for the Global South.²⁰⁰

At the 2012 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders proposed the construction of the NDB.²⁰¹ The NDB aimed to mobilize financing for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS, emerging economies and developing countries. Leaders created a multilateral working group to analyze project feasibility.

¹⁹⁷ The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023: Special Edition, United Nations Statistics Division (New York) 10 July 2023. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2023.pdf>

¹⁹⁸ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto), 29 March 2012. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

¹⁹⁹ Eighth BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto), 16 October 2016. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

²⁰⁰ BRICS 2024 Kazan Summit: Commitment 79, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto), 24 October 2024. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/commitments>

²⁰¹ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

At the 2013 Durban Summit, BRICS leaders concluded on establishing the New Development Bank.²⁰² Leaders consolidated USD100 billion in funds to ensure an appropriate initial capital contribution.

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders signed an agreement to consolidate the NDB.²⁰³ The NDB's main objective was to strengthen multilateral cooperation and supplement international financial institutions in development goals. This was accompanied by comprehensive Articles of Agreement which included provisions detailing the bank's objectives and principles. The agreement entailed that the NDB headquarters would be located in Shanghai, China, with the Africa Regional Center located in South Africa.

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS countries' national Development Banks signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation for the NDB.²⁰⁴ The agreement acknowledged strategic cooperation for sustainable development and inclusive economic growth to be achieved through the NDB. In addition, the Agreement on NDB entered into force during this summit.

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS members met to discuss the successful operationalization of the New Development Bank.²⁰⁵ Countries announced the NDB's approval of the first set of loans targeted at the renewable and green energy sectors.

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the BRICS Export Credit Agencies and the New Development Bank.²⁰⁶ This MoU aimed to strengthen bilateral institutional cooperation and overall multilateral cooperation.

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders acknowledged the significance of the New Development Bank.²⁰⁷ Leaders highlighted the NDB's functionality in promoting private sector financing for infrastructure development and investment in developing economies.

At the 2019 Brasília Summit, the Meeting of the New Development Bank Board of Governors occurred.²⁰⁸ The meeting aimed to consider expansion of membership into the bank, to strengthen multilateral reach and cooperation.

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, BRICS leaders met to reaffirm the objectives of the New Development Bank, including climate financing mechanisms of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, dialogue on technological and innovation cooperation through the use of the NDB was discussed, notably sustainable investment in the energy sector.

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders re-evaluated the priorities of the New Development Bank to better address health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.²¹⁰ Furthermore, priorities were

²⁰² Statement by BRICS Leaders on the Establishment of the BRICS-Led Development Bank, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-brics-bank.html>

²⁰³ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

²⁰⁴ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 17 May 2015. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

²⁰⁵ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

²⁰⁶ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

²⁰⁷ BRICS In Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

²⁰⁸ Brasília Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasil.html>

²⁰⁹ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

²¹⁰ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 September 2021. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

reoriented towards financing of social infrastructure projects such as digital technology. Notably, increased cooperation with Multilateral Development Banks and Development Financial Institutions was discussed.

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS leaders discussed collaboration between other multilateral organizations and the New Development Bank.²¹¹ The dialogue entailed increasing cooperation between PartNIR projects and the New Development Bank as well as the BRICs Interbank Cooperation Mechanism with the NDB.

At the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, BRICs leaders announced the expansion of the Bank to include three new members.²¹² New members included Bangladesh, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to increase knowledge sharing and multilateral cooperation.

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, BRICs leaders agreed to jointly develop the New Development Bank into a new type of Multilateral Development Bank.²¹³ Dialogue included the further expansion of the NDB through membership and expedited applications of other BRICS members.

Commitment Features

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, leaders committed to “support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs.”²¹⁴ This commitment can be understood as having three dimensions: (1) building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, (2) supporting the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and (3) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB in fulfilling its mandate.

Definitions and Concepts

“Support” refers to the “action or act of providing aid, assistance, or backing up an initiative, or entity.”²¹⁵ In this context, it refers to members enabling or reinforcing the NDB’s actions in the areas specified in the commitment.

“Enhance” is understood to mean to “heighten or intensify.”²¹⁶ Thus, “support the enhancement” refers to actions that actively expand or strengthen the NDB’s capacity-building and knowledge-exchange functions.

“Synergy” is understood to mean “ensuring alignment and seeking linkages between different plans and actions so that the result of their joint effort is greater than the sum of their individual effects.”²¹⁷ In this context, “building synergies” refers to BRICS members facilitating alignment or coordination between the NDB and knowledge sources based in developing countries.

²¹¹ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

²¹² XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

²¹³ XVI BRICS Summit: Kazan Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

²¹⁴ XVI BRICS Summit, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

²¹⁵ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 23 May 2025. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

²¹⁶ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 23 May 2025. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

²¹⁷ What’s Next After UNEA-6: Why “synergies” is more than a buzzword for countries tackling the triple planetary crisis, International Institute for Sustainable Development (Winnipeg) 4 April 2024. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://www.iisd.org/articles/policy-analysis/synergies-after-unea-6>

“Efficiency” is understood to mean “capable of producing desired results with little or no waste (as of time or materials).”²¹⁸ In this commitment, it refers to the NDB’s ability to carry out its mandate using time, resources and processes in a streamlined and cost-effective manner.

“Effectiveness” refers to “things—such as policies, treatments, arguments and techniques—that do what they are intended to do.”²¹⁹ In this context, it refers to the degree to which the NDB carries out its functions and achieves the institutional and developmental goals outlined in its mandate.

The NDB is a Multilateral Development Institution and may also be referred to as a Multilateral Development Bank (MDB).²²⁰ An MDB is defined as “supranational institutions set up by sovereign states, which are their shareholders.” Their work reflects the development cooperation priorities of those states and is typically focused on financing infrastructure and social development projects, supporting investment and mobilizing capital to promote economic and social progress in developing countries. In the context of this commitment, member actions that strengthen the NDB’s institutional capacity to deliver on this mandate — such as improving its ability to mobilize capital, support investment or implement development programs — can be considered compliant.

Capacity-building is defined as the “process of developing and strengthening the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that organizations and communities need to survive, adapt and thrive in a fast-changing world.”²²¹ In this context, capacity building refers to actions by BRICS members that enhance the institutional, technical or operational capabilities of the NDB, enabling it to perform its mandate more effectively and sustainably over time.

“Knowledge exchange” refers to an iterative process of sharing knowledge, expertise and experience between institutional actors—such as governments, researchers and development banks—in ways that inform action and improve outcomes.²²² In this commitment, it specifically refers to collaboration between the NDB and knowledge sources from developing countries, with the goal of integrating diverse perspectives, practices and evidence into the Bank’s operations and development strategies. Member actions that support knowledge exchange may include facilitating joint research, technical collaboration and peer learning mechanisms.

General Interpretive Guidelines

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be assigned to BRICS members that demonstrate strong support across all three dimensions of the commitment: (1) building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, (2) supporting the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and (3) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB in fulfilling its mandate. Strong actions include material actions such as directly sharing relevant policy expertise or data, providing official development assistance to other members countries and providing capital contributions to the NDB discussing knowledge-sharing partnerships, engaging in talks on development and SDG collaboration with other members and actively participating in consultations or working groups to strengthen the NDB’s operations. To achieve full compliance, a member must actively engage and provide support across all three areas.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that demonstrate strong support in at least one criteria or less than strong support in all three: (1) building synergies with knowledge sources from

²¹⁸ Efficient, Merriam Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/efficient>

²¹⁹ Effective, Merriam Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effective>

²²⁰ Multilateral Development Banks, European Investment Bank (Luxembourg) n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://www.eib.org/en/about/partners/development-banks/index>

²²¹ Capacity-Building, United Nations (New York), n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/capacity-building>

²²² Creating Pathways to Impact, The University of British Columbia (Vancouver) n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://kx.ubc.ca/creating-pathways-impact>

developing countries, (2) supporting the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and (3) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB in fulfilling its mandate. For example, a member that supports the NDB in building synergies with knowledge sources but does not take actions supporting SDG assistance or institutional improvement would receive a 0. Or a member that attends meetings but no evidence is found of active participation.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1, will be assigned if a BRICS member takes no action or only weak action in two or fewer criteria of: (1) building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, (2) supporting the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs or (3) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB in fulfilling its mandate. Weak actions include verbal reaffirmations, such as declaring support for knowledge sharing, offering general endorsements of the SDGs, or making vague expressions of support for the NDB.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member has not taken action or has only taken weak action across two or fewer of the following dimensions: 1) building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, or 2) supporting the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or 3) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the New Development Bank (NDB) in fulfilling its mandate.
0	The BRICS member has taken strong action across one criteria or weaker action across all three of: 1) building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, or 2) supporting the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs, or 3) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB in fulfilling its mandate.
+1	The BRICS member has taken strong action across all three of the following dimensions: 1) building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, and 2) supporting the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs, and 3) improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB in fulfilling its mandate.

*Compliance Director: Parami Epaarachchi
Lead Analyst: Ritika Roy Chowdhury*

Brazil: +1

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

On 11 November 2024, Brazilian representatives attended a High-Level Technical Workshop organized by the United Arab Emirates and the New Development Bank (NDB).²²³ This workshop fostered multilateral dialogue and knowledge sharing regarding cooperation for sustainable development and finance partnerships.²²⁴

On 18 November 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva alongside other leaders from the G20 launched the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (GAAHP).²²⁵ One of Brazil's chief initiatives during its G20

²²³ Concept Note and Agenda, Ministry of Finance of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 22 October 2024. Access Date: 5 August 2024. https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Concept-Note-with-Agenda-Technical-Workshop-on-Evaluation-methodologies_22.10.2024.pdf

²²⁴ Ministry of Finance and New Development Bank Co-Organise High-Level Technical Workshop, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 11 November 2024. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-and-new-development-bank-co-organise-high-level-technical-workshop/>

²²⁵ Brazil's President Lula launches the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty alongside 148 members, including 82 countries, Government of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries>

presidency, the GAAHP commits 82 countries and 148 total member entities to cooperating on mobilizing funds and projects to implement the development goals of eradicating hunger and poverty.

On 26 December 2024, Brazil served as guarantor for a EUR94 million NDB loan to the Brasilia Energy Company for the construction of the Brasilia Capital of Solar Lighting Project.²²⁶ This assists the NDB in carrying out its mandate and aligns with SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) and SDG 13 (Climate Action).

On 25 February 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira and BRICS Sherpa for Brazil Ambassador Mauricio Lyrio attended the First BRICS Sherpas Meeting hosted under the Brazilian BRICS Presidency.²²⁷ Minister Vieira advanced the NDB's continued operational objectives as part of the Sherpa agenda, leading to the Leader's Summit.

On 14 April 2025, the Ministry of Finance launched the COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers to support the Baku to Belém Roadmap for the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.²²⁸ This project aimed to mobilize public and private financing of USD1.3 trillion for climate change and economic development. Part of this campaign involves reforming multilateral development banks such as the NDB to expand concessional finance and climate funds.

On 28 April 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Vieira attended the BRICS Meeting of Foreign Ministers.²²⁹ The meeting concluded with the publication of the Chair's Statement which highlighted the key role of the NDB and expressed the Minister's collective agreement to further develop the NDB into a new type of 21st century multilateral development bank.

On 30 April 2025, Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation Luciana Santos hosted leaders of the space agencies of the BRICS countries.²³⁰ The meeting emphasized international cooperation on reducing technological asymmetries, promoting space sustainability and advancing the BRICS Virtual Constellation of Remote Sensing Satellites. BRICS representatives promoted ideas to strengthen higher technical capacities and synergy building through this multilateral dialogue.

On 15 May 2025, Brazilian vice-president Geraldo Alckmin took part in the 9th World Circular Economy Forum, held in São Paulo.²³¹ Vice-President Alckmin highlighted Brazil's leading role in emerging climate governance, connecting sustainable development of the Global South and inclusive industrialization to the role of circular economies.

²²⁶ NDB Board of Directors approved four project proposals in December 2024, New Development Bank (Shanghai) 6 January 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://www.ndb.int/news/ndb-board-of-directors-approved-four-project-proposals-in-december-2024/>

²²⁷ Address by Minister Mauro Vieira at the First BRICS Sherpas Meeting – Brasília, February 25–26, 2025, Government of Brazil (Brasília) 25 February 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs/speeches/mauro-vieira-2023/address-by-minister-mauro-vieira-at-the-first-brics-sherpas-meeting-2013-brasilia-february-25201326-2025>

²²⁸ Brazil Launches COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers to Support the Baku to Belém Roadmap to USD1.3 trillion, Ministério da Fazenda (Brasília) 14 April 2025. Access Date: 20 July 2025. https://www.gov.br/fazenda/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/2025/abril/arquivo/brazil-launches-cop30.pdf

²²⁹ 2025.04.29_BRICS MFA Chair's Statement.pdf, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Brasília) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf

²³⁰ BRICS expands cooperation in the space sector to reduce technological asymmetries among member countries, BRICS Brasil 2020 (Brasília) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 20 July 2025. <https://brics.br/en/news/brics-expands-cooperation-in-the-space-sector-to-reduce-technological-asymmetries-among-member-countries>

²³¹ Alckmin: Economia circular promove desenvolvimento sustentável e bem-estar social, Planalto (Brasília) 15 March 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/vice-presidencia/central-de-conteudo/noticias/alckmin-economia-circular-promove-desenvolvimento-sustentavel-e-bem-estar-social-1>

On 27 May 2025, the country hosted the BRICS Seminar on Sustainable Public Procurement.²³² The meeting promoted experiential exchanges between leaders regarding the strategic use of public procurement to drive sustainable development. It included representatives from the NDB, Brazilian Development Bank, South Africa, Uganda, Russia and India.

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. Brazil has taken strong action to assist member countries in achieving the SDGs through spearheading multilateral initiatives. Brazil has also taken strong action to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB in fulfilling its mandate, by taking actions such as guaranteeing NDB loans. Brazil has also taken strong action to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange by attending the High-Level Technical Workshop.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of +1.

Analysts: Isa Oliveira Taranto and Maabeerah Anwar

China: +1

China has fully complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

On 11 November 2024, China's representatives, alongside the New Development Bank (NDB), attended a High-Level Technical Workshop organized by the United Arab Emirates.²³³ This workshop fostered multilateral dialogue and knowledge sharing regarding cooperation for sustainable development and finance partnerships.²³⁴

On 18 November 2024, President Xi Jinping alongside other leaders from the G20 launched the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (GAAHP).²³⁵ The GAAHP commits 82 countries and 148 total member entities to cooperating on mobilizing funds and projects to implement the development goals of eradicating hunger and poverty.

On 2 December 2024, President Xi unveiled plans to expand the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to deepen China-Ethiopia cooperation through high-quality and mutually beneficial development.²³⁶ The NDB endorsed the initiative and aligned it with its long-term strategic objectives.

²³² BRICS seminar discusses future of cooperation in sustainable public procurement, BRICS (Brasilia) 30 May 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://infobrics.org/post/46493>

²³³ Concept Note and Agenda, Ministry of Finance of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 22 October 2024. Access Date: 5 August 2024. https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Concept-Note-with-Agenda-Technical-Workshop-on-Evaluation-methodologies_22.10.2024.pdf

²³⁴ Ministry of Finance and New Development Bank Co-Organise High-Level Technical Workshop, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 11 November 2024. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-and-new-development-bank-co-organise-high-level-technical-workshop/>

²³⁵ Brazil's President Lula launches the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty alongside 148 members, including 82 countries, Government of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries>

²³⁶ The Belt and Road Initiative: A Key Pillar of the Global Community of Shared Future, State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 10 October 2024. Access Date: 31 May 2025. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/zfbps_2279/202310/t20231010_773734.html

On 9 December 2025, Premier Li Qiang attended the “1+10 Dialogue” hosted by China between the heads of 10 international economic organizations.²³⁷ The NDB was in attendance and Premier Qiang incorporated the strategic objectives of the NDB into the agenda through multilateral dialogues on expansion and financial contributions for development financing in sustainable development.

On 21 February 2025, the state-owned Bank of Communications and the NDB signed a loan agreement equivalent to USD150 million for the acquisition of at least three LNG carriers to help reduce China’s coal consumption and related greenhouse gas emissions – in pursuit of the Chinese Government’s “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”²³⁸ This action fulfils SDG 7, Affordable and Clean Energy.²³⁹

On 26 March 2025, President Dilma Rousseff of the NDB attended the China Development Forum, hosted by China.²⁴⁰ The multilateral forum discussed the future development potential and capacity through emerging markets, inclusive infrastructure and strong governance.

On 8 April 2025, the NDB priced a 3-year CNY7 billion Panda Bond in the China Interbank Bond Market.²⁴¹ This effort actively expanded the NDB’s funding sources and promoted its mandate of diversifying its finance across instruments and currencies. Additionally, it will enhance the Bank’s capacity to finance sustainable development projects.

On 29 April 2025, President Xi visited the Shanghai headquarters of the NDB and met with President Rousseff.²⁴² He affirmed China’s commitment to strengthening project cooperation with NDB and sharing development experience with other BRICS member countries to ensure the collective rise of the Global South and pursuit of world peace.

On 29 April 2025, Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended the BRICS session for Ministers of Foreign Affairs to discuss strengthened cooperation in the Global South.²⁴³ Minister Yi discussed the use of the New Development Bank for high-quality development, innovation and green development.

On 29 April 2025, President Xi visited the Shanghai headquarters of the NDB and met with its President Dilma Rousseff.²⁴⁴ He affirmed China’s commitment to strengthening project cooperation with NDB and sharing development experience with other BRICS member countries to ensure the collective rise of the Global South and pursuit of world peace.

²³⁷ NDB President Dilma Rousseff Participated in “1+10” Dialogue with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, New Development Bank (Shanghai) 11 December 2024. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://www.ndb.int/insights/ndb-president-dilma-rousseff-participated-in-110-dialogue-with-chinese-premier-li-qiang/>

²³⁸ New Development Bank and Bank of Communications Financial Leasing Co., Ltd. sign USD 150 mln Equivalent in RMB Loan Agreement for the LNG Transportation Project, New Development Bank (Shanghai) 25 February 2025. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://www.ndb.int/news/new-development-bank-and-bank-of-communications-financial-leasing-co-ltd-sign-usd-150-mln-equivalent-in-rmb-loan-agreement-for-the-lng-transportation-project/>

²³⁹ Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all, United Nations (New York) n.d. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal7>

²⁴⁰ President Dilma Rousseff attended the China Development Forum, New Development Bank (Shanghai) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 20 July 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202503/26/content_WS67e40626c6d0868f4e8f132f.html, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/new-development-bank_cdf2025-activity-7310200878378979329-m4oA/

²⁴¹ New Development Bank priced 3-Year CNY 7 billion Panda Bond, New Development Bank (Shanghai) 10 April 2025. Access Date: 20 July 2025. <https://www.ndb.int/news/new-development-bank-priced-3-year-cny-7-billion-panda-bond/>

²⁴² China's Xi pushes AI and 'Global South' opportunity amid US trade war, Reuters (Beijing) 19 April 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/technology/chinas-xi-lauds-ai-progress-meets-brics-bank-shanghai-visit-2025-04-29/>

²⁴³ The Session for Ministers of Foreign Affairs / International Relations from BRICS Members and Partner Countries Held in Rio de Janeiro, Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China (Beijing) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 21 July 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjzbzd/202505/t20250501_11614800.html

²⁴⁴ China's Xi pushes AI and 'Global South' opportunity amid US trade war, Reuters (Beijing) 19 April 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/technology/chinas-xi-lauds-ai-progress-meets-brics-bank-shanghai-visit-2025-04-29/>

China has fully complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. China has taken strong action to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB and ensure it remains a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs by hosting the 1+10 Dialogue. China has also taken strong action to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange by attending the High-Level Technical Workshop, visiting the NDB's headquarters and working with Brazil. China has also taken strong action to develop the SDGs through its participation in the GAAHP platform and financing NDB initiatives targeting SDGs.

Thus, China receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Karissa Cruz

Egypt: 0

Egypt has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

On 11 November 2024, Egyptian representatives attended a High-Level Technical Workshop organized by the United Arab Emirates and the New Development Bank (NDB).²⁴⁵ This workshop fostered multilateral dialogue and knowledge sharing regarding cooperation for sustainable development and finance partnerships.²⁴⁶

On 18 November 2024, Egypt was announced as a founding member during the launch of the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (GAAHP).²⁴⁷ The GAAHP commits 82 countries and 148 total member entities to cooperating on mobilizing funds and projects to implement the development goals of eradicating hunger and poverty.

On 17 February 2025, Minister of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation Rania Al-Mashat met with the Saudi Minister of Economy and Planning Faisal Alibrahim to discuss strategies to further bilateral relations between the parties.²⁴⁸ During the meeting, officials highlighted the importance of South-South cooperation and expertise sharing while emphasizing the significance of joint efforts to achieve SDGs.

On 21 March 2025, Minister of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation Rania Al-Mashat met with the chief representative for the Middle East at the Japan Bank for International Cooperation

²⁴⁵ Concept Note and Agenda, Ministry of Finance of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 22 October 2024. Access Date: 5 August 2024. https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Concept-Note-with-Agenda-Technical-Workshop-on-Evaluation-methodologies_22.10.2024.pdf

²⁴⁶ Ministry of Finance and New Development Bank Co-Organise High-Level Technical Workshop, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 11 November 2024. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-and-new-development-bank-co-organise-high-level-technical-workshop/>

²⁴⁷ Brazil's President Lula launches the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty alongside 148 members, including 82 countries, Government of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries>

²⁴⁸ MINISTER OF PLANNING, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION MEETS THE SAUDI MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND PLANNING TO DISCUSS WAYS TO ENHANCE BILATERAL RELATIONS, Ministry of Planning, Economic Development, and International Cooperation (Cairo) 17 February 2025. Access Date: 31 May 2025. <https://mped.gov.eg/singlenews?id=6025&lang=en&Minister-of-Planning,-Economic-Development,-and-International-Cooperation-Meets-the-Saudi-Minister-of-Economy-and-Planning-to-Discuss-Ways-to-Enhance-Bilateral-Relations>

Kenny Kitamura in Dubai.²⁴⁹ The meeting emphasized the cooperation between Japan and Egypt within the fields including energy transition and sustainable development.

On 28 April 2025, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Ragy el-Etreby attended the BRICS Meeting of Foreign Ministers.²⁵⁰ The meeting concluded with the publication of the Chair's Statement which highlighted the key role of the NDB and expressed the Minister's collective agreement to further develop the NDB into a new type of 21st century multilateral development bank.²⁵¹

Egypt has partially complied its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. Egypt has taken strong action to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange by attending the High-Level Technical Workshop and meeting with Japan. Egypt has taken weak action to support development towards SDGs by joining the multilateral GAAHP platform. Egypt has taken weak action to improve the effectiveness of the NDB by contributing to a BRICS meeting statement calling for further NDB development.

Thus, Egypt receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Zülal Tunç

Ethiopia: 0

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

On 24 October 2024, Ethiopia took part in a conference hosted by New Development Bank (NDB) President Dilma Rousseff.²⁵² The event focused on the Global South's growing influence in shaping global security governance, advancing peace and driving economic reform. The conference underscored the NDB's commitment to revitalizing development and highlighted the South's expanding role in international decision-making.

On 18 November 2024, Ethiopia was announced as a founding member during the launch of the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (GAAHP).²⁵³ The GAAHP commits 82 countries and 148 total member

²⁴⁹ DR. RANIA AL-MASHAT DISCUSSES WITH JBIC REPRESENTATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE BANK'S INVESTMENTS IN EGYPT TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS AND THE GREEN TRANSITION, Ministry of Planning, Economic Development, and International Cooperation (Cairo) 21 March 2025. Access Date: 16 July 2025.

<https://mped.gov.eg/singlenews?id=6105&lang=en&Dr.-Rania-Al-Mashat-Discusses-with-JBIC-Representative-in-the-Middle-East-the-Developments-of-the-Bank's-Investments-in-Egypt-to-Support-Development-Efforts-and-the-Green-Transition>

²⁵⁰ President El- Sisi's Personal Representative Participates in BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting, State Information Service (Cairo) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. <https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/208427/President-El-Sisi's-Personal-Representative-Participates-in-BRICS-Foreign-Ministers'-Meeting?lang=en-us>

²⁵¹ 2025.04.29_BRICS MFA Chair's Statement.pdf, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Brasilia) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf

²⁵² Xi Jinping Attends the "BRICS Plus" Dialogue and Delivers Important Remarks, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 24 October 2024. Access Date: 31 May 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202410/t20241029_11517700.html

²⁵³ Brazil's President Lula launches the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty alongside 148 members, including 82 countries, Government of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025.

<https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries>

entities to cooperating on mobilizing funds and projects to implement the development goals of eradicating hunger and poverty.

On 25 February 2025, the Ethiopian delegation led by National Bank Governor and Ethiopia's BRICS Sherpa Mamo Esmelealem Mihretu alongside State Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesganu Arga attended the First Meeting of BRICS Sherpas and Sous Sherpas.²⁵⁴ This multilateral dialogue entailed strategization for Ethiopia's membership into the NDB and key financial priorities.

On 14 April 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gedion Timothewos met with Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhenkov to discuss the advancement of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.²⁵⁵ The discussions focused on commitments within the framework of NDB, including initiatives to modernize Ethiopia's agricultural sector through the adoption of Belarusian technologies and equipment.

On 28 April 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gedion Timothewos attended the BRICS Meeting of Foreign Ministers.²⁵⁶ The meeting concluded with the publication of the Chair's Statement which highlighted the key role of the NDB and expressed the Minister's collective agreement to further develop the NDB into a new type of 21st century multilateral development bank.²⁵⁷

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. Ethiopia has taken strong action to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB to fulfill its mandate and serve as a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs by working to join the NDB and attending key NDB conferences and meetings. Moreover, Ethiopia has taken weak action to aid international development through joining the multilateral GAAHP platform. Moreover, Ethiopia has not taken substantial action to enhance capacity building and knowledge exchange.

Thus, Ethiopia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Avishka Gautham

India: 0

India has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

²⁵⁴ A Week in the Horn 28.02.2025, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Blog (Addis Ababa) 28 February 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://mfaethiopia.blog/2025/02/28/a-week-in-the-horn-28-02-2025/>

²⁵⁵ Belarus and Ethiopia plan to sign roadmap for cooperation, TV BRICS International Media Network (Moscow) 14 April 2025. Access Date: 16 July 2025. <https://tvbrics.com/en/news/belarus-and-ethiopia-plan-to-sign-roadmap-for-cooperation/>

²⁵⁶ BRICS Foreign Ministers convey positions on reforming global governance, strengthening multilateralism, and promoting peace, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Rio de Janeiro) 28 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. <https://brics.br/en/news/brics-foreign-ministers-convey-positions-on-reforming-global-governance-strengthening-multilateralism-and-promoting-peace>

²⁵⁷ 2025.04.29_BRICS MFA Chair's Statement.pdf, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Brasilia) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf

On 11 November 2024, India's representatives attended a High-Level Technical Workshop organized by the United Arab Emirates and the New Development Bank (NDB).²⁵⁸ This workshop fostered multilateral dialogue and knowledge sharing regarding cooperation for sustainable development and finance partnerships.²⁵⁹

On 18 November 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi alongside the other leaders of the G20 launched the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (GAAHP).²⁶⁰ The GAAHP commits 82 countries and 148 total member entities to cooperating on mobilizing funds and projects to implement the development goals of eradicating hunger and poverty.

On 7 April 2025, the National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development (NaBFID) signed a memorandum of understanding with the NDB.²⁶¹ This Memorandum aims to enhance knowledge sharing, capacity building and cooperative research between the two institutions. NaBFID also aims to work with the NDB on clean energy and transportation projects, which are aligned with the SDGs.

On 28 April 2025, Secretary of Economic Relations Shri Dammu Ravi attended the BRICS Meeting of Foreign Ministers.²⁶² The meeting concluded with the publication of the Chair's Statement which highlighted the key role of the NDB and expressed the Minister's collective agreement to further develop the NDB into a new type of 21st century multilateral development bank.²⁶³

India has partially complied with the commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. India has taken strong action to aid member countries in achieving the SDGs through its participation in the GAAHP platform and by approving NDB loans to member states. India has also taken strong action to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange by attending the High-Level Technical Workshop and signing the NaBFID-NDB Memorandum. Moreover, the NaBFID-NDB memorandum for further cooperation constitutes strong action to support the NDB in improving its efficiency and effectiveness.

Thus, India receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Chidera Uduji

Indonesia: 0

Indonesia has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the

²⁵⁸ Concept Note and Agenda, Ministry of Finance of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 22 October 2024. Access Date: 5 August 2024. https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Concept-Note-with-Agenda-Technical-Workshop-on-Evaluation-methodologies_22.10.2024.pdf

²⁵⁹ Ministry of Finance and New Development Bank Co-Organise High-Level Technical Workshop, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 11 November 2024. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-and-new-development-bank-co-organise-high-level-technical-workshop/>

²⁶⁰ Brazil's President Lula launches the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty alongside 148 members, including 82 countries, Government of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries>

²⁶¹ New Development Bank and National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development Sign MoU to accelerate Infrastructure and Sustainable Development Projects in India, New Development Bank (Shanghai) 11 April 2025. Access Date: August 6 2025. <https://www.ndb.int/news/new-development-bank-and-national-bank-for-financing-infrastructure-and-development-sign-mou-to-accelerate-infrastructure-and-sustainable-development-projects-in-india/>

²⁶² Secretary (Economic Relations), Shri Dammu Ravi represented External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. <https://www.mea.gov.in/newsdetail1.htm?13525/#contentStart>

²⁶³ 2025.04.29_BRICS MFA Chair's Statement.pdf, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Brasilia) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf

assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

On 18 November 2024, Indonesia helped launch the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (GAAHP) as a founding member.²⁶⁴ The GAAHP commits 82 countries and 148 total member entities to cooperating on mobilizing funds and projects to implement the development goals of eradicating hunger and poverty.

On 16 January 2025, Minister of National Development Planning Rachmat Pambudy met with Ambassador to Kuwait Lena Maryana Mukti to discuss strengthening bilateral relations between Indonesia and Kuwait.²⁶⁵ The meeting focused on opportunities for development cooperation, particularly in economic transformation, industrial down streaming and other strategic sectors. These efforts include knowledge sharing in agricultural technologies, energy innovations and sustainable practices aimed at enacting the SDGs through improving food security, advancing modern agriculture and accelerating the development of new and renewable energy.

On 25 March 2025, President Prabowo Subianto met with New Development Bank (NDB) President Dilma Rousseff in Jakarta, where Indonesia announced its decision to join the NDB.²⁶⁶ The leaders discussed collaboration on Indonesia's development priorities, including logistics infrastructure, digital connectivity, sustainable energy and addressing poverty and inequality, all in alignment with Indonesia's 2025-2045 Development Strategy.

On 28 April 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sugiono attended the BRICS Meeting of Foreign Ministers.²⁶⁷ The meeting concluded with the publication of the Chair's Statement which highlighted the key role of the NDB and expressed the Minister's collective agreement to further develop the NDB into a new type of 21st century multilateral development bank.²⁶⁸

Indonesia has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. Indonesia has taken strong action to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange across developing countries by collaborating with Kuwait. Indonesia has taken strong action to improve the effectiveness of the NDB by joining the NDB and contributing to a Chairs statement calling for further development. However, Indonesia has only taken weak action to aid BRICS members in achieving the SDGs by joining the GAAHP.

Thus, Indonesia receives a score of 0.

²⁶⁴ Brazil's President Lula launches the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty alongside 148 members, including 82 countries, Government of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries>

²⁶⁵ Ministry of National Development Planning/Bappenas Discusses Strengthening Indonesia-Kuwait Bilateral Relations, Ministry of National Development Planning (Jakarta) 16 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://www.bappenas.go.id/berita/kementerian-ppnbappenas-bahas-penguatan-hubungan-bilateral-indonesia-kuwait-dUWB3>

²⁶⁶ Meeting between NDB President Dilma Rousseff and President of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto, New Development Bank (Jakarta) 25 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.ndb.int/news/meeting-between-ndb-president-dilma-rousseff-and-president-of-indonesia-prabowo-subianto/>

²⁶⁷ BRICS Foreign Ministers convey positions on reforming global governance, strengthening multilateralism, and promoting peace, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Rio de Janeiro) 28 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. <https://brics.br/en/news/brics-foreign-ministers-convey-positions-on-reforming-global-governance-strengthening-multilateralism-and-promoting-peace>

²⁶⁸ 2025.04.29_BRICS MFA Chair's Statement.pdf, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Brasilia) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf

Iran: 0

Iran has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

On 28 April 2025, Deputy Foreign Minister on Economic Diplomacy Seyed Rasoul Mohajer attended the BRICS Meeting of Foreign Ministers.²⁶⁹ The meeting concluded with the publication of the Chair's Statement which highlighted the key role of the New Development Bank (NDB) and expressed the Minister's collective agreement to further develop the NDB into a new type of 21st century multilateral development bank.²⁷⁰

On 12 May 2025, the Iran University of Science & Technology and Russia's St. Petersburg State University agreed to establish a joint university inside Iran's Pardis Technology Park.²⁷¹ This action, which followed an Iranian cabinet resolution allowing foreign university branches in Iran's innovation hubs, will mark a significant step in academic cooperation and knowledge sharing between Iran and Russia.

On 13 May 2025, Vice President for Science, Technology and Knowledge-Based Economy, Hossein Afshin accompanied Uzbekistan Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov during his visit to Iran's House of Innovation and Technology (iHiT) in Tehran.²⁷² The purpose of the visit was to deepen scientific and technological collaboration between the two nations by opening doors for technology transfer, joint ventures and increased knowledge-based exports within various sectors. Iran announced its plans to open a branch of iHiT in Tashkent, Uzbekistan to further bilateral innovation exchanges with the nation.

On 25 May 2025, senior representatives from the Iranian Office for International Scientific and Technological Cooperation and Malaysia's Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation met at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Dialogue Platform Ministers' Meeting in Tehran to explore strategies to strengthen bilateral cooperation in science and technology at the iHiT.²⁷³ Iran introduced its' capabilities and knowledge-based companies, whereby the Malaysian delegation affirmed its nation's readiness to expand partnerships in the field of technology.

Iran has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. Iran has taken strong action to enhance capacity building and knowledge exchange with other countries, such as establishing a joint school with St Petersburg University. However, Iran has not taken substantive action to assist member countries in achieving the SDGs. Iran has taken weak action to improve the efficiency and

²⁶⁹ Growing BRICS group shows internal rifts as ministers fall short of joint statement, Reuters (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-ministers-fail-reach-joint-statement-brazil-warns-against-protectionism-2025-04-29/>

²⁷⁰ 2025.04.29_BRICS MFA Chair's Statement.pdf, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Brasilia) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf

²⁷¹ St. Petersburg University to open branch in Iran's International Innovation Zone, Organization for Development of International Science and Technological Cooperation (Tehran) 12 May 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://cistc.ir/en/5849/st-petersburg-university-to-open-branch-in-irans-international-innovation-zone/>

²⁷² Iran, Uzbekistan explore new avenues for technological cooperation, Organization for Development of International Science and Technology Cooperation (Tehran) 13 May 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://cistc.ir/en/5852/iran-uzbekistan-explore-new-avenues-for-technological-cooperation/>

²⁷³ Iran, Malaysia discuss expansion of scientific, technological cooperation, Organization for Development of International Science and Technology Cooperation (Tehran) 25 May 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://cistc.ir/en/5868/iran-malaysia-discuss-expansion-of-scientific-technological-cooperation/>

effectiveness of the NDB by issuing a joint BRICS foreign ministers statement calling for development of the organization.

Thus, Iran receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Karissa Cruz

Russia: 0

Russia has partially complied with supporting the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

On 11 November 2024, Russia's representatives attended a High-Level Technical Workshop organized by the United Arab Emirates and the New Development Bank (NDB).²⁷⁴ This workshop fostered multilateral dialogue and knowledge sharing regarding cooperation for sustainable development and finance partnerships.²⁷⁵

On 18 November 2024, Russia was announced as a founding member during the launch of the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (GAAHP).²⁷⁶ The GAAHP commits 82 countries and 148 total member entities to cooperating on mobilizing funds and projects to implement the development goals of eradicating hunger and poverty.

On 4 December 2024, President Vladimir Putin spoke on the importance of digital settlement systems becoming integrated in the BRICS investment platform and announced a NDB working group group on the topic in his speech at the 15th VTB Russia Calling! Investment Forum.²⁷⁷ This action helps advance the NDB to better fulfill its mandate.

On 6 February 2025, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Maxim Oreshkin met with UAE Minister of State for Financial Affairs Mohamed bin Hadi Al Hussaini.²⁷⁸ This bilateral dialogue aimed to increase financial cooperation under the BRICS Framework of the NDB by fostering sustainable economic growth and expertise exchange.

On 28 April 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov attended the BRICS Meeting of Foreign Ministers.²⁷⁹ The meeting concluded with the publication of the Chair's Statement which highlighted the key

²⁷⁴ Concept Note and Agenda, Ministry of Finance of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 22 October 2024. Access Date: 5 August 2024. https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Concept-Note-with-Agenda-Technical-Workshop-on-Evaluation-methodologies_22.10.2024.pdf

²⁷⁵ Ministry of Finance and New Development Bank Co-Organise High-Level Technical Workshop, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 11 November 2024. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-and-new-development-bank-co-organise-high-level-technical-workshop/>

²⁷⁶ Brazil's President Lula launches the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty alongside 148 members, including 82 countries, Government of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries>

²⁷⁷ BRICS investment platform to comprise digital payments — Putin, TASS Russian News Agency (Moscow) 4 December 2024. Access Date: 31 May 2025. <https://tass.com/politics/1882245>

²⁷⁸ UAE, Russia discuss boosting financial cooperation, Emirates News Agency (Abu Dhabi) 6 February 2025. Access Date: 21 July 2025. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bi2e9rt-uae-russia-discuss-boosting-financial-cooperation>

²⁷⁹ Growing BRICS group shows internal rifts as ministers fall short of joint statement, Reuters (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-ministers-fail-reach-joint-statement-brazil-warns-against-protectionism-2025-04-29/>

role of the NDB and expressed the Minister's collective agreement to further develop the NDB into a new type of 21st century multilateral development bank.²⁸⁰

On 12 May 2025, St. Petersburg State University and the Iran University of Science & Technology agreed to establish a joint university inside Iran's Pardis Technology Park.²⁸¹ This action will mark a significant step in academic cooperation and knowledge sharing between Iran and Russia.

Russia has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. Russia has taken strong action to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange by attending the High-Level Technical Workshop and holding bilateral dialogue with the UAE. Russia has taken strong action to help the NDB improve its efficiency by underscoring the importance of integrating digital settlement systems, participating in the working group launch and issuing a supportive joint foreign ministers statement. Russia has also taken weak action to support SDG development in member countries by supporting the creation of the GAAHP platform.

Thus, Russia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Zülal Tunç

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

On 11 November 2024, South Africa's representatives attended a High-Level Technical Workshop organized by the United Arab Emirates and the New Development Bank (NDB).²⁸² This workshop fostered multilateral dialogue and knowledge sharing regarding cooperation for sustainable development and finance partnerships.²⁸³

On 18 November 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa alongside the other leaders of the G20 announced the launch of the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (GAAHP).²⁸⁴ The GAAHP commits 82 countries and 148 total member entities to cooperating on mobilizing funds and projects to implement the development goals of eradicating hunger and poverty.

²⁸⁰ 2025.04.29_BRICS MFA Chair's Statement.pdf, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Brasilia) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf

²⁸¹ St. Petersburg University to open branch in Iran's International Innovation Zone, Organization for Development of International Science and Technological Cooperation (Tehran) 12 May 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://cistc.ir/en/5849/st-petersburg-university-to-open-branch-in-irans-international-innovation-zone/>

²⁸² Concept Note and Agenda, Ministry of Finance of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) 22 October 2024. Access Date: 5 August 2024. https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Concept-Note-with-Agenda-Technical-Workshop-on-Evaluation-methodologies_22.10.2024.pdf

²⁸³ Ministry of Finance and New Development Bank Co-Organise High-Level Technical Workshop, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 11 November 2024. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-and-new-development-bank-co-organise-high-level-technical-workshop/>

²⁸⁴ Brazil's President Lula launches the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty alongside 148 members, including 82 countries, Government of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries>

On 28 April 2025, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Lamola attended the BRICS Meeting of Foreign Ministers.²⁸⁵ The meeting concluded with the publication of the Chair's Statement which highlighted the key role of the NDB and expressed the Minister's collective agreement to further develop the NDB into a new type of 21st century multilateral development bank.²⁸⁶

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. South Africa has taken weak action to assist member states in achieving the SDGs through its participation in the GAAHP platform. South Africa has taken strong action to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange by attending the High-Level Technical Workshop. South Africa has taken weak action to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB by participating in the BRICS Foreign Ministers joint statement calling for development and modernization.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Avishka Gautam

United Arab Emirates: 0

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).

On 11 November 2024, the Ministry of Finance organized a High-Level Technical Workshop alongside the New Development Bank (NDB).²⁸⁷ This workshop fostered multilateral dialogue and knowledge sharing regarding cooperation for sustainable development and finance partnerships.

On 18 November 2024, the United Arab Emirates was announced as a founding member during the launch of the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (GAAHP).²⁸⁸ The GAAHP commits 82 countries and 148 total member entities to cooperating on mobilizing funds and projects to implement the development goals of eradicating hunger and poverty.

On 6 February 2025, Minister of State for Financial Affairs Mohamed bin Hadi Al Hussaini met with the Russian Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Maxim Oreshkin.²⁸⁹ This bilateral dialogue aimed to increase financial cooperation under the BRICS Framework of the NDB by fostering sustainable economic growth and expertise exchange.

²⁸⁵ Growing BRICS group shows internal rifts as ministers fall short of joint statement, Reuters (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-ministers-fail-reach-joint-statement-brazil-warns-against-protectionism-2025-04-29/>

²⁸⁶ 2025.04.29_BRICS MFA Chair's Statement.pdf, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Brasilia) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf

²⁸⁷ Ministry of Finance and New Development Bank Co-Organise High-Level Technical Workshop, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 11 November 2024. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-and-new-development-bank-co-organise-high-level-technical-workshop/>

²⁸⁸ Brazil's President Lula launches the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty alongside 148 members, including 82 countries, Government of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries>

²⁸⁹ UAE, Russia discuss boosting financial cooperation, Emirates News Agency (Abu Dhabi) 6 February 2025. Access Date: 21 July 2025. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bi2e9rt-uae-russia-discuss-boosting-financial-cooperation>

On 12 February 2025, Director General of Abu Dhabi Fund for Development Mohamed Saif Al Suwaidi attended the World Governments Summit in Dubai.²⁹⁰ During the event, Director General Al Suwaidi announced active partnerships with the NDB for knowledge transfer, capacity building in BRICS countries.

On 28 April 2025, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Reem bint Ebrahim Al Hashimy attended the BRICS Meeting of Foreign Ministers.²⁹¹ The meeting concluded with the publication of the Chair's Statement which highlighted the key role of the NDB and expressed the Minister's collective agreement to further develop the NDB into a new type of 21st century multilateral development bank.²⁹²

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with its commitment to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge exchange, including by building synergies with knowledge sources from developing countries, the assistance of member countries in achieving the SDGs and the further improvement of efficiency and effectiveness to fulfill its mandate, aiming to be a premier multilateral development institution for EMDCs. The United Arab Emirates have taken strong action to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the NDB such as by working to increase financial cooperation with the NDB under the BRICS Framework and attending the World Governments Summit. The United Arab Emirates have also taken strong action to support the enhancement of capacity building and knowledge sharing by hosting the High-Level Technical Workshop. The United Arab Emirates have taken weak action to assist other member countries in achieving the SDGs through joining the GAAHP.

Thus, the United Arab Emirates receives a score of 0.

Analysts: Isa Oliveira Taranto and Mabeerah Anwar

²⁹⁰ WGS Panelists: UAE leverages BRICS membership to boost global trade resilience, infrastructure leadership, Emirates News Agency – WAM (Abu Dhabi) 12 February 2025. Access Date: 21 July 2025. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bi5yvi1-wgs-panelists-uae-leverages-brics-membership-boost>

²⁹¹ Growing BRICS group shows internal rifts as ministers fall short of joint statement, Reuters (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-ministers-fail-reach-joint-statement-brazil-warns-against-protectionism-2025-04-29/>

²⁹² 2025.04.29_BRICS MFA Chair's Statement.pdf, BRICS Brasil 2025 (Brasilia) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 13 August 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf

3. International Crime: Cooperation and Coordination Against Corruption

“We [commit] to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthen our coordination on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.”

XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil		0	
China		0	
Egypt	-1		
Ethiopia		0	
India	-1		
Indonesia		0	
Iran		0	
Russia	-1		
South Africa		0	
United Arab Emirates	-1		
Average		-0.40 (30%)	

Background

On 14 December 2005, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) entered into force and exists as the only legally binding international anti-corruption instrument to which all BRICS members are party.²⁹³ The Convention emphasizes preventive measures, criminalization and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery and technical assistance and information exchange.

All 10 BRICS members have ratified the UNCAC.²⁹⁴ With these internationally recognized standards set, BRICS leaders consistently prioritize progress towards anti-corruption.

At the 2013 Durban Summit, BRICS leaders identified “BRICS Anti-Corruption Cooperation” as a new area to be explored within the eThekweni Action Plan, marking the first time anti-corruption was identified as a prospective area for collaboration among the leaders.²⁹⁵

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders committed “to combat domestic and foreign bribery and strengthen international cooperation, including law enforcement cooperation, in accordance with multilaterally established principles and norms, especially the UNCAC.”²⁹⁶ This was the first explicit commitment to anti-corruption made by BRICS leaders.

²⁹³ United Nations Convention against Corruption, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (New York City) 14 December 2005. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/uncac.html>

²⁹⁴ Signature and Ratification Status, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (New York City) 6 February 2020. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ratification-status.html>

²⁹⁵ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization – eThekweni Declaration (Durban) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 20 March 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

²⁹⁶ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS leaders declared corruption a legal challenge that requires international cooperation to tackle and reaffirmed a commitment to the UNCAC.²⁹⁷ Furthermore, BRICS leaders announced the creation of a BRICS Working Group on Anti-Corruption Cooperation.

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS leaders pledged their support for strengthening international cooperation against corruption, including on issues relating to asset recovery and persons sought for corruption and in the context of the BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group.²⁹⁸

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS leaders declared their support for improving BRICS anti-corruption cooperation, reaffirming their commitment to experience sharing and compiling a compendium on fighting corruption.²⁹⁹ BRICS leaders reiterated their support for strengthening anti-corruption collaboration through the BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group based on the UNCAC and other international legal instruments.

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to international cooperation under Chapter IV of the UNCAC and committed to strengthening international cooperation under the BRICS Working Group on Anti-Corruption Cooperation, stating that “subject to our domestic legal systems, we will cooperate in an anti-corruption law enforcement, extradition of fugitives, economic and corruption offenders and repatriation in matters relating to assets recovery and other related criminal and non-criminal matters involving corruption and call on the international community to deny safe haven to corrupt persons and proceeds of corruption.”³⁰⁰

At the 2019 Brasilia Summit, BRICS leaders restated their “commitment to fight corruption, inter alia, through the strengthening of domestic legal frameworks, as appropriate, to more effectively address cases of corruption. We remain committed to adopting integrity measures in the public sector and promoting integrity standards in private enterprises and to build a stronger global commitment to a culture of intolerance towards corruption. We will maintain our ongoing efforts on anti-corruption law enforcement cooperation and returning of assets, including on civil and administrative proceedings. We will make full use of the BRICS Meeting on Asset Recovery and strengthen experience-sharing and case-cooperation on asset recovery among BRICS countries. We will enhance our exchange of views within multilateral frameworks such as UNCAC and the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, with the aim of joining efforts in denying safe haven to economic and corruption offenders and to facilitate the repatriation of proceeds of crime.”³⁰¹

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, BRICS leaders reiterated their commitment to promoting the UNCAC as an integral mechanism for international anti-corruption cooperation, especially “in light of the 2021 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly against corruption, strengthen BRICS collaboration, including within multilateral frameworks, subject to domestic legal systems, on all issues related to anti-corruption law enforcement, including on matters related to asset recovery and denying safe haven to corrupt persons and proceeds of corruption.”³⁰²

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders adopted the New Delhi Declaration. The Declaration states: “we reaffirm stronger cooperation and commitment to action on international anti-corruption issues, including within multilateral frameworks, subject to domestic legal systems, especially on matters related to asset recovery,

²⁹⁷ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 19 May 2025.

http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

²⁹⁸ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 19 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

²⁹⁹ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 19 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

³⁰⁰ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

³⁰¹ Brasilia Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 19 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasilia.html>

³⁰² XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 19 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

denying safe havens to corrupt persons and identification of proceeds of corruption. We will continue to enhance anti-corruption capacity building through various education and training programs. We welcome the 2021 special session of the UN General Assembly on challenges and measures to prevent and combat corruption and strengthen international cooperation and reiterate our commitment to implement its political declaration.”³⁰³

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS leaders adopted the Beijing Declaration.³⁰⁴ They also welcomed the BRICS Initiative on Denial of Safe Haven to Corruption and the first BRICS Anti-Corruption Ministerial Meeting, further committing to “strengthen anti-corruption capacity building through education and training programs and enhance anti-corruption exchanges and cooperation within multilateral frameworks.”

At the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders adopted the Johannesburg declaration.³⁰⁵ They reaffirmed their commitment to working against corruption and committed to enhancing “international cooperation through collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets subject to domestic laws and regulations of BRICS countries.”

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, BRICS leaders adopted the “Formulation of the BRICS Common Vision and Joint Action on Enhanced Anti-Corruption Cooperation and Recovery and Return of Assets and Proceeds of Corruption.”³⁰⁶ BRICS leaders further recommitted to “Cooperation in Anti-Corruption Education, Knowledge-Sharing and Capacity-Building.”

Commitment Features

This commitment can be interpreted to have two main goals to achieve the welfare target of preventing and fighting corruption through the international anti-corruption agenda: 1) promote BRICS cooperation and 2) strengthen coordination.

Definitions and Concepts

“Cooperation” is understood to mean “the action or process of working together to the same end.”³⁰⁷

“Coordination” is understood to mean “the act of making all the people involved in a plan or activity work together in an organized way.”³⁰⁸

“Corruption” is understood to mean “illegal, bad, or dishonest behaviors, especially by people in positions of power.”³⁰⁹

³⁰³ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 September 2021. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

³⁰⁴ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

³⁰⁵ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

³⁰⁶ XVI BRICS Summit, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

³⁰⁷ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7, G20 and BRICS Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 22 May 2025. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

³⁰⁸ Coordination, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/coordination>

³⁰⁹ Corruption, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/corruption>

“Fight” is understood to mean “to use a lot of effort to defeat or achieve something, or to stop something happening.”³¹⁰

“International anti-corruption agenda” is understood to mean “advancing the transparency, accountability, and integrity agendas at global, regional, and country levels.”³¹¹

“Promote” is understood to mean “support or renew old efforts or create new efforts in the area. It should not have to be a brand-new initiative. To contribute to growth or prosperity of, to help bring into being.”³¹²

“Prevention” is understood to mean the act of stopping something from happening or of stopping someone from doing something.”³¹³

“Strengthen” is understood to mean “to make or become stronger.”³¹⁴

“United Nations Convention Against Corruption” refers to the UN’s legally binding international multilateral treaty that has the purpose to “promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively.”³¹⁵

General Interpretive Guidelines

This commitment requires BRICS members to promote cooperation among themselves and to coordinate with other international actors or institutions, to prevent and fight against corruption. The act of “promoting cooperation” involves actively promoting BRICS cooperation, such as active participation in bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral regional meetings that include fellow BRICS members. Unilateral BRICS action that can be interpreted as acting in cooperation with the international anti-corruption agenda would count towards partial compliance if it were missing the cooperation criteria. The act of “coordinating with relevant actors” involves international coordinated effort, as opposed to solely domestic or unilateral action, to discuss major joint anti-corruption initiatives, such as through active participation in UNCAC meetings.

Thus, full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to BRICS members that take strong action to 1) promote BRICS cooperation in preventing and fighting corruption domestically and with other BRICS members, and 2) strengthen coordination on international anti-corruption issues, including at the UNCAC. Strong actions include members’ active participation with BRICS members regionally, domestic compliance with major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, active participation at the UNCAC. Active participation includes sharing best practices with other BRICS and non-BRICS members and participating in relevant international negotiations (as opposed to merely attending meetings).

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that take strong action in one criterion or weak action in both criteria. Examples of weak action include participating in some BRICS or international anti-corruption discussions but there is no evidence of individual members’ contributions, or participating in only domestic or unilateral actions, as opposed to coordinated effort with all or more than 5 of the BRICS members.

³¹⁰ Fight, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 May 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/fight>

³¹¹ Anti-corruption, United Nations Development Programme (New York) n.d. Access Date: 22 May 2025.

<https://www.undp.org/governance/inclusive-and-future-smart-public-goods-and-services/anti-corruption>

³¹² Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7, G20 and BRICS Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 22 May 2025. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

³¹³ Prevention, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 May 2025.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/prevention>

³¹⁴ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7, G20 and BRICS Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 22 May 2025. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

³¹⁵ United Nations Convention against Corruption, United Nations (Mérida). Access Date: 22 May 2025.

https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf

Non-compliance, or a score of -1, will be assigned to BRICS members that take weak action in only one criterion or takes action that is directly and explicitly antithetical to the commitment, such as negotiating in bad faith or rolling back anti-corruption support. Actions that do not count as compliance to the commitment include missing BRICS anti-corruption meetings, refusing to participate in joint initiatives and publicly taking contradictory positions to other BRICS members on international anti-corruption issues.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member has taken weak action in only one of the two criteria of 1) promoting BRICS cooperation in preventing and fighting corruption or 2) strengthening coordination on international anti-corruption issues; has taken no action on either criteria; or has taken action antithetical to the commitment.
0	The BRICS member has taken strong action in one of the two criteria or weak action in both criteria.
+1	The BRICS member has taken strong action in both criteria.

*Compliance Director: Ananiya Narmathan
Lead Analyst: Jack Zhu*

Brazil: 0

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

On 13 December 2024, Brazil launched a comprehensive plan to address integrity and anti-corruption in the federal public administration.³¹⁶ The plan outlines 260 initiatives which aim to address this goal, focusing on corruption in the federal government in terms of both addressing current corruption but also the deterrence, detection and ability to address instances of corruption.

On 29 April 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement after the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries, hosted by Brazil, reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption.³¹⁷ The chair statement also reaffirmed their commitment to the furthering of relevant international agreements, particularly the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to both promote BRICS cooperation in corruption prevention and fighting against corruption, in addition to strengthening coordination on international anti-corruption issues. Brazil has engaged in domestic action to address integrity and anti-corruption through a comprehensive federal plan. While Brazil also took action to strengthen coordination on anti-corruption with other BRICS members at the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations held in Rio, there is no evidence of individual members’ contributions.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of 0.

Analyst: William Bouffard-McManus

³¹⁶ Plano De Integridade E Combate A Corrupcao 2025-2027, Presidency of the Republic (Brasilia) 13 December 2024. Translated by Google Translate. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/plano-de-integridade-e-combate-a-corrupcao-2025-2027/>

³¹⁷ Chair’s Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries (Rio de Janeiro de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf/@download/file

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

On 8 January 2025, the Communist Party of China's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) stated it would focus on industries including the financial sector, state-owned entities, the energy sector and the medical sector.³¹⁸ The CCDI specified a focus on corruption cases where political and economic issues are present.

On 10 December 2024, China sentenced China Everbright Group's former chairman Tang Shuangning to 12 years in prison for corruption, bribery and abuse of his position for personal gains.³¹⁹ Tang's arrest for taking bribes and subsequent sentencing is a part of China's intensified campaign against corruption in the financial sector.

On 24 March 2025, China launched the Sky Net 2025 campaign focused on fugitive repatriation and combatting cross-border corruption.³²⁰ This underscores China's commitment to continue to tackle corruption both domestically and internationally.

On 29 April 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi attended the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries. As the host, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption.³²¹ They also reaffirmed their commitment to the furthering of relevant international agreements, particularly the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

China has partially complied with its commitment to both promote BRICS cooperation in corruption prevention and fighting against corruption, in addition to strengthening coordination on international anti-corruption issues. China has taken strong action domestically in corruption prevention and fighting against corruption, investigating and sentencing senior officials, focusing on the work of the CCDI and launching Sky Net 2025. China has also taken action to strengthen coordination on international cooperation issues during the Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of the BRICS Member and Partner Countries. However, there is no evidence of active participation with BRICS members to coordinate against corruption issues.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: William Bouffard-McManus

Egypt: -1

Egypt has not complied with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

³¹⁸ China's anti-graft watchdog to rigorously probe political, economic cases (Beijing) 8 January 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-anti-graft-watchdog-rigorously-probe-political-economic-cases-2025-01-08/>

³¹⁹ China Everbright Group former chairman jailed 12 years for corruption, bribery, Reuters (Beijing) 10 December 2024. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-everbright-group-former-chairman-jailed-12-years-corruption-bribery-2024-12-10/>

³²⁰ China launches 'Sky Net 2025' to hunt corruption fugitives, CGTN (Beijing) 25 March 2025. Access Date: 20 July 2025. <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-03-25/China-launches-Sky-Net-2025-to-hunt-corruption-fugitives-1C1rUjCpCow/p.html>

³²¹ Chair's Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf/@download/file

On 20 November 2024, Lieutenant General Ahmed Khalifa oversaw the candidate selection process for Egypt's military institutes, emphasizing transparency and equality.³²² This reflects Egypt's commitment to promote accountability and integrity in public sector recruitment, aligning with broader anti-corruption efforts.

On 3 December 2024, Egypt's House of Representatives approved the member's access to the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Convention under the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).³²³ This agreement will enhance cooperation among members by sharing information and intelligence for the purpose of preventing, detecting, prosecuting and recovering from corruption-related offenses.

On 5 January 2025, Minister of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation Rania Al-Mashat spoke at Egypt's launch of the E-voting System and the Complaints and Performance Monitoring Program.³²⁴ This initiative upholds Egypt's commitment to transparency and anti-corruption under Egypt's Vision 2030 and its members' National Anti-Corruption Strategy.

On 16 March 2025, the Administrative Control Authority and National Anti-Corruption Academy hosted a regional meeting in Cairo with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to promote business integrity in surrounding regions.³²⁵ This initiative highlights Egypt's actions towards preventing corruption in the private sector and promoting ethical practices.

On 29 April 2025, Assistant Minister for Multilateral International and Regional Economic Affairs Ragui El-Etreby attended the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries.³²⁶ As the host, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption. They also reaffirmed their commitment against corruption through the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Egypt has not complied with its commitment to prevent and fight against corruption and strengthen coordination on the major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Egypt has taken action in preventing and fighting corruption, such as emphasizing transparency and equality in military candidate selection and launching the E-Voting system, although such actions do not constitute strong actions as they are purely domestic and does not promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption. Egypt's statement at the Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries, as well as its participation of the UNODC meeting, constitutes weak or indirect action in promoting BRICS cooperation as there is no evidence of strong contributions to the discussions. Egypt has taken action in strengthening coordination such as signing the Makkah Al-Mukarramah Convention, which enables sharing of best practices between BRICS member and non-member states that belong to the OIC.

³²² Lieutenant General Ahmed Khalifa, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Observes the Selection Process for Candidates Applying to the Non-Commissioned Officers Institute and the Health Institutes, Ministry of Defense – Armed Forces News (Cairo) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.mod.gov.eg/ModWebSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=44299>

³²³ Parl't approves Egypt's accession to OIC anti-corruption convention, Middle Eastern News Agency (Cairo) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 6 June 2025. <https://www.mena.org.eg/en/news/dbcall/table/textnews/id/10976771>

³²⁴ H.E. Dr. Rania Al-Mashat, Minister of Planning, Economic Development, and International Cooperation, attends the launch of the E-Voting System and the Complaints and Performance Monitoring Program at the Administrative Prosecution Authority, Ministry of Planning, Economic Development & International Cooperation (Cairo) 5 January 2025. Access Date: 6 June 2025. https://mped.gov.eg/singlenews?id=5933&lang=en&utm_

³²⁵ Building a Culture of Integrity: How Businesses in MENA Are Strengthening Anti-Corruption Efforts, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Cairo) 16 March 2025. Access Date: 19 July 2025. https://www.unodc.org/romena/en/Stories/2025/March/building-a-culture-of-integrity_-how-businesses-in-mena-are-strengthening-anti-corruption-efforts.html

³²⁶ Chair's Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf/@@download/file

Thus, Egypt receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Nabiba Habib

Ethiopia: 0

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

On 2 November 2024, Oromia Attorney General's Bureau launched a corruption investigation into executives of Kenticha Mining Plc and African Mining and Energy Plc over suspicions of embezzlement and fraud.³²⁷ This action reflects Ethiopia's evolving ability to increase public accountability and address large-scale financial schemes, misconduct and corruption.

On 15 January 2025, Ethiopian Customs Commission hosted a multi-stakeholder Collective Action Event in Addis Ababa, supported by the World Customs Organization.³²⁸ This opportunity reaffirmed Ethiopia's commitment by opening conversations on strengthening joint actions against corruption and instilling accountability in customs operations.

On 29 April 2025, Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos attended the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries. As the host, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption.³²⁹ They also reaffirmed their commitment to the furthering of relevant international agreements, particularly the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Ethiopia has not complied with its commitment to addressing international crime and coordinating with BRICS. Ethiopia has taken weak action in promoting BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption, such as opening corruption investigations and participating in the Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries without evidence of strong contributions to the discussions. Ethiopia has also taken action in strengthening cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda by hosting the Collective Action Event and attending the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries.

Thus, Ethiopia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Christina Paola Carballo

India: -1

India has not complied with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

³²⁷ Oromia launches corruption investigation into Kenticha Mining execs, The Reporter (Oromia) 2 November 2024. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/42405/>

³²⁸ Combating Corruption and Advancing Integrity in Ethiopia – A productive Collective Action Event with the Ethiopian Customs Commission and Key Partners, World Customs Organization (n.d.) 21 January 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2025/january/combating-corruption-and-advancing-integrity-in-ethiopia.aspx?>

³²⁹ Chair's Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf/@download/file

On 28 October 2024, the Ministry of Home Affairs launched investigations against illegal payment gateways created by transnational cybercriminals.³³⁰ Police forces in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh police carried out statewide raids to tackle cybercriminal activities of setting up illegal digital payment systems through rented bank accounts for money laundering purposes, typically used in other organized criminal activities.

On 7 March 2025, the Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Tuhin Kanta Pandey emphasized India's aim to improve transparency through market regulations, aimed to increase international trust.³³¹

On 29 April 2025, Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs Dammu Ravi attended the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries. As the host, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption.³³² They also reaffirmed their commitment to the furthering of relevant international agreements, particularly the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

India has not complied with its commitment to strengthening BRICS cooperation on preventing corruption, fighting against corruption and promoting collaboration on international anti-corruption issues. India has taken a variety of actions in the prevention of and fight against corruption, such as warning against illegal payment gateways and improving regulator transparency, although such actions are purely domestic and does not involve cooperation with other BRICS members. India has also taken weak action in strengthening BRICS cooperation on the two commitment areas, such as attending the Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries without evidence of strong, meaningful participation in discussions.

Thus, India receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Aditi Malhotra

Indonesia: 0

Indonesia has partially complied with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).

On 24 January 2025, the Office of Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation encouraged organizational leaders in government institutions to commit to eradicating corruption, especially bribes and gratuities.³³³ The government reiterated this commitment after the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) released a report revealing high levels of bribery and gratification in ministries and local governments.

On 31 January 2025, the Minister of Human Rights Natalius Pigai emphasized the importance of transparent governance as the Ministry launched the integrity zone development as part of their commitment to creating a

³³⁰ Centre warns against illegal digital payment gateways set up by cybercriminals, Hindustan Times (Delhi) 28 October 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/centre-warns-against-illegal-digital-payment-gateways-set-up-by-cybercriminals-101730135522559.html>

³³¹ India markets regulator to boost transparency, including on board conflicts, chair says, Reuters (Mumbai) 7 March 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-markets-regulator-boost-transparency-including-board-conflicts-chair-says-2025-03-07/>

³³² India participates in BRICS Sherpas meeting, discussions held on multilateralism and sustainable development (Rio de Janeiro de Janeiro) 26 April 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/others/india-participates-in-brics-sherpas-meeting-discussions-held-on-multilateralism-and-sustainable-development20250426003101/>

³³³ KPK Rilis Hasil Survei Penilaian Integritas 2024, Korupsi Masih Rentan di Pemerintah, Portal Informasi Indonesia (Jakarta) 24 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/politik-hukum/8927/kpk-rilis-hasil-survei-penilaian-integritas-2024-korupsi-masih-rentan-di-pemerintah?lang=1>

corruption-free zone and promoting an anti-corruption work culture.³³⁴ This declaration serves as a pledge and a crucial step towards anti-corruption practices and transparent work environments.

On 10 February 2025, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto led a workshop and discussion titled “Supporting Indonesia in Fighting Foreign Bribery: Towards Accession to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.” The discussions aim to align Indonesia with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) anti-corruption standards towards transparency and accountability.³³⁵

On 5 February 2025, the KPK signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Interior (Kemendagri), the Attorney General’s Office (Kejagung), the Republic of Indonesia Police (Polri) and the Special Development and Investigation Control Agency (Bappisus) to strengthen supervision over licensing in core areas of economic progress.³³⁶ This agreement stresses the importance of improving standard licensing regulations for public services to run efficiently, preventing corruption.

On 28 February 2025, the KPK and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) partnered to deliver specialized training to anti-corruption agencies of Indonesia to combat financial crimes effectively.³³⁷ The aim of the training is to fight corruption, protect public money and recover assets through inter-agency cooperation and intelligence-sharing mechanisms.

On 13 March 2025, President Prabowo Subianto announced his plan to build a prison on a remote island dedicated to penalizing corrupt individuals who have committed “offences against the nation”.³³⁸ President Subianto plans to allocate a significant budget for this plan, showing that Indonesia is reinforcing the consequences of corruption as part of its broader anti-corruption efforts.

On 27 March 2025, Coordinating Minister for Law, Human Rights, Immigration and Corrections Yusril Ihza Mahendra emphasized the government’s commitment to eliminating corruption by bidding to join as a member of OECD Global Anti-Corruption Forum.³³⁹ By joining the forum, Indonesia aims to fight corruption nationally and globally by international standard.

On 29 April 2025, Foreign Minister Sugiono attended the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries. As the host, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption.³⁴⁰ They also reaffirmed their commitment to the furthering of relevant international agreements, particularly the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Indonesia has partially complied with the commitment to prevent and fight against corruption and strengthen coordination on the major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including the United Nations

³³⁴ Ministry launches integrity zone as anti-corruption commitment, ANTARA News (Jakarta) 31 January 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://en.antaranews.com/news/343294/ministry-launches-integrity-zone-as-anti-corruption-commitment?>

³³⁵ Indonesia commits to fight bribery to support OECD accession, ANTARA News (Jakarta) 10 February 2025. Access Date: 7 June 2025. <https://en.antaranews.com/news/344361/indonesia-commits-to-fight-bribery-to-support-oecd-accession?>

³³⁶ KPK dan Kemendagri Perkuat Pengawasan Perizinan Daerah untuk Cegah Korupsi, Portal Informasi Indonesia (Jakarta) 5 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/politik-hukum/8987/kpk-dan-kemendagri-perkuat-pengawasan-perizinan-daerah-untuk-cegah-korupsi?lang=1>

³³⁷ Indonesia strengthens financial investigation capabilities to fight corruption, UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific (Jakarta) 28 February 2025. Access Date: 27 May 2025.

<https://www.unodc.org/roseap/en/indonesia/2025/02/financial-investigation-fight-corruption/story.html>

³³⁸ Prabowo shares plan to build corruptor prison on remote island, Antara News (Jakarta) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 14 July 2025. <https://en.antaranews.com/news/348309/prabowo-shares-plan-to-build-corruptor-prison-on-remote-island>

³³⁹ Indonesia seeks OECD membership to strengthen anti-corruption efforts (Jakarta) 28 March 2025. Access Date: 11 June 2025. <https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/4036/policy-and-governance/indonesia-seeks-oecd-membership-to-strengthen-anti-corruption-efforts>

³⁴⁰ Chair’s Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf/@@download/file

Convention Against Corruption. Indonesia has taken various actions in the prevention of and fight against corruption, such as issuing statements of encouragement and memorandums, launching workshops, initiating integrity zone developments, cooperating with the UNDOC and building the new prison, although such actions are either purely domestic or does not involve cooperation with other BRICS members. Indonesia has also taken weak action in strengthening BRICS cooperation on the two commitment areas, such as attending the Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries without evidence of strong, meaningful participation in discussions.

Thus, Indonesia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Aanya Gupta

Iran: 0

Iran has partially complied with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

On 3 December 2024, President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged the importance of transparency for dealing with the financial crisis in the country in an interview.³⁴¹ President Pezeshkian assured that the national budget is prepared with a clear presentation of figures that reflect the reality and prevent the introduction of inflationary policies.

On 9 December 2024, Head of the Organizational Governance Commissions at the Tehran Chamber of Commerce Hassan Forouzan-Fard stated that the Tehran Chamber of Commerce Industries, Mines and Agriculture's Anti-Corruption Committee has developed regulations for tackling corruption and is committed to pursuing the matter rigorously.³⁴² This was addressed at the 10th Anti-Corruption Conference as part of the anti-corruption agenda of the Tehran Chamber.

On 27 November 2024, Deputy Minister of Justice Ali Kazemi attended and signed the Makkah Convention at the Second Ministerial Meeting of Anti-Corruption Law Enforcement Authorities in the member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.³⁴³ This reinforces Iran's commitment to cooperate among member states to effectively combat corruption while upholding unity.

On 15 April 2025, Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Tajikistan's Defense Minister Lieutenant General Emomali Sobirzoda to emphasize the need to enhance regional security and combat organized crime.³⁴⁴ This collaboration reiterates Iran's commitment to upholding institutional integrity and fostering bilateral cooperation.

³⁴¹ Economic Analysis: Interview with Dr. Masoud Pezeshkian, President of Iran, Tehran Times (Tehran) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/507056/Economic-Analysis-Interview-with-Dr-Masoud-Pezeshkian-President>

³⁴² TCCIMA's Anti-Corruption Committee collaborates with ISO, Tehran Times (Tehran) 9 December 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/507273/TCCIMA-s-Anti-Corruption-Committee-collaborates-with-ISO>

³⁴³ Iran determined to actively contribute to anti-corruption efforts: Official, Islamic Republic News Agency (Doha) 7 November 2024. Access Date: 5 June 2025. <https://en.irna.ir/news/85675336/Iran-determined-to-actively-contribute-to-anti-corruption-efforts?>

³⁴⁴ Iran, Tajikistan Pledge Closer Defense Ties, Joint Fight Against Terrorism, Caspian News (Tehran) 17 April 2025. Access Date: 22 July 2025. <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/iran-tajikistan-pledge-closer-defense-ties-joint-fight-against-terrorism-2025-4-16-0/>

On 16 April 2025, the Iranian Parliament approved a bill permitting the government to join the Asian-Pacific Accreditation Co-operation.³⁴⁵ This action helps combat corruption by promoting transparency and parliamentary oversight, ensuring that Iran's accreditation process is subject to public and legislative scrutiny.

On 29 April 2025, Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Diplomacy Seyed Rasoul Mohajer attended the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries. As the host, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption.³⁴⁶ They also reaffirmed their commitment to the furthering of relevant international agreements, particularly the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Iran has partially complied with the commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption and strengthen coordination on the major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Iran has taken action to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda by signing the Makkah Convention, attending the Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries and signaling its willingness to join the Asian-Pacific Accreditation Co-operation, although such actions falls short of active, continuous promotion and participation in coordination and cooperation. Iran has also taken a variety of unilateral, domestic actions in preventing and fighting corruption, such as preparing transparent budgets and developing regulations.

Thus, Iran receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Aanya Gupta

Russia: -1

Russia has not complied with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

On 29 April 2025, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov attended the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries. As the host, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption.³⁴⁷ They also reaffirmed their commitment to the furthering of relevant international agreements, particularly the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Russia has not complied with its commitment to strengthening BRICS cooperation on preventing corruption, fighting against corruption and promoting collaboration on international anti-corruption issues. By combating corruption present within the governing apparatus and punishing those guilty, Russia has implemented steps to fight corruption on a national level. However, Russia lacks strong multilateral efforts to promote BRICS cooperation in fighting corruption and addressing the anti-corruption agenda besides attending the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries.

³⁴⁵ Iran parliament greenlights membership in Asia-Pacific Accreditation Cooperation (APAC), Tehran Times (Tehran) 16 April 2025. Access Date: 12 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511920/Iran-parliament-greenlights-membership-in-Asia-Pacific-Accreditation>

³⁴⁶ Chair's Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf/@download/file

³⁴⁷ Chair's Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf/@download/file

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Aditi Malhotra

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

On 10 November 2024, Minister of Public Service and Administration Inkosi Mzamo Buthelezi launched the Regenesys Executive Leadership Development Programme in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to professionalize and reform the public sector through ethical leadership training.³⁴⁸ This action reinforces South Africa's commitment to combating corruption by ensuring public sector leaders uphold the values of accountability, transparency and integrity.

On 13 November 2024, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs Njabulo Nzuza opened the inaugural Border Management Conference, where he emphasized the Border Management Authority's (BMA) commitment to effectively combating corruption.³⁴⁹ Deputy Minister Nzuza outlined the BMA's mission to create private sector relationships that focus on investing in technology and security firms in order to digitally transform the documentation and immigration process. This aims to enhance South Africa's national security and economic development while ensuring strong law enforcement authority.

On 10 December 2024, Minister Inkosi Mzamo Buthelezi chaired the Third Confidence of State Parties to the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, calling for accelerated implementation of the Charter to strengthen ethical governance and accountability.³⁵⁰ Throughout the conference, Minister Buthelezi emphasized the need to acknowledge the interconnectedness between ethical governance, public administration, policy implementation and anti-corruption.

On 11 February 2025, Minister of Police Senzo Mchunu strongly condemned any form of abuse of power, corruption and criminal activities by government officials entrusted with serving the public.³⁵¹ This statement followed the takedown operation targeting officials at Lephalale Local Municipality who were under investigation for corruption, fraud and contravening the Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996.

On 20 February 2025, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development published a press statement concerning its release of Discussion Paper 165 which included the use of Non-Trial Resolutions (NTRs) for corruption cases.³⁵² NTRs are a form of public-private cooperation and anti-corruption strategy prescribed by

³⁴⁸ Opening statement by Minister of public service and administration, Inkosi Mzamo Buthelezi at the conference of state parties to the African charter on values and principles of public service and administration, Department of Service and Administration (South Africa) 10 November 2024. Access Date: 6 June 2025.

https://www.dpsa.gov.za/documents/speeches/speech_10_11_2024.pdf

³⁴⁹ The Border Management Authority Is getting down to work, Department of Home Affairs (Pretoria) 13 November 2024. Access Date: 31 May 2025. <https://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/statements-speeches/1840-the-border-management-authority-is-getting-down-to-work>

³⁵⁰ Opening statement by Minister of public service and administration, Inkosi Mzamo Buthelezi at the conference of state parties to the African charter on values and principles of public service and administration, Department of Service and Administration (South Africa) 10 December 2024. Access Date: 6 June 2025.

<https://www.dpsa.gov.za/documents/speeches/OPENING%20STATEMENT%20BY%20MINISTER%20OF%20PUBLIC%20SERVICE%20AND%20ADMINISTRATION,%20INKOSI%20MZAMO%20BUTHELEZI%20-%20CONFERENCE%20OF%20STATE%20PARTIES%20TO%20THE%20AFRICAN%20CHARTER%20ON%20VALUES%20AND%20PRINCIPLES%20OF%20PUBLIC%20SERVICE%20AND%20ADMINISTRATION,%2010%20DEC%202024.pdf>

³⁵¹ Media Statement from the Office of the Minister of Police, Police Secretariat (Pretoria) 11 February 2025. Access Date: 31 May 2025. https://www.policesecretariat.gov.za/sites/default/files/documents/media_11022025.pdf

³⁵² PRESS STATEMENT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION CONCERNING ITS RELEASE OF DISCUSSION PAPER 165 ON NON-TRIAL RESOLUTIONS: PROJECT 151, Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (Pretoria) 20 February 2025. Access Date: 31 May 2025. <https://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/media/20250220-ms-dp165-Non-TrialResolutions.pdf>

the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Using NTRs would save prosecuting authorities time and resources used for complex corruption cases that would have lasted for up to ten years.

On 29 April 2025, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Lamola attended the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries. As the host, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption.³⁵³ They also reaffirmed their commitment to the furthering of relevant international agreements, particularly the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

South Africa has fully complied with the commitment to the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening coordination on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. South Africa has taken weak action in promoting BRICS cooperation in the two commitment areas by attending the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries, which falls short of active, continuous promotion and participation in coordination and cooperation. South Africa has also taken a wide variety of domestic, unilateral actions in the prevention and fight against corruption, such as working with the UNDP, issuing statements of support for anti-corruption efforts, strengthening private sector cooperation, publishing reports and dismissing officials.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Nabiba Habib

United Arab Emirates: -1

The United Arab Emirates has failed to comply with its commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption and strengthening of cooperation on major issues of the international anti-corruption agenda, including United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

On 31 January 2025 the Ministry of Interior and the Dubai Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority signed a Memorandum of Understanding to safeguard financial systems and combat money laundering or related fraudulent crimes.³⁵⁴ This partnership reflects the UAE's dedication to enhancing measures to detect and prevent financial corruption crimes.

On 29 April 2025, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for International Cooperation Reem bint Ebrahim Al Hashimy attended the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member and Partner Countries. As the host, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira issued a chair statement reaffirming their commitment to promote BRICS cooperation in the prevention and fight against corruption.³⁵⁵ They also reaffirmed their commitment to the furthering of relevant international agreements, particularly the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

The United Arab Emirates has not complied with its commitment to addressing international crime and coordinating with other BRICS members. While they attended the BRICS meeting for Ministers of Foreign Affairs, there is no evidence of individual contributions. The United Arab Emirates has also taken weak action domestically in the prevention and fight against corruption, such as signing the Memorandum of Understanding.

³⁵³ Chair's Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf/@download/file

³⁵⁴ MOI and Dubai Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority Ink MOU, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Interior (Rio de Janeiro) 31 January 2025. Access Date: 18 July 2025. <https://moi.gov.ae/en/media.center/news/013125n01.aspx>

³⁵⁵ Chair's Statement of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations of BRICS Member Countries (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. https://brics.br/en/documents/2025-04-29_brics-mfa-chairs-statement.pdf/@download/file

Thus, United Arab Emirates receives a score of -1 .

Analyst: Christina Paola Carballo

4. Food and Agriculture: Trade in Agricultural Fertilizers

“We commit to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.”

XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil		0	
China		0	
Egypt		0	
Ethiopia		0	
India			+1
Indonesia		0	
Iran		0	
Russia			+1
South Africa		0	
United Arab Emirates		0	
Average		+0.20 (60%)	

Background

Food security and agricultural trade remain core concerns for BRICS countries, whose combined agricultural production accounts for over one-third of global output. Fluctuating food prices, weaponized trade measures, climate-related supply shocks and disruptions triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic have compelled BRICS to strengthen multilateral approaches to food systems and essential agricultural inputs. As both major producers and consumers, BRICS countries promote cooperation in agriculture that avoids undue trade restrictions and aligns with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The 2024 Kazan Summit’s pledge to minimize disruptions and uphold rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers continues BRICS’s long-standing agenda on food security, sustainable agriculture and resilient supply chains.

At the 2009 Yekaterinburg Summit, BRICS leaders issued a joint statement on global food security, underscoring the need to stabilize food supplies and collectively address hunger and market volatility.³⁵⁶ They framed food security as a shared responsibility and urged efforts to boost agricultural productivity to ensure consistent access to food.

At the 2010 Brasília Summit, BRICS leaders welcomed the first Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, where they committed to collaborate on family farming, develop an agricultural information base and advance agricultural technology to address climate change.³⁵⁷ This moment launched BRICS’s structured efforts to institutionalize agricultural cooperation.

At the 2011 Sanya Summit, BRICS leaders identified commodity price volatility as a major economic risk and advocated for stronger regulation of derivatives markets and greater access to reliable market data.³⁵⁸ They proposed the BRICS System of Agricultural Information and pledged to maintain regular meetings among agriculture ministers to facilitate ongoing policy dialogue.

³⁵⁶ Joint Statement on Global Food Security, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 June 2009. Access Date: 18 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-food-security.html

³⁵⁷ 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 April 2010. Access Date: 18 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html

³⁵⁸ Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 19 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html

At the 2012 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders declared food and energy security central to sustainable development.³⁵⁹ They pushed for stricter commodity market oversight and endorsed the second Meeting of BRICS Agriculture Ministers, which emphasized higher productivity, market transparency and nutrition-focused cooperation. The Delhi Action Plan mandated continued engagement among ministers and experts to strengthen agricultural capacity.

At the 2013 Durban Summit, BRICS leaders linked food and nutrition security with infrastructure development and employment creation, especially in Africa.³⁶⁰ They supported sustainable agriculture through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and called for broader partnerships to combat food price volatility, which they described as a threat to the macroeconomic stability of low-income countries.

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed support for a fair multilateral trade system and pressed for resolution of Doha Round issues such as public stockholding.³⁶¹ They facilitated the exchange of information on food access, climate-resilient agriculture and family farming. They also marked the UN's recognition of the International Year of Family Farming and emphasized the importance of smallholders in ensuring food access.

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS leaders adopted the Strategy for the BRICS Economic Partnership and named agricultural cooperation as a key area.³⁶² They prioritized innovation, climate resilience and targeted food distribution, deepened cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and called for better land management and improved market data. Leaders also aligned their commitments with the International Year of Soils to emphasize soil sustainability.

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS leaders supported science-based agriculture, digital tools and land sustainability.³⁶³ They signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to create the BRICS Agricultural Research Platform (ARP), which aimed to assist smallholder farmers and expand productivity. Leaders also focused on improving irrigation systems to combat drought and facilitate water-sharing practices.

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS leaders agreed to expand agricultural cooperation in five key areas: food and nutrition security, climate adaptation, technological development, trade and investment and information and communication technology (ICT).³⁶⁴ They launched the ARP Coordination Center in India, adopted the 2017–2020 Agricultural Cooperation Action Plan and encouraged inclusive innovation for rural producers.

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders reiterated support for the ARP and introduced the Basic Agricultural Information Exchange System (BAIES).³⁶⁵ They emphasized infrastructure investment in Africa and encouraged the inclusion of smaller firms in global value chains. The leaders also expanded the BRICS agricultural agenda to spotlight micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) as vital players in promoting rural growth.

³⁵⁹ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 19 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html

³⁶⁰ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 19 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html

³⁶¹ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 20 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html

³⁶² VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 20 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

³⁶³ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 20 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html

³⁶⁴ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 19 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html

³⁶⁵ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 20 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html

At the 2019 Brasília Summit, BRICS leaders endorsed the outcomes of the ninth Agriculture Ministers Meeting and promoted agribusiness initiatives through the BRICS Business Council.³⁶⁶ They reaffirmed their commitment to research, poverty reduction and agricultural innovation. They also released the Bonito Declaration, which laid out strategies for environmental sustainability, hunger eradication and green technology.

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, BRICS leaders responded to Covid-19's impact on food systems by stressing the importance of uninterrupted supply chains that comply with WTO rules.³⁶⁷ They called on members to resist protectionism and apply targeted, temporary measures. Leaders also prioritized smallholder support, rural development, food waste reduction and technological adaptation for agricultural resilience.

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders endorsed the 2021–2024 Action Plan for Agricultural Cooperation and spotlighted the use of space technologies to study food systems.³⁶⁸ They praised the ARP and the Agricultural Information Exchange System for driving rural development and promoted digital tools like climate modeling and smart farming to modernize agriculture.

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS leaders committed to strengthening agricultural cooperation under the Strategy on Food Security and to advancing the 2021–2024 Action Plan.³⁶⁹ They encouraged greater involvement from the BRICS Business Council and pledged support for African development. Leaders also identified fertilizer access and input supply chains as critical issues amid geopolitical instability.

At the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders advocated for a market-based, equitable agricultural trading system and denounced sanctions and restrictions that hinder food trade.³⁷⁰ They supported sustainability and women's inclusion in farming and reaffirmed their goal of completing WTO negotiations under Article 20. Leaders also backed public food reserves and protective mechanisms for developing countries.

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, BRICS leaders emphasized that food and fertilizer trade must remain free from restrictive economic measures that violate WTO rules.³⁷¹ They reiterated their support for smallholder farmers, resilient agricultural practices and international collaboration to prevent hunger. Leaders also proposed the creation of a BRICS Grain Exchange to ensure the steady availability of agricultural goods.

Commitment Features

This commitment has the goals of minimizing disruptions and promoting rules-based trade for agriculture broadly and for fertilizer specifically, in order to ensure the overarching welfare target of a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. It is underpinned by the values statement in the leaders' communiqué that such inputs should be exempted from restrictive economic measures taken in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Definitions and Concepts

“Minimize” is understood to mean “to reduce something to the least possible level or amount.”³⁷²

³⁶⁶ Brasília Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 21 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasilia.html

³⁶⁷ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 22 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html

³⁶⁸ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 September 2021. Access Date: 22 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html

³⁶⁹ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 22 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html

³⁷⁰ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 22 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html

³⁷¹ XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 22 May 2025. www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html

³⁷² Minimize, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/minimize>

“Promote” is understood to mean “support or renew old efforts or create new efforts in the area. It should not have to be a new initiative. To contribute to growth or prosperity of, to help bring into being.”³⁷³

“Disruptions” is understood to mean “the action of preventing something, especially a system, process, or event, from continuing as usual or as expected.”³⁷⁴

“Trade” is understood to mean “the activity of buying and selling, or exchanging, good and/or services between people or countries.”³⁷⁵

“Ensure” is understood to mean “to make something certain to happen.”³⁷⁶

“WTO rules” are understood to mean “the rules of trade between nations ... to use trade as a means to improve people’s living standards, create better jobs and promote sustainable development.”³⁷⁷ “Inconsistent with WTO rules” is understood to mean actions conflicting with WTO restrictions.

General Interpretive Guidelines

This commitment refers to two actions relating to agriculture broadly and, more specifically, fertilizers: 1) to minimize disruptions and 2) to promote rules-based trade. The overarching welfare target is a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. This commitment thus has four aspects.

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to BRICS members that take strong action to minimize disruption and promote rules-based trade in agriculture broadly and specifically in fertilizers in order to maintain a continuous flow of food and essential agricultural inputs. Full compliance thus includes all four aspects of the commitment.

Strong actions to minimize disruptions include removing or avoiding trade restrictions on food and fertilizers. Strong actions to promote rules-based trade include actively encouraging international adherence to WTO rules such as by actively supporting WTO-compliant agricultural trade policies, facilitating agricultural shipments during crises, or publicly advocating against restrictive measures on agricultural producers and exporters. From this, these actions should aim towards ensuring continuous flow by securing the imports and exports of food and essential inputs for agricultural production, explicitly including fertilizers.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that take strong action that involves at least two of the four aspects, such as minimizing disruptions for agriculture, or weak action involving at least three aspects, such as promoting rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizer. Examples of weak actions include verbal declarations of support, including public advocacy, diplomacy and attending meetings without actively participating.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1, will be assigned to BRICS members that takes weak action involving all four aspects or take inconsistent action, such as supporting rules-based trade in public statements while maintaining some agricultural export restrictions, facilitating food flows while restricting fertilizer trade, or removing some barriers while imposing other barriers that do not align with WTO rules. Other antithetical

³⁷³ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7, G20 and BRICS Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 22 May 2025. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

³⁷⁴ Disruption, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/disruption>

³⁷⁵ Trade, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/trade>

³⁷⁶ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7, G20 and BRICS Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 22 May 2025. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

³⁷⁷ What is the WTO? World Trade Organization (Geneva) n.d. Access Date: 22 May 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm

actions include implementing export bans on agriculture or fertilizers, restricting agricultural producers and exporters through measures that are inconsistent with WTO rules and blocking international agricultural trade.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member has taken weak action involving three of the four aspects of this commitment to 1) minimize disruptions and 2) promote rules-based trade in 3) agriculture generally and 4) fertilizers specifically or has taken significant action directly antithetical to the commitment.
0	The BRICS member has taken strong action involving at least two of the four aspects or weak action in all four aspects.
+1	The BRICS member has taken strong action in all four aspects.

Compliance Director: Antonette De Los Reyes
Lead Analyst: Lillian Toe

Brazil: 0

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 20 November 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in Brasília where they signed 37 agreements covering agriculture, infrastructure, energy and technology.³⁷⁸ President Lula da Silva emphasized shared priorities in sustainable development and food security. Both leaders agreed to establish joint task forces on finance and productive development. The agreements signed by the two presidents represents efforts to minimize disruptions in agriculture trading.

On 27 December 2024, the Brazilian government released a joint statement in response to China's investigation into global bovine meat imports.³⁷⁹ The government reaffirmed respect for China's decision and emphasized its intention to defend Brazil's agricultural sector and engage constructively throughout the process. As China serves as Brazil's primary export market for beef, the government reiterated that these exports complement rather than harm China's domestic supply. This diplomatic response highlights Brazil's efforts to prevent trade disruptions and maintain stable agricultural exports.

On 14 February 2025, Governor of the State of Goiás Ronaldo Caiado met Indian Minister of State for Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare Bhagirath Choudhary at Krishi Bhawan in New Delhi to advance agricultural cooperation between India and Brazil.³⁸⁰ The discussion focused on strengthening collaboration in sugarcane, ethanol and pulses and expanding efforts in research, innovation and digital agriculture through shared agro-climatic conditions.

On 6 March 2025, President Lula da Silva submitted several international agreements to Congress, including a cooperation agreement with Bangladesh in agriculture, livestock and natural resource management.³⁸¹ The agreement also promotes training for small and medium enterprises and sustainable forest management. These

³⁷⁸ Brazil and China Expand Bilateral Relations During State Visit by President Xi Jinping, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil-and-china-expand-bilateral-relations-during-state-visit-by-president-xi-jinping>

³⁷⁹ Joint statement on investigation regarding bovine meat imports announced by China, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 27 December 2024. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/12/joint-statement-on-investigation-regarding-bovine-meat-imports-announced-by-china>

³⁸⁰ H.E. Governor Mr. Ronaldo Caiado, Governor of the State of Goiás, Brazil calls on Shri Bhagirath Choudhary, Minister of State for Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare at Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 14 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2103391>

³⁸¹ President Lula submits international agreements on defense, technical cooperation, humanitarian assistance to Congress, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 7 March 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/03/president-lula-submits-international-agreements-on-defense-technical-cooperation-humanitarian-assistance-to-congress>

initiatives aim to foster rural development and strengthen Brazil's global agricultural partnerships, aligning with the country's effort to secure food systems and trade cooperation.

On 13 March 2025, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock furthered trade ties with Chile, specifically regarding agribusiness supply chain integration, advancing agribusiness trade and export opportunities.³⁸²

On 24 March 2025, Acting President and Minister of Development, Industry, Trade and Services Geraldo Alckmin participated in the "Rumos 2025" seminar to outline Brazil's strategy for sustainable development, trade and climate leadership.³⁸³ He emphasized Brazil's key role in global food and energy security, highlighted progress on trade negotiations with the United States and China and reaffirmed Brazil's climate commitments ahead of COP30.

On 25 March 2025, President Lula da Silva met with meat exporters in Japan to advocate for opening the Japanese market to Brazilian beef.³⁸⁴ He was joined by ministers and industry leaders and reaffirmed Brazil's readiness to meet Japan's trade and sanitary standards. President Lula da Silva emphasized the importance of expanding agricultural exports and identified ethanol and clean energy as strategic sectors for bilateral trade. The initiative demonstrates Brazil's effort to diversify food markets and strengthen global trade partnerships.

On 26 March 2025, President Lula da Silva and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba signed ten agreements and over 80 cooperation instruments aimed at deepening Brazil–Japan trade and strategic partnership.³⁸⁵ The two leaders committed to expanding bilateral trade beyond USD17 billion, strengthening collaboration in areas such as sustainable mobility, digital innovation, degraded land recovery and the energy transition. These actions contribute to Brazil's BRICS Kazan Summit goals of fostering inclusive economic partnerships, promoting climate cooperation and advancing rules-based international trade.

On 28 March 2025, President Lula da Silva announced that Vietnam would begin importing Brazilian beef after 20 years of negotiations.³⁸⁶ The agreement followed meetings with Vietnamese leaders, including the Prime Minister and marked a major step in expanding Brazil's agricultural exports. President Lula da Silva also noted Vietnam's potential to serve as a hub for Brazilian meat exports to Southeast Asia. This move supports Brazil's effort to strengthen food trade and minimize disruptions in agricultural supply chains.

On 29 March 2025, President Lula da Silva addressed the Brazil-Vietnam Economic Forum and called for a new phase of cooperation focused on trade, agriculture and renewable energy.³⁸⁷ He highlighted Vietnam's role as a key partner and reaffirmed Brazil's commitment to deepening food trade, citing the recent beef export agreement. President Lula da Silva also emphasized shared goals such as sustainable development and recognized Vietnam as a market economy, underscoring mutual support for rules-based global trade.

³⁸² Brazil and Chile deepen agribusiness trade relations in high-level mission, Ministério da Agricultura e Pecuária (Brasília) 24 March 2025. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/agricultura/en/news/brazil-and-chile-deepen-agribusiness-trade-relations-in-high-level-mission>

³⁸³ Alckmin: We are the major player on climate, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília), 25 March 2025. Access Date: 17 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/03/alckmin-we-are-the-major-player-on-climate>

³⁸⁴ Lula to meat exporters in Japan: we are here to open doors, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 26 March 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/03/lula-to-meat-exporters-in-japan-we-are-here-to-open-doors>

³⁸⁵ Lula: "Brazil–Japan relationship reaches new dimension," Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 27 March 2025. Access Date: 17 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/03/lula-201cbrazil-japan-relationship-reaches-new-dimension201d>

³⁸⁶ President Lula announces the opening of the Vietnamese market to Brazilian meat, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 1 April 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/es/ultimas-noticias/2025/04/el-presidente-lula-anuncia-la-apertura-del-mercado-vietnamita-a-la-carne-brasilena>

³⁸⁷ Lula to business leaders in Vietnam: "A framework for a new phase of cooperation", Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 29 March 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/es/ultimas-noticias/2025/03/lula-a-los-empresarios-en-vietnam-201cun-marco-en-una-nueva-fase-de-cooperacion201d>

On 29 March 2025, President Lula da Silva visited Vietnam and announced the opening of the Vietnamese market to Brazilian beef following several high-level meetings.³⁸⁸ Vietnam has become Brazil's fourth-largest destination for agricultural exports. President Lula da Silva's visit also resulted in new agreements on trade, industrial cooperation and biofuels, with both countries aiming to strengthen food security and energy partnerships. These actions demonstrate Brazil's effort to expand agricultural trade and secure stable input flows.

On 29 March 2025, President Lula da Silva and Vietnamese President Luong Cuong adopted the Brazil–Vietnam Plan of Action for 2025–2030, which outlines cooperation in six key areas, including trade, science and innovation.³⁸⁹ The plan affirms both countries' commitment to expanding bilateral trade and cooperation on sustainable development, with a focus on agricultural trade, climate resilience and digital innovation. These actions reflect Brazil's support for the BRICS Kazan Summit's commitment to promote rules-based trade and foster development partnerships, particularly in the agricultural sectors involving animal protein.

On 20 April 2025, Minister of Agriculture and Livestock Carlos Henrique Baquetta Favero and Brazilian Minister of Agricultural Development and Family Agriculture Luiz Paulo Teixeira met with Indian Union Agriculture Minister Sivraj Chouhan during the 15th BRICS Agriculture Ministers' Meeting.³⁹⁰ The meeting, held under the theme "Promoting inclusive and sustainable agriculture through cooperation, innovation and equitable trade among BRICS countries," focused on enhancing bilateral cooperation in soybean production, mechanization, irrigation, agricultural trade, food processing and research. These discussions contributed to promoting rules-based agricultural trade and sustained flows of essential inputs.

On 22 April 2025, President Lula da Silva participated in the Brazil-Chile Business Forum in Brasília, which aimed to strengthen trade between the two countries.³⁹¹ During the event, President Lula da Silva emphasized the importance of equitable trade and reaffirmed the need to respect national sovereignty in international partnerships. The forum concluded with the signing of 13 agreements, including cooperation in agriculture, livestock and food-related sectors. These developments reflect Brazil's ongoing effort to promote rules-based trade and deepen regional integration through formal economic cooperation.

On 29 April 2025, Brazil and India negotiated on the Indian export of 5 citrus products to Brazil.³⁹² These include Tahiti lime, Sicilian lemon, sweet orange, tangerine and similar fruits.

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. Brazil demonstrated consistent and proactive efforts to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade on agriculture by strengthening ties with major importers such as China, Vietnam, Japan and Chile and supporting food security initiatives at international forums. However, no actions have been taken to promote rules-based trade in fertilizers specifically.

³⁸⁸ Brazil and Vietnam strengthen alliances during President Lula and ministers' visit to Asia, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 2 April 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/04/brazil-and-vietnam-strengthen-alliances-during-president-lula-and-ministers-visit-to-asia>

³⁸⁹ Joint Statement on the Occasion of the State Visit of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to Vietnam, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 1 April 2025. Access Date: 17 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/follow-the-government/official-notices/joint-statement-on-the-occasion-of-the-state-visit-of-president-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-to-vietnam>

³⁹⁰ Union Agriculture Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chauhan's Brazil visit becomes important on many counts, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 20 April 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2123055>

³⁹¹ "A good deal is one where both countries profit," says Lula at Brazil-Chile Business Forum in Brasília, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 26 April 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/04/201ca-good-deal-is-one-where-both-countries-profit-201d-says-lula-at-brazil-chile-business-forum-in-brasilia>

³⁹² Opening of the Indian market for Brazilian citrus products. (Rio de Janeiro) 29 April 2025. Translated by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 August 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/abertura-de-mercado-na-india-para-produtos-citricos-brasileiros

Thus, Brazil receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Faryzki Noor Thoriq

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 14 November 2024, President Xi Jinping met with President Dina Boluarte of Peru and announced China's willingness to expand imports of high-quality agricultural products with Peruvian characteristics.³⁹³ The statement aimed to continue rules-based trade on agricultural products between China and Peru while reducing disruptions.

On 20 November 2024, President Xi attended a meeting with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brasília where they signed 37 agreements covering agriculture, infrastructure, energy and technology.³⁹⁴ The visit marked 50 years of diplomatic relations and reinforced China's position as Brazil's top trading partner in agricultural goods. President Lula da Silva emphasized shared priorities in sustainable development and food security. The agreements signed by the two presidents represents efforts to minimize disruptions in agriculture trading.

On 30 November 2024, President Xi and Brazilian President Lula da Silva jointly signed a document aligning the Belt and Road Initiative with Brazil's national development strategies, including the Accelerated Growth Plan, New Industrial Policy and South American Integration Route Plan.³⁹⁵ The agreement includes provisions for collaboration in agriculture, sustainable development, reinforcing South-South cooperation and supporting global food and trade security.

On 27 December 2024, the Brazilian government released a joint statement in response to China's investigation into global bovine meat imports.³⁹⁶ The government reaffirmed respect for China's decision and emphasized its intention to defend Brazil's agricultural sector and engage constructively throughout the process. As China serves as Brazil's primary export market for beef, the government reiterated that these exports complement rather than harm China's domestic supply.

On 13 February 2025, a delegation from the Chinese Customs Authority met Head of the Egyptian Agricultural Quarantine Authority Mohamed El-Mansi cooperation on facilitating Egyptian agricultural exports to China.³⁹⁷ This engagement promotes rules-based trade and minimizes disruptions to agricultural trade by enhancing bilateral cooperation and inspection procedures.

³⁹³ 习近平同秘鲁总统博鲁阿尔特举行会谈, 共产党员网 (Beijing) 15 November 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://www.12371.cn/2024/11/15/ARTI1731651884567367.shtml>

³⁹⁴ Brazil and China Expand Bilateral Relations During State Visit by President Xi Jinping, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil-and-china-expand-bilateral-relations-during-state-visit-by-president-xi-jinping>

³⁹⁵ 习近平同巴西总统卢拉举行会谈, 共产党员网 (Beijing) 30 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.12371.cn/2024/11/21/ARTI1732148671072367.shtml>

³⁹⁶ Joint statement on investigation regarding bovine meat imports announced by China, Palácio do Planalto (Brasília) 27 December 2024. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/12/joint-statement-on-investigation-regarding-bovine-meat-imports-announced-by-china>

³⁹⁷ وفد الجمارك الصينية يبحث تسهيل حركة الصادرات مع الحجر الزراعي المصري, وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Cairo) 13 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/-وفد-الجمارك-الصينية/>

On 7 May 2025, President Xi and French President Emmanuel Macron issued a joint statement on agricultural cooperation.³⁹⁸ The statement affirmed France's support for China's efforts to join the International Organization of Vine and Wine (OIV), reflecting China's efforts to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture through international organizations.

China has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. China has taken substantial measures to minimize disruptions and promote rule-based trade on agriculture with Peru and Brazil, as well as working to join the OIV. However, China has not taken significant action on fertilizers specifically.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Edith Wong

Egypt: 0

Egypt has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 24 November 2024, Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation Aala Farouk announced the opening of the Guatemalan market to Egyptian citrus exports for the first time.³⁹⁹ This action enhances Egypt's agricultural export infrastructure, broadens international market access and promotes rules-based trade in agricultural goods.

On 2 December 2024, Minister Farouk met with the Saudi Minister of Environment, Water and Agriculture Abdulrahman Al-Fadli, who also serves as President of the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP16) to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, to discuss opportunities for enhancing bilateral agricultural cooperation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.⁴⁰⁰ The two parties discussed pest control, water management and sustainable agriculture, reinforcing Egypt's commitment to stable, rules-based food and input flows.

On 12 February 2025, Minister Farouk and Chairman of the Arab Organization for Industrialization Major General Mokhtar Abdel Latif witnessed the signing of a cooperation protocol to enhance joint action in agricultural research and production.⁴⁰¹ The agreement included collaboration in agricultural mechanization, irrigation technologies, recycling agricultural waste and localizing industries such as the perfume sector and agricultural manufacturing. These efforts aim to increase local production capacity, reduce import reliance and support the continuous flow of agricultural inputs.

On 13 February 2025, Minister Farouk received Vice President of Kraft Heinz International Patrick Sheridan to discuss expanding the company's agricultural investment in Egypt and its role in supporting tomato

³⁹⁸ 中法关于农业交流与合作的联合声明, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing) 5 May 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 5 August 2025.

https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/202405/t20240507_11293817.shtml

³⁹⁹ وزير الزراعة يعلن فتح السوق الجواتيمالي امام صادرات الموالح المصرية, وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Cairo) 24 November 2024.

Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/-فتح-السوق-الجواتيمالي/>

⁴⁰⁰ السيد/ علاء فاروق يبحث مع نظيره السعودي تعزيز التعاون الزراعي بين البلدين, وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Cairo) 2 December 2024.

Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/-على-هامش-١٦-مؤتمر-الأطراف-كوب>

⁴⁰¹ وزير الزراعة ورئيس الهيئة العربية للتصنيع يشهدان توقيع بروتوكول لتعزيز التعاون في مجال البحوث الزراعية, وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Cairo) 12 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/-توقيع-بروتوكول-لتعزيز-التعاون>

cultivation for export to the European Union.⁴⁰² The Ministry committed to supporting Kraft Heinz through technical coordination and encouraged the contracting of Egyptian farmers to grow climate-resilient tomato varieties aligned with manufacturing and export requirements. This action promotes the continuous flow of food and essential agricultural inputs while minimizing disruptions.

On 13 February 2025, Head of the Egyptian Agricultural Quarantine Authority Mohamed El-Mansi met with a delegation from the Chinese Customs Authority to discuss cooperation on facilitating Egyptian agricultural exports to China.⁴⁰³ The meeting followed Minister Farouk's directives to expand market access and reduce trade barriers. The Chinese delegation praised Egypt's success in exporting 22 agricultural products and acknowledged 480 Egyptian companies registered for export. This engagement promotes rules-based trade and minimizes disruptions to agricultural trade by enhancing bilateral cooperation and inspection procedures.

On 18 March 2025, the Central Laboratory for Organic Agriculture provided certification and advisory services to farmers, exporters and organic input producers to enhance trade and regulatory compliance.⁴⁰⁴ Director Saad Jaafar stated that the lab facilitates registration and quality certification for biopesticides, biofertilizers, plant-based inputs and organic farms under Ministerial Resolution No. 12 of 2020 and Executive Regulations No. 196 of 2021. These services support sustainable agricultural practices and improve the export readiness of Egyptian organic products, thereby promoting rules-based trade in agriculture.

On 30 March 2025, Director of the Central Laboratory for the Analysis of Pesticide Residues and Heavy Elements in Food Hend Abdel-Latif announced that the laboratory had received and analyzed more than 1,200 samples and issued results for over 1,000 samples during the first two days of the Eid al-Fitr holiday.⁴⁰⁵ The laboratory continued operating during the official holiday to maintain export procedures, support regulatory authorities and ensure timely inspection of agricultural and food products destined for local and international markets, thereby contributing to the continuous flow of food and agricultural inputs.

On 9 April 2025, Minister Farouk met with Chairman of the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development Obaid Al-Zaabi in Kuwait to discuss expanding the Authority's agricultural investments in Egypt in line with its 2025 plan.⁴⁰⁶ Minister Farouk reaffirmed Egypt's support for the Authority's agricultural projects, including sugar production, veterinary vaccines and strategic crop seed manufacturing. Both parties agreed to implement new projects, expand existing ones and seek a partner to operate the Authority's onion drying plant in Minya Governorate to meet increasing global demand, especially from European Union countries.

On 9 April 2025, Minister Farouk met with Kuwait's Minister of Finance and Minister of State for Economic Affairs and Investment Noura Suleiman Al-Fassam to discuss increasing Kuwaiti investments in Egypt's agricultural sector.⁴⁰⁷ The meeting focused on expanding bilateral cooperation in food security and agricultural

⁴⁰² (Cairo) 13 February 2025. وزير الزراعة يستقبل نائب رئيس شركة هاينز العالمية ويؤكد على دعم الدولة للإستثمار المحلي والأجنبي. وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Cairo) 13 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/شركة-هاينز-العالمية-استصلاح-الأراضي/>

⁴⁰³ (Cairo) 13 February 2025. وفد الجمارك الصينية يبحث تسهيل حركة الصادرات مع الحجر الزراعي المصري. وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Cairo) 13 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/وفد-الجمارك-الصينية/>

⁴⁰⁴ المركزي للزراعة العضوية يستعرض الخدمات المقدمة للمزارعين والمستثمرين والشركات العاملة في مجال المدخلات العضوية. وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Cairo) 18 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/المركزي-للزراعة-عضوية/>

⁴⁰⁵ يستقبل ويفحص أكثر من 1200 عينة ويصدر نتائج لـ 1000 عينة في أول وثاني أيام إجازة عيد الفطر المبارك. وزارة (QCAP) المركزي لمتبقيات المبيدات (Cairo) 30 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 31 May 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/المركزي-لمتبقيات-المبيدات-qcap/>

⁴⁰⁶ وزير الزراعة يبحث سبل تعزيز الفرص الاستثمارية في مصر مع رئيس الهيئة العربية للاستثمار والانماء الزراعي. وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Kuwait) 9 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/رئيس-الهيئة-العربية-للاستثمار-والانماء-الزراعي/>

⁴⁰⁷ (Cairo) 9 April 2025. وزير الزراعة يبحث مع وزيرة المالية والاستثمار الكويتية زيادة فرص الاستثمار بالقطاع الزراعي في مصر. وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Cairo) 9 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/وزير-الزراعة-يبحث-مع-وزيرة-المالية-والاستثمار-الكويتية/>

manufacturing. Minister Farouk emphasized Egypt's improved investment climate and infrastructure, while Minister Al-Fassam affirmed Kuwait's interest in strategic stockpiling and proposed joint efforts to develop a regional food security strategy. This action promotes rules-based agricultural trade and supports a continuous flow of food and inputs.

On 13 April 2025, Minister Farouk participated in the Egyptian Saudi Business Council Forum to promote joint investment and trade in the agricultural sector between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.⁴⁰⁸ Minister Farouk emphasized that Saudi Arabia is one of the largest recipients of Egyptian agricultural exports and identified new opportunities for investment in strategic crops, veterinary serums, seed production and food processing. This action supports rules-based trade and encourages a continuous flow of food and inputs.

Egypt has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. Egypt has taken substantial action to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade of agricultural food products, such as opening the Guatemalan market to citrus exports, deepening trade facilitation with China and the EU and engaging in regional cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Egypt also collaborated with international organizations such as COP16 and the Arab Organization for Industrialization. While the Central Laboratory for Organic Agriculture supports trade through the certification of biofertilizers, Egypt has not taken substantial action to minimize barriers and promote rules-based trade on fertilizers specifically.

Thus, Egypt receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Harleen Kaur

Ethiopia: 0

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 26 October 2024, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to advance bilateral cooperation in agriculture, trade, industry and investment.⁴⁰⁹ The leaders expressed optimism about expanding joint initiatives and highlighted opportunities for strategic partnership. The meeting also marked Ethiopia's endorsement of Malaysia's entry into BRICS as a partner country, signalling a broader commitment to minimizing agricultural trade ties.

On 11 January 2025, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Addis Ababa, where Ethiopia and Somalia formally restored diplomatic relations after a yearlong rift.⁴¹⁰ The two governments pledged to strengthen cooperation across key areas, including trade and agricultural development, as part of broader efforts to rebuild trust. The diplomatic restoration was a significant step toward improving regional stability and reflects Ethiopia's commitment to minimizing disruptions of food and fertilizer flows throughout the Horn of Africa.

On 19 January 2025, Ambassador Tefera Derbew Yimam inaugurated Ethiopia's National Pavilion in Beijing, aiming to introduce more specialty agricultural products, particularly coffee, to the Chinese market.⁴¹¹ The initiative included the signing of cooperation agreements with Chinese institutions to support quality assurance,

⁴⁰⁸ وزير الزراعة يشارك في ملتقى مجلس الأعمال المصري السعودي. وزارة الزراعة واستصلاح الأراضي (Cairo) 13 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://moa.gov.eg/ar/ministry-activities/news/ملتقى-مجلس-الأعمال-المصري-السعودي/>

⁴⁰⁹ Ethiopia, Malaysia Forge New Partnerships in Agriculture and Trade, News Central (Putrajaya) 26 October 2024. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://newscentral.africa/ethiopia-malaysia-forge-new-partnerships-in-agriculture-and-trade/>

⁴¹⁰ Ethiopia and Somalia restore diplomatic ties, Deutsche Welle (Addis Ababa) 11 January 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-and-somalia-restore-diplomatic-ties/a-71275126>

⁴¹¹ Ambassador: Introduce more Ethiopian products to China, China Daily (Beijing) 20 January 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202501/20/WS678e1a9aa310a2ab06ea81e7.html>

ecological product origin protection and supply chain development, thus reducing disruptions in the trade of specialty agricultural products.

On 17 February 2025, President Taye Atske-Selassie addressed the Africa Business Forum, emphasizing Ethiopia's role in regional value chains and food sovereignty.⁴¹² He highlighted Ethiopia's shift to wheat self-sufficiency and its comparative advantage in livestock, aligning with efforts to boost agro-industrial exports. The president's statements represent Ethiopia's commitment to promoting rules-based trade in agriculture.

On 6 March 2025, Minister of Agriculture Girma Amente emphasized Ethiopia's leadership in food system resilience during the closing of a high-level ministerial event in Addis Ababa.⁴¹³ Minister Amente highlighted the country's homegrown agricultural policy, wheat self-sufficiency and digital agriculture roadmap as models for African nations to follow. His remarks affirmed Ethiopia's commitment to food sovereignty, intra-African trade and nationally owned development strategies.

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. Ethiopia has taken strong action to minimize disruptions and promote the trade of agricultural products by cooperating with Malaysia, Somalia and China, as well as making statements affirming food sovereignty and intra-African trading of agricultural goods. However, Ethiopia has not taken action to promote rules-based trade for fertilizers specifically.

Thus, Ethiopia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Faryzki Noor Thoriq

India: +1

India has fully complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 27 November 2024, Union Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal stated that India and France can collectively expand agricultural and food processing to enhance global food security using innovative sustainable practices.⁴¹⁴ Speaking at the Asia Pacific Commission 2024 Forum, he emphasized that such efforts would also help mitigate the adverse impacts of the climate change crisis, reinforcing the significance of cross-national cooperation in sustainable food systems.

On 4 December 2024, Secretary of Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare Devesh Chaturvedi met with Estonian Minister of Regional Affairs and Agriculture Piret Hartman in New Delhi to strengthen cooperation in agriculture and other allied sectors.⁴¹⁵ Secretary Chaturvedi emphasized the importance of climate-resilient and organic farming, food security, digital infrastructure and crop diversification. Both sides expressed interest in technology exchange and value addition, reinforcing efforts toward sustainable agriculture.

⁴¹² Remarks by H.E. Taye Atske-Selassie at the Africa Business Forum 2025, UNECA (Addis Ababa) 17 February 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://www.uneca.org/stories/remarks-by-h.e.-taye-atske-selassie-at-the-africa-business-forum-2025>

⁴¹³ Ethiopia sets example for Africa in agriculture by adopting homegrown policy, Fanabc (Addis Ababa) 6 March 2025. Access Date: 17 July 2025. <https://www.fanabc.com/english/ethiopia-sets-example-for-africa-in-agriculture-by-adopting-homegrown-policy>

⁴¹⁴ India, France collectively can expand agricultural and food processing for world's food security using innovative sustainable practices: Shri Piyush Goyal, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 27 November 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2078037>

⁴¹⁵ Secretary Department of Agriculture & Farmers' Welfare Dr. Devesh Chaturvedi bilateral meet with Estonian Minister of Regional Affairs and Agriculture, Ms. Piret Hartman in New Delhi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 4 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2080788>

On 6 December 2024, Union Minister Anupriya Patel confirmed that the Government of India, through fertilizer companies, engaged with Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to procure additional Di-Ammonium Phosphate (DAP), a widely-used fertilizer, for the Rabi 2024-25 season.⁴¹⁶ The government reported 38.27 Lakh Metric Tonnes (LMT) of DAP available against a pro-rata requirement of 35.52 LMT, ensuring sufficient supply through advance procurement planning and international engagement.

On 9 January 2025, Secretary Chaturvedi met with a delegation from the United States National Association of State Departments of Agriculture to strengthen agricultural collaboration.⁴¹⁷ Secretary Chaturvedi discussed joint opportunities in cold chain management, voluntary carbon credit initiatives and artificial intelligence-enabled precision agriculture as part of India's efforts to modernize and make its food systems more sustainable.

On 10 January 2025, Minister Goyal set a target of USD100 billion in exports over five years for India's food and beverage, agriculture and marine sectors.⁴¹⁸ Minister Goyal highlighted that the government allows 100 per cent foreign direct investment in the food processing sector and supports scaling exports through expanded food testing labs, high-value product development and sustainability-driven trade facilitation.

On 15 January 2025, Secretary Chaturvedi met with German Ambassador Philipp Ackermann at Krishi Bhawan to expand Indo-German cooperation in agriculture and other allied sectors.⁴¹⁹ Ambassador Ackermann and Secretary Chaturvedi discussed promoting horticultural exports, advancing digital farming solutions and integrating sustainable practices and food processing to strengthen agricultural productivity and market connectivity.

On 25 January 2025, Prime Minister Modi held a bilateral meeting with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto in New Delhi and emphasized the importance of accelerating economic cooperation between the two countries.⁴²⁰ During the meeting, the two leaders agreed to expand collaboration in several key sectors including trade, investment, infrastructure and technology, while President Prabowo also committed to simplifying regulations to facilitate bilateral trade and private sector investment.

On 27 January 2025, Secretary Chaturvedi met with Associate Vice President of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Donal Brown in New Delhi to strengthen agricultural cooperation.⁴²¹ Associate Vice President Brown reaffirmed IFAD's commitment to supporting climate-resilient value chains and rural infrastructure in India, while Secretary Chaturvedi emphasized the role of sustainable Farmer Producer Organizations and integrated farming systems in advancing food security and agricultural sustainability.

⁴¹⁶ Government of India, through fertilizer companies, is actively engaging with DAP producing nations to procure additional supplies of DAP, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2081466>

⁴¹⁷ Delegates from NASDA of USA meet Secretary of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare Devesh Chaturvedi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 9 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2091550>

⁴¹⁸ Union Minister of Commerce & Industry Piyush Goyal sets \$100 billion target of combined product exports for Food & Beverage, agri and marine industries in next five years, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 10 January 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2091975>

⁴¹⁹ Dr. Philipp Ackermann, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Meets Devesh Chaturvedi, Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 15 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2093177>

⁴²⁰ Pertemuan Hangat Presiden Prabowo dan PM Modi: Tonggak Baru Kemitraan Strategis Indonesia-India, Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia (Jakarta) 25 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 26 May 2025. https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/pertemuan_hangat_presiden_prabowo_dan_pm_modi_tonggak_baru_kemitraan_strategis_indonesia_india

⁴²¹ IFAD Associate Vice President Donal Brown meets Agriculture Secretary Devesh Chaturvedi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 27 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2096770>

On 6 February 2025, the Department of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare expanded the National Agricultural Market e-NAM platform by including tradable parameters for ten additional commodities.⁴²² The action aims to increase digital trading opportunities, improve market access and enhance pricing transparency for agricultural producers and traders.

On 14 February 2025, Minister of State for Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare Bhagirath Choudhary met Brazil's Governor of the State of Goias Ronaldo Caiado at Krishi Bhawan in New Delhi to advance agricultural cooperation between India and Brazil.⁴²³ The discussion focused on strengthening collaboration in sugarcane, ethanol and pulses, expanding efforts in research, innovation and digital agriculture through shared agro-climatic conditions.

On 5 March 2025, Prime Minister Modi announced the establishment of India's second National GenBank to conserve plant genetic resources and enhance regional food security.⁴²⁴ The new facility will support international biodiversity conservation efforts and assist countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and BRICS regions through access to India's preservation infrastructure.

On 11 March 2025, the Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) promoted Indian agricultural exports at the International Food and Hospitality Fair in New Delhi.⁴²⁵ APEDA showcased processed and organic food products, including millets and plant-based alternatives and emphasized sustainable export growth through culinary demonstrations and coordinated participation from multiple Indian states. This action supports rules-based trade by expanding international market access and promoting environmentally sustainable agricultural exports.

On 12 March 2025, the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare and Chile's Office of Agricultural Studies and Policies co-chaired the first Joint Working Group meeting on agriculture.⁴²⁶ The session addressed bilateral cooperation on horticulture, market access and digital agriculture. Indian officials highlighted national initiatives including organic farming and women-led agricultural programs, thereby promoting rules-based agricultural trade and enhancing access to international markets.

On 19 March 2025, Secretary of the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying Alka Upadhyay and German State Secretary Silvia Bender co-chaired the 8th Joint Working Group Meeting between India and Germany on agriculture in New Delhi.⁴²⁷ Officials discussed cooperation in digital agriculture, seed innovation, mechanization and animal husbandry, thereby advancing bilateral engagement and promoting rules-based agricultural trade.

On 24 March 2025, Union Minister of Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare Shivraj Singh Chouhan announced the abolition of the 20 per cent export duty on onions.⁴²⁸ Minister Chouhan confirmed that this measure

⁴²² e-NAM Platform expanded to boost agricultural trade with addition of 10 New commodities and their tradable parameters, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 6 February 2025. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2100393>

⁴²³ H.E. Governor Mr. Ronaldo Caiado, Governor of the State of Goias, Brazil calls on Shri Bhagirath Choudhary, Minister of State for Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare at Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 14 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2103391>

⁴²⁴ Gene Bank to be established to ensure food security and genetic resources for future generations: Shri Narendra Modi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 5 March 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2108488>

⁴²⁵ APEDA Showcases India's Agricultural and Processed Food Excellence at the 39th Edition of AAHAR 2025, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 11 March 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2110129>

⁴²⁶ India-Chile 1st JWG meeting on Agriculture held, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2111241>

⁴²⁷ 8th Joint Working Group Meeting between INDIA-GERMANY on Agriculture held today, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 19 March 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2113081>

⁴²⁸ Union Agriculture Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan says that Central Government completely abolished the 20 percent export duty on onion, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 24 March 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2114339>

followed an earlier reduction from 40 per cent and was implemented to improve market access for Indian farmers and promote the stable export of agricultural goods.

On 8 April 2025, Minister Chouhan and Israeli Minister of Agriculture and Food Security Avi Dicter signed an Agriculture Cooperation Agreement in New Delhi.⁴²⁹ The agreement established a Joint Working Group and outlined collaboration on seed improvement, post-harvest technology, research and innovation, thereby supporting sustainable production systems and promoting a rules-based approach to agricultural cooperation.

On 9 April 2025, Minister Chouhan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Nepal's Minister of Agriculture and Livestock Development Ramnath Adhikari to expand bilateral agricultural cooperation.⁴³⁰ The agreement outlined joint efforts to enhance crop productivity, improve post-harvest management and facilitate agricultural trade through the creation of a Joint Working Group, promoting rules-based agricultural cooperation and supporting the flow of food and inputs.

On 12 April 2025, APEDA, in partnership with the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, hosted an International Buyer-Seller Meet in Tawang to promote agricultural exports from the North-Eastern Region.⁴³¹ The event enabled direct engagement between international buyers and local producers, showcasing region-specific products such as kiwi, yak cheese and Khaw Tai rice to integrate remote farmers into global markets. This action promotes rules-based trade and supports the continuous flow of agricultural goods by expanding market access for producers in remote regions.

On 18 April 2025, Minister Chouhan represented India at the 15th BRICS Agriculture Ministers' Meeting and endorsed the launch of the BRICS Land Restoration Partnership.⁴³² Minister Chouhan emphasized support for smallholder farmers and highlighted domestic initiatives such as AgriStack and the Climate-Resilient Villages program to strengthen sustainable agriculture and food systems. This engagement promotes multilateral cooperation on sustainable agriculture and contributes to continuous flow of agricultural products.

On 19 April 2025, APEDA coordinated the first commercial sea shipment of Indian pomegranates from Maharashtra to the United States.⁴³³ The initiative involved a pre-clearance program and shipment of 14 tonnes of the Bhagwa variety, reducing air freight dependence and promoting sustainable logistics for agri-exports, enhancing rules-based trade and ensuring a continuous flow of agricultural products.

On 20 April 2025, Minister Chouhan met with Brazilian Minister of Agriculture and Livestock Carlos Henrique Baquetta Favero and Brazilian Minister of Agricultural Development and Family Agriculture Luiz Paulo Teixeira during the 15th BRICS Agriculture Ministers' Meeting.⁴³⁴ The meeting, held under the theme "Promoting inclusive and sustainable agriculture through cooperation, innovation and equitable trade among BRICS countries," focused on enhancing bilateral cooperation in soybean production, mechanization, irrigation, agricultural trade, food processing and research. These discussions contributed to promoting rules-based agricultural trade and sustained flows of essential inputs.

⁴²⁹ Meeting between Union Agriculture Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan and Israel's Minister of Agriculture and Food Security Mr. Avi Dicter, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 8 April 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025.

<https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2120150>

⁴³⁰ Union Agriculture Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan calls on Prime Minister of Nepal Shri K.P. Sharma Oli on the sidelines of 3rd BIMSTEC Ministerial meeting in Kathmandu, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 9 April 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025.

<https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2120595>

⁴³¹ APEDA and Government of Arunachal Pradesh Host International Conclave cum Buyer-Seller Meet, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 12 April 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2121149>

⁴³² India Reaffirms Commitment to Sustainable Agriculture at 15th BRICS Meet, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 18 April 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2122764>

⁴³³ APEDA Facilitates First Commercial Sea Shipment of Indian Pomegranates to USA, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 19 April 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2122827>

⁴³⁴ Union Agriculture Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chauhan's Brazil visit becomes important on many counts, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 20 April 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2123055>

India has fully complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. Overall, India has taken proactive steps to minimize disruptions and support rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers. Its actions include stabilizing fertilizer prices, securing international input supplies, promoting export infrastructure, advancing bilateral trade partnerships with countries such as Brazil and Nepal, and participating in international forums such as the 15th BRICS Agriculture Minister's Meeting.

Thus, India receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Harleen Kaur

Indonesia: 0

Indonesia has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 9 January 2025, Deputy Minister of Agriculture Sudaryono announced plans to import 2 million dairy and beef cattle over five years to meet growing domestic demand under the Free Nutritious Meal Program.⁴³⁵ By involving private sector imports and distributing livestock to farmers, the initiative aims to secure a stable supply of essential food inputs, particularly meat and dairy, thereby supporting the continuous flow of agricultural products and minimizing domestic disruptions.

On 10 January 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sugiono delivered the Annual Press Statement and emphasized that Indonesian diplomacy under President Prabowo Subianto would prioritize food and energy independence, along with expanding agricultural trade to non-traditional markets and supporting fairer, rules-based trade practices.⁴³⁶ These efforts aim to strengthen the stability of agricultural trade, support predictable international market access and improve the flow of essential inputs needed for domestic food production.

On 25 January 2025, President Prabowo held a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi in New Delhi and emphasized the importance of accelerating economic cooperation between the two countries.⁴³⁷ During the meeting, the two leaders agreed to expand collaboration in several key sectors including trade, investment, infrastructure and technology, while President Prabowo also committed to simplifying regulations to facilitate bilateral trade and private sector investment.

On 27 January 2025, President Prabowo met with Prime Minister of Malaysia Anwar Ibrahim in Kuala Lumpur to strengthen cooperation in the palm oil industry, one of Indonesia's most significant agricultural exports.⁴³⁸ Minister of Trade Budi Santoso emphasized that the collaboration aims to secure palm oil trade flows, address regulatory trade barriers and promote the commodity as environmentally sustainable.

On 12 February 2025, President Prabowo Subianto held a bilateral meeting with President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Bogor, during which both leaders witnessed the signing of multiple memorandums of

⁴³⁵ Indonesia to Import 2 Million Cattle Until 2029 for Free Nutritious Meal, Tempo.co (Jakarta) 9 January 2025. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://en.tempo.co/read/1961972/indonesia-to-import-2-million-cattle-until-2029-for-free-nutritious-meal>

⁴³⁶ Transkrip Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Tahun 2025, Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia (Jakarta) 10 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 26 May 2025. <https://www.kemlu.go.id/publikasi/pidato/pidato-menteri/transkrip-pernyataan-pers-tahunan-menteri-luar-negeri-ri-tahun-2025?type=publication>

⁴³⁷ Pertemuan Hangat Presiden Prabowo dan PM Modi: Tonggak Baru Kemitraan Strategis Indonesia-India, Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia (Jakarta) 25 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 26 May 2025. https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/pertemuan_hangat_presiden_prabowo_dan_pm_modi_tonggak_baru_kemitraan_strategis_indonesia_india

⁴³⁸ Kemitraan Sawit Indonesia-Malaysia: Kunci Produksi Dunia, Indonesia.go.id (Jakarta) 28 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/ekonomi-bisnis/8941/kemitraan-sawit-indonesia-malaysia-kunci-produksi-dunia?lang=1>

understanding, including one on agricultural cooperation.⁴³⁹ The two presidents also committed to increasing bilateral trade and expanding market access, with specific attention to strengthening sectoral partnerships in agriculture, energy and the halal industry. These actions contribute to enhancing agricultural cooperation, broadening export potential and reinforcing stable international trade ties.

On 10 March 2025, President Prabowo met with Secretary General of the Communist Party of Vietnam Tô Lâm to establish a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and strengthen bilateral economic cooperation.⁴⁴⁰ The two leaders agreed to expand trade and investment in sectors including agriculture and food security, positioning Indonesia as a collaborative partner in ensuring stable agricultural input flows and contributing to global food security.

On 8 April 2025, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto announced Indonesia's plan to increase imports of US agricultural commodities such as soybeans and wheat as part of efforts to ease reciprocal tariff measures.⁴⁴¹ This action supports the continuous flow of essential agricultural inputs while helping to reduce trade tensions through bilateral cooperation.

On 8 April 2025, President Prabowo ordered the elimination of import quotas, particularly for agricultural goods such as meat, to improve trade efficiency and reduce market restrictions.⁴⁴² This directive aims to simplify bureaucratic barriers and liberalize commodity imports, thereby minimizing trade disruptions and promoting rules-based agricultural trade in line with international standards.

On 9 April 2025, President Prabowo met with His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, in Abu Dhabi to discuss ways to enhance bilateral cooperation, including in food security and the economy.⁴⁴³ The presidents signed multiple agreements covering sectors such as agriculture, environment and sustainability, highlighting joint efforts to improve trade flows and reinforce strategic agricultural partnerships.

On 14 April 2025, Minister of Agriculture Andi Amran Sulaiman signed a memorandum of understanding with the Jordanian Ministry of Agriculture to strengthen bilateral cooperation in agricultural development.⁴⁴⁴ The agreement covers areas such as trade and investment promotion, facilitation of market access and implementation of joint capacity-building programs, supporting Indonesia's commitment to promote predictable international trade and ensure the stable flow of food and agricultural inputs.

On 15 April 2025, Director General of International Trade Negotiations Djatmiko Bris Witjaksono announced that Indonesia had concluded negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with

⁴³⁹ Pernyataan Pers Bersama Presiden Republik Indonesia Prabowo Subianto dan Presiden Republik Turkiye Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Ministry of State Secretariat (Jakarta) 12 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/transkrip/pernyataan-pers-bersama-presiden-republik-indonesia-prabowo-subianto-dan-presiden-republik-turkiye-recep-tayyip-erdogan-2/>

⁴⁴⁰ Indonesia dan Viet Nam Sepakati Kemitraan Strategis Komprehensif, Perkuat Kerja Sama di Berbagai Sektor, Presiden Republik Indonesia (Jakarta) 10 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 13 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/indonesia-dan-viet-nam-sepakati-kemitraan-strategis-komprehensif-perkuat-kerja-sama-di-berbagai-sektor/>

⁴⁴¹ Indonesia Eyes Boost in US Energy, Agriculture Imports to Ease Tariffs, Jakarta Globe (Jakarta) 8 April 2025. Access Date: 14 July 2025. <https://jakartaglobe.id/business/indonesia-eyes-boost-in-us-energy-agriculture-imports-to-ease-tariffs>

⁴⁴² Presiden Prabowo Perintahkan Penghapusan Kuota Impor, Presiden Republik Indonesia (Jakarta) 8 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 13 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/presiden-prabowo-perintahkan-penghapusan-kuota-impor/>

⁴⁴³ UAE–Indonesian Presidents explore ways to strengthen bilateral ties, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) 9 April 2025. Access Date: 15 July 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/04/UAE-Indonesian-Presidents-explore-ways-to-strengthen-bilateral-ties>

⁴⁴⁴ Indonesia, Jordan to Enhance Agricultural Cooperation, Indonesia.go.id (Jakarta) 14 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 July 2025. <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/social-culture/9199/indonesia-jordan-to-enhance-agricultural-cooperation?lang=2>

Canada and was pursuing new trade partnerships with Tunisia and the Eurasian Economic Union.⁴⁴⁵ These trade deals aim to expand market access for agricultural products and liberalize tariffs, helping Indonesia minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in response to new US tariff measures.

On 18 April 2025, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Airlangga led a delegation to Washington D.C. to meet with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick to negotiate tariff and trade issues.⁴⁴⁶ During the meeting, both parties agreed to finalize a bilateral agreement within 60 days, including proposals to increase agricultural imports from the United States, reduce tariff burdens and streamline import procedures, thereby supporting rules-based trade and reducing disruptions to the flow of agricultural products.

On 27 April 2025, Minister of Agriculture Andi stated that Indonesia would strengthen agricultural cooperation with Palestine and Japan through strategic investments and joint innovation programs.⁴⁴⁷ This action demonstrates a commitment to enhancing agricultural trade relations and expanding international cooperation to support food security.

Indonesia has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. Indonesia has demonstrated strong action in promoting rules-based agricultural trade, reduced regulatory barriers and supported bilateral and multilateral cooperation with countries such as Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, the United States and Vietnam. However, Indonesia has not taken significant action to promote rules-based trade of fertilizers specifically.

Thus, Indonesia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Annisa Alya Ramadhani

Iran: 0

Iran has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 11 January 2025, Board Member of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture Majid Movahed Ghaderi signed a memorandum of understanding between Iran and Türkiye to promote cooperation in livestock, poultry and aquatic feed trade.⁴⁴⁸ The agreement facilitates joint investments and knowledge exchange in feed safety and sustainable practices while targeting USD5 billion in bilateral agricultural trade within five years.

On 19 April 2025, Agriculture Minister Gholamreza Nouri Ghezalfeh met with Indian Agriculture Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan at the BRICS agriculture ministers' summit in Brazil.⁴⁴⁹ The two sides agreed to expand

⁴⁴⁵ Indonesia Targets Canada, Tunisia, and Eurasia for Export Growth, Jakarta Globe (Jakarta) 15 April 2025. Access Date: 14 July 2025. <https://jakartaglobe.id/business/indonesia-targets-canada-tunisia-and-eurasia-for-export-growth>

⁴⁴⁶ Indonesia fast-tracks talks with U.S., aiming to finalize tariff and trade deal in 60 days, Indonesia Business Post (Jakarta) 18 April 2025. Access Date: 14 July 2025. <https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/4129/geopolitics-and-diplomacy/indonesia-fast-tracks-talks-with-u-s-aiming-to-finalize-tariff-and-trade-deal-in-60-days>

⁴⁴⁷ Indonesia ready to boost agriculture ties with Palestine, Japan: Govt, Antara News (Jakarta) 27 April 2025. Access Date: 14 July 2025. <https://jatim.antaranews.com/berita/911817/indonesia-ready-to-boost-agriculture-ties-with-palestine-japan-govt>

⁴⁴⁸ Iran, Turkey sign cooperation agreement on livestock, aquatic feed, Tehran Times (Tehran) 14 January 2025. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/508633/Iran-Turkey-sign-cooperation-agreement-on-livestock-aquatic>

⁴⁴⁹ ایران و هند آماده گسترش روابط تجاری کشاورزی فراتر از ۱ میلیارد دلار, Tehran Times (Tehran) 19 April 2025. Translated by Tehran Times. Access Date: 17 July 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/512008/Iran-India-set-to-expand-agricultural-trade-ties-beyond-1b>

agricultural trade beyond USD1 billion and establish a joint agricultural committee to address export facilitation, quarantine protocols and customs barriers.

On 30 April 2025, Minister Ghezjeljeh met with Afghanistan's Deputy Agriculture Minister to advance bilateral agricultural cooperation.⁴⁵⁰ Minister Ghezjeljeh offered for Iran to export technical and engineering services in agriculture and proposed forming a joint committee based in Kabul to facilitate collaboration. Minister Ghezjeljeh emphasized drafting formal cooperation agreements and highlighted agriculture as a key sector for expanding economic ties.

Iran has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. Iran has taken action to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade of foods with Afghanistan, India and Türkiye. However, Iran has not taken significant action to promote rules-based trade of fertilizers specifically.

Thus, Iran receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Edith Wong

Russia: +1

Russia has fully complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 9 November 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko and Deputy Prime Minister of Cuba Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz participated in a meeting centered on bilateral collaboration.⁴⁵¹ The two leaders discussed cooperation in the agricultural sector, with plans for Russia to export wheat and fertilizer to Cuba.

On 27 November 2024, President Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev participated in a plenary session of the 20th Russia-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum, in which they discussed increasing bilateral cooperation in the agricultural and industrial industries.⁴⁵²

On 29 November 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk participated in a Eurasian Economic Commission Council meeting centering around the promotion of Eurasian integration through talks of customs, tariff regulation, technical regulation and other topics.⁴⁵³ Member states agreed to amend the Unified Quarantine Phytosanitary Requirements for quarantined products, where certain species of agricultural plants would need to go through a period of quarantine, making the decision a step towards minimizing disruptions and promoting rules-based trade in agriculture.

On 29 November 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk participated in a Eurasian Economic Commission Council meeting focused on customs, tariff regulation, technical regulation and other significant topics integral

⁴⁵⁰ ایران آماده ارائه خدمات فنی کشاورزی به افغانستان است, Tehran Times 30 April 2025. Translated by Tehran Times. Access Date: 17 July 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/512452/Iran-offers-agricultural-technical-services-to-Afghanistan>

⁴⁵¹ Дмитрий Чернышенко обсудил с сопредседателем Российско-Кубинской межправкомиссии перспективы сотрудничества, Правительство России (Moscow) 9 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/53269/>

⁴⁵² Russia-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum, President of Russia (Moscow) 27 November 2024. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75683>

⁴⁵³ Алексей Оверчук принял участие в заседании Совета Евразийской экономической комиссии, Правительство России (Moscow) 29 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/53581/>

to the promotion of Eurasian integration.⁴⁵⁴ Member states decided to reduce tariffs on the import of butter, cattle meat, potatoes, carrots and apples in their respective countries, promoting international agricultural trade.

On 10 December 2024, First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov and Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Jamshid Khodjayev co-chaired the 25th meeting of the Intergovernmental Russia-Uzbekistan Commission on Economic Cooperation in which agricultural cooperation was addressed.⁴⁵⁵ Deputy Prime Minister Manturov noted Russia's readiness to increase exports to Uzbekistan, including exports of oil and fat products, grain, meat and confectionery, to boost food trade as well as prevent livestock diseases.

On 11 December 2024, the government reduced export taxes on mineral fertilizers, including nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium and complex fertilizers from 10 per cent to 7 per cent till the end of 2024.⁴⁵⁶

On 20 December 2024, the Government set quotas for grain exports outside the European Economic Union, effective from 15 February to 30 June 2025.⁴⁵⁷ The export quota allows for 10.6 million tons of wheat and meslin, with no barley, rye and corn allowed. The quota considers the domestic supply and demand of grain crops, excludes grain exports intended for international humanitarian aid and may be adjusted based on market conditions.

On 23 December 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture signed a directive establishing the procedure for duty-free imports of butter into Russia, following a decision by the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission.⁴⁵⁸ This measure allows for the import of up to 25,000 tonnes of butter without tariffs (should the imports comply exemption parameters) until mid-July 2025 while minimizing disruptions to the agriculture trade.

On 26 December 2024, the Government set export quotas allowing agricultural producers to ship their products abroad without paying duties, effective from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025.⁴⁵⁹ This action minimizes disruptions to the agricultural trade.

On 23 January 2025, the Government signed a resolution in which imports of potatoes, carrots and apples would be exempt from levy, following a decision by the Council of the Eurasian Economic Council.⁴⁶⁰ This measure allows for the import of up to 150,000 tonnes of potatoes, 55,000 tonnes of carrots and 230,000 tonnes of apples without duty (should the imports comply with exemption parameters) until 31 July 2025 and is meant to minimize disruptions to the agriculture trade.

On 11 February 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev held a working meeting with Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of India to Russia Vinay Kumar, where they discussed further

⁴⁵⁴ Алексей Оверчук принял участие в заседании Совета Евразийской экономической комиссии, Правительство России (Moscow) 29 November 2024. Translation Provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/53581/>

⁴⁵⁵ Денис Мантуров и Жамшид Ходжаев провели 25-е заседание Межправительственной Российско-Узбекской комиссии, Правительство России (Moscow) 10 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/53675/>

⁴⁵⁶ Правительство снизило экспортные пошлины на минеральные удобрения, Правительство России (Moscow) 11 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <http://government.ru/news/53693/>

⁴⁵⁷ Правительство установило квоту на вывоз зерна в 2025 году, Правительство России 20 December 2020. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/53784/>

⁴⁵⁸ Правительство определило порядок беспошлинного ввоза в Россию сливочного масла, Правительство России (Moscow) 29 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <http://government.ru/docs/53900/>

⁴⁵⁹ Правительство утвердило квоты на беспошлинный вывоз зерновых, подсолнечного масла и шрота из новых регионов в 2025 году, Правительство России (Moscow) 28 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/53878/>

⁴⁶⁰ Правительство определило порядок беспошлинного ввоза в Россию картофеля, моркови и яблок, Правительство России (Moscow) 24 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate Access Date: 26 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54044/>

promoting trade between their countries.⁴⁶¹ Deputy Prime Minister Patrushev highlighted Russia's interest in exporting products to India, including vegetable oils, livestock products, fish, wheat and leguminous plants, as well as importing Indian agricultural products, such as fruit and vegetables.

On 20 February 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Patrushev met with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the United Arab Emirates and First Deputy Ruler of the Emirate of Dubai Maktoum bin Mohammed Al Maktoum.⁴⁶² The two leaders had a discussion centering around cooperation in agriculture. Deputy Prime Minister Patrushev noted Russia's readiness to increase exports of grains and confectionery to the UAE and promote halal-certified products that comply with UAE standards.

On 4 March 2025, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met with the Chairman of the State Administration Council and Prime Minister of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Min Aung Hlaing to explore collaborative initiatives in the agriculture and food sectors.⁴⁶³

On 11 March 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Patrushev and Uzbekistani Deputy Prime Minister Khodjaev held a meeting centered on bilateral collaboration in the agro-industrial sector.⁴⁶⁴ Deputy Prime Minister Patrushev mentioned that Russia is willing to boost exports of sunflower oil, confectionery, grains, livestock, fruits and vegetables to Uzbekistan.

On 17 March 2025, President Putin and Tajikistani President Emomali Rahmon made statements for the press after discussions on cooperation between the two countries, in which they discussed the agro-industrial sector being a key opportunity for collaboration.⁴⁶⁵ The presidents mentioned that Russia could play a role in setting up facilities in Tajikistan to process agricultural goods, such as vegetables, fruits, raw cotton, leather and wool. Additionally, the Tajikistani party reiterated its dedication to increasing the export of eco-friendly agricultural products to Russia.

On 25 March 2025, the Kremlin outlined the key agreements of the Russia and United States expert groups meeting, much of which centered around the trade of agriculture.⁴⁶⁶ The actors agreed that the United States would assist in reestablishing Russia's ability to export agricultural products and fertilizers to global markets once sanctions are lifted on financial institutions, companies and insurance providers involved in the production, export, international trade and services related to food and fertilizers.

On 27 March 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Patrushev announced at the last meeting of the Board of the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance that President Putin had established an objective for the

⁴⁶¹ Дмитрий Патрушев: Товарооборот агропродукции между Россией и Индией в 2024 году увеличился более чем на 60%, Правительство России (Moscow) 11 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54206/>

⁴⁶² Дмитрий Патрушев и Заместитель Премьер-министра ОАЭ обсудили сотрудничество в сельском хозяйстве, Правительство России (Moscow) 20 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54286/>

⁴⁶³ Встреча Михаила Мишустина с Председателем Государственного административного совета, Премьер-министром Республики Союз Мьянма Мин Аун Хлайном, Правительство России (Moscow) 4 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54409/>

⁴⁶⁴ Дмитрий Патрушев: Товарооборот сельхозпродукции и продовольствия между Россией и Узбекистаном вырос на 20%, Правительство России (Moscow) 11 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54465/>

⁴⁶⁵ Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rahmon made statements for the press, President of Russia (Moscow) 17 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76469>

⁴⁶⁶ Main outcomes of the Russia and United States expert groups meeting, President of Russia (Moscow) 25 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76526>

agro-industrial sector to grow production output by 25 per cent and expand exports to one and a half times their current levels by 2030.⁴⁶⁷

On 27 March 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk attended the Boao Forum for Asia where the topic of bilateral cooperation for food security was raised during his separate meetings with Bangladeshi Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus and Pakistani Minister of Finance Muhammad Aurangzeb.⁴⁶⁸

On 4 April 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Chernyshenko and Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Ricardo Cabrisas co-chaired the 22nd Intergovernmental Russian-Cuban Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, where they discussed collaborating in the agriculture sector.⁴⁶⁹

On 22 April 2025, President Putin met with the Omani Sultan and Prime Minister Haitham bin Tariq Al Said during a state visit, in which they discussed the possibility of increasing collaboration in agriculture.⁴⁷⁰

On 24 April 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Patrushev had a meeting with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United Arab Emirates to Russia Mohammad Ahmad Aljaber, during which they discussed further improving trade and food security between the countries.⁴⁷¹

Russia has fully complied its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. Russia has taken significant steps to minimize disruptions to the agriculture trade, such as by exempting products from levies, reducing tariffs and setting production output targets. Russia has also taken significant steps to promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizer, such as cooperating with Cuba, India, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.

Thus, Russia receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Haba-Maria Konaré

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 27 November 2024, Minister in the Presidency Khumbudzo Ntshavheni mentioned at the Thabo Mbeki Foundation's 2nd Annual Cape Town Conversations the need for a Task Force on Food Security.⁴⁷² This initiative would tackle issues such as market concentration and barriers related to food trading systems.

⁴⁶⁷ Дмитрий Патрушев: В России налажена одна из лучших в мире практик контрольно-надзорной деятельности в сфере сельского хозяйства, Правительство России (Moscow) 27 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54608/>, <http://government.ru/news/54584/>

⁴⁶⁸ Рабочий визит Алексея Оверчука в Китай, Правительство России (Moscow) 29 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54631/>

⁴⁶⁹ Дмитрий Чернышенко и Заместитель Премьер-министра Республики Куба Рикардо Кабрисас провели 22-е заседание Российско-Кубинской межправительственной комиссии, Правительство России (Moscow) 4 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54691/>

⁴⁷⁰ Russia-Oman talks, President of Russia (Moscow) 22 April 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76773>

⁴⁷¹ Дмитрий Патрушев встретился с Послом Объединённых Арабских Эмиратов Мохаммадом Ахмадом Альджабером, Правительство России (Moscow) 24 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54855/>

⁴⁷² Speaking notes of Ms Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, Minister in The Presidency at the Thabo Mbeki Foundation 2nd Annual Cape Town Conversations, The Presidency (Pretoria) 27 November 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speaking-notes-ms-khumbudzo-ntshavheni-minister-presidency-thabo-mbeki-foundation-2nd-annual-cape>

On 29 November 2024, the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition announced that the South Africa-Angola Business Forum would focus on advancing economic partnerships, promoting business partnerships and exploring strategies for more trade and investment opportunities between the two countries, in various sectors, including agriculture and agro-processing.⁴⁷³ This will increase rules-based trading of agricultural goods.

On 6 December 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa made an address to the Parliament of Algeria.⁴⁷⁴ In his speech, he mentioned a rise in collaborations between businesses of both countries and South Africa's interest in further cooperating in sectors such as agriculture.

On 10 December 2024, Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition Parks Tau met with Deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Marian Jurečka to begin the South Africa-Czech Republic Business Forum.⁴⁷⁵ Deputy Prime Minister Jurečka highlighted key sectors for future collaboration between the two countries, including agriculture.

On 6 February 2025, President Ramaphosa made his State of the Nation address in which he discussed measures to grow the agricultural sector.⁴⁷⁶ These efforts will include supporting farmers, improving logistics networks and rural supply chains, as well as creating new opportunities in international markets to export agricultural products.

On 13 February 2025, President Ramaphosa replied to the debate on his State of the Nation address, mentioning that the Government was addressing logistical issues in the agricultural sector. He also noted the government's efforts to open global markets for South African agricultural products.⁴⁷⁷

On 13 February 2025, President Ramaphosa approved the Plant Health Bill.⁴⁷⁸ This law ensures phytosanitary measures to prevent the "introduction, establishment and spread of regulated pests to safeguard South African agriculture and plant natural resources," reducing barriers for agricultural exports.

On 3 March 2025, the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and North West University's Mahikeng Campus introduced an Agricultural Hub on which they collaborated on at the university's Molelwane Research in hopes to promote innovation, advance research and enhance skill development in the agricultural industry.⁴⁷⁹ This initiative will contribute to "positioning the province as a leading exporter of agricultural products," while also facilitating agricultural growth aligned with technological innovation and satisfies global demand trends.

⁴⁷³ Opportunities to Enhance Trade and Investment Between South Africa and Angola to be Explored In Pretoria, Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (Pretoria) 29 November 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.thedtic.gov.za/opportunities-to-enhance-trade-and-investment-between-south-africa-and-angola-to-be-explored-in-pretoria>

⁴⁷⁴ President Cyril Ramaphosa: Address to Parliament of Algeria, South African President (Pretoria) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-address-parliament-algeria-06-dec-2024>

⁴⁷⁵ Minister Parks Tau strengthens economic ties between South Africa and Czechia, Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (Pretoria) 10 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-parks-tau-strengthens-economic-ties-between-south-africa-and-czechia>

⁴⁷⁶ President Cyril Ramaphosa: State of the Nation Address, The Presidency (Pretoria) 6 February 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.gov.za/speeches/2025StateOfTheNation>

⁴⁷⁷ President Cyril Ramaphosa: Reply to debate on State of the Nation Address, The Presidency (Pretoria) 13 February 2025. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-reply-debate-state-nation-address-13-feb-2025>

⁴⁷⁸ President Cyril Ramaphosa assents to the Plant Health Bill, The Presidency (Pretoria) 13 February 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-assents-plant-health-bill-13-feb-2025>

⁴⁷⁹ North West Agriculture and Rural Development and North West University launch Agricultural Hub to empower farmers and strengthen regional economy, North West Agriculture and Rural Development (Mmabatho) 4 March 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/north-west-agriculture-and-rural-development-and-north-west-university-launch>

On 5 March 2025, Minister of Agriculture John Steenhuisen announced the official opening of a new export market for South African fresh table grapes to the Philippines.⁴⁸⁰ This action follows a decade-long negotiations with an aim to raise production and exports of agricultural products as well increase the sector's impact on South Africa's economy.

On 24 April 2025, President Ramaphosa welcomed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for his official visit in South Africa, where they discussed collaboration in various sectors including agriculture.⁴⁸¹ Additionally, their Ministers talked about furthering trade and investment in their respective countries, namely in agriculture and agribusiness.

On 26 April 2025, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Lamola embraced Tanzania's decision to remove the ban on South Africa's agricultural imports.⁴⁸² Minister Lamola and Tanzania's Minister for Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation Mahmoud Thabit Kombo highlighted the importance of cooperation between their countries.

On 30 April 2025, Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition Parks Tau attended the South Africa-Nigeria Private Sector Engagement Session and emphasized the importance of diversifying South Africa and Nigeria's trade. The parties highlighted agriculture as a key industry for economic growth and cooperation.⁴⁸³

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. South Africa has taken action to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade for agricultural goods, such as the Plant Health Bill and introducing the Agriculture Hub. South Africa has also made weaker statements on minimizing disruptions and promoting rules-based trade with Algeria, Angola and the Czech Republic, as well as a variety of domestic occasions. However, South Africa has taken no action to promote rules-based trade of fertilizers specifically.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Haba-Maria Konaré

United Arab Emirates: 0

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production.

On 6 November 2024, the UAE and Australia signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to eliminate tariffs on over 99 per cent of Australia's agricultural exports to the UAE, including key products such as meat, dairy, grains, legumes and horticulture.⁴⁸⁴ The agreement establishes modern rules of

⁴⁸⁰ Agriculture on opening of new export market for fresh table grapes from South Africa to Philippines, Department of Agriculture (Pretoria) 5 March 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/agriculture-opening-new-export-market-fresh-table-grapes-south-africa>

⁴⁸¹ Media briefing remarks by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the occasion of the Official Visit by the President of Ukraine, Union Buildings, Tshwane, The Presidency (Pretoria) 24 April 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025. <https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/media-briefing-remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-occasion-official-visit-president-ukraine-union>

⁴⁸² Minister Ronald Lamola welcomes Tanzania's decision to lift its import ban on South African agricultural products, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Pretoria) 26 April 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-ronald-lamola-welcomes-tanzania%E2%80%99s-decision-lift-its-import-ban-south>

⁴⁸³ Nigeria Remains South Africa's Leading Export Destination In Africa – Minister Tau (Pretoria) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025. <https://www.thedtic.gov.za/nigeria-remains-south-africas-leading-export-destination-in-africa-minister-tau/>, <https://www.thedtic.gov.za/south-africa-nigeria-private-sector-engagement-to-deepen-trade-and-investment-relations/>

⁴⁸⁴ Tariffs axed for Aussie farmers exporting to the UAE, Australian Government – Minister for Trade and Tourism (Canberra) 6 November 2024. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://www.trademinister.gov.au/minister/don-farrell/media-release/tariffs-axed-aussie-farmers-exporting-uae>

origin, streamlines customs procedures and includes a standalone chapter on sustainable agriculture and food systems.

On 21 November 2024, the UAE collaborated with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to unveil artificial intelligence-powered agricultural solutions aimed at supporting climate-resilient farming, particularly for smallholder farmers in developing countries.⁴⁸⁵ This partnership, showcased during an event in Abu Dhabi, aims to bridge research and practical applications, helping mitigate disruptions in food production and ensuring continued access to essential agricultural inputs for vulnerable regions.

On 23 November 2024, His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, UAE President, met with President of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto in Abu Dhabi to reaffirm bilateral commitments under the UAE–Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.⁴⁸⁶ This agreement will expand cooperation on food security and sustainable agriculture. The two leaders emphasized deepening trade and investment ties, with a target to increase non-oil trade to USD10 billion and identified agriculture as a strategic area of collaboration.

On 6 January 2025, Sheikh Mohamed met with Prime Minister of Pakistan Shehbaz Sharif in Rahim Yar Khan and agreed to expand cooperation in key sectors, including agriculture.⁴⁸⁷ Both leaders emphasized deepening economic ties and fostering collaboration in agriculture, aligning with efforts to promote stable and rules-based trade.

On 14 January 2025, the UAE and Malaysia signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in Abu Dhabi to expand trade relations and strengthen supply chains.⁴⁸⁸ The agreement aims to reduce tariffs, streamline trade procedures and increase market access between the two countries.

On 14 January 2025, the UAE and Kenya signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in Abu Dhabi to expand trade and investment ties and strengthen economic collaboration across strategic sectors.⁴⁸⁹ The agreement aims to reduce trade barriers, enhance market access and accelerate cooperation in key areas including agriculture and supply chain development.

On 15 January 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan visited Abu Dhabi to strengthen agricultural cooperation with the UAE. Both countries agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) focused on food security and sustainable agriculture.⁴⁹⁰ The meeting highlighted the UAE's support for Uzbekistan's agricultural sector, particularly the adoption of climate resilient crops and modern irrigation systems, reinforcing agricultural trade and input flow.

⁴⁸⁵ UAE and Bill Gates unveil AI-powered agriculture solutions, The National (Abu Dhabi) 21 November 2024. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://www.thenationalnews.com/future/science/2024/11/21/uae-and-bill-gates-unveil-ai-powered-agriculture-solutions>

⁴⁸⁶ UAE, Indonesian Presidents reaffirm continued commitment to expanding bilateral ties, Emirates News Agency (Abu Dhabi) 23 November 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2024/11/UAE-Indonesian-Presidents-reaffirm-continued-commitment-to-expanding-bilateral-ties>

⁴⁸⁷ Pak-UAE to strengthen ties in minerals, agriculture sectors, Mettis Global (Rahim Yar Khan) 6 January 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://mettisglobal.news/pak-uae-to-strengthen-ties-in-minerals-agriculture-sectors/>

⁴⁸⁸ UAE, Malaysia sign Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement to deepen trade, investment ties, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) 14 January 2025. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/01/UAE-Malaysia-sign-Comprehensive-Economic-Partnership-Agreement>

⁴⁸⁹ Presidents of UAE, Kenya take part in Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signing, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) 14 January 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/01/Presidents-of-UAE-Kenya-take-part-in-Comprehensive-Economic-Partnership-Agreement-signing>

⁴⁹⁰ Strengthening mutual cooperation between Uzbekistan and the UAE, The Korea Post (Seoul) 15 January 2025. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=43942>

On 19 February 2025, officials from the UAE met with a delegation from Brazil's Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock in Abu Dhabi to strengthen bilateral cooperation on food supply and trade.⁴⁹¹ The discussions focused on expanding Brazil's food exports to the UAE, particularly meat, sugar, ethanol and tropical fruits.

On 20 February 2025, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the United Arab Emirates and First Deputy Ruler of the Emirate of Dubai Maktoum bin Mohammed Al Maktoum met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev.⁴⁹² The two leaders had a discussion centering on cooperation in agriculture. Deputy Prime Minister Patrushev noted Russia's readiness to increase exports of grains and confectionery to the UAE and promote halal-certified products that comply with UAE standards.

On 24 January 2025, Minister of Economy Abdulla bin Touq Al Marri met with officials from the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh during the World Economic Forum 2025 in Davos to explore enhanced cooperation in agriculture, logistics and infrastructure.⁴⁹³ The meeting emphasized the UAE's interest in importing more cereals and fruits from Uttar Pradesh.

On 8 February 2025, Minister of State for Foreign Trade Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi participated in a high-level business forum in Dubai to promote the UAE-Costa Rica Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.⁴⁹⁴ The forum highlighted the CEPA's role in enhancing bilateral trade and investment, including in key sectors such as agribusiness and food security. The agreement aims to eliminate or reduce tariffs, simplify customs procedures and expand market access for agricultural and food-related goods.

On 13 February 2025, Minister Al Marri led the UAE delegation at the 115th session of the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League in Cairo, where the UAE concluded its presidency of the 114th session.⁴⁹⁵ During its presidency, the UAE promoted initiatives to strengthen regional economic integration and emphasized the importance of joint action in food security, sustainability and trade development.

On 21 February 2025, Minister Al Marri attended the Invest Kerala Global Summit to strengthen bilateral trade and investment ties between the UAE and India.⁴⁹⁶ During the event, he emphasized the UAE's commitment to expanding cooperation in food security, sustainable technology and innovation, highlighting agriculture-related sectors as priority areas for future economic collaboration.

On 6 March 2025, Sheikh Mohamed witnessed the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the Central African Republic to boost bilateral trade and investment.⁴⁹⁷ The deal aims to

⁴⁹¹ Brazil's Ministry of Agriculture on mission to UAE, ANBA (São Paulo) 19 February 2025. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://anba.com.br/en/brazils-ministry-of-agriculture-on-mission-to-uae/>

⁴⁹² Дмитрий Патрушев и Заместитель Премьер-министра ОАЭ обсудили сотрудничество в сельском хозяйстве, Правительство России (Moscow) 20 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54286/>

⁴⁹³ UP and UAE explore collaboration in agriculture, logistics, and labour skill development at WEF 2025, The Statesman (New Delhi) 24 January 2025. Access Date: 31 May 2025. <https://www.thestatesman.com/india/up-and-uae-explore-collaboration-in-agriculture-logistics-and-labour-skill-development-at-wef-2025-1503390456.html>

⁴⁹⁴ UAE and Costa Rica to promote trade, investment opportunities, The Statesman (Dubai) 8 February 2025. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://www.thestatesman.com/india/up-and-uae-explore-collaboration-in-agriculture-logistics-and-labour-skill-development-at-wef-2025-1503390456.html>

⁴⁹⁵ UAE reviews key initiatives during its presidency of 114th session of Economic and Social Council of Arab League, Ministry of Economy (Abu Dhabi) 13 February 2025. Access Date: 31 May 2025. <https://www.moec.gov.ae/en/-/uae-reviews-key-initiatives-during-its-presidency-of-114th-session-of-economic-and-social-council-of-arab-league>

⁴⁹⁶ H.E. Bin Touq takes part in 'Invest Kerala Global Summit,' reviews promising investment opportunities in the UAE's new economy sectors, Ministry of Economy (Abu Dhabi) 21 February 2025. Access Date: 31 May 2025. <https://www.moec.gov.ae/en/-/h.e.-bin-touq-takes-part-in-invest-kerala-global-summit-reviews-promising-investment-opportunities-in-the-uae-s-new-economy-sectors>

⁴⁹⁷ UAE President, Central African Republic President witness signing of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) 6 March 2025. Access Date: 15 July 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/03/UAE-President-Central-African-Republic-President-witness-signing-of-Comprehensive-Partnership>

remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers, improve market access and increase agricultural trade flows, including exports of coffee, cotton and cassava to the UAE.

On 19 March 2025, Minister of State for Foreign Trade Thani and Minister of State Ahmed bin Ali Al Sayegh led a delegation to Brussels to meet with European Union and Belgian officials to strengthen trade ties.⁴⁹⁸ During the visit, they discussed food security, investment flows and preserving rules-based trade, reflecting the UAE's commitment to facilitating the smooth flow of agricultural trade and reinforcing predictable trade norms.

On 28 March 2025, Sheikh Mohamed met with Prime Minister of Montenegro Milojko Spajić in Abu Dhabi to strengthen cooperation in food security, trade and economic development.⁴⁹⁹ The leaders affirmed their commitment to expanding partnerships in priority sectors and witnessed the signing of two bilateral agreements that support enhanced trade flows and economic integration.

On 8 April 2025, Sheikh Mohamed and Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso witnessed the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the UAE and the Republic of Congo.⁵⁰⁰ The agreement aims to expand bilateral trade through reduced tariffs and increased market access, reinforcing the UAE's commitment to rules-based trade and enhancing its strategic trade ties.

On 9 April 2025, Sheikh Mohamed met with Indonesia's President Prabowo Subianto in Abu Dhabi to discuss ways to enhance bilateral cooperation, including in food security and the economy.⁵⁰¹ The presidents signed multiple agreements covering sectors such as agriculture, environment and sustainability, highlighting joint efforts to improve trade flows and reinforce strategic agricultural partnerships.

On 10 April 2025, Minister of State for International Cooperation Reem Al Hashimy and Minister of State Sheikh Shakhboot Bin Nahyan Al Nahyan announced the UAE's support for an agricultural training program in partnership with the Brazil Africa Institute to benefit professionals from Angola and Guinea-Bissau.⁵⁰² The UAE will contribute funding, curriculum design and technical training to improve agricultural capacity in the cocoa and cashew industries, supporting global food security and enhancing regional agricultural trade capacity.

On 10 April 2025, Sheikh Mohamed and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen agreed to begin negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.⁵⁰³ This decision demonstrates the UAE's intent to expand trade with the EU by lowering tariffs, enhancing market access and removing trade barriers, thereby advancing rules-based trade and reducing the risk of future disruptions.

⁴⁹⁸ UAE, European Union strengthening trade relations, promoting investment opportunities, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Abu Dhabi) 19 March 2025. Access Date: 16 July 2025. <https://www.mofa.gov.ae/MediaHub/News/2025/3/19/19-3-2025-UAE-UAE>

⁴⁹⁹ UAE President discusses strengthening bilateral relations with Montenegrin Prime Minister, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) 28 March 2025. Access Date: 15 July 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/03/UAE-President-discusses-strengthening-bilateral-relations-with-Montenegrin-Prime-Minister>

⁵⁰⁰ UAE President, President of Republic of the Congo witness signing of Comprehensive Agreement, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) 8 April 2025. Access Date: 15 July 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/04/UAE-President-President-of-Republic-of-the-Congo-witness-signing-of-Comprehensive-Agreement>

⁵⁰¹ UAE-Indonesian Presidents explore ways to strengthen bilateral ties, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) 9 April 2025. Access Date: 15 July 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/04/UAE-Indonesian-Presidents-explore-ways-to-strengthen-bilateral-ties>

⁵⁰² UAE and Brazil Partner to Train Agricultural Professionals in Angola and Guinea-Bissau, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Abu Dhabi) 10 April 2025. Access Date: 16 July 2025. <https://www.mofa.gov.ae/MediaHub/News/2025/4/10/10-4-2025-UAE-Brazil>

⁵⁰³ UAE President, President of European Commission agree to launch negotiations towards Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Abu Dhabi) 10 April 2025. Access Date: 15 July 2025. <https://www.mohamedbinzayed.ae/en/latest-news-listing/2025/04/UAE-President-President-of-European-Commission-agree-to-launch-negotiations>

On 17 April the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) and the World Agricultural Forum (WAF) signed a MoU with shared goals of sustainable agricultural development, food security, empowering farmers and investing in facilitating the agricultural sector.⁵⁰⁴

On 30 April 2025, Minister Al Hashimy represented the United Arab Emirates at the BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Brazil, where she emphasized the role of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements in fostering rules-based trade.⁵⁰⁵ Her remarks reinforced the UAE's use of economic diplomacy to build resilient trade ties and strengthen multilateral cooperation within the BRICS framework.

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with its commitment to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture and fertilizers with the view to ensure a continuous flow of food and essential inputs for agricultural production. The UAE has taken strong action to minimize disruptions and promote rules-based trade in agriculture, such as collaborating with Australia, Brazil, Congo, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Malaysia, Montenegro, Uzbekistan, Russia, India and Costa Rica to increase rules-based trade and reduce barriers. However, the UAE has not taken significant action to promote rules-based trade of fertilizers specifically.

Thus, the United Arab Emirates receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Annisa Alya Ramadhani

⁵⁰⁴ Signing a Memorandum of Understanding between the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development and the World Agricultural Forum (Dubai) 17 April 2025. Access Date: 14 August 2025. <https://www.aaaid.org/en/news/signing-a-memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-arab-authority-for-agricultural-investment-and-development-and-the-world-agricultural-forum/>

⁵⁰⁵ Reem Al Hashimy Highlights UAE's Vision for Global Cooperation at BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Brazil, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Abu Dhabi) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 14 July 2025. <https://www.mofa.gov.ae/MediaHub/News/2025/4/30/30-4-2025-UAE-Brazil>

5. Health: Strengthen the International Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response System

“We reiterate our support to the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.”

XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil			+1
China		0	
Egypt			+1
Ethiopia		0	
India		0	
Indonesia		0	
Iran		0	
Russia	-1		
South Africa			+1
United Arab Emirates		0	
Average		+0.20 (60%)	

Background

Health has always been a large part of BRICS policy and commitments. At the 2024 Kazan Summit, BRICS members reiterated “support to the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit[ed] to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system”. In the past, members have addressed frequently discussed public health topics such as greater health product accessibility, tuberculosis response, the spread of disease, research and much more. The 2020 COVID-19 Pandemic has recently made health one of the most highlighted topics within BRICS summits, with plans to strengthen research, prevention of other pandemics and improve the accessibility of vaccinations.⁵⁰⁶ International collaboration between BRICS members has remained a large component in realizing members’ universal health and well-being goals.

At the 2011 Sanya Summit, BRICS leaders committed to collaboration in public health as well as in their “fight against AIDS.”⁵⁰⁷ They also called for a “Meeting of Ministers of Health” to take place in 2011 in China.

At the 2012 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders acknowledged shared public health challenges, including “universal access to health services, access to health technologies, including medicines, increasing costs and the growing burden of both communicable and non-communicable diseases.”⁵⁰⁸ Leaders decided on the institutionalization of the meetings of BRICS Health Ministers. They also affirmed their collaboration in technology and information sharing in health research.

⁵⁰⁶ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

⁵⁰⁷ Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

⁵⁰⁸ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

At the 2013 Durban Summit, BRICS leaders reiterated their commitment to annual meetings of BRICS Health Ministers.⁵⁰⁹

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders established their shared commitment to fighting the world drug problem to ensure public health.⁵¹⁰ BRICS leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to universal sexual and reproductive health.

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS leaders international cooperation through partnerships with stakeholders and mutual support to minimize the threat of communicable and non-communicable diseases, fight global health challenges, ensure equitable access to health care and achieve health security. The summit mentioned the disease Ebola as a matter of concern, and BRICS leaders affirmed their support for the United Nations' efforts to stop Ebola and improve "systems of international response to public health emergencies."⁵¹¹ They reiterated their commitment to strengthening health sectors with the support of the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, BRICS leaders also called for a collaborative approach in line with United Nations (UN) principles to address the world drug problem.⁵¹² Furthermore, BRICS leaders also reiterated their commitment to the right to reproductive health and the right to mental health.⁵¹³

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS leaders emphasized the importance of cooperation to combat global health challenges.⁵¹⁴ BRICS leaders called for increased efforts to advance HIV and Tuberculosis treatments and to find avenues for collaboration on combating antimicrobial resistance. BRICS leaders also acknowledged the 2017 Moscow "Global Conference" on Tuberculosis, taking place with the support of WHO.

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS leaders committed to increasing "people-to-people exchanges" to foster cooperation in the health field.⁵¹⁵ BRICS leaders also agreed to take a leading role in global health governance with WHO and UN to improve research, innovation, access to drugs and vaccines, medical technologies and services and to maintain high standards of health services and combat infectious and non-communicable diseases.

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders expressed their support for multiple conferences in support of health initiatives.⁵¹⁶ They highlighted the 2017 WHO Conference in Moscow on Tuberculosis response and brought attention to two upcoming conferences happening in 2018, including the 1st UN General Assembly on ending tuberculosis and the 3rd UN General Assembly on the control of non-communicable diseases.

At the 2019 Brasília Summit, the work by the BRICS Network of Human Milk Banks was emphasized, along with the continued work by BRICS Health Ministers and the BRICS TB Research Network on all matters

⁵⁰⁹ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization, eThekweni Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

⁵¹⁰ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 17 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

⁵¹¹ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 18 May 2025. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

⁵¹² VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 18 May 2025. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

⁵¹³ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 18 May 2025. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

⁵¹⁴ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

⁵¹⁵ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

⁵¹⁶ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

related to tuberculosis response.⁵¹⁷ Collective action was emphasized in support of initiatives related to disease prevention, such as research, development of medicine, diagnostic tools and accessibility of treatments.

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, BRICS members collaborated on a response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.⁵¹⁸ Solidarity among BRICS members was heavily emphasized as well as the process of immunization against the virus, particularly in a way that was “fair, equitable and affordable”. BRICS leaders announced support of the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator initiative. BRICS leaders also expressed support for addressing other social and financial consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS members continued their commitment to a strong COVID-19 response.⁵¹⁹ This included the support of WHO’s COVID-19 response plans and further medical research. BRICS members emphasized the importance of accessible COVID-19 vaccines through an Intellectual Property Rights waiver and committed to facilitating equitable vaccine distribution. BRICS members expressed support for the BRICS Integrated Early Warning System.

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS members reiterated support for a strong and collaborative COVID-19 response.⁵²⁰ BRICS members highlighted the importance of future pandemic response by welcoming the BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Center and the BRICS Integrated Early Warning System, emphasizing the importance of preventative measures against cross-border transmission of infectious diseases. BRICS also members reiterated the continued promise of tuberculosis mitigation and committed to WHO’s goal of ending tuberculosis by 2030.

At the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders expressed their continued support for the BRICS Virtual Vaccine Research and Development Center and the 2023 UN High-Level Meeting on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response.⁵²¹ BRICS members also expressed interest in establishing Universal Health Care and highlighted the importance of the 2023 UN High-Level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage to reach good health and well-being for all. Support for tuberculosis response was reiterated.

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, BRICS leaders highlighted the importance of WHO’s role in global public health.⁵²² Moreover, they discussed continuing reform and reinforcement of international pandemic response systems.

Commitment Features

At the 2025 Kazan Summit, leaders committed to “reiterate...support to the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.” This commitment can be interpreted as having two main components, which are 1) supporting the World Health Organization’s (WHO) central role in coordinating the implementation of multilateral international action to defend public health from diseases and epidemics and 2) to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

⁵¹⁷ Brasília Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 1 January 2020. Access Date: 20 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasilia.html>

⁵¹⁸ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 20 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

⁵¹⁹ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 September 2021. Access Date: 20 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

⁵²⁰ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 20 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

⁵²¹ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 21 November 2023. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

⁵²² XVI BRICS Summit, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 24 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

Definitions and Concepts

“Central” is understood to mean “of primary importance.”⁵²³

“Coordinating” is understood to mean “to bring into a common action, movement, or condition.”⁵²⁴

“Role” is understood to mean “a function or part performed especially in a particular operation or process.”⁵²⁵

The “World Health Organization” is “the United Nations agency that connects nations, partners and people to promote health, keep the world safe and serve the vulnerable.”⁵²⁶

“Central Coordinating Role” is therefore understood to mean, in the context of this commitment, as the WHO’s function as the primary actor in bringing together other actors and shaping their efforts.

“Implementation” is understood to mean “an act or instance of implementing something: the process of making something active or effective.”⁵²⁷ In the context of this commitment, the implementation of initiatives or processes is the primary responsibility of the WHO. Thus, BRICS members need to act through the WHO to support its work on implementation.

“Multilateral” is understood to mean “involving or participated in by more than two nations or parties.”⁵²⁸

“International” is understood to mean “reaching beyond national boundaries” and is disambiguated from the alternative definition of “relating to, or constituting a group or association having members in two or more nations,” which is described instead by the term “multilateral,” as defined above.⁵²⁹

“Efforts” is understood to mean “conscious exertion of power.”⁵³⁰

“Multilateral International Efforts” is therefore understood to mean, in the context of this commitment, conscious exertions of power by or between two or more nations or parties and having effects that reach beyond national boundaries.

“Protect” is understood to mean “to cover or shield from exposure, injury, damage, or destruction.”⁵³¹ In the context of this commitment, specifically, best describes the process of protecting public health from infectious diseases and epidemics.

“Public health” is understood to mean “the art and science dealing with the protection and improvement of community health by organized community effort and including preventive medicine and sanitary and social

⁵²³ Central, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/central>

⁵²⁴ Coordinate, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coordinate>

⁵²⁵ Role, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/role>

⁵²⁶ About WHO, World Health Organization (Geneva) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.who.int/about>

⁵²⁷ Implementation, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implementation>

⁵²⁸ Multilateral, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/multilateral>

⁵²⁹ International, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/international>

⁵³⁰ Effort, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effort>

⁵³¹ Protect, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/protect>

science.”⁵³² In the context of this commitment, public health refers specifically to protecting community health by preventing and responding to infectious disease outbreaks and epidemics.

“Infectious diseases” is understood to mean illnesses “caused by pathogenic microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi; the diseases can be spread, directly or indirectly, from one person to another.”⁵³³

“Epidemic” is understood to mean “an unexpected increase in the number of disease cases in a specific geographical area,” referring “to a disease or other specific health-related behavior... with rates that are clearly above the expected occurrence in a community or region.”⁵³⁴

“Reform” is understood to mean “to put or change into an improved form or condition.”⁵³⁵

“Strengthen” is understood to mean “to make... stronger.”⁵³⁶

The “international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system” is understood to mean the proposed “convention, agreement or other international instrument under the Constitution of the World Health Organization to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness and response.”⁵³⁷ The system has not been finalized and has been subject to ongoing negotiations since December 2021.

General Interpretive Guidelines

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be assigned to BRICS members that take strong action in both commitment dimensions to 1) support to the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and 2) reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

Examples of strong actions to support to the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics include but are not limited to providing financial, technical or other support to WHO coordination initiatives against diseases and epidemics, providing support for WHO capacities in that same field or politically supporting the WHO as the central coordinator of epidemic and disease response and prevention efforts.

Strong actions to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system include but are not limited to participating in WHO Member State meetings concerning such systems, financing or focusing political efforts on negotiations towards such a system or providing financial support to the WHO for the explicit purpose of supporting the development of such a system, efforts to form or support the formation of the “international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system” do not need to directly support the creation of a WHO convention or instrument and may also include efforts to improve pandemic prevention, preparedness and response systems as negotiations towards a final system progress.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that take strong action in one but not both commitment dimensions, or take weak actions in both dimensions. Examples of weak actions include but are not limited to verbal reaffirmation of the commitment without assigning financial or political resources to

⁵³² Public Health, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public-health>

⁵³³ Infectious Diseases, World Health Organization: Eastern Mediterranean Region (Cairo) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.emro.who.int/health-topics/infectious-diseases/index.html>

⁵³⁴ Epidemic, Endemic, Pandemic: What are the Differences?, Columbia: Mailman School of Public Health (New York) 19 February 2021. Access Date: 18 May 2-2025. <https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu/news/epidemic-endemic-pandemic-what-are-differences>

⁵³⁵ Reform, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reform>

⁵³⁶ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 12 November 2020. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁵³⁷ Pandemic prevention, preparedness and response accord, World Health Organization (Geneva) 7 May 2025. <https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/pandemic-prevention--preparedness-and-response-accord>

the cause or meeting with international partners to discuss the commitment and its dimensions outside of WHO frameworks.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1 will be assigned to BRICS members that do not take action towards the commitment, take weak action towards only one of the commitment dimensions or take action that is directly antithetical to the commitment.

Further, domestic actions aimed at protecting public health against infectious diseases and pandemics are beyond the scope of this commitment and do not count towards compliance.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member has taken only weak action in one or less of the commitment dimensions, to 1) support to the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics; or 2) reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system or the BRICS member has taken action directly antithetical to the commitment.
0	The BRICS member has taken strong action in one of the two commitment dimensions, to 1) support to the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics; or 2) reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system or the BRICS member has taken weak action in both commitment dimensions.
+1	The BRICS member has taken strong action to 1) support the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics; and 2) reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

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Lead Analyst: Lisanne Koehler*

Brazil: +1

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 25 November 2024, United Nations Ambassador Tovar Da Silva Nunes chaired the twelfth meeting of the WHO Intergovernmental Negotiating Body as Vice-chair.⁵³⁸ Ambassador Nunes participated in efforts to reform the negotiation process with the intention of a global pandemic agreement for future outbreaks offered in this position.

On 25 January 2025, the Ministry of Health announced that the single-dose dengue vaccine of Butantan Institute was ready to enter late-stage clinical development before being nationally produced.⁵³⁹ The initiative marked Brazil's strategic investment in domestic medication in hopes of advancing pandemic preparedness.

⁵³⁸ Twelfth meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body to draft and negotiate a WHO convention, agreement or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response: Interim report of the meeting, World Health Organization (Geneva) 27 November 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2025. https://apps.who.int/gb/inb/pdf_files/inb12/A_inb12_3-en.pdf

⁵³⁹ Governo Federal anuncia primeira vacina 100% nacional e de dose única contra a dengue, Ministério da Saúde (Brasília) 25 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://www.gov.br/saude/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/fevereiro/governo-federal-anuncia-primeira-vacina-100-nacional-e-de-dose-unica-contra-a-dengue>

On 18 and 19 February 2025, the Ministry of Health brought together regional health authorities to align health and environmental surveillance at the national level.⁵⁴⁰ Key topics included pandemic preparedness and vaccine distribution.

On 24 February 2025, the Ministry of Health released plans to distribute 22 vaccines to remote areas of the country.⁵⁴¹ The campaign will be funded by BRL20 million, which will be used for training, transportation and coverage for materials and teams.

On 25 February 2025, the Federal Government announced the finalization and large-scale production of the dengue vaccination.⁵⁴² Production of the dengue vaccination is on par with the Unified Health System, which is aimed at improving public health and the access of it.

On 27 February 2025, the Ministry of Health launched the National Guideline for the integrated action of Endemic Disease Control Agents and Community Health Agents.⁵⁴³ This comprehensive document will enforce integration between the National Council of Health Secretaries and the National Council of Municipal Secretariats to address health surveillance and primary health care in the country.

On 7 April 2025, Ambassador Nunes participated in the resumed 13th meeting of the World Health Organisation Intergovernmental Negotiating Body.⁵⁴⁴ The negotiations on the draft WHO Pandemic Agreement included provisions on technology transfer, pathogen access, benefit-sharing and supply chains.

On 16 April 2025, Ambassador Nunes contributed to finalizing the full draft of the WHO Pandemic Agreement in the resumed thirteenth meeting of the World Health Organisation Intergovernmental Negotiating Body.⁵⁴⁵ Brazil and other member states of the WHO stated their goal of unifying a global approach to future pandemics.

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to support the WHO central role in coordinating the implementation of multilateral international action to defend public health from diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. At the BRICS Kazan summit, Brazil demonstrated political support through the endorsement of the declaration and active leadership participation during WHO pandemic treaty negotiations. Brazil contributed to the final negotiations and supported the adoption of the WHO Pandemic Agreement draft, thus playing a strong role in the strengthening of international pandemic resilience.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of +1.

Analyst: June Vo

⁵⁴⁰ Dirigentes estaduais reúnem-se em Brasília para reforçar vigilância em saúde no país, Ministério da Saúde (Brasília) 19 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 16 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/saude/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/fevereiro/dirigentes-estaduais-reunem-se-em-brasilia-para-reforcar-vigilancia-em-saude-no-pais>.

⁵⁴¹ Operação Gota: Ministério da Saúde planeja vacinação para populações que vivem em áreas remotas, Ministério da Saúde (Brasília) 26 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 8 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/saude/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/fevereiro/operacao-gota-ministerio-da-saude-planeja-vacinacao-para-populacoes-que-vivem-em-areas-remotas>

⁵⁴² Governo Federal anuncia primeira vacina 100% nacional e de dose única contra a dengue, Ministério da Saúde (Brasília) 25 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 8 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/saude/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/fevereiro/governo-federal-anuncia-primeira-vacina-100-nacional-e-de-dose-unica-contra-a-dengue>

⁵⁴³ Diretriz inédita integra vigilância e atenção primária à saúde, Ministério da Saúde (Brasília) 28 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 8 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/saude/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/fevereiro/diretriz-inedita-integra-vigilancia-e-atencao-primaria-a-saude>

⁵⁴⁴ Summary report of the resumed Thirteenth meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB13), World Health Organization (Geneva) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. https://apps.who.int/gb/inb/pdf_files/inb13/A_inb13_5-en.pdf

⁵⁴⁵ WHO Member States conclude negotiations and make significant progress on draft pandemic agreement, World Health Organization (Geneva) 16 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.who.int/news/item/16-04-2025-who-member-states-conclude-negotiations-and-make-significant-progress-on-draft-pandemic-agreement>

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 28 November 2024, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) held a lecture on the potential application of artificial intelligence (AI) for disease monitoring.⁵⁴⁶ The technological advancement suggested an improvement of disease monitoring and will subsequently allow pandemic prediction and prevention.

On 14 January 2025, the China CDC and the United States held an exchange conference on “Vaccine Monitoring Network and Measles Prevention and Control.”⁵⁴⁷ At the conference, the country’s measles monitoring system, control of clustered outbreaks and current vaccination measures were introduced. The exchange conference will aid in controlling global measles outbreak and potential measles eradication.

On 23 February 2025, the People’s Daily published an article detailing China’s goal to reform its healthcare system.⁵⁴⁸ The article was signed by Deputy Director of the National Health Commission, Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the National Center for Disease Control and Prevention Shen Hongbing. The reform aims to modernize the healthcare system in China to prioritize disease prevention through advancements in monitoring systems and vaccination implementations.

On 24 March 2025, the China CDC Center for AIDS Prevention held a conference, where officials emphasised the need for AIDS prevention and monitoring at the 2025 AIDS Key Population Monitoring and Intervention Training Course.⁵⁴⁹ The training provides technical support for AIDS monitoring data collection and management thus enabling epidemic analysis and prediction.

On 29 April 2025, experts from the China CDC carried out a post-disaster health and epidemic prevention professional technical training for 30 Myanmar medical and health professionals.⁵⁵⁰ The training focused post-earthquake disasters disinfection, monitoring, prevention, risk assessment and investigation of infectious disease outbreaks. The training aimed to help maintain public health after natural disaster through the international sharing of knowledge.

China has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. China has taken strong actions to reform the country’s pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system, such as hosting conferences on AIDS and measles monitoring, exploring the use of AI for

⁵⁴⁶ 中国疾控中心举办关于人工智能在传染病监测预警中应用的学术报告, 中国疾病预防控制中心 (Beijing) 4 December 2024.

Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025.

https://www.chinacdc.cn/gzdt/zxzb/202412/t20241204_303098.html

⁵⁴⁷ 中美疾控中心召开第34期技术交流视频会议, 中国疾病预防控制中心 (Beijing) 23 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. https://www.chinacdc.cn/gzdt/zxzb/202501/t20250123_304028.html

⁵⁴⁸ 《人民日报》发表国家卫生健康委党组成员、副主任, 国家疾控局党组书记、局长沈洪兵署名文章: 改革完善疾控体系 保障公共卫生安全, 中国疾病预防控制中心 (Beijing) 23 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025.

https://www.chinacdc.cn/zxyw/202502/t20250223_304489.html

⁵⁴⁹ 强基础, 提能力, 促创新——2025年艾滋病重点人群监测和干预培训班 (第一期) 在合肥举办, 中国疾病预防控制中心 (Beijing) 14 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025.

https://www.chinacdc.cn/gzdt/zsdw/202504/t20250414_305958.html

⁵⁵⁰ 中国政府援缅甸卫生防疫队中国疾控中心专家开展灾后卫生防疫技术培训, 中国疾病预防控制中心 (Beijing) 29 April 2025.

Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025.

https://www.chinacdc.cn/zxyw/202505/t20250505_306471.html

disease prevention and strengthening vaccination programs. However, China has not taken any strong actions to support the central coordinating role of the WHO.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Kennice Cheung

Egypt: +1

Egypt has fully complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 26 November 2024, the Ministry of Health and Population and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control hosted “The Progress Towards Hepatitis C Elimination” conference, in Cairo.⁵⁵¹ The ministry invited public health experts, policymakers and key stakeholders from the Mediterranean, Europe and more. The meeting, alongside key discussions and presentations, focused on identifying how the European Union and European Economic Area and other European Neighbourhood Policy partner countries could achieve the elimination of hepatitis C. Strategies included screening and diagnosis, sustainable and local manufacturing, hepatitis B integration and general prevention in recognition of Egypt’s lessons and continued resolution in combatting the disease.

On 1 December 2024, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health and Population Khaled Abdel Ghaffar reviewed the Ministry of Health and Population’s efforts and highlighted that the Presidential Initiative to Eliminate Hepatitis C has screened over 63 million citizens and treated more than four million patients.⁵⁵² The initiative has saved approximately EGP16 billion in direct medical costs through early detection and treatment of the disease.

On 3 December 2024, the cabinet launched the Egyptian Vaccine Manufacturers Alliance to implement a national strategy to localise vaccine manufacturing from 2024 to 2030 under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and Population, the Egyptian Unified Procurement Authority, the Medical Technology and Supply Authority and the Egyptian Drug Authority.⁵⁵³ The alliance will take a strategic plan of meeting domestic vaccination needs at 75 million doses annually and to increase exports by 50 per cent by 2040 to meet the growing demand in Africa which requires 1.8 billion vaccine doses annually by then.

On 20 December 2024, the WHO announced that Egypt became the first country in Africa to attain maturity level 3 out of four possible levels in the WHO’s global classification of national regulatory authorities.⁵⁵⁴ This achievement means that Egypt continues to meet the WHO global benchmarking process thus strengthening

⁵⁵¹ ECDC and Egypt organize a landmark conference on the progress towards hepatitis C elimination, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (Solna) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ecdc-and-egypt-organise-landmark-conference-progress-towards-hepatitis-c-elimination>

⁵⁵² Hepatitis C initiative saves Egypt about EGP 16bn in medical costs: Health Minister, Daily News Egypt (Cairo) 1 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2024/12/01/hepatitis-c-initiative-saves-egypt-about-egp-16bn-in-medical-costs-health-minister/>

⁵⁵³ Vaccine ambitions, Ahram Online (Cairo) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025.

<https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1201/536386/AlAhram-Weekly/Egypt/Vaccine-ambitions.aspx>

⁵⁵⁴ Egypt’s regulatory system reaches WHO maturity level 3 in medicines regulation, World Health Organization (Geneva) 20 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.who.int/news/item/20-12-2024-egypt-s-regulatory-system-reaches-who-maturity-level-3-in-medicines-regulation>

its health system and is recognised for continued efforts in medicines and vaccines regulation, is a recognition of the country's sustained investment towards standards of safety, efficacy and quality.⁵⁵⁵

On 23 January 2025, Minister Ghaffar announced that Egypt has met the regional target for hepatitis B control set by the WHO's Regional Committee during its 56th session.⁵⁵⁶ This followed a review and verification which assessed Egypt's efforts to combat hepatitis B and C and the elimination of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, hepatitis B and syphilis. These remarks are in accordance with WHO issued certifications acknowledging Egypt's success in reducing hepatitis B prevalence to less than one per cent among children aged five and older.

On 16 April 2025, UN Ambassador Amr Ramadan contributed to finalizing the full draft of the WHO Pandemic Agreement in the resumed thirteenth meeting of the WHO Intergovernmental Negotiating Body.⁵⁵⁷ Egypt and other member states of the WHO stated their goal of unifying a global approach to future pandemics.

On 19 April 2025, Minister Ghaffar renewed Egypt's international certification from the WHO in a public statement, confirming the country's elimination of measles, rubella and congenital rubella syndrome (CRS) for the second consecutive year.⁵⁵⁸ As part of this process, Egypt invited a team of WHO experts to conduct field evaluations. This action highlights Egypt's regard for the WHO as the primary international health authority.

On 27 April 2025, the Ministry of Health and Population launched a campaign to prevent and treat Chlamydia trachomatis in seven governorates.⁵⁵⁹ The initiative is part of a comprehensive national campaign, implemented in coordination with the WHO, aiming to declare Egypt free of the disease by 2027.

Egypt has fully complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. Egypt has proactively taken actions to contribute to the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system by providing detailed knowledge and resource sharing with both regional and international nations on numerous diseases. Additionally, Egypt has taken actions in WHO coordination initiatives against diseases and epidemics and politically supported the WHO as the central coordinator of epidemic and disease response and prevention efforts in continually respecting and meeting public health standards.

Thus, Egypt receives a score of +1

Analyst: Acacia Philcox

Ethiopia: 0

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health

⁵⁵⁵ Egypt attains WHO maturity level 3 in medicines regulations, Ahram Online (Cairo) 21 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/1236/537328/Egypt/Health/Egypt-attains-WHO-maturity-level--in-medicines-reg.aspx>

⁵⁵⁶ Egypt achieves WHO regional target for hepatitis B control, State Information Service (Cairo) 23 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/204463?lang=en-us>

⁵⁵⁷ WHO Member States conclude negotiations and make significant progress on draft pandemic agreement, World Health Organization (Geneva) 16 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.who.int/news/item/16-04-2025-who-member-states-conclude-negotiations-and-make-significant-progress-on-draft-pandemic-agreement>

⁵⁵⁸ WHO confirms Egypt free of measles, rubella for second year, State Information Service (Cairo) 20 April 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/207233/WHO-confirms-Egypt-free-of-measles%2C-rubella-for-second-year?lang=en-us>

⁵⁵⁹ Egypt's Ministry of Health launches trachoma elimination campaign in 7 governorates, Daily News Egypt (Cairo) 27 April 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://www.dailynewsegyp.com/2025/04/27/egypts-ministry-of-health-launches-trachoma-elimination-campaign-in-7-governorates/>

from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 27 November 2024, Ethiopia and other Africa Union member states participated in a workshop under direction of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) where they endorsed a new strategic plan to tackle endemic diseases across the African continent.⁵⁶⁰ The plan emphasises integrated health systems, prioritising preventing and controlling major health threats such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, hepatitis and neglected tropical diseases.

On 20 December 2024, the Ministry of Health met with China and African countries to discuss a tripartite framework aimed at boosting domestic pharmaceutical production within Ethiopia.⁵⁶¹ Domestic production would include ingredients and raw materials, bettering the country's production capacity, infrastructure and research.

On 28 January 2025, Minister of Health Mekdes Daba and State Minister of Health Dereje Duguma met with financial partners on strengthening support for the elimination of malaria.⁵⁶² The ministers emphasized strengthening of healthcare facilities and prevention during this forum and partners reached a consensus that further support will include such actions aimed at preventing the spread of malaria.

On 12 February 2025, Minister Daba reiterated Ethiopia's commitment to building and strengthening a strong health care system.⁵⁶³ He stated that conversations and cooperation are ongoing in this field.

On 13 February 2025, the Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI) hosted the 3rd cohort African Volunteers Health Corps - Strengthening and Utilizing Response Groups for Emergencies Corps (AVoHC-SURGE) onboard training in Adama city.⁵⁶⁴ The EPHI trained AVoHC-SURGE members in Africa and aimed to strengthen international emergency response in the continent. The WHO provided support and emphasized Ethiopia's ongoing commitment in pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. This collaboration with the WHO within Ethiopian jurisdiction indicates support for the WHO's authority and central role in global health.

On 25 April 2025, the Ministry of Health signed a memorandum of understanding with the Russian Federal Service for the Oversight of Consumer Protection and Welfare.⁵⁶⁵ This agreement was aimed at strengthening multilateral pandemic and health emergency response cooperation between the two countries and took place during the first Russia-Africa Emergency Response Teams Exercise and Seminar Program.

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. Ethiopia has taken strong actions to increase its pandemic preparedness through working with private

⁵⁶⁰ Africa CDC Launches a Continental Blueprint to Combat Endemic and Neglected Tropical Diseases, Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Addis Ababa) 28 November 2025. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://africacdc.org/news-item/africa-cdc-launches-a-continental-blueprint-to-combat-endemic-and-neglected-tropical-diseases/>

⁵⁶¹ Discussions held on China, Africa and UN Tripartite Framework to Boost Domestic Pharmaceutical Production, Ministry of Health (Addis Ababa) 20 December 2024. Access Date: 8 June 2025. <https://www.moh.gov.et/en/node/461>

⁵⁶² Discussions with partners on ways to use new strategies and technologies to eliminate malaria have been held, Ministry of Health (Addis Ababa) 28 January 2025. Access Date: 8 June 2025. <https://www.moh.gov.et/en/node/479>

⁵⁶³ Ethiopia is committed to building a strong and resilient health system in partnership with all stakeholders. Minister of Health Dr. Mekdes Daba, Ministry of Health (Addis Ababa) 12 February 2025. Access Date: 8 June 2025. <https://www.moh.gov.et/en/node/491>

⁵⁶⁴ Ethiopia bolsters public health emergency response through workforce development with support from the Pandemic Fund, World Health Organization (Geneva) 20 March 2025. Access Date: 21 July 2025. <https://www.afro.who.int/countries/ethiopia/news/ethiopia-bolsters-public-health-emergency-response-through-workforce-development-support-pandemic>

⁵⁶⁵ Ethiopia, Russia sign MoU to strengthen health cooperation, Ministry of Health (Addis Ababa) 5 May 2025. Access Date 21 July 2025. https://www.moh.gov.et/am/node/514?language_content_entity=en

and international partners to increase pharmaceutical production and to improve pandemic responses across Africa. However, Ethiopia has not taken strong action to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics.

Thus, Ethiopia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Hilena Gebregiorgis

India: 0

India has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 25 October 2024, Union Minister for Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying Shri Rajiv Ranjan Singh launched the Pandemic Fund Project on Animal Health Security Strengthening in India for Pandemic Preparedness and Response.⁵⁶⁶ The G20 Pandemic Fund partly finances this project and builds on the department's prior work on disease surveillance, focusing on genomic and environmental early warning surveillance, laboratory infrastructure development and cross-border collaboration.

On 6 November 2024, Ministry of External Affairs Secretary Jaideep Mazumdar led a delegation into the second meeting for the India-CARICOM (Caribbean Community) Joint Commission and engaged with representatives from the CARICOM Secretariat and member states.⁵⁶⁷ The discussion included a review of initiatives of health, technology and capacity building, with plans to strengthen economic cooperation in areas such as disaster management and resilient infrastructure.

On 20 November 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi chaired the 2nd India-CARICOM Summit with CARICOM Chair Dickon Mitchell in Georgetown, Guyana.⁵⁶⁸ CARICOM leaders attended this meeting and included a discussion on reviewing bilateral and regional initiatives discussed at the previous meeting for the India-CARICOM Joint Commission held earlier that month. The leaders agreed to further development and collaborative multilateral efforts within the areas of interest, including digital public infrastructure and early warning systems.

On 4 December 2024, Director General of Health Services Atul Goel co-chaired a workshop on Mpox with the WHO Representative to India Roderico Ofrin.⁵⁶⁹ The workshop focused on strengthening India's public health response to Mpox and brought together officials from organizational bodies in public health and medicine for knowledge-sharing sessions on topics such as collaborative surveillance, clinical management and risk communication.

⁵⁶⁶ Union Minister Shri Rajiv Ranjan Singh launches \$25 Million Pandemic Fund Project; Aimed at Strengthening Animal Health Security in India, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 25 October 2024. Access Date: 12 July 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2068146>

⁵⁶⁷ Second Meeting of India-CARICOM Joint Commission, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 6 November 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38494/Second_Meeting_of_IndiaCARICOM_Joint_Commission

⁵⁶⁸ Joint Statement: Second CARICOM-India Summit, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38601/Joint_Statement_Second_CARICOMIndia_Summit

⁵⁶⁹ Collaborative surveillance key to strengthening public health response to Mpox, World Health Organization (New Delhi) 9 December 2024. Access Date: 12 July 2025. <https://www.who.int/india/news/item/09-12-2024-collaborative-surveillance-key-to-strengthening-public-health-response-to-mpox>

On 31 December 2024, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a joint statement alongside the foreign ministers of Australia, Japan and the United States commemorating the 20th anniversary of Quad cooperation.⁵⁷⁰ The statement recognized the Quad's emergency response efforts in the Indo-Pacific region and re-affirmed its continued support of trans-national collaboration through pandemic preparedness and work in infrastructure and critical technologies.

On 17 March 2025, the Ministry of Health hosted the Quad Workshop on Pandemic Preparedness for the Indo-Pacific Region.⁵⁷¹ This workshop focused on strengthening global health emergency response and technology exchange within countries in the Indo-Pacific Region, including India, Australia, Japan and the United States. During the event, India pledged USD10 million to the international Pandemic Fund.

India has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. India has taken strong action to strengthen its pandemic prevention and response systems, investing funds in international coordination networks, increasing surveillance of animal-derived epidemic risks and hosting workshops. However, India has not taken strong action to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics.

Thus, India receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Charlyze Medina

Indonesia: 0

Indonesia has not complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 24 January 2025, the WHO announced that Indonesia has taken steps in strengthening the health care system through the Mid-Term National Development Plan as a collaboration between the Ministry of Health and the WHO.⁵⁷² Indonesia's new methodologies and tools will improve health tracking in the country and help achieve an equitable system. Specifically, the Ministry of Health and WHO's joint aim was to lower the out-of-pocket spending for healthcare and strengthening health insurance.

On 19 February 2025, the WHO announced that Indonesia, the European Union and it, are partnering to strengthen Indonesia's healthcare infrastructure.⁵⁷³ The project centered on laboratory information management enhancements, including increased Polymerase Chain Reaction and genomic sequencing ability and strengthening the capacity of immunization programs.

⁵⁷⁰ Joint Statement from the Quad Foreign Ministers Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Quad Cooperation, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 31 December 2024. Access Date: 27 May 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/38875/Joint_Statement_from_the_Quad_Foreign_Ministers_Commemorating_the_20th_Anniversary_of_Quad_Cooperation

⁵⁷¹ Union Minister of State for Health and Family Welfare, Smt. Anupriya Patel inaugurates QUAD Workshop on Pandemic Preparedness for Indo-Pacific Region, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (New Delhi) 17 March 2025. Access Date: 21 July 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2111705>

⁵⁷² Tracking every rupiah: Indonesia's bold step towards universal health coverage, World Health Organization (Geneva) 24 January 2025. Access Date: 8 June 2025. <https://www.who.int/indonesia/news/detail/24-01-2025-tracking-every-rupiah--indonesia-s-bold-step-towards-universal-health-coverage>

⁵⁷³ WHO and European Union strengthen Indonesia's health system for a healthier tomorrow, World Health Organization (Jakarta) 19 February 2024. Access Date: 26 May 2025. <https://www.who.int/indonesia/news/detail/19-02-2024-who-and-european-union-strengthen-indonesia-s-health-system-for-a-healthier-tomorrow>

On 28 April 2025, the Ministry of Health held a national workshop with the WHO to improve multisource surveillance for dengue.⁵⁷⁴ The workshop strived to enhance early detection and outbreak response through warning systems and better data integration, focusing on health, climate and disaster management data.

Indonesia has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. Indonesia has taken strong action to strengthen the international pandemic preparedness system, such as through its Mid-Term National Development Plan, the EU partnership and the national workshop. However, Indonesia has not taken strong action to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics.

Thus, Indonesia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: June Vo

Iran: 0

Iran has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 26 January 2025, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education announced that it would introduce the Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine into Iran's national immunization program to reduce levels of genital warts and cervical cancer.⁵⁷⁵ Iran will deploy HPV vaccines to high-risk groups first, especially those at risk of cervical cancer.

On 18 February 2025, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education delivered a training and consultative workshop with the WHO Country Office in Iran to provide stakeholders with further education in collaborative approaches for addressing health inequities.⁵⁷⁶ The course focuses on integrating the social determinants of health into primary health care and is designed to be applicable across sectors and communities.

On 8 April 2025, Deputy Minister and President of the Food and Drug Administration Mahdi Pirsalehi met with the WHO Director of Regulation and Prequalification Rogerio Gaspar during a high-level mission to Iran focused on strengthening the country's regulatory system for medical products.⁵⁷⁷ The engagement was concerned with operational work for tools, frameworks and programmes regarding medical devices and services, affirming Iran's commitment to collaborating with the WHO to improve regulatory capacity in support of global health initiatives in disease prevention and response.

Iran has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and

⁵⁷⁴ Indonesia and WHO ramp up dengue fight with smarter surveillance, World Health Organization (Jakarta) 16 May 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.who.int/indonesia/news/detail/16-05-2025-indonesia-and-who-ramp-up-dengue-fight-with-smarter-surveillance>

⁵⁷⁵ HPV vaccination to be implemented nationwide, Tehran Times (Tehran) 26 January 2025. Access Date: 17 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/509088/HPV-vaccination-to-be-implemented-nationwide>

⁵⁷⁶ Iran advances health equity by addressing the social determinants of health through primary health care, World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Region (Tehran) 4 March 2025. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://www.emro.who.int/iran/news/iran-advances-health-equity-by-addressing-the-social-determinants-of-health-through-primary-health-care.html>

⁵⁷⁷ WHO high-level mission: strengthening Iran's national regulatory system for medical products, World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Region (Tehran) 10 April 2025. Access Date: 7 July 2025. <https://www.emro.who.int/iran/news/who-high-level-mission-strengthening-irans-national-regulatory-system-for-medical-products.html>

epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. Iran has engaged in weak actions involving the WHO which focus on operational health infrastructure projects and has outlaid plans to increase its population's disease resilience, protecting it against potential pandemics. This indirectly acknowledges and supports the WHO's central coordinating role in global health, indicating partial compliance.

Thus, Iran receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Charlyze Medina

Russia: -1

Russia has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 20 January 2025, the Ministry of Health announced that Russia and Zimbabwe had signed an agreement on healthcare cooperation.⁵⁷⁸ Key areas for cooperation include infectious disease response and organizing healthcare systems.

On 20 May 2025, Russia abstained from the committee vote on a draft solution of the WHO Pandemic Agreement during the 78th World Health Assembly.⁵⁷⁹ In an official statement, the Russian government emphasized its prioritization of a national over a WHO pandemic response stating that “the Russian Federation builds its emergency health response based on the interests of the Russian people, national priorities in public health protection, domestic laws, rules, and standards, and in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.” In the drafting of the document, Russia added provisions emphasizing the sovereign rights of signing countries. Russia also emphasizes their commitment to continued cooperation with the Global South in pandemic prevention and response. This is antithetical to the commitment's aim of recognizing the WHO's central coordinating role in global health, specifically in terms of pandemic prevention and response.

On 25 April 2025, the Federal Service for the Oversight of Consumer Protection and Welfare (Rospotrebnadzor) signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ethiopian Ministry of Health.⁵⁸⁰ This agreement was aimed at strengthening multilateral pandemic and health emergency response cooperation between the two countries and took place during the first Russia-Africa Emergency Response Teams Exercise and Seminar Program. Moreover, as part of signing celebrations, the Rospotrebnadzor donated Ethiopia a mobile laboratory worth over ETB110 million.

Russia has not complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the WHO in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. Russia has taken moderate action in fostering pandemic preparedness through international cooperation. However, it has taken action antithetical to the commitment element of supporting the central coordinating role of the WHO in multilateral international efforts to protect public health, by abstaining from

⁵⁷⁸ Россия и Зимбабве подписали соглашение о сотрудничестве в области здравоохранения, Ministry of Health (Moscow) 20 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 17 June 2025.

<https://minzdrav.gov.ru/news/2025/01/20/22714-rossiya-i-zimbabve-podpisali-soglashenie-o-sotrudnichestve-v-oblasti-zdravoohraneniya>

⁵⁷⁹ On the adoption of the WHO Pandemic Agreement, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office in Geneva (Geneva) 21 May 2025. Access Date: 19 July 2025.

https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/on_the_adoption_of_the_who_pandemic_agreement/

⁵⁸⁰ Ethiopia, Russia sign MoU to strengthen health cooperation, Ministry of Health (Addis Ababa) 5 May 2025. Access Date 21 July 2025. https://www.moh.gov.et/am/node/514?language_content_entity=en

a WHO vote and releasing a statement shirking the WHO's importance in favour of its own independent health program.

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Hilena Gebregiorgis

South Africa: +1

South Africa has fully complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 27 November 2024, South Africa and other Africa Union member states participated in a workshop under direction of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) where they endorsed a new strategic plan to tackle endemic diseases across the African continent.⁵⁸¹ The plan emphasises integrated health systems, prioritising preventing and controlling major health threats such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis (TB), hepatitis and neglected tropical diseases.

On 6 February 2025, President Cyril Ramaphosa presented a state of the nation address at Cape Town City Hall and announced the South Africa's preparation for the establishment of the National Health Insurance (NHI).⁵⁸² The NHI will provide a package of services including specific services for people living with HIV, those with TB and those suffering from non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, cancer and diabetes.

On 25 February 2025, the WHO announced that South Africa, in partnership with the WHO and UNAIDS, had launched the "Closing 1.1 million HIV Treatment Gap Campaign" to accelerate efforts toward achieving objectives in identifying and supporting 1.1 million people living with HIV who know their status but are not yet on treatment.⁵⁸³ The campaign prioritizes groups who are disproportionately affected by treatment initiation and/or barriers to healthcare access, emphasizing men, youth and children. This initiative aims to decrease the transmission of HIV/AIDS in South Africa.

On 26 March 2025, the Department of Health and Unitaid signed a memorandum of understanding at the G20 Health Working Group Meeting in Zimbali.⁵⁸⁴ The agreement reinforces the initial 2018 commitment between the two countries to tackle HIV, TB and more while strengthening the resilience of African health programs through domestic production of health products. The campaign aims to decrease the transmission of HIV/AIDS by accelerating access to health innovations such as HIV self-tests, pre-exposure prophylaxis options, shorter TB prevention regimens and improve treatments for drug-resistant TB.

On 16 April 2025, Representative Precious Matsoso contributed and co-chaired the finalization of the full draft of the WHO Pandemic Agreement in the resumed thirteenth meeting of the World Health Organisation

⁵⁸¹ Africa CDC Launches a Continental Blueprint to Combat Endemic and Neglected Tropical Diseases, Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Addis Ababa) 28 November 2025. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://africacdc.org/news-item/africa-cdc-launches-a-continental-blueprint-to-combat-endemic-and-neglected-tropical-diseases/>

⁵⁸² SITE OF THE NATION ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT CYRIL RAMAPHOSA, Republic of South Africa Department of Health (Cape Town) 6 February 2025. Access Date: 25 May 2025. <https://www.health.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/State-of-the-Nation-Address-2025-6-February-2025.pdf>

⁵⁸³ South Africa launches 1.1 million HIV campaign to close treatment gap, World Health Organization (Johannesburg) 25 February 2025. Access Date: 26 May 2025. <https://www.afro.who.int/countries/south-africa/news/south-africa-launches-11-million-hiv-campaign-close-treatment-gap-0>

⁵⁸⁴ South Africa and Unitaid partner to accelerate access to health innovations for HIV, tuberculosis and cervical cancer, Republic of South Africa Department of Health (Cape Town) 15 April 2025. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://www.health.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/South-Africa-and-Unitaid-partner-to-accelerate-access-to-health-innovations-for-HIV-tuberculosis-and-cervical-cancer.pdf>

Intergovernmental Negotiating Body.⁵⁸⁵ South Africa and other WHO member states stated their goal of unifying a global approach to future pandemics.

South Africa has fully complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the WHO in implementing multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. South Africa has attended regional, international and WHO meetings and worked in collaboration with WHO objectives for achieving multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases such as HIV and AIDS and has contributed to fortifying its defences against some endemics, indicating strong compliance in both fields. South Africa has also explicitly acknowledged the WHO's central role in global health by finalizing a draft of the WHO Pandemic Agreement and thus directly acknowledging its support for a unified, WHO-centred pandemic approach.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Acacia Philcox

United Arab Emirates: 0

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the implementation of multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system.

On 29 October 2024, Minister of Health and Prevention Abdul Rahman bin Mohammed Al Owais participated in the G20 Health Ministers' Meeting in Brazil.⁵⁸⁶ The meeting involved discussions on strengthening global health systems, enhancing pandemic preparedness and promoting equitable access to healthcare services. The participation showcased the United Arab Emirates commitment to an international collaboration in addressing global health challenges.

On 30 October 2024, the Ministry of Health and Prevention launched the National Supplementary Measles Immunization Campaign 2024.⁵⁸⁷ The campaign aims to facilitate the country's efforts in preventing measles outbreaks by increasing vaccination coverage among children. Children who missed previous doses and those in high-risk areas were specifically targeted in this campaign. This campaign will follow WHO guidelines to ensure effectiveness. This contributes to the global efforts in preventing measles pandemic.

On 24 March 2025, the Ministry of Health and Prevention published an article detailing the UAE's continued efforts in supporting the international elimination and prevention of tuberculosis.⁵⁸⁸ Aligning with the WHO's global strategy, the UAE demonstrated its commitment through the adoption of rapid diagnostic tests, development of modern treatment and technological advancements for disease monitoring.

⁵⁸⁵ WHO Member States conclude negotiations and make significant progress on draft pandemic agreement, World Health Organization (Geneva) 16 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025.

<https://www.who.int/news/item/16-04-2025-who-member-states-conclude-negotiations-and-make-significant-progress-on-draft-pandemic-agreement>

⁵⁸⁶ (Dubai) 3 (البر وزارة الصحة ووقاية المجتمع - الإمارات العربية المتحدة , الإمارات تشارك في اجتماع وزراء صحة مجموعة العشرين في البرازيل November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://mohap.gov.ae/ar/w/uae-takes-part-in-g20-health-ministers-meeting-in-brazil>

⁵⁸⁷ وزارة الصحة ووقاية المجتمع تطلق حملة وطنية للتحصين بجرعة داعمة ضد مرض الحصبة بالتعاون مع الجهات الصح , وزارة الصحة ووقاية المجتمع - الإمارات العربية المتحدة (Dubai) 31 October 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://mohap.gov.ae/ar/w/mohap-launches-national-supplementary-measles-immunization-campaign-2024-in-cooperation-with-health-authorities>

⁵⁸⁸ وزارة الصحة ووقاية المجتمع - الإمارات العربية المتحدة , وزارة الصحة ووقاية المجتمع تعزز الوعي بمرض الدرن (السل) عبر استراتيجيات وبرامج وقائية فعالة بالتعاون مع الشركاء (Dubai) 24 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://mohap.gov.ae/ar/w/uae-among-nations-with-the-lowest-tuberculosis-rates>

On 7 April 2025, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Health and Prevention Mohammed Salim Al Olama highlighted the UAE's dedication to enhancing healthcare services, prevention and awareness, following international standards.⁵⁸⁹ The Ministry of Health and Prevention affirmed their commitment to improving care for mothers and newborns, as advised by the WHO.

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with its commitment to support the central coordinating role of the WHO in implementing multilateral international efforts to protect public health from infectious diseases and epidemics and commit to reform and strengthen the international pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system. The United Arab Emirates demonstrated efforts in advancing current measures for global pandemic prevention, preparedness and response system, through the sharing of knowledge and increasing immunization rates within the country. The United Arab Emirates has also participated in global pandemic preparedness reform efforts through the G20. However, the UAE has only indirectly acknowledged and supported the WHO's central role in global health by adhering to the WHO recommendations regarding postnatal health.

Thus, the United Arab Emirates receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Kennice Cheung

⁵⁸⁹ وزارة الصحة ووقاية المجتمع - الإمارات العربية المتحدة , سعادة العلماء: الإمارات نموذج عالمي في تطوير أنظمة الرعاية الصحية (Dubai) 1 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 11 July 2025. <https://mohap.gov.ae/ar/w/h.e.-al-olama-uae-has-become-a-global-example-for-the-development-of-state-of-the-art-healthcare-systems>

6. Economics and Finance: Economic Cooperation

“We reaffirm our commitment to enhance macro-economic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.”

XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil			+1
China			+1
Egypt			+1
Ethiopia			+1
India		0	
Indonesia			+1
Iran			+1
Russia			+1
South Africa			+1
United Arab Emirates			+1
Average		+0.90 (95%)	

Background

Economics and finance have been a key focus of BRICS cooperation, seen as significant for strengthening the group’s influence in global economic governance.⁵⁹⁰ Member countries have consistently called for reforms to international financial institutions and promoted using local currencies to reduce reliance on existing systems. Annual summit declarations reveal how the bloc has adapted its economic agenda in response to shifting global conditions and internal priorities.

At the 2009 Yekaterinburg Summit, BRIC leaders emphasized the need to reform international financial institutions to reflect shifts in the global economy.⁵⁹¹ They called for greater representation of emerging and developing economies, a more stable, diversified international monetary system and efforts to curb protectionism and support the multilateral trading system.

At the 2010 Brasília Summit, BRIC leaders reaffirmed the need to reform the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank by shifting voting power toward developing countries and ensuring open, merit-based leadership selection.⁵⁹² The leaders also encouraged cooperation on regional monetary arrangements and local currency trade settlements to facilitate economic and financial integration.

At the 2011 Sanya Summit, BRICS leaders emphasized their commitment to strengthening global economic governance and called for reforms to international financial institutions that would increase the voice of emerging and developing economies.⁵⁹³ The leaders endorsed deeper financial cooperation, including oversight reform, coordination on capital flows and strengthened financial regulation to support global market stability.

⁵⁹⁰ Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 June 2009. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html>

⁵⁹¹ 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 April 2010. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html>

⁵⁹² Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

⁵⁹³ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 19 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

At the 2012 Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders expressed concern over global financial instability and emphasized the need for coordinated macroeconomic policies to support recovery.⁵⁹⁴ They reiterated support for reforming IMF quotas and governance to reflect the growing importance of emerging economies, agreeing to assess the feasibility of establishing a BRICS Development Bank to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects across the Global South.

At the 2013 Durban Summit, leaders agreed to create this New Development Bank and endorsed the establishment of a Contingent Reserve Arrangement to provide financial support during short-term liquidity pressures.⁵⁹⁵

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders launched the New Development Bank and signed an agreement to establish a EUR 100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement to protect against short-term liquidity pressures.⁵⁹⁶

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS leaders marked the operational launch of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement.⁵⁹⁷ They adopted the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership to guide expanded trade, investment and infrastructure ties. The summit continued emphasizing the need for IMF reform, supported a stronger voice for emerging economies and condemned unilateral sanctions and military interventions.

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing global economic governance and emphasized the need for greater representation of emerging economies in international institutions.⁵⁹⁸ They welcomed the expansion of BRICS financial tools, including progress on the Local Currency Bond Fund and cooperation in Public Private Partnerships. The summit also highlighted the role of the New Development Bank in financing sustainable infrastructure and praised its new Africa Regional Center. Leaders committed to broadening financial integration and innovation cooperation and endorsed initiatives for bond market development, taxation transparency and anti-corruption collaboration across BRICS economies.

At the 2019 Brasília Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to economic growth, trade and sustainable development.⁵⁹⁹ They included the signing of the BRICS Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Competition Law and Policy and the adoption of the Innovation BRICS Network (iBRICS). The leaders also emphasized the importance of the New Development Bank and encouraged continued progress on its expansion. Additionally, they committed to strengthening the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution and enhancing cooperation in investment facilitation and the digital economy.

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, held virtually due to COVID-19, BRICS leaders endorsed the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025.⁶⁰⁰ The summit reaffirmed support for United Nations and World Trade Organization (WTO) reforms and economic recovery through open trade and resilient supply chains, the

⁵⁹⁴ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

⁵⁹⁵ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

⁵⁹⁶ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 20 May 2025. http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

⁵⁹⁷ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

⁵⁹⁸ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 20 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

⁵⁹⁹ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

⁶⁰⁰ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

expansion of the New Development Bank, progress on the Local Currency Bond Fund and deeper cooperation on ICT security, energy and digital economy initiatives.

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed support for a rules-based multilateral trading system and endorsed WTO reform.⁶⁰¹ They emphasized macroeconomic coordination for post-COVID recovery and committed to advancing the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025. The summit marked the launch of the BRICS Digital Economy Working Group, support for resilient supply chains and welcomed the New Development Bank's expansion. Members also backed reforms to strengthen the IMF and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement.

At the 2023 Johannesburg II Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed support for economic cooperation, sustainable recovery and IMF reform to better represent emerging economies.⁶⁰² They endorsed local currency use in trade, payment system interlinking and the expansion of the New Development Bank. The summit also highlighted support for Africa's development and the African Continental Free Trade Area.

Commitment Features

At the 2025 Kazan Summit, leaders committed to “enhance macro-economic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.” This commitment can be interpreted as having three dimensions, to 1) enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, 2) deepen economic cooperation and 3) work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. The third dimension has four criteria, “strong,” “sustainable,” “balanced” and “inclusive,” all of which must relate to economic recovery.

Definitions and Concepts

“Enhance” is understood to mean “to increase or improve in value [or] quality.”⁶⁰³

“Macroeconomic policy” is understood to mean “government actions aimed at managing a country's economy as a whole.”⁶⁰⁴ In the context of this commitment, macroeconomic policies can concern government spending, taxation or control of the money supply and interest rates.

“Coordination” is understood to mean “the process of organizing people or groups so that they work together properly and well.”⁶⁰⁵ In the context of this commitment, this refers specifically to coordination between economic actors, such as governments, firms and international bodies.

“Deepen” is understood to mean “to make deep or deeper.”⁶⁰⁶ In the context of this commitment, that means to increase the depth of economic cooperation.

“Economic” is understood to mean “of, relating to, or based on the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services.”⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰¹ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre 23 August 2023. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

⁶⁰² Kazan Declaration: Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

⁶⁰³ Enhance, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enhance>

⁶⁰⁴ Macroeconomic Policy in Practice module (BU42020), University of Dundee (Dundee) n.d. Access Date 18 May 2025. <https://www.dundee.ac.uk/module/bu42020>

⁶⁰⁵ Coordination, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coordination>

⁶⁰⁶ Deepen, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deepen>

⁶⁰⁷ Economic, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/economic>

“Cooperation” is understood to mean “the action or process of working together to the same end.”⁶⁰⁸

“Deepen economic cooperation” is therefore understood to mean increasing the depth of common action in the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services.

“Work” is understood to mean “to perform or carry through a task requiring sustained effort.”⁶⁰⁹

“Realize” is understood to mean ‘to bring into concrete existence; accomplish.’⁶¹⁰

“Work to realize” is therefore understood to mean to make a sustained effort to accomplish goals.

“Strong” is understood to mean “effective or efficient especially in a specified direction.”⁶¹¹ In the context of this commitment, that means an efficient and effective economic recovery, promoting resilience and improving economic fortunes.

“Sustainable” is understood to mean “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”⁶¹²

“Balanced” is understood to mean “being in a state of balance : having different parts or elements properly or effectively arranged, proportioned, regulated, considered, etc.”⁶¹³ In the context of this commitment, this is understood to mean that different parts or beneficiaries of the economic recovery are considered.

“Inclusive” is understood to mean “including and accommodating people who have historically been excluded (as because of their race, gender, sexuality, or ability.)”⁶¹⁴

“Economic recovery” is understood to mean “A period of increasing business activity signaling the end of a recession.”⁶¹⁵ In the context of this commitment, the period refers to the commitment cycle and future economic periods.

General Interpretive Guidelines

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be assigned to BRICS members that takes strong action to 1) enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, 2) deepen economic cooperation and 3) work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. In order to comply with the third dimension, BRICS members must take action towards at least two of the four criteria of working towards “strong,” “sustainable,” “balanced” and “inclusive” economic recovery.

Strong actions to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination include but are not limited to hosting or funding bilateral or multilateral economic with public or private partners including those from other BRICS members,

⁶⁰⁸ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 12 November 2020. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁶⁰⁹ Cooperation, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cooperation>

⁶¹⁰ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 12 November 2020. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁶¹¹ Strong, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strong>

⁶¹² Sustainability, United Nations: Academic Impact (New York) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/sustainability>

⁶¹³ Balanced, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/balanced>

⁶¹⁴ Inclusive, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inclusive>

⁶¹⁵ Economic Recovery, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (Beirut) n.d. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <https://archive.unescwa.org/economic-recovery>

complying with joint macroeconomic frameworks or agreements or forming and agreeing to new such frameworks and agreements.

Strong actions to deepen economic cooperation include but are not limited to reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, taking proportional action to reduce global protectionism, investing in infrastructure for international trade such as export port facilities or signing agreements to increase trade with other BRICS members or BRICS summit attendees.

Strong actions towards working to realize a strong economic recovery may include economic stimulus or heightened investment in BRICS economies. Strong actions towards working to realize a sustainable economic recovery may include investing in green infrastructure such as renewable energy production facilities and grids. Strong actions towards working to realize a balanced economic recovery may include focusing development efforts on areas struggling with acute infrastructural or economic disadvantages compared to wealthier regions of the same economic area. Strong actions towards working to realize an inclusive economic recovery may include including disadvantaged social groups or communities in considerations of infrastructural needs.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that take strong action towards at least one but less three of the commitment dimensions, or to BRICS members taking weak action towards all three dimensions. Examples of weak actions include but are not limited to verbal reaffirmations of the commitment, consultations towards investment or action without committing fiscal resources or renewals of existing agreements or initiatives.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1, will be assigned to BRICS members taking no strong action and weak action towards less than three of the commitment dimensions, or to BRICS members that take action directly antithetical to the commitment.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member has not taken strong action to 1) enhance macroeconomic policy coordination; 2) deepen economic cooperation; 3) work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery by taking weak action in less than three above-described commitment dimensions; or 4) has taken action directly antithetical to the commitment.
0	The BRICS member has taken strong action towards at least one but less than three of the commitment dimensions: 1) to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination; 2) to deepen economic cooperation; or 3) to work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery; or 4) the BRICS member has taken weak action in all three above-described dimensions.
+1	The BRICS member has taken strong action in all three commitment dimensions: 1) to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination; 2) to deepen economic cooperation; and 3) to work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic victory.

*Compliance Director: Iva Zivaljevic
Lead Analyst: Luke Lee*

Brazil: +1

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 8 November 2024, the Ministry of Finance announced Brazil’s publication of its first Allocation and Impact Report for sustainable sovereign bonds issued in 2023 and 2024.⁶¹⁶ The report outlines allocations to environmental and social expenditures and tracks expected impacts using national indicators, reflecting Brazil’s

⁶¹⁶ Brazil publishes first Allocation and Impact Report of sustainable sovereign bonds issuance, Ministry of Finance (Brasilia) 8 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/tesouronacional/en/news/press-release-2013-2024-allocation-and-impact-report>

commitment to fiscal transparency and sustainable development. This action supports inclusive recovery and macroeconomic coordination by integrating sustainability into sovereign debt practices.

On 19 November 2024, the governments of Brazil, India and South Africa issued a joint declaration on Digital Public Infrastructure, Artificial Intelligence and Data for Governance.⁶¹⁷ The statement emphasizes inclusive digital transformation as a driver of growth, job creation and sustainable development, calling for open, interoperable and citizen-focused systems. It supports equitable economic development and reflects coordinated efforts to strengthen digital governance in emerging economies.

On 6 December 2024, the Ministry of Finance announced that Brazil and its MERCOSUR partners had concluded negotiations with the EU on a comprehensive Partnership Agreement, creating one of the world's largest free trade areas.⁶¹⁸ The agreement supports macroeconomic coordination and deepens economic cooperation through commitments on trade, sustainable development and public policy protections.

On 9 January 2025, the Ministry of Finance announced that Brazil had secured market access for poultry feathers in South Korea and pet food with animal-origin ingredients in Vietnam.⁶¹⁹ These new export authorizations mark the 15th market opening in 2025 and reflect Brazil's broader strategy to diversify exports, deepen trade partnerships and strengthen global supply chains. The move supports inclusive economic recovery and demonstrates sustained macroeconomic engagement through international agricultural trade.

On 6 March 2025, the Ministry of Transport authorized the reissuance of debentures to boost investment in national highway corridors.⁶²⁰ This instrument mobilizes private capital for public infrastructure. It contributes to a strong recovery by improving infrastructure financing and advancing economic cooperation by enhancing connectivity and supply chain resilience.

On 6 March 2025, Vice President Geraldo Alckmin announced BRL3 billion in funding for the second phase of the industrial park modernization program.⁶²¹ This measure facilitates reindustrialization by financing capital upgrades in capacity and supporting technological adoption. It promotes sustainable and inclusive recovery by supporting industrial productivity and sustaining job creation.

On 12 March 2025, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva launched the Worker's Credit Program, offering concession financing, through lower interest rates, to low-income individuals.⁶²² This policy expands access to

⁶¹⁷ Declaration on Digital Public Infrastructure, AI and Data for Governance – Joint Communiqué from Brazil, South Africa and India, Ministry of Finance (Brasília) 19 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-sobre-infraestrutura-publica-digital-ia-e-dados-para-governanca-2013-comunicado-conjunto-de-brasil-africa-do-sul-e-india

⁶¹⁸ Announcement of the conclusion of negotiations on the Partnership Agreement between MERCOSUR and the European Union, Ministry of Finance (Brasília) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/announcement-of-the-conclusion-of-negotiations-on-the-partnership-agreement-between-mercosur-and-the-european-union>

⁶¹⁹ Opening of new markets in South Korea and Vietnam – joint MRE/MAPA press release, Ministry of Finance (Brasília) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/opening-of-new-markets-in-south-korea-and-vietnam-2013-joint-mre-mapa-press-release>

⁶²⁰ Para turbinar investimentos em infraestrutura, Ministério dos Transportes autoriza reemissão de debêntures, Ministério dos Transportes (Brasília) 6 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/transportes/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/03/para-turbinar-investimentos-em-infraestrutura-ministerio-dos-transportes-autoriza-reemissao-de-debentures>

⁶²¹ Alckmin announces BRL 3 billion for second phase of industrial park modernization program, Secretaria de Comunicação Social (Brasília) 6 March 2025. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2025/03/alckmin-announces-brl-3-billion-for-second-phase-of-industrial-park-modernization-program>

⁶²² Governo cria o Crédito do Trabalhador, linha com juros mais baixos, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços (Brasília) 12 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/marco/governo-cria-o-credito-do-trabalhador-linha-com-juros-mais-baixos>

affordable financing for workers. It promotes an inclusive recovery, by targeting financial exclusion and enabling household-level economic participation.

On 14 March 2025, indigenous communities in Mato Grosso do Sul signed contracts for 581 rural housing units under the Minha Casa, Minha Vida program.⁶²³ The program expands inclusive housing access for indigenous communities. This intervention demonstrates targeted social investment in historically underserved populations. It supports inclusive recovery by expanding rural infrastructure and indigenous housing access.

On 21 March 2025, the Ministry of Agrarian Development and Family Farming, the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change and the Brazil Development Bank launched a BRL150 million reforestation call focused on rural settlement areas.⁶²⁴ This program integrates environmental restoration with rural economic development. It supports a sustainable recovery by generating green employment and rehabilitating degraded ecosystems.

On 21 March 2025, Minister of Racial Equality Anielle Franco and Secretary-General of the Presidency Márcio Costa Macêdo announced BRL665 million in investments under the Juventude Negra Viva Plan (Black Youth Alive Plan).⁶²⁵ This initiative targets systemic exclusion of Afro-Brazilian youth through affirmative development strategies. It promotes inclusive recovery by fostering intergenerational equity and socio-economic mobility.

On 28 March 2025, President Lula da Silva and Vietnamese President Luong Cuong launched a joint Action Plan for 2025–2030, outlining bilateral cooperation in strategic sectors.⁶²⁶ The plan outlines strategic sectors for bilateral cooperation and trade. The agreement strengthens macroeconomic policy coordination through multi-sectoral diplomacy. It deepens economic cooperation by expanding trade and technology exchange.

On 1 April 2025, Minister of Entrepreneurship, Microenterprise and Small Business Márcio França announced that the ProCred 360 program had surpassed BRL2 billion in microenterprise loans, with BRL1 billion allocated specifically to women entrepreneurs.⁶²⁷ This achievement underscores targeted financial inclusion and gender equity in credit access. It supports inclusive recovery by enabling entrepreneurship and diversifying economic participation.

On 3 April 2025, President Lula da Silva announced an expansion of the Minha Casa, Minha Vida program, alongside an early disbursement of the 13th pension payment for National Social Security Institute beneficiaries

⁶²³ Indígenas do MS assinam contratos de 581 moradias do Minha Casa, Minha Vida Rural, com a presença da ministra Sonia Guajajara, Ministério dos Povos Indígenas (Brasília) 14 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/povosindigenas/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/03/indigenas-do-ms-assinam-contratos-de-581-moradias-do-minha-casa-minha-vida-rural-com-a-presenca-da-ministra-sonia-guajajara>

⁶²⁴ Florestas Produtivas: MDA, MMA e BNDES lançam edital de R\$ 150 mi para reforestamento em áreas de assentamentos rurais, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário e Agricultura Familiar (Brasília) 21 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mda/pt-br/noticias/2025/03/florestas-produtivas-mda-mma-e-bndes-lancam-edital-de-r-150-mi-para-reflorestamento-em-areas-de-assentamentos-rurais>

⁶²⁵ Governo Federal anuncia mais de R\$ 665 mi em investimentos no Plano Juventude Negra Viva, Ministério da Igualdade Racial (Brasília) 21 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. https://www.gov.br/igualdaderacial/pt-br/assuntos/copy2_of_noticias/governo-federal-anuncia-mais-de-r-665-mi-em-investimentos-no-plano-juventude-negra-viva

⁶²⁶ Brazil, Vietnam officially launch Action Plan for 2025-2030, Presidência da República (Brasília) 28 March 2025. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/03/brazil-vietnam-officially-launch-action-plan-for-2025-2030>

⁶²⁷ ProCred 360: Programa de acesso a crédito para MEIs e microempresas atinge R\$ 2 bilhões em empréstimos, com cerca de R\$ 1 bi destinado a mulheres, Ministério do Empreendedorismo, da Microempresa e da Empresa de Pequeno Porte (Brasília) 1 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/memp/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/procred-360-programa-de-acesso-a-credito-para-meis-e-microempresas-atinge-r-2-bilhoes-em-emprestimos-com-cerca-de-r-1-bi-destinado-a-mulheres>

and a new public awareness campaign.⁶²⁸ These measures aid vulnerable households with housing support and income. They support inclusive recovery by stabilizing household incomes and stimulating domestic demand.

On 10 April 2025, Vice President Alckmin attended the launch of a new pulp production facility with a planned investment of USD4.6 billion.⁶²⁹ The project attracts foreign direct investment and industrial value chains. It advances economic cooperation and supports a strong, balanced recovery through job creation and export expansion. It supports sustainable recovery by promoting export competitiveness and green industrialization.

On 15 April 2025, the Ministry of Labor and Employment announced a new housing credit line for families earning up to BRL12,000 monthly.⁶³⁰ This measure enhances credit access for middle-income households and reflects targeted housing finance reform. It supports inclusive recovery by facilitating homeownership and reducing regional housing gaps.

On 16 April 2025, the Government of Brazil launched a BRL150 million public call for indigenous land restoration.⁶³¹ This funding supports environmental and land justice projects. It advances sustainable, balanced and inclusive recovery by empowering Indigenous communities and ecosystems.

On 17 April 2025, President Lula da Silva signed a decree regulating the Green Mobility and Innovation Program.⁶³² The initiative accelerates green transport and industrial innovation. It fosters sustainable recovery by promoting low-carbon infrastructure and industry solutions.

On 23 April 2025, President Lula da Silva and President of Chile Gabriel Boric signed 13 agreements that covered a wide range of sectors.⁶³³ These agreements formalize policy coordination and create frameworks for deeper bilateral engagement between the two countries. The act emphasizes the importance of support and integration between South American countries, with a focus on aiding growth and stability.

On 25 April 2025, Minister of Labor and Employment Luiz Marinho announced that banks can now conduct debt refinancing through their own digital platforms under the Workers' Credit Program.⁶³⁴ This operational upgrade reflects public-private collaboration in fintech adoption. It supports inclusive recovery by simplifying credit access for financially vulnerable populations.

⁶²⁸ Governo amplia MCMV, antecipa '13º' de aposentados do INSS e lança campanha, Presidência da República (Brasília) 3 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2025/04/governo-amplia-mcmv-antecipa-201813o2019-de-aposentados-do-inss-e-lanca-campanha>

⁶²⁹ Alckmin participa de lançamento de nova indústria de celulose que terá US\$ 4,6 bi de investimento, Presidência da República (Brasília) 10 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/vice-presidencia/central-de-conteudo/noticias/alckmin-participa-de-lancamento-de-nova-industria-de-celulose-que-tera-us-4-6-bi-de-investimento>

⁶³⁰ Conselho do FGTS aprova nova linha de crédito habitacional para famílias com renda de até 12 mil, Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego (Brasília) 15 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/trabalho-e-emprego/pt-br/noticias-e-conteudo/2025/abril/conselho-do-fgts-aprova-nova-linha-de-credito-habitacional-para-familias-com-renda-de-ate-12-mil>

⁶³¹ Brazil's Federal Government launches BRL 150 million public call for restoration of Indigenous lands, Presidência da República (Brasília) 16 April 2025. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/04/brazil2019s-federal-government-launches-brl-150-million-public-call-for-restoration-of-indigenous-lands>

⁶³² President Lula signs decree that regulates Green Mobility and Innovation Program, Presidência da República (Brasília) 17 April 2025. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/04/president-lula-signs-decree-that-regulates-green-mobility-and-innovation-program>

⁶³³ Lula, Boric sign 13 agreements, expand Brazil-Chile strategic partnership, Presidência da República (Brasília) 23 April 2025. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2025/04/lula-boric-sign-13-agreements-expand-brazil-chile-strategic-partnership>

⁶³⁴ Crédito do Trabalhador: Bancos já podem fazer a troca de dívidas em suas próprias plataformas digitais, Presidência da República (Brasília) 25 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/trabalho-e-emprego/pt-br/noticias-e-conteudo/2025/abril/credito-do-trabalhador-bancos-ja-podem-fazer-a-troca-de-dividas-em-suas-proprias-plataformas-digitais>

On 28 April 2025, Minister of Agrarian Development and Family Farming Paulo Teixeira launched new land credit measures to promote equitable land access and sustainable food systems.⁶³⁵ These reforms empower small producers while restoring degraded lands. They support inclusive recovery by advancing rural livelihoods and environmental stewardship.

On 29 April 2025, Minister of Finance Fernando Haddad and Minister of Environment and Climate Change Marina Silva launched Brazil's second Eco Invest auction, channeling funds toward the restoration of degraded lands.⁶³⁶ This market-based intervention mobilizes green capital for landscape recovery. It supports sustainable macroeconomic coordination by integrating ecological restoration into fiscal planning.

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. The country has enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination through initiatives involving bilateral dialogue, establishing joint agreements and policy coordination between partners to improve economic fortunes. It has deepened economic cooperation through greater investments, particularly focused on improving the infrastructure in the country, including a modernization program and a new pulp industry. It has worked towards a more sustainable and inclusive economic recovery by launching programs that are focused on helping disadvantaged communities and setting aside investments into such initiatives.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Saanvi Prasanth

China: +1

China has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 18 November 2024, President Xi Jinping as part of the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro announced China's intention to work with global partners to build a just world of common development.⁶³⁷ This includes committing to eight key actions focused on sustainable development, poverty reduction, international cooperation and opening markets to promote inclusive and balanced economic growth worldwide.

On 2 December 2024, state news agency Xinhua announced that the Khunjerab Pass, a key China-Pakistan border port located in Xinjiang, would commence year-round operations to strengthen trade and regional connectivity.⁶³⁸ This policy decision is expected to increase cross-border economic activity and further deepen bilateral cooperation with Pakistan.

⁶³⁵ Crédito Fundiário: mais acesso à terra, mais alimentos, mais desenvolvimento sustentável, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário e Agricultura Familiar (Brasília) 28 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mda/pt-br/noticias/2025/04/credito-fundiario-mais-acesso-a-terra-mais-alimentos-mais-desenvolvimento-sustentavel>

⁶³⁶ Federal Government announces 2nd Eco Invest Auction, focused on restoring degraded lands, Secretariat of Social Communication (Brasília) 29 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2025/04/federal-government-announces-2nd-eco-invest-auction-focused-on-restoring-degraded-lands>

⁶³⁷ Xi calls for building just world of common development, outlines China's actions for global development, Xinhua (Rio de Janeiro) 19 November 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202411/19/content_WS673bba1ec6d0868f4e8ed25d.html

⁶³⁸ China-Pakistan border port in Xinjiang to operate year-round, Xinhua (Xinjiang) 2 December 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202412/02/content_WS674cfb1dc6d0868f4e8ed941.html

On 9 December 2024, Premier Li Qiang voiced China's support for expanding the New Development Bank's project financing scope and strengthening cooperation with the World Bank and IMF.⁶³⁹ These actions aim to boost economic development in BRICS and developing countries while improving global financial stability.

On 18 February 2025, China announced the launch of a new direct container shipping route linking the northeastern port city of Dalian with several Mediterranean countries including Egypt, Türkiye and Israel.⁶⁴⁰ This initiative aims to enhance maritime logistics efficiency, reduce transit time by approximately 10 days and deepen economic and trade cooperation between China's northeast region and the Mediterranean region.

On 28 March 2025, President Xi and Bangladeshi Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation during Chief Advisor Yunus's visit to Beijing, reaffirming their commitment to advancing bilateral trade and development.⁶⁴¹ The agreement will support infrastructure upgrades and industrialization in Bangladesh, with China encouraging investment in key sectors such as textiles, clean energy, digital economy and agriculture. Both sides also agreed to launch Free Trade Agreement negotiations, upgrade their investment agreement and enable market access for Bangladeshi exports.

On 28 March 2025, President Xi met with representatives of the international business community and reaffirmed China's commitment to high-standard opening-up and attracting foreign investment.⁶⁴² Following this address, Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao introduced targeted measures to expand market access in sectors such as cloud computing, biotechnology and healthcare, designed to enhance the business environment, promote fair competition and facilitate greater participation of foreign enterprises in China's economic development.

On 23 April 2025, Minister of Finance Lan Fo'an participated in the second G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting in Washington, D.C., where he called for increased support to vulnerable economies, deeper cooperation with multilateral institutions and reforms to the global financial architecture.⁶⁴³ These efforts aim to promote inclusive economic recovery and strengthen financial partnerships with developing countries.

On April 24 2025, Ministry of Commerce spokesperson He Yadong reiterated China's commitment to deepening regional economic integration with neighboring countries, highlighting enhanced trade facilitation through initiatives such as the "Two Countries, Two Parks" program with Malaysia.⁶⁴⁴ These efforts aim to strengthen stable and resilient production and supply chains with Vietnam and Cambodia, support trade and investment cooperation, accelerate modernization and jointly oppose unilateralism and protectionism.

China has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. China has strengthened macroeconomic policy coordination at the Rio G20 Summit. China has also taken strong

⁶³⁹ China to further deepen reform comprehensively, expand opening-up: premier, Xinhua (Beijing) 9 December 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202412/09/content_WS6756ea83c6d0868f4e8edcb9.html

⁶⁴⁰ New container shipping route connects Dalian with the Mediterranean, Xinhua (Dalian) 20 February 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202502/20/content_WS67b66f74c6d0868f4e8efcdf.html

⁶⁴¹ Joint Press Release of the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing) 28 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 10 July 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202503/t20250328_11584034.shtml

⁶⁴² MOFCOM Regular Press Conference (April 3, 2025), Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 3 April 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025.

https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/News/PressConference/art/2025/art_61bca47ed379473facb5f0952ab71ceb.html

⁶⁴³ Lan Fo'an attends the second G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting in 2025 and holds several bilateral meetings, Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 4 July 2025. https://www.mof.gov.cn/en/news/mn/202504/t20250429_3962972.htm

⁶⁴⁴ MOFCOM Regular Press Conference (April 24, 2025), Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 24 April 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025.

https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/News/PressConference/art/2025/art_c7fc2b6626ad486eaeade1aca226a84d.html

action to deepen economic cooperation through cooperation with Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Türkiye and Israel, as well as with international organizations such as the IMF, the NDB and the World Bank. China has also implemented policies to support a strong, balanced and inclusive recovery while working with other countries such as Bangladesh to promote sustainable development and clean energy technologies.

Thus, China receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Hal Glover

Egypt: +1

Egypt has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 21 October 2024, Minister of Finance Ahmed Kouchouk met with Turkish business leaders to discuss integrated financial, investment and trade policy reforms, including tax facilitations and a forthcoming “Tax Policies 2030” strategy.⁶⁴⁵ The meeting aimed to enhance bilateral trade and support private sector growth by improving the business environment and linking incentives to measurable results. These actions aim to deepen economic cooperation and enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, through promotion of international trade and the implementation of coordinated fiscal reforms.

On 26 October 2024, Minister Kouchouk met with Kuwaiti Finance Minister Noura Al-Fasam to discuss expanding trade and joint investments between the two countries. The meeting emphasized Arab financial policy integration and included the announcement of tax concessions to incentivize local and foreign investment in Egypt. These investments and trade expansions support economic cooperation and enhancing macroeconomic policy coordination through bilateral trade promotion and fiscal reform to stimulate economic activity.

On 26 October 2024, Minister Kouchouk met with representatives of major financial institutions and announced new fiscal and structural reforms to strengthen investor confidence and stimulate growth.⁶⁴⁶ These included cancelling preferential treatment for state-owned enterprises, simplifying taxes for startups and small enterprises, capping public investment and launching sector-specific initiatives in exports, tech, tourism and the green economy. These actions enhance macroeconomic policy coordination and working to realize a strong and inclusive economic recovery, through targeted reforms supporting private sector-led development and financial stability. Minister Kouchouk also announced reforms including tax simplification for startups, cancellation of preferential treatment for state-owned enterprises and a cap on public investment. These measures aim to boost private sector participation, expand the tax base and stabilize fiscal policy.

On 30 October 2024, Minister Kouchouk participated in a roundtable at the US Chamber of Commerce and announced steps to attract FDI, including fee reform, reduced investment burdens and a cap on public

⁶⁴⁵ Minister of Finance, in his meeting with representatives of the Turkish business community: We aim to improve the business environment and reduce financial burdens through integrated financial, investment and trade, Finance Ministry (Nasr City) 21 October 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. [policieshttps://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/67169abab0fad40008a971a4/Minister-of-Finance%2C-in-his-meeting-with-representatives-of-the-Turkish-business-community%3A-We-aim-to-improve-the-business-environment-and-reduce-financial-burdens-through-integrated-financial%2C-investment-and-trade-policies](https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/67169abab0fad40008a971a4/Minister-of-Finance%2C-in-his-meeting-with-representatives-of-the-Turkish-business-community%3A-We-aim-to-improve-the-business-environment-and-reduce-financial-burdens-through-integrated-financial%2C-investment-and-trade-policies)

⁶⁴⁶ Minister of Finance, In his extended dialogue with representatives of major financial institutions and investment banks in Washington: Priority is to enhance the confidence of local and international investors in the diverse capabilities of the Egyptian economy, Ministry of Finance, (Nasr City) 26 October 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/671cc4cddcd3d50008caf55d/Minister%20of%20Finance%2C%20In%20his%20extended%20dialogue%20with%20representatives%20of%20major%20financial%20institutions%20and%20investment%20banks%20in%20Washington%3A%20Priority%20is%20to%20enhance%20the%20confidence%20of%20local%20and%20international%20investors%20in%20the%20diverse%20capabilities%20of%20the%20Egyptian%20economy>

investment.⁶⁴⁷ The minister also committed to expanding private sector partnerships and improving debt indicators.

On 7 November 2024, Minister Kouchouk announced at the World Urban Forum that Egypt is expanding public-private partnerships and implementing frameworks for blended and green finance.⁶⁴⁸ These actions aim to mobilize private capital, improve project delivery and enhance local development. This enhances macroeconomic policy coordination and working to realize a sustainable and inclusive economic recovery.

On 21 November 2024, Minister Kouchouk announced the implementation of a simplified tax system for startups and freelancers, including exemptions and reduced compliance requirements.⁶⁴⁹ These reforms aim to stimulate small-scale economic activity and support financial inclusion.

On 24 November 2024, Minister Kouchouk announced the automation and development of the public procurement system, supported by Korean expertise.⁶⁵⁰ The reform aims to improve governance, reduce costs and increase private sector participation in public contracts. This supports the enhancement of macroeconomic policy coordination through improved fiscal processes and procurement governance.

⁶⁴⁷ Minister of Finance At a roundtable at the US Chamber of Commerce on the sidelines of the meetings of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington: We look forward to greater cooperation with the American Chamber of Commerce to attract more FDI flows to all sectors in Egypt, Ministry of Finance (Nasr City) 30 October 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025.

<https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/6721e98a649a030009ece997/Minister%20of%20Finance%20at%20a%20roundtable%20at%20the%20US%20Chamber%20of%20Commerce%20on%20the%20sidelines%20of%20the%20meetings%20of%20the%20IMF%20and%20the%20World%20Bank%20in%20Washington%3A%20We%20look%20forward%20to%20greater%20cooperation%20with%20the%20American%20Chamber%20of%20Commerce%20to%20attract%20more%20FDI%20flows%20to%20all%20sectors%20in%20Egypt>

⁶⁴⁸ Minister of Finance, at the World Urban Forum: "Financing needs" to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals are beyond the capabilities of governments. There is no alternative to partnership and strengthening the role of the private sector and all development partners, Ministry of Finance (Nasr City) 7 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025.

<https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/672c68f62d8d130007121b1c/Minister%20of%20Finance%2C%20at%20the%20World%20Urban%20Forum%3A%20%20%22Financing%20needs%22%20to%20achieve%20the%20Sustainable%20Development%20Goals%20are%20beyond%20the%20capabilities%20of%20governments.%20There%20is%20no%20alternative%20to%20partnership%20and%20strengthening%20the%20role%20of%20the%20private%20sector%20and%20all%20development%20partners>

⁶⁴⁹ Minister of Finance, at the conference and exhibition of digital payments, financial inclusion and digital banks «PAFIX»: Facilities and incentives for entrepreneurship projects and Freelancers in the path of «Trust, Partnership and Support» with the tax community, Ministry of Finance 21 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025.

<https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/673f0e84c0e7220009ec8486/Minister%20of%20Finance%2C%20at%20the%20conference%20and%20exhibition%20of%20digital%20payments%2C%20financial%20inclusion%20and%20digital%20banks%20%2C%20ABPAFIX%2C%20BB%3A%20Facilities%20and%20incentives%20for%20entrepreneurship%20projects%20and%20Freelancers%20in%20the%20path%20of%20%2C%20ABTrust%2C%20Partnership%20and%20Support%2C%20BB%20with%20the%20tax%20community>

⁶⁵⁰ Minister of Finance, in a high-level seminar on the public procurement system in cooperation with the Korean International Cooperation Agency: Raising the efficiency of the public contracting system with Korean expertise to maximize competition, achieve financial savings and increase the role and contribution of the private sector, Ministry of Finance (Nasr City) 24 November 2024. Access date: 4 June 2025.

<https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/6742f5796653a8000812c767/Minister%20of%20Finance%2C%20in%20a%20high-level%20seminar%20on%20the%20public%20procurement%20system%20in%20cooperation%20with%20the%20Korean%20International%20Cooperation%20Agency%3A%20Raising%20the%20efficiency%20of%20the%20public%20contracting%20system%20with%20Korean%20expertise%20to%20maximize%20competition%2C%20achieve%20financial%20savings%20and%20increase%20the%20role%20and%20contribution%20of%20the%20private%20sector>

On 29 November 2024, Minister Kouchouk announced the implementation of new tax facilities, set limits on public investments and debt and confirmed expansion of public-private partnerships.⁶⁵¹ These measures aim to improve fiscal discipline, promote investor confidence and increase private sector contributions.

On 18 December 2024, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and President of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto issued a joint statement highlighting the economic complementarities between Egypt and Indonesia.⁶⁵² The two presidents acknowledged the potential for expanding bilateral trade and investment and committed to advancing cooperation in sectors such as palm oil, fertilizers, renewable energy, agricultural goods, digital economy, infrastructure and transportation. They emphasized Egypt's role as a strategic entry point for Indonesian exports to Euro-Mediterranean and African markets and Indonesia's function as a hub for Egyptian goods entering the Association of Southeast Asian Nations region.

On 19 December 2024, President El-Sisi delivered the opening address at the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation Summit.⁶⁵³ In his remarks, President El-Sisi announced the establishment of a "Network for Cooperation between Economic Think Tanks" among members states to facilitate the exchange of ideas and perspectives on strengthening economic cooperation, investment and trade. This initiative reflects Egypt's effort to improve macroeconomic policy coordination with BRICS members.

On 23 January 2025, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly established advisory committees to strengthen dialogue between the government and the private sector.⁶⁵⁴ This action reflects Egypt's commitment to improving domestic macroeconomic policy coordination.

On 11 February 2025, Minister Kouchouk announced initiatives to swap debt for investments supporting sustainable development and the green transition.⁶⁵⁵ The announcement reaffirmed Egypt's commitment to increasing access to concessional development financing and creating greater fiscal space for developing countries. The initiative represents a concrete step toward advancing sustainable economic recovery.

On 12 March 2025, the Parliament of Egypt approved a bilateral investment protection agreement between President El-Sisi and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, aiming to promote capital inflows, create jobs and strengthen bilateral economic ties.⁶⁵⁶ A joint statement described the agreement as a key step toward

⁶⁵¹ Minister of Finance, at a seminar at the British Egyptian Business Association: We work to build confidence and certainty between «The Tax Authority» and investors through a clear, simple and fair tax system, Ministry of Finance (Nasr City) 29 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025.

<https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/67497ab865fb0500088449ef/Minister%20of%20Finance%2C%20at%20a%20seminar%20at%20the%20British%20Egyptian%20Business%20Association%3A%20%20%20We%20work%20to%20build%20confidence%20and%20certainty%20between%20%20%20The%20Tax%20Authority%2C%20and%20investors%20through%20a%20clear%20and%20simple%20and%20fair%20tax%20system>

⁶⁵² Joint Statement by Egypt and Indonesia, The Arab Republic of Egypt Presidency (New Administrative Capital) 18 December 2024. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://www.presidency.eg/en/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news18122024-1/>

⁶⁵³ President El-Sisi's Speech at Opening of D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation Summit, The Arab Republic of Egypt Presidency (New Administrative Capital) 19 December 2024. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://www.presidency.eg/en/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news19122024/>

⁶⁵⁴ PM forms advisory committees to strengthen government collaboration with private sector, Ahram Online (New Administrative Capital) 24 January 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/539254.aspx>

⁶⁵⁵ Egypt launches debt-for-investment initiatives to support sustainable development, green transition, Daily News Egypt (New Administrative Capital) 11 February 2025. Access Date: 3 June 2025. <https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2025/02/11/egypt-launches-debt-for-investment-initiatives-to-support-sustainable-development-green-transition/>

⁶⁵⁶ Egypt approves investment protection deal with Saudi Arabia, Arab News, 12 March 2025. Access Date 7 July 2025. <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2593350/business-economy>

enhancing economic cooperation, fostering investment opportunities and promoting sustainable development between the two countries.

On 15 March 2025, Minister Kouchouk and Minister of Social Solidarity Maya Morsi announced an additional support for the 4.7 million families benefiting from the “Takaful and Karama” program during the month of Ramadan.⁶⁵⁷ Approximately EGP1.5 billion will be distributed by the Public Treasury for the Ministry of Social Solidarity to the beneficiaries.

On 16 March 2025, Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade Hassan El-Khatib met with Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal to reaffirm and increase their commitment to bilateral economic cooperation.⁶⁵⁸ The ministers reaffirmed their commitment to tripling bilateral trade from USD4.2 billion in 2024 to USD12 billion within five years, reinforcing a target set last year during a joint meeting.⁶⁵⁹

On 26 March 2025, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health and Population Khaled Abdel Ghaffar met with Tajikistan’s Ambassador to Egypt Parviz Mirzazoda regarding reactivating the cooperation protocol between the health ministries of both countries.⁶⁶⁰ The cooperation would include collaboration on drug registration, supply, pharmaceutical industry partnerships, training programs and medical expertise exchange.

On 29 March 2025, Minister Kouchouk announced that EGP732.6 billion has been allocated in the new budget for more targeted social protection for those eligible for subsidies.⁶⁶¹ This funding aims to alleviate the burdens on the most vulnerable groups and supports inclusive growth.

Egypt has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. The country has enhanced macroeconomic coordination through bilateral engagements with BRICS members India and Tajikistan. It has deepened economic cooperation via an investment protection agreement with Saudi Arabia and a healthcare partnership with China. To support inclusive and balanced recovery, Egypt expanded its national safety net through the Takaful and Karama program and allocated significant funding for subsidies and social protection.

Thus, Egypt receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Fiona Mengchen Wang

⁶⁵⁷ In pursuance of presidential mandates 4.7 million families benefiting from the "Takaful and Karama" program spend 300 pounds as an "additional support" during the month of Ramadan, Ministry of Finance, 15 March 2025. Access Date: 7 July 2025. <https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/67d5646844f38f00093c3812/In%20pursuance%20of%20presidential%20mandates%20%204.7%20million%20families%20benefiting%20from%20the%20%22Takaful%20and%20Karama%22%20program%20spend%20300%20pounds%20as%20an%20%22additional%20support%22%20during%20the%20month%20of%20Ramadan>

⁶⁵⁸ The Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade heads to India to boost economic ties, State Information Services (Cairo) 16 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://us.sis.gov.eg/Story/205577/The-Minister-of-Investment-and-Foreign-Trade-heads-to-India>

⁶⁵⁹ Indian Investments in Egypt, Embassy of India (Cairo) 7 July 2025. Access Date: 9 July 2025. <https://www.eoicairo.gov.in/page/indian-investments-in-egypt/>

⁶⁶⁰ Minister of Finance, 732.6 billion pounds in the new budget for more targeted social protection for those eligible for subsidies, Ministry of Finance (Cairo) 26 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/67e7d704d817670009760cc5/Minister%20of%20Finance%2C%20%20%20%20%20732.6%20billion%20pounds%20in%20the%20new%20budget%20for%20more%20targeted%20social%20protection%20for%20those%20eligible%20for%20subsidies>

⁶⁶¹ Minister of Finance, 732.6 billion pounds in the new budget for more targeted social protection for those eligible for subsidies, Ministry of Finance, 29 March, 2025. Access Date: 7 July 2025. <https://mof.gov.eg/en/posts/media/67e91998b5a3260007627062/Minister%20of%20Finance%2C%20%20%20%20%20Increase%20spending%20on%20health%20and%20education%20with%20the%20new%20budget%20to%20improve%20services%20provided%20to%20citizens>

Ethiopia: +1

Ethiopia has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 23 November 2024, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inaugurated the Quality Village, an institution for products and services quality assurance.⁶⁶² Prime Minister Ahmed asserted that the Quality Village will strengthen Ethiopia’s export competitiveness and enhance its participation in global value chains.

On 6 December 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture held a consultation forum with the Southwestern Ethiopian People’s National Regional Government, investors and other stakeholders.⁶⁶³ The forum identified and acknowledged solutions to the region’s investment and development challenges in the agricultural sector. The Ministry of Agriculture also emphasized the importance of holding regional forums to enhance investments in the agricultural sector and foster cooperation between stakeholders.

On 9 December 2024, Prime Minister Ahmed inaugurated YMG Gold Mining facilities.⁶⁶⁴ Prime Minister Ahmed noted the green technology that will be implemented in the mining operations and the opportunities the mine would bring to the local community.

On 12 December 2024, the Ministry of Planning and Development introduced the first Regional Economic Accounts Handbook.⁶⁶⁵ The handbook will guide regions to align with national and international standards in tracking economic growth. Furthermore, it will pave the way for equitable economic growth among regions through informed decision-making and effective policies.

On 14 December 2024, Prime Minister Ahmed inaugurated the Oromia Abdi Boru Orphanage Center, built with the support of Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahayan.⁶⁶⁶ Prime Minister Ahmed noted the facility was one of many efforts of the Ethiopian government’s infrastructure projects aimed at improving the lives of low-income communities.

On 19 December 2024, State Minister of Labour and Skills Solomon Soka attended the African Entrepreneurship Forum.⁶⁶⁷ Minister Soka reiterated Ethiopia’s commitment to empower women and youth and to ensure that they could benefit equitably from the country’s economic growth. He also emphasized the government’s efforts such as the Women and Youth Access to Finance 2030 initiative and the development of a digital trade platform.

⁶⁶² PM Abiy Inaugurates ‘Quality Village’, Ethiopian News Agency (Addis Ababa) 23 November 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025.

https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_5505045

⁶⁶³ ለግብርና ኢንቨስትመንት ውጤታማነት ክልል-አቀፍ የባለድርሻ አካላት የምክክር መድረክ ሚና, ግብርና ሚኒስቴር (Addis Ababa) 6 December 2024.

Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 22 May 2025.

<https://www.moa.gov.et/%e1%88%88%e1%8c%8d%e1%89%a5%e1%88%ad%e1%8a%93-%e1%8a%a2%e1%8a%95%e1%89%a8%e1%88%b5%e1%89%b5%e1%88%98%e1%8a%95%e1%89%b5-%e1%8b%8d%e1%8c%a4%e1%89%b3%e1%88%9b%e1%8a%90%e1%89%b5-%e1%8a%ad%e1%88%8d/>

⁶⁶⁴ Prime Minister Abiy Says Ethiopia’s Gold Mining Industry Presenting Immense Potential for Local, International Investment, Ethiopian News Agency (Addis Ababa) 10 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025.

https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_5601102

⁶⁶⁵ MoPD Launches Ethiopia’s First Regional Economic Accounts Handbook, Ministry of Planning and Development (Bishoftu) n.d.

Access Date: 22 May 2025. <https://www.mopd.gov.et/en/news/articles/mopd-launches-ethiopias-first-regional-economic-accounts-handbooknonenone/>

⁶⁶⁶ Prime Minister Abiy Inaugurates Oromia Abdi Boru Orphanage Center, Ethiopian News Agency (Addis Ababa) 14 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_5626587

⁶⁶⁷ በአፍሪካ ቀጣይነት ያለው ኢኮኖሚያዊ ዕድገትን ለማረጋገጥ የሴቶችና የወጣቶችን ተሳታፊነት ዕውን ማድረግ ቀዳሚው አጀንዳ ሊሆን ይገባል። ክቡር አቶ ሰለሞን ሶካ የሥራና ክህሎት ሚኒስትር ዴኤታ, የሥራና ክህሎት ሚኒስቴር (Addis Ababa) 18 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate.

Access Date: 25 May 2025. <https://mols.gov.et/am/%e1%89%a0%e1%8a%a0%e1%8d%8d%e1%88%aa%e1%8a%ab-%e1%89%80%e1%8c%a3%e1%8b%ad%e1%8a%90%e1%89%b5-%e1%8b%ab%e1%88%88%e1%8b%8d-%e1%8a%a2%e1%8a%ae%e1%8a%96%e1%88%9a%e1%8b%ab%e1%8b%8a-%e1%8b%95%e1%8b%b5/>

On 26 December 2024, the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs signed an agreement with the Development Expert Center that will focus on helping 1,500 irregular migrants, returnees and female victims of human trafficking over one and a half years.⁶⁶⁸ The agreement will provide individuals with the resources and support that will allow them to enter the workforce, supporting Ethiopia's economy.

On 10 January 2025, Ethiopia launched the Ethiopian Security Exchange (ESE).⁶⁶⁹ The ESE aims to support Ethiopia's ongoing macroeconomic by opening the economy to private investment.

On 13 January 2025, the Ministry of Innovation and Technology signed agreements with private sector companies Cyber ZEB, the Corporate Information and Communication Technology Sector Association and Nuna Ethiopia to promote innovation and digital transformation in Ethiopia.⁶⁷⁰ The agreements foster cooperation between the private and public sectors in creating a sustainable digital economy.

On 16 January 2025, the Ministry of Innovation and Technology, in collaboration with the Korea International Cooperation Agency, began the first phase of the needs analysis on the Startup Ethiopia Digital Platform project.⁶⁷¹ The project aims to foster innovation-led economic growth by creating a conducive ecosystem for startups.

On 23 January 2025, the Ministry of Innovation and Technology signed a memorandum of understanding with Agri Contract to digitize farmers' contracts and financial information.⁶⁷² The agreement will incorporate the agricultural sector into the digital economy, improve financial accessibility for farmers and agribusinesses and increase sector competitiveness.

On 27 January 2025, Minister of Finance Ahmed Shide signed a EUR4.5 million agreement with Italian Minister of Higher Education and Research Anna Maria Bernini.⁶⁷³ The initiative aims to strengthen Ethiopia's digital development and promote job creation through the creation of digital infrastructure.

On 27 January 2025, the Ministry of Planning and Development held a forum with representatives from Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway and other international organizations to evaluate Ethiopia's progress

⁶⁶⁸ The Ministry of Women and Social Affairs has signed a joint working agreement with the Development Expert Center (DEC), Ministry of Women and Social Affairs (Addis Ababa) 31 December 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.mowsa.gov.et/?p=5712&lang=en>

⁶⁶⁹ Ethiopia launches stock exchange in fresh step to liberalise economy, Reuters (Addis Ababa) 10 January 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-launches-stock-exchange-fresh-step-liberalise-economy-2025-01-10/>

⁶⁷⁰ Private sector institutions have a big role in making Ethiopia's digital transformation a reality, so it is important to work together to achieve this. Dr. Belete Mola, Ministry of Innovation and Technology (Addis Ababa) 27 January 2025. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://www.mint.gov.et/ca/w/private-sector-institutions-have-a-big-role-in-making-ethiopia-s-digital-transformation-a-reality-so-it-is-important-to-work-together-to-achieve-this.-dr.-belete-mola>

⁶⁷¹ የሀገራዊ የስታርታፕ ዲጂታል ፕላንፎርም መዘጋጀት ለስታርታፕ ስነ-ምህጻር ግንባታ ቁልፍ ሚና እንዳለው ዶ/ር ባይሳ በዳዳ ገለፁ። የኢኮኖሚና ቴክኖሎጂ ሚኒስቴር (Addis Ababa) 27 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 21 May 2025.

<http://www.mint.gov.et/zh/web/am/w/%E1%8B%A8%E1%88%80%E1%8C%88%E1%88%AB%E1%8B%8A-%E1%8B%A8%E1%88%B5%E1%89%B3%E1%88%AD%E1%89%B3%E1%8D%95-%E1%8B%B2%E1%8C%85%E1%89%B3%E1%88%8D-%E1%8D%95%E1%88%8B%E1%89%B5%E1%8D%8E%E1%88%AD%E1%88%9D-%E1%88%98%E1%8B%98%E1%8C%8B%E1%8C%80%E1%89%B5-%E1%88%88>

⁶⁷² የሀገራዊን እና የግብርና ቢዝነሶችን ኮንትራት እንዲሁም የፋይናንስ ተደራሽነት መረጃዎችን ዲጂታላይዝ ለማድረግ የሚያስችል ስምምነት ተፈረመ። የኢኮኖሚና ቴክኖሎጂ ሚኒስቴር (Addis Ababa) 27 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 21 May 2025.

<http://www.mint.gov.et/zh/web/am/w/%E1%8B%A8%E1%8C%88%E1%89%A0%E1%88%AC%E1%8B%8D%E1%8A%95-%E1%8A%A5%E1%8A%93-%E1%8B%A8%E1%8C%8D%E1%89%A5%E1%88%AD%E1%8A%93-%E1%89%A2%E1%8B%9D%E1%8A%90%E1%88%B6%E1%89%BD%E1%8A%95-%E1%8A%AE%E1%8A%95%E1%89%B5%E1%88%AB%E1%89%B5-%E1%8A%A5%E1%8A%95%E1%8B%B2>

⁶⁷³ Ministry of Finance Welcomes Italian Minister of Universities and Research and signs a 4.5 million Euro Grant Agreement with the Republic of Italy, Ministry of Finance (Addis Ababa) 28 January 2025. Access Date: 21 May 2025.

<https://www.mofed.gov.et/blog/ministry-of-finance-welcomes-italian-minister-of-universities-and-research-and-signs-a-45-million-euro-grant-agreement-with-the-republic-of-italy/>

in implementing climate commitments from the COP29 Climate Change Conference.⁶⁷⁴ The international representatives stressed their continued support of Ethiopia's initiatives to build a climate-resilient green economy.

On 5 March 2025, the Government of Ethiopia implemented the Rural Development SafeNet Program in 11 regions and 492 districts across Ethiopia.⁶⁷⁵ The program, with over 8 million beneficiaries, supports balanced economic recovery by implementing water and soil conservation, providing water supply to water-scarce regions and rehabilitating infrastructure such as schools, roads and health clinics.

On 25 March 2025, State Minister of Finance Eyob Tekalign and French Development Agency (AFD) Country Director Louis-Antoine Souchet signed a EUR28.5 million financial agreement to support Ethiopia's ongoing economic reforms.⁶⁷⁶ The parties will use EUR25 million for budget support and EUR3.5 million for technical assistance on key reform initiatives such as the financial sector reform, capacity building, the Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda 2.0 and public-private partnership regulatory frameworks. This supports Ethiopia's strong economic recovery by providing both financial and technical assistance on its reforms.

On 3 April 2025, Minister of Finance Ato Ahmed Shide and EU Ambassador to Ethiopia Sofie From-Emmesberger signed a EUR240 million grant agreement under the 2024 Annual Action Programme.⁶⁷⁷ The program aims to address key areas of development which includes initiatives for agribusinesses and reinforcing participation of the private sector in key value chains. It also places a focus on balanced and inclusive economic recovery by providing health services for communities affected by conflict and improving economic opportunities for refugees and displaced individuals.

On 3 April 2025, State Minister of Innovation and Technology Yeshurun Alemayehu and Director of the China-ASEAN African Village Management Committee agreed to establish a joint committee to work in modernizing the trade and service delivery system in Ethiopia.⁶⁷⁸ The committee will focus on the trade system's modernization through artificial intelligence technologies as well as advancing the digital economy through collaborations with partner organizations and institutions.

On 8 April 2025, the Ministry of Water and Energy launched the Basin Management Support for Resilient, Inclusive Growth and Harmonized Transformation (BRIGHT) project on the Abay, Awash and Tekeze river basins.⁶⁷⁹ The BRIGHT project aims to improve the livelihoods of the river basin residents and promote climate

⁶⁷⁴ International Donors Pledge Continued Support for Ethiopia's Green Economy Development, Ministry of Planning and Development (Addis Ababa) 27 January 2025. Access Date: 21 May 2025.

<https://www.mopd.gov.et/en/news/articles/international-donors-pledge-continued-support-for-ethiopia-green-economy-development-addis-ababa-january-27-2025-mopdnonenone/>

⁶⁷⁵ በምግብ እራስን ለመቻል እየተሰሩ ያሉ ስራዎች በአፋንቦ ወረዳ, ግብርና ሚኒስቴር (Addis Ababa) 5 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 16 June 2025. <https://www.moa.gov.et/%e1%89%a0%e1%88%9d%e1%8c%8d%e1%89%a5-%e1%8a%a5%e1%88%ab%e1%88%b5%e1%8a%95-%e1%88%88%e1%88%98%e1%89%bb%e1%88%8d-%e1%8a%a5%e1%8b%a8%e1%89%b0%e1%88%b0%e1%88%a9-%e1%8b%ab%e1%88%89-%e1%88%b5%e1%88%ab/>

⁶⁷⁶ Ethiopia and AFD Sign Agreement for 28.5 Million Euros in Budget Support and Technical Assistance, Ministry of Finance (Addis Ababa) 25 March 2025. Access Date: 16 June 2025. <https://www.mofed.gov.et/blog/ethiopia-and-afd-sign-agreement-for-285-million-euros-in-budget-support-and-technical-assistance/>

⁶⁷⁷ Ethiopia and European Union Sign €240 Million Grant Agreement, Ministry of Finance (Addis Ababa) 3 April 2025. Access Date: 16 June 2025. <https://www.mofed.gov.et/blog/ethiopia-and-european-union-sign-240-million-grant-agreement/>

⁶⁷⁸ የኢ.ኖ.ቪ.ሽንና ቴክኖሎጂ ሚኒስትር ዴኤታ ዶ/ር ይሹሩን አለማየሁ በቻይና ኢ.ሲ.ዮን የአፍሪካ መንደር ማኔጅመንት ኮሚቴ ዳይሬክተር የተመራ ልዑካን ቡድን በቢ.ፖ.ቸው ተቀብለው ቢጋራ ለመስራት በሚያስችሉ ጉዳዮች ላይ መከሩ።, የኢ.ኖ.ቪ.ሽንና ቴክኖሎጂ ሚኒስትር (Addis Ababa) 3 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 16 June 2025.

<http://www.mint.gov.et/web/am/w/%E1%8B%A8%E1%8A%A2%E1%8A%96%E1%89%AC%E1%88%BD%E1%8A%95%E1%8A%93-%E1%89%B4%E1%8A%AD%E1%8A%96%E1%88%8E%E1%8C%82-%E1%88%9A%E1%8A%92%E1%88%B5%E1%89%B5%E1%88%AD-%E1%8B%B4%E1%8A%A4%E1%89%B3-%E1%8B%B6/%E1%88%AD-%E1%8B%AD%E1%88%B9%E1%88%A9%E1%8A%95-%E1%8A%A0>

⁶⁷⁹ Integrated Watershed Management Project that Benefits Millions on Abay, Awash and Tekeze Basins Launched, Ethiopian News Agency (Addis Ababa) 8 April 2025. Access Date: 4 July 2025. https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_6349995

resilience by implementing water resource management practices. It promotes sustainable economic recovery and contributes towards sustainable development.

On 14 April 2025, the Ministry of Innovation and Technology established a national digital technology development team.⁶⁸⁰ The team will be responsible for attracting investment, creating employment opportunities for citizens and evaluating Ethiopia's progress in developing their digital economy. This initiative aims to advance Ethiopia's economic development and ensure it becomes globally competitive.

On 14 April 2025, Deputy Minister of Social Affairs Huriya Ali announced a mobile medical and nutrition clinic initiative to be implemented in 18 districts in Ethiopia's Oromia, Afar and Somali regions.⁶⁸¹ The project supports inclusive and balanced economic recovery as it aims to assist 12 health facilities, some of which are in inaccessible areas, while providing services to vulnerable communities and victims of gender-based violence.

On 25 April 2025, State Minister of Innovation and Technology Baisa Bedada held discussions with Country Director of the AFD Louis-Antoine Souchet on initiatives to support Ethiopia's startup companies.⁶⁸² As a result, the AFD announced that it would provide EUR10 million to strengthen the startup ecosystem. The discussions support Ethiopia's enhancement of macroeconomic policy coordination as well as its commitment to a strong economic recovery by cooperating with foreign partners.

On 25 April 2025, the Ministry of Innovation and Technology announced its collaboration with Visa International Services.⁶⁸³ The partnership will enhance macroeconomic policy coordination and support strong economic recovery by focusing on improving digital finance, financial inclusion and the digital ecosystem.

Ethiopia has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. It enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination through financial agreements with AFD and the EU, collaboration with Visa on digital finance and the launch of a national digital technology team. It supported sustainable and inclusive recovery via the Rural Development SafeNet Program, the BRIGTH climate resilience project and a mobile medical and nutrition clinic initiative targeting vulnerable regions. It deepened economic cooperation through partnerships with AFD, the EU and Visa.

⁶⁸⁰ የኢትዮጵያ ዲሞክራሲ ትራንስፎርሜሽን ጉዞ ስኬታማነትን ለማረጋገጥና በአለም አቀፍ ደረጃ ተወዳዳሪ የሆነች ሀገር ለመገንባት እየተሰራ መሆኑን ዶ/ር ይቩሩን ዓለማየሁ ገለፁ, የኢኮኖሚና ቴክኖሎጂ ሚኒስትር (Addis Ababa) 14 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 16 June 2025.

<http://www.mint.gov.et/zh/web/am/w/%E1%8B%A8%E1%8A%A2%E1%89%B5%E1%8B%AE%E1%8C%B5%E1%8B%AB-%E1%8B%B2%E1%8C%82%E1%89%B3%E1%88%8D-%E1%89%B5%E1%88%AB%E1%8A%95%E1%88%B5%E1%8D%8E%E1%88%AD%E1%88%9C%E1%88%BD%E1%8A%95-%E1%8C%89%E1%8B%9E-%E1%88%B5%E1%8A%AC%E1%89%B3%E1%88%9B%E1%8A%90%E1%89%B5>

⁶⁸¹ A mobile medical and nutrition clinic project to be implemented in Afar, Somali and Oromia regions has been announced, Ministry of Women and Social Affairs (Addis Ababa) 14 April 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025.

<https://www.mowsa.gov.et/?p=6047&lang=en>

⁶⁸² የኢኮኖሚና ቴክኖሎጂ ሚኒስቴር ለስጋታጥ ስነምግባር ግንባታ በሚውል የአለም አቀፍ ድጋፍ ረገድ ምክክር ተደረገ፤ የኢኮኖሚና ቴክኖሎጂ ሚኒስትር (Addis Ababa) 25 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 16 June 2025.

<http://www.mint.gov.et/zh/web/am/w/%E1%8B%A8%E1%8A%A2%E1%8A%96%E1%89%AC%E1%88%BD%E1%8A%95%E1%8A%93-%E1%89%B4%E1%8A%AD%E1%8A%96%E1%88%8E%E1%8C%82-%E1%88%9A%E1%8A%92%E1%88%B5%E1%89%B4%E1%88%AD-%E1%88%88%E1%88%B5%E1%89%B3%E1%88%AD%E1%89%B3%E1%8D%95-%E1%88%B5%E1%8A%90%E1%88%9D%E1%8B%B3>

⁶⁸³ የኢኮኖሚና ቴክኖሎጂ ሚኒስቴር ከቪዛ ዓለም አቀፍ አገልግሎት ጋር በጋራ ለመስራት ተስማሙ። የኢኮኖሚና ቴክኖሎጂ ሚኒስትር (Addis Ababa) 25 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 16 June 2025.

<http://www.mint.gov.et/zh/web/am/w/%E1%8B%A8%E1%8A%A2%E1%8A%96%E1%89%AC%E1%88%BD%E1%8A%95%E1%8A%93-%E1%89%B4%E1%8A%AD%E1%8A%96%E1%88%8E%E1%8C%82-%E1%88%9A%E1%8A%92%E1%88%B5%E1%89%B4%E1%88%AD-%E1%8A%A8%E1%89%AA%E1%8B%9B-%E1%8B%93%E1%88%88%E1%88%9D-%E1%8A%A0%E1%89%80%E1%8D%8D-%E1%8A%A0>

Thus, Ethiopia receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Minji Kwak

India: 0

India has partially complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 5 November 2024, the Department of Financial Services held a review meeting with Public Sector Banks to strengthen financial performance, cybersecurity and support for agriculture and Micro, Small and Medium and Small Enterprises (MSMEs).⁶⁸⁴ The Department of Financial Services Secretary urged banks to intensify financial inclusion, enhance digital services and expand access to key schemes like Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana, Pradhan Mantri Mudra Yojana and Stand Up India. This action aligns with efforts to promote inclusive economic recovery and deepen economic cooperation through sectoral support and technology-driven outreach.

On 9 November 2024, Union Minister for Finance and Corporate Affairs Nirmala Sitharaman launched the National MSME Cluster Outreach Programme, inaugurating new Small Industries Development Bank of India and Nari Shakti bank branches to expand financial access for small enterprises and women entrepreneurs.⁶⁸⁵ Minister Sitharaman set a national target of INR1.54 trillion in additional MSME lending for the 2024–2025 financial year. This action advances inclusive and sustainable recovery by strengthening credit access and supporting entrepreneurship across India.

On 13 November 2024, the governments of India and Russia convened the 25th Session of the Inter-Governmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation.⁶⁸⁶ The meeting addressed trade facilitation, logistics, connectivity corridors and future cooperation in sectors such as energy, food security, pharmaceuticals and skilled mobility. This action reflects efforts to deepen economic cooperation and support sustainable recovery through bilateral engagement.

On 19 November 2024, the governments of India, Brazil and South Africa issued a joint declaration on Digital Public Infrastructure, Artificial Intelligence and Data for Governance.⁶⁸⁷ The statement emphasizes inclusive digital transformation as a driver of growth, job creation and sustainable development, calling for open, interoperable and citizen-focused systems. It supports equitable economic development and reflects coordinated efforts to strengthen digital governance in emerging economies.

On 27 November 2024, the Ministry of External Affairs announced that India and Japan held the inaugural Dialogue on Economic Security in Tokyo, co-chaired by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Japan's Vice

⁶⁸⁴ Shri M. Nagaraju, Secretary, Department of Financial Services (DFS), chairs review meeting with Public Sector Banks (PSBs), Ministry of Finance (New Delhi) 5 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2070994>

⁶⁸⁵ Union Minister for Finance and Corporate Affairs Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman launches National MSME Cluster Outreach Programme and inaugurates New SIDBI Branches in Bengaluru today, Ministry of Finance (New Delhi) 9 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2072117>

⁶⁸⁶ Opening Remarks by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the 25th Session of the India Russia Inter-Governmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGEC-TEC), Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 13 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/38511/opening+remarks+by+external+affairs+minister+dr+s+jaishankar+at+the+25th+session+of+the+india+russia+intergovernmental+commission+for+trade+economic+scientific+and+cultural+cooperation+irigectec>

⁶⁸⁷ Declaration on Digital Public Infrastructure, AI and Data for Governance – Joint Communiqué from Brazil, South Africa and India, Ministry of Finance (Brasilia) 19 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-sobre-infraestrutura-publica-digital-ia-e-dados-para-governanca-2013-comunicado-conjunto-de-brasil-africa-do-sul-e-india

Minister of Foreign Affairs Masataka Okano.⁶⁸⁸ The dialogue focused on building industrial and technological resilience, securing supply chains and enhancing policy coordination across strategic sectors. This action reflects macroeconomic policy coordination and supports a strong and sustainable economic recovery through bilateral cooperation in strategic trade and technology.

On 20 February 2025, the Ministry of External Affairs announced that India co-hosted the 9th Asia Economic Dialogue in Pune under the theme “Economic Resilience and Resurgence in an Era of Fragmentation.”⁶⁸⁹ The event featured international stakeholders and focused on geoeconomic issues such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, MSMEs, climate impacts and global economic fragmentation. This action reflects efforts to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination and promote sustainable and inclusive economic recovery through international dialogue.

On 13 March 2025, Reserve Bank Governor Sanjay Malhotra urged lenders to create common green projects to increase climate-related financing.⁶⁹⁰ The central bank has also proposed sustainable finance under its Regulatory Sandbox. This action aligns with sustainable growth and investment in green energy and growth.

On 14 March 2025, Minister of Information and Broadcasting Ashwini Vaishnaw announced a USD1 billion fund for the online creator economy at the World Audio-Visual and Entertainment Summit 2025.⁶⁹¹ The fund aims to allow Indian creators to access world-class technologies, capital and increase their skills and allow content creators to reach the global market. This action aligns with investing in capital, skill development and economic inclusion.

On 16 March 2025, Minister Goyal met with Egyptian Minister El-Khatib to reaffirm and increase their commitment to bilateral economic cooperation.⁶⁹² The ministers have reaffirmed their commitment to tripling bilateral trade from USD4.2 billion in 2024 to USD12 billion within five years, reinforcing a target set last year during a joint meeting.⁶⁹³

On 19 March 2025, the Union Cabinet approved INR15 billion as part of a scheme to promote small digital transactions.⁶⁹⁴ Small merchants will receive a small incentive on each transaction up to INR2000 done through the UPI system. This action reduces costs for small merchants and promotes economic inclusion and growth for small businesses.

On 21 April 2025, Minister Goyal and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer finalized the Terms of Reference for a Bilateral Trade Agreement under the Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership,

⁶⁸⁸ Inaugural round of India-Japan Dialogue on Economic Security, including Strategic Trade and Technology, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 27 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38603/inaugural-round-of-indiajapan-dialogue-on-economic-security-including-strategic-trade-and-technology>

⁶⁸⁹ The Asia Economic Dialogue 2025, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 19 February 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/39085/the-asia-economic-dialogue-2025>

⁶⁹⁰ India central bank chief urges common pool of climate-focused projects to enhance financing, Reuters (London) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/india-central-bank-chief-urges-common-pool-climate-focused-projects-enhance-2025-03-13/>

⁶⁹¹ Govt announces 1 billion dollar fund for creators’ economy, ahead of WAVES 2025, Newsonair (Mumbai) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 9 July <https://www.newsonair.gov.in/govt-announces-1-billion-dollar-fund-for-creators-economy-ahead-of-waves-2025/>

⁶⁹² The Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade heads to India to boost economic ties, State Information Services (Cairo) 16 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://us.sis.gov.eg/Story/205577/The-Minister-of-Investment-and-Foreign-Trade-heads-to-India>

⁶⁹³ Indian Investments in Egypt, Embassy of India (Cairo) 7 July 2025. Access Date: 9 July 2025. <https://www.eoicairo.gov.in/page/indian-investments-in-egypt/>

⁶⁹⁴ Cabinet approves Incentive scheme for promotion of low-value BHIM-UPI transactions (P2M), Cabinet (New Delhi) 19 March 2025. Access Date: 9 July 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2112771>

Accelerated Commerce and Technology (COMPACT) initiative.⁶⁹⁵ This action supports macroeconomic coordination and deepening economic cooperation through structured trade negotiations.

On 27 April 2025, Governor Malhotra urged US industries to invest in India.⁶⁹⁶ This action at the US-India Economic Forum organized by the Confederation of Indian Industry and US-India Strategic Partner Forum promotes economic cooperation and macroeconomic growth for both countries.

India has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable and inclusive economic recovery. It took strong action to enhance macroeconomic coordination and deepen economic cooperation through the finalization of Terms of Reference for a bilateral trade agreement under the COMPACT initiative and through high-level engagement at the US-India Economic Forum. It promoted strong and inclusive recovery by establishing the online creator economy fund and approving incentives for small digital transactions. Additional actions, such as the Reserve Bank's proposals on sustainable finance and bilateral trade discussions with Egypt, further support these efforts. However, India has not taken strong action to realize a balanced economic recovery.

Thus, India receives a score of 0

Analyst: Natalia Lisa George

Indonesia: +1

Indonesia has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 25 January 2025, Deputy Minister of Agriculture Sudaryono reaffirmed Indonesia's commitment to national food self-sufficiency and global food leadership by boosting domestic production of key commodities and reducing import dependence.⁶⁹⁷ The Government of Indonesia will expand fertilizer distribution, provide free seeds and invest in agricultural tools and machinery. These efforts aim to strengthen food security, promote exports and position Indonesia as a global food hub, contributing to sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 28 January 2025, President Prabowo Subianto and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the palm oil sector.⁶⁹⁸ The initiative aims to boost economic ties between Indonesia and Malaysia, address export barriers and promote palm oil as a sustainable commodity. This collaboration supports regional economic stability and trade resilience.

On 30 January 2025, the National Food Agency set the rice purchase price at IDR6,500 per kilogram to boost domestic rice production and ensure farmer welfare.⁶⁹⁹ The policy eliminates price fractioning, supports the

⁶⁹⁵ Ambassador Greer Issues Statement on Trade Negotiation Progress with India, Office of the United States Trade Representative 21 April 2025. Access Date: 9 July 2025. <https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/april/ambassador-greer-issues-statement-trade-negotiation-progress-india>

⁶⁹⁶ RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra urges US industry to invest in India, The Economic Times (Delhi) 27 April 2025. Access Date: 7 July 2025. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/rbi-governor-sanjay-malhotra-urges-us-industry-to-invest-in-india/articleshow/120664411.cms>

⁶⁹⁷ Indonesia Will Become the World's Food Barn in the Era of President Prabowo, Government of Indonesia (Jakarta) 25 January 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/ekonomi-bisnis/8952/indonesia-akan-jadi-lumbung-pangan-dunia-di-era-presiden-prabowo?lang=1>

⁶⁹⁸ Indonesia-Malaysia Palm Oil Partnership: Key to World Production, Government of Indonesia (Jakarta) 28 January 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/ekonomi-bisnis/8941/kemitraan-sawit-indonesia-malaysia-kunci-produksi-dunia?lang=1>

⁶⁹⁹ Government Sets Rice Purchase Price at IDR 6,500 per Kg, Targets Food Self-Sufficiency by 2025 Government of Indonesia (Jakarta) 30 January 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/ekonomi-bisnis/8963/pemerintah-tetapkan-harga-pembelian-gabah-rp6-500-per-kg-targetkan-swasembada-pangan-2025?lang=1>

government's 2025 food self-sufficiency goal and promotes sustainable economic recovery and macroeconomic policy.

On 3 February 2025, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia resumed operations of three-kilogram liquefied petroleum gas retailers under a new “sub-base” system to improve subsidized gas distribution.⁷⁰⁰ The policy includes digital tracking and a requirement for citizens to present national identity cards to ensure targeted subsidies. This action enhances macroeconomic policy coordination and supports an inclusive and balanced economic recovery by formalizing small-scale retailers and improving access for lower-income households.

On 24 February 2025, President Prabowo signed regulations and a presidential decree to formally establish the Daya Anagata Nusantara Investment Management Agency (Danantara) to manage state investments in strategic sectors.⁷⁰¹ The agency will focus on high-impact, sustainable projects in renewable energy, advanced manufacturing, downstream industries and food production to help achieve Indonesia's 8 per cent economic growth target. This measure enhances macroeconomic policy coordination, deepens economic cooperation and supports a strong, sustainable and inclusive economic recovery.

On 4 March 2025, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia announced the Government of Indonesia's readiness to implement 21 strategic projects to accelerate national downstream industrialization.⁷⁰² This initiative reflects a coordinated economic strategy to enhance value-added production and reduce export dependency. It supports sustainable and inclusive development by expanding domestic processing capabilities and stimulating regional industrial hubs.

On 6 March 2025, Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia Doni P. Joewono announced the provision of IDR180.9 trillion in cash to support transactions during Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr 2025.⁷⁰³ This liquidity injection serves as a macroeconomic stimulus aimed at boosting consumption during peak holiday periods. It reinforces inclusive recovery by ensuring cash availability in both urban and rural areas.

On 10 March 2025, President Prabowo and Secretary General of the Communist Party of Vietnam Tô Lâm formalized a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to strengthen bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors.⁷⁰⁴ The agreement, which includes three cooperation documents, deepens economic cooperation and signals Indonesia's commitment to regional integration and joint frameworks. It supports macroeconomic coordination through enhanced trade, investment and diplomatic alignment.

⁷⁰⁰ 3 Kg LPG Retailer Back in Operation as Sub-Base, Government of Indonesia (Jakarta) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/ekonomi-bisnis/8977/pengecer-lpg-3-kg-kembali-beroperasi-sebagai-sub-pangkalan?lang=1>

⁷⁰¹ President Prabowo Signs Regulations and Presidential Decree for BPI Danantara, Government of Indonesia (Jakarta) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://indonesia.go.id/kategori/ekonomi-bisnis/9023/presiden-prabowo-teken-aturan-dan-keppres-untuk-bpi-danantara?lang=1>

⁷⁰² Percepatan Hilirisasi Nasional, Pemerintah Siap Jalankan 21 Proyek Strategis, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 4 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/percepatan-hilirisasi-nasional-pemerintah-siap-jalankan-21-proyek-strategis/>

⁷⁰³ Ramadan dan Idulfitri 2025, BI Siapkan Uang Tunai Rp180,9 Triliun, Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara Dan Reformasi Birokrasi, (Jakarta) 6 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.menpan.go.id/site/berita-terkini/berita-daerah/ramadan-dan-idulfitri-2025-bi-siapkan-uang-tunai-rp180-9-triliun>

⁷⁰⁴ Indonesia dan Viet Nam Sepakati Kemitraan Strategis Komprehensif, Perkuat Kerja Sama di Berbagai Sektor, Kementerian Sekretariat Negara, (Jakarta) 10 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/indonesia_dan_viet_nam_sepakati_kemitraan_strategis_komprehensif_perkuat_kerja_sama_di_berbagai_sektor

On 10 March 2025, President Prabowo announced plans to construct a one-million-barrel oil refinery as part of the national downstreaming strategy.⁷⁰⁵ This investment enhances energy independence and reduces reliance on imported fuels. It supports long-term industrial transformation and infrastructure-led economic recovery.

On 12 March 2025, Minister of Communications and Digital Meutya Viada Hafid and Minister of Investment and Downstream Rosan Perkasa Roeslani announced targeted investments to accelerate 5G deployment, aiming for 100 megabits per second nationwide by 2029.⁷⁰⁶ This initiative integrates digital infrastructure into national development planning. It supports inclusive recovery by expanding broadband access and digital equity.

On 17 March 2025, Deputy Minister of Housing and Settlement Areas Fahri Hamzah advanced the 3 Million Homes Program by preparing land for over 150,000 housing units.⁷⁰⁷ This intervention reflects state-led investment in urban infrastructure and social housing. It supports inclusive recovery by addressing housing deficits in low- and middle-income segments.

On 17 March 2025, President Prabowo visited a national mining facility, highlighting Indonesia's new industrial agenda focused on domestic processing of mineral resources.⁷⁰⁸ The move supports industrial policy reform and green industrialization. It reinforces long-term structural transformation and economic diversification.

On 18 March 2025, the Ministry of Investment signed an agreement with the Tools for Humanity Corporation (TFH) to boost digital sector investment in Indonesia.⁷⁰⁹ The Government of Indonesia's partnership with TFH aligns innovation with private capital inflows. It supports sustainable development by integrating digitalization into national investment strategies.

On 18 March 2025, the governments of Indonesia and Spain signed a bilateral financial cooperation agreement aimed at advancing shared economic growth.⁷¹⁰ The agreement underscores Indonesia's commitment to international macroeconomic coordination. It supports regional development through expanded capital flows and trade finance.

⁷⁰⁵ Percepat Hilirisasi, Pemerintah Akan Bangun Refinery 1 Juta Barrel, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 10 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/percepat-hilirisasi-pemerintah-akan-bangun-refinery-1-juta-barrel/>

⁷⁰⁶ Investasi Digital Dorong Akselerasi 5G, Indonesia Targetkan 100 Mbps di 2029, Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital, (Jakarta) 12 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.komdigi.go.id/berita/siaran-pers/detail/investasi-digital-dorong-akselerasi-5g-indonesia-targetkan-100-mbps-di-2029>

⁷⁰⁷ Kementerian PKP - Perum Perumnas Genjot Program 3 Juta Rumah, Siapkan Lahan 1.575 Ha untuk 150.152 Unit Hunian, PUBLIK KEMENTERIAN PERUMAHAN DAN KAWASAN PERMUKIMAN, (Jakarta) 17 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://pkp.go.id/berita/detail/kementerian-pkp-perum-perumnas-genjot-program-3-juta-rumah-siapkan-lahan-1575-ha-untuk-150152-unit-hunian>

⁷⁰⁸ Era Baru Industri Tambang, Presiden Prabowo Tinjau Produksi Logam Mulia di PTFI, Kementerian Sekretariat Negara, (Jakarta) 17 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025.

https://www.setneg.go.id/baca/index/era_baru_industri_tambang_presiden_prabowo_tinjau_produksi_logam_mulia_di_ptfi

⁷⁰⁹ Kementerian Investasi dan Tools for Humanity Sepakat Dorong Investasi di Sektor Digital Indonesia, Kementerian Investasi dan Hilirisasi/Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal, (Jakarta) 18 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.bkpm.go.id/en/info/press-release/kementerian-investasi-dan-tools-for-humanity-sepakat-dorong-investasi-di-sektor-digital-indonesia>

⁷¹⁰ Indonesia dan Spanyol Perkuat Kerja Sama Keuangan Bilateral untuk Pertumbuhan Ekonomi, Kementerian Luar Negeri, (Jakarta) 18 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.kemlu.go.id/berita/indonesia-dan-spanyol-perkuat-kerja-sama-keuangan-bilateral-untuk-pertumbuhan-ekonomi?type=publication>

On 20 March 2025, President Prabowo inaugurated the Batang Industriopolis Special Economic Zone, aimed at driving industrialization and downstream activity.⁷¹¹ This project supports spatial economic planning and industrial clustering. It promotes inclusive development by creating employment in high-growth regions.

On 25 March 2025, Indonesia officially joined the New Development Bank.⁷¹² This milestone reinforces its commitment to BRICS-led financial multilateralism. It supports macroeconomic coordination and infrastructure-led recovery by expanding access to development finance.

On 9 April 2025, the governments of Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates signed eight memoranda of understanding and letters of intent to enhance economic ties.⁷¹³ These agreements reflect Indonesia's strategy of bilateral engagement to mobilize investment. They support macroeconomic cooperation and regional integration.

On 11 April 2025, President Prabowo and Turkish President Erdoğan agreed on concrete steps to strengthen Indonesia-Türkiye bilateral relations.⁷¹⁴ This diplomatic initiative enhances South-South economic cooperation. It supports inclusive recovery by deepening trade, technology and defense collaboration.

On 15 April 2025, Minister of Public Works Dody Hanggodo emphasized the expansion of irrigation infrastructure in East Java to achieve food self-sufficiency.⁷¹⁵ This investment in agricultural resilience enhances rural productivity and water governance. It supports inclusive development through food security and regional modernization.

On 15 April 2025, the governments of Indonesia and Russia reopened high-level strategic dialogue to discuss economic and diplomatic cooperation.⁷¹⁶ The engagement reflects Indonesia's active participation in multipolar global governance. It strengthens macroeconomic alignment with other BRICS members.

On 16 April 2025, the government of Indonesia signed an agricultural cooperation agreement with Jordan, witnessed by President Prabowo and King Abdullah II.⁷¹⁷ This initiative reflects diplomatic commitment to global food security and agri-innovation. It supports inclusive recovery through knowledge exchange and market diversification.

⁷¹¹ Presiden Prabowo Resmikan KEK Industriopolis Batang, Wujudkan Industrialisasi dan Hilirisasi untuk Bangun Ekonomi Nasional, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 20 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/presiden-prabowo-resmikan-kek-industriopolis-batang-wujudkan-industrialisasi-dan-hilirisasi-untuk-bangun-ekonomi-nasional/>

⁷¹² Indonesia Resmi Gabung NDB, Presiden Prabowo: Langkah Strategis untuk Percepatan Transformasi Nasional, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 25 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/indonesia-resmi-gabung-ndb-presiden-prabowo-langkah-strategis-untuk-percepatan-transformasi-nasional/>

⁷¹³ Pemerintah Indonesia dan Persatuan Emirat Arab Sepakati 8 MOU dan LOI, Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 9 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/pemerintah-indonesia-dan-persatuan-emirat-arab-sepakati-8-mou-dan-loi/>

⁷¹⁴ Presiden Prabowo dan Presiden Erdoğan Sepakati Langkah Konkret Perkuat Hubungan Bilateral, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 11 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/presiden-prabowo-dan-presiden-erdogan-sepakati-langkah-konkret-perkuat-hubungan-bilateral/>

⁷¹⁵ Menteri Dody Encourages Irrigation Infrastructure to Achieve Food Self-Sufficiency in East Java, Kementerian Pekerjaan Umum, (Jakarta) 15 April 2025. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://pu.go.id/berita/Minister-Dody-Encourages-Irrigation-Infrastructure-to-Achieve-Food-Self-Sufficiency-in-East-Java>

⁷¹⁶ Indonesia-Rusia Dorong Kembali Dialog Tingkat Tinggi, Bahas Kerja Sama Strategis, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 15 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/indonesia-rusia-dorong-kembali-dialog-tingkat-tinggi-bahas-kerja-sama-strategis/>

⁷¹⁷ Mentan Amran Tandatangani Kesepakatan Kerja Sama Pertanian Dengan Yordania, Disaksikan Presiden Prabowo dan Raja Abdullah II, Kementerian Pertanian, (Jakarta) 16 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.pertanian.go.id/index.php?show=news&act=view&id=6731>

On 17 April 2025, the Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstream Todotua Pasaribu reviewed downstream industry projects in the Palu Special Economic Zone, reaffirming the government's IDR162 trillion investment target.⁷¹⁸ This action reinforces Indonesia's industrial policy agenda. It supports sustainable development by expanding regional economic zones.

On 18 April 2025, Deputy Minister of Public Works Diana Kusumastuti presented infrastructure investment opportunities to Chinese stakeholders in Nantong and Shanghai.⁷¹⁹ This effort promotes international infrastructure finance. It strengthens macroeconomic cooperation through transnational capital mobilization.

On 28 April 2025, Indonesia proposed a “win-win solution” during trade negotiations with the United States.⁷²⁰ The proposal reflects Indonesia's stance on equitable trade reform and strategic market access. It supports macroeconomic coordination and reduced protectionism.

On 28 April 2025, President Prabowo met with the Federation of Korean Industries to discuss economic cooperation.⁷²¹ The dialogue strengthens regional economic ties and signals Indonesia's investment readiness. It supports long-term trade expansion and industrial collaboration.

On 28 April 2025, the Indonesian government reaffirmed its commitment to state-owned enterprise reform through a comprehensive evaluation of state-owned enterprise governance.⁷²² This administrative effort promotes institutional efficiency and accountability. It supports macroeconomic stability and public sector modernization.

Indonesia has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. It has demonstrated macroeconomic coordination through fiscal and industrial policy measures, such as strategic investment in downstream sectors, liquidity provision during peak consumption periods and infrastructure planning for housing and food security. Indonesia has deepened economic cooperation through high-level bilateral and multilateral engagements with Vietnam, Spain, the UAE, Türkiye, Russia and Korea, alongside accession to the New Development Bank and efforts to expand trade frameworks with the United States. Its investments in digital infrastructure, environmental restoration and regional industrial clusters further support a sustainable and inclusive recovery by integrating green development with employment generation and innovation-led growth.

Thus, Indonesia receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Saanvi Prasanth

⁷¹⁸ Kejar Target Rp162 T, Wamen Investasi Tinjau Perusahaan Hilirisasi di KEK Palu, Kementerian Investasi dan Hilirisasi, (Jakarta) 17 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.bkpm.go.id/en/info/press-release/kejar-target-rp162-t-wamen-investasi-tinjau-perusahaan-hilirisasi-di-kek-palu>

⁷¹⁹ Dorong Investasi Infrastruktur, Wamen Diana Paparkan Peluang Kerja Sama ke Delegasi Nantong dan KJRI Shanghai, Kementerian Pekerjaan Umum, (Jakarta) 18 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://pu.go.id/berita/dorong-investasi-infrastruktur-wamen-diana-paparkan-peluang-kerja-sama-ke-delegasi-nantong-dan-kjri-shanghai>

⁷²⁰ Indonesia Tawarkan Win-Win Solution dalam Perundingan Perdagangan dengan Amerika Serikat, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 28 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/indonesia-tawarkan-win-win-solution-dalam-perundingan-perdagangan-dengan-amerika-serikat/>

⁷²¹ Bertemu Presiden Prabowo, Delegasi FKI Sepakat Perkuat Kerja Sama dengan Indonesia, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 28 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.presidentri.go.id/siaran-pers/bertemu-presiden-prabowo-delegasi-fki-sepakat-perkuat-kerja-sama-dengan-indonesia/>

⁷²² Pemerintah Tegaskan Komitmen Tata Kelola BUMN Lewat Evaluasi Komprehensif, Presiden Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta) 28 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.komdigi.go.id/berita/siaran-pers/detail/investasi-digital-dorong-akselerasi-5g-indonesia-targetkan-100-mbps-di-2029>

Iran: +1

Iran has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 23 November 2024, Minister of Defense Amir Nasirzadeh announced plans to implement preferential tariffs and enhance trade ties with Venezuela during his visit.⁷²³ Minister Nasirzadeh stated that negotiations had taken place with the Venezuelan government and private companies to expand economic cooperation and enhance trade between the two countries.

On 4 December 2024, Minister of Agriculture Jihad Gholamreza Nouri Ghezleji announced plans to form joint working committees with Saudi Arabia.⁷²⁴ Minister Ghezleji stated the two countries will cooperate on green development and agricultural infrastructure.

On 8 December 2024, executive of the Conservation Agriculture Project Alireza Yazdani announced incentives in the form of grants and subsidies for farmers implementing conservation agriculture methods.⁷²⁵ The project aims to expand to four provinces severely affected by climate change throughout the year.

On 13 December 2024, head of the Tribal Affairs Organization Shayan Naderi announced the allocation of IRR10 trillion for the infrastructural development of the country's nomadic regions.⁷²⁶ Naderi stated that infrastructure projects will include creating a supply of sustainable drinking water, the construction and improvement of roads and creation of shelters for the nomadic community.

On 20 December 2024, Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Abdolnasser Hemmati met with Secretary General of the Economic Cooperation Organization Isaka Abdul Quadir Imam during the D8 Summit.⁷²⁷ The two sides discussed ways to enhance trade and investment between the eight participating countries of the D8 Summit. Minister Hemmati stated that a trade target of USD500 billion by 2030 had been set for the D8 countries.

On 22 December 2024, Deputy Minister of Petroleum Hassan Abbaszadeh emphasized the importance of the petrochemical industry as a main driver of Iran's economy.⁷²⁸ Deputy Minister Abbaszadeh announced the second phase of the Petrochemical Special Economic Zone with a focus on balanced development.

On 26 December 2024, the Foreign Investment Board approved approximately USD705 billion in foreign investment at its 287th meeting.⁷²⁹ The foreign investment projects relate to various economic sectors ranging from renewable energy, pharmaceutical, food to tourism, transportation and agriculture.

⁷²³ (Tehran) 23 November 2024. وزارت دفاع و پشتیبانی نیروهای مسلح، بازدید وزیر دفاع از فروشگاه مگاصیص در ونزوئلا و تأکید بر گسترش همکاری‌های اقتصادی (Tehran) 23 November 2024. Translation provided by Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 27 May 2025.

<https://www.irna.ir/news/85667055/%d9%88%d8%b2%db%8c%d8%b1-%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d8%a7%d8%b2-%d8%a8%d8%b1%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%87-%d8%b1%db%8c%d8%b2%db%8c-%d8%a8%d8%b1%d8%a7%db%8c-%da%af%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%b1%d8%b4-%d9%87%d9%85%da%a9%d8%a7%d8%b1%db%8c-%d9%87%d8%a7%db%8c-%d8%a7%d9%82%d8%aa%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%af%db%8c-%d8%a8%d8%a7-%d9%88%d9%86%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%a6%d9%84%d8%a7>

⁷²⁴ (Riyadh) 4 December 2024. وزارت جهاد کشاورزی، کارگروه مشترک کشاورزی ایران و عربستان تشکیل می‌شود (Riyadh) 4 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/453814>

⁷²⁵ (Tehran) 8 December 2024. وزارت جهاد کشاورزی، اعطای مشوق‌های بلاعوض برای اجرای کشاورزی حفاظتی (Tehran) 8 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 26 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/453982>

⁷²⁶ (Tehran) 13 December 2024. وزارت جهاد کشاورزی، اختصاص ۱۰ همت برای توسعه زیرساخت‌ها در مناطق عشایری کشور (Tehran) 13 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/453715>

⁷²⁷ (Tehran) 20 December 2024. وزارت امور اقتصادی و دارایی، دیدار وزیر امور اقتصاد و دارایی جمهوری اسلامی ایران با دبیر کل سازمان همکاری‌های دی‌۸ (Tehran) 20 December 2024. Translation provided by Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/454643>

⁷²⁸ (Tehran) 22 December 2024. وزارت نفت، توسعه منطقه ویژه اقتصادی پتروشیمی با تکمیل زنجیره ارزش (Tehran) 22 December 2024. Translation provided by Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/454718>

⁷²⁹ (Tehran) 26 December 2024. وزارت امور اقتصادی و دارایی، هفتصد میلیون دلار سرمایه‌گذاری خارجی تصویب شد (Tehran) 26 December 2024. Translation provided by Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/454925>

On 1 January 2025, President Masoud Pezeshkian met with members of the Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mining and Agriculture.⁷³⁰ President Pezeshkian stated that various branches of the government were working together to give the private sector a greater role in the economy. He mentioned that one of such initiatives would be transferring state-owned companies' ownership or management to the private sector.

On 4 January 2025, Deputy Minister of Energy Mohsen Tarzatab announced plans to offer incentives to investors intending to develop the renewable energy sector.⁷³¹ The incentives will facilitate the development of renewable energy power plants.

On 6 January 2025, the Central Bank of Iran approved IRR50 trillion in the form of special investment deposit certificates.⁷³² They will be given to investors and will be used to fund development projects in the agricultural sector.

On 10 January 2025, Minister Ghezal announced that Iran and Turkey will increase bilateral agricultural trade to USD5 billion over a five-year horizon.⁷³³ Minister Ghezal stressed cooperation in the field of education, agriculture and joint investment in water use, soil and technology.

On 12 January 2025, the National Development Fund (NDF) announced the formation of a special working group to review its role in eliminating energy imbalances and to assist the country's development projects.⁷³⁴ The NDF expressed its willingness to finance projects in collaboration with the private sector to remove existing energy imbalances in the country.

On 12 January 2025, CEO of the National Oil Company Hamid Boord announced 100 investment packages to be distributed to the domestic and foreign private investment sectors.⁷³⁵ The investment packages aim to increase oil and gas production in the country.

On 17 January 2025, President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with Russian President Vladimir Putin.⁷³⁶ The agreement aims to strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries. President Pezeshkian expressed Iran's commitment to expanding economic and trade ties with Russia, particularly in the maritime and port sectors.

On 23 January 2025, CEO of the National Petrochemical Company Hassan Abbaszadeh announced an investment of USD80 billion in the petrochemical industry, with USD30 billion intended for the Mahshahr region.⁷³⁷ Abbaszadeh emphasized that the investment will be used to advance the petrochemical industry.

On 25 January 2025, Deputy Minister of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Welfare Seyyed Malek Hosseini announced the formation of a special committee to tackle high unemployment in the Khuzestan province.⁷³⁸

⁷³⁰ President: Govt. determined to give private sector greater role in addressing issues, Government of Iran (Tehran) 1 January 2025. Access Date: 26 May 2025. <https://irangov.ir/detail/455427>

⁷³¹ وزارت نیرو، دولت مشوق‌های خوبی به سرمایه‌گذاران انرژی‌های تجدیدپذیر ارائه می‌دهد (Tehran) 4 January 2025. Translation provided by Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/455491>

⁷³² وزارت جهاد کشاورزی، اختصاص ۵۰ هزار میلیارد تومان به طرح‌های کشاورزی در قالب اوراق گواهی سپرده سرمایه‌گذاری خاص (Tehran) 6 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/455624>

⁷³³ غلامرضا نوری قزلبچه، افزایش تجارت کشاورزی ایران و ترکیه به ۵ میلیارد دلار طی پنج سال (Tehran) 8 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/456046>

⁷³⁴ President chairs Natl. Development Fund's meeting focused on energy imbalances, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran) 12 January 2025. Access Date: 26 May 2025. <https://president.ir/en/156707>

⁷³⁵ وزارت نفت، ارائه ۱۰۰ بسته سرمایه‌گذاری به بخش خصوصی برای افزایش تولید نفت و گاز (Tehran) 13 January 2025. Translation provided by Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/456160>

⁷³⁶ Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty 'roadmap for Iran-Russia future ties': Pezeshkian, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran) 17 January 2025. Access Date: 26 May 2025. <https://president.ir/en/156878>

⁷³⁷ وزارت نفت، سرمایه‌گذاری ۳۰ میلیارد دلاری صنعت پتروشیمی در منطقه ماهشهر (Tehran) 23 January 2025. Translation provided by Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/456852>

⁷³⁸ وزارت تعاون، کار و رفاه اجتماعی، برای ساماندهی اشتغال خوزستان کمیته ویژه تشکیل می‌دهیم (Tehran) 25 January 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/457016>

Deputy Minister Hosseini affirmed the committee's commitment to developing the province's economy, agriculture, tourism and transportation sectors to create job opportunities and reduce unemployment.

On 28 January 2025, Minister of Cooperatives, Labour and Social Welfare Ahmad Meydari announced the implementation of the Kala Barg plan with IRR150 billion during Ramadan.⁷³⁹ The Kala Barg, a food rationing electric coupon system, was distributed to around 25 million economically vulnerable individuals.

On 31 January 2025, the Central Bank announced a financing package of foreign exchange and Iranian rials for the development of renewable energy.⁷⁴⁰ The package aims to attract domestic and foreign investors in developing renewable energy facilities of the country.

On 7 February 2025, the South Khorasan Skills Consortium was formed with an investment of IRR1 trillion.⁷⁴¹ The consortium provides educational infrastructure and aims to increase employment in the province.

On 15 February 2025, Minister Ghezalfeh met with Kazakhstan's Minister of Trade and Integration Arman Shakkaliyev to discuss bilateral economic cooperation.⁷⁴² Minister Ghezalfeh emphasized strengthening bilateral relations to achieve a US3 billion trade target and plans to remove customs tariffs between the two countries to promote trade.

On 19 February 2025, Minister Ghezalfeh met with Sudan's Foreign Minister Ali Yousef Ahmed Al-Sharif to discuss bilateral economic relations.⁷⁴³ The ministers announced the plan to form a joint economic commission and expand cooperation in the fields of construction, transportation and agriculture.

On 19 February 2025, Deputy Minister of Transportation and Urban Development and Acting Director of the Ports and Maritime Organization Saeed Rasouli met with Russia's Minister of Transportation Dmitry Azbrov to discuss maritime cooperation.⁷⁴⁴ Minister Rasouli affirmed plans to increase transit through the Caspian route and facilitate trade through the unification of port tariffs.

On 22 February 2025, Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade Seyyed Mohammad Atabak announced the reduction of tariffs in trading with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).⁷⁴⁵ This will promote competition between Iranian and foreign traders while boosting trade between the two sides.

On 23 February 2025, the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development announced the start of seven investment projects and five infrastructure projects in the Shahid Beheshti port of Chabahar.⁷⁴⁶ The investment and infrastructure projects aim to enhance the port's capacity and safety and develop it into an international trade hub.

⁷³⁹ (Tehran) 28 January 2025. وزارت تعاون، کار و رفاه اجتماعی، اجرای طرح کالا برگ با ۱۵ هزار میلیارد تومان برای اقشار خاص جامعه در ماه رمضان.

Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/457206>

⁷⁴⁰ (Tehran) 31 January 2025. وزارت نیرو، ابلاغ بسته تامین مالی بانک مرکزی برای سرمایه‌گذاری در انرژی‌های تجدیدپذیر.

Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/457365>

⁷⁴¹ (Tehran) 7 February 2025. وزارت تعاون، کار و رفاه اجتماعی، کنسرسیوم مهارت خراسان جنوبی با سرمایه‌گذاری یک‌هزار میلیارد ریالی تشکیل شد.

Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/457899>

⁷⁴² (Tehran) 15 February 2025. وزارت جهاد کشاورزی، حذف تعرفه‌های گمرکی ایران و قزاقستان.

Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/458406>

⁷⁴³ (Tehran) 19 February 2025. وزارت جهاد کشاورزی، کمیسیون مشترک اقتصادی ایران و سودان برگزار می‌شود / توسعه روابط با آفریقا در دولت چهاردهم.

Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/458702>

⁷⁴⁴ (Tehran) 19 February 2025. وزارت راه و شهرسازی، افزایش ترانزیت ترکیبی از مسیر خزر در دستور کار ایران و روسیه.

Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/458645>

⁷⁴⁵ (Tehran) 22 February 2025. سید محمد اتابک، چشم‌انداز ۱۰ میلیارد دلاری تجارت ایران با اتحادیه اوراسیا.

Translator. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://dolat.ir/detail/458849>

⁷⁴⁶ وزارت راه و شهرسازی، بهره‌برداری از ۷ پروژه سرمایه‌گذاری و آغاز عملیات اجرایی ۵ پروژه زیربنایی در بندر چابهار با اعتبار ۲۵۶۳۷ میلیارد ریال.

(Tehran) 23 February 2025. Translation provided by Microsoft Translator. Access Date: 28 May 2025.

<https://dolat.ir/detail/458860>

On 14 March 2025, Head of the Trade Promotion Organization Mohammad Ali Dehghan Dehnavi announced plans to strengthen economic cooperation with African countries and to establish a shipping line to West Africa.⁷⁴⁷ Iran aims to strengthen economic cooperation with the countries by increasing trade and encouraging greater private sector involvement.

On 24 March 2025, Minister of Energy Abbas Aliabadi announced 14 mega projects that aim to tackle Iran's energy imbalance.⁷⁴⁸ The projects support strong and sustainable economic recovery given some handle renewable and thermal energy. As well, promoting the industry to the private sector enhances macroeconomic policy coordination.

On 11 April 2025, Deputy Transport Minister Jabarali Zakeri and Head of Belarusian Railways Valery Verenich signed an agreement to expand the International North-South Transit Corridor.⁷⁴⁹ The agreement will deepen economic cooperation on the Belarus-Iran trade route through optimization of transportation tariffs to increase competitiveness and development of rail infrastructure to increase transport capacity.

On 13 April 2025, a delegation composed of the Ministry of Transport and Urban Development, Foreign Ministry's Economic Affairs Department and the South Khorasan provincial government held discussions with a delegation from Afghanistan on expanding bilateral economic cooperation, especially transport infrastructure.⁷⁵⁰ The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to develop the Khaf-Herat railway line and the Maahi Rud-Farah route and increase the national transit volume to 40 million tons per year. Iran deepens economic cooperation with Afghanistan through the development of regional transit infrastructure and the subsequent increase in trade.

On 13 April 2025, the Government of Iran announced its plans to implement 26 executive packages targeted to boost economic growth.⁷⁵¹ The packages are a strong action to enhance Iran's macroeconomic policy coordination and focus on inflation control, reducing economic inequalities, promoting economic growth, improving the standard of living and advancing economic projects.

On 21 April 2025, the Foreign Investment Board approved USD7 billion in foreign investment.⁷⁵² These investments support strong economic recovery and span multiple economic sectors such as agriculture, renewable energy, manufacturing and tourism.

On 22 April 2025, Deputy Chairman of the National Development Fund Mostafa Seyed Hashemi and Deputy for International Affairs Reza Abbaspour met with Uzbekistan's Deputy Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade Shokhrukh Gulomov and proposed a joint investment fund.⁷⁵³ The two sides agreed to deepen economic cooperation as they discussed expanding bilateral trades and using the joint investment fund to finance export-oriented and tech-based projects.

⁷⁴⁷ Iran to strengthen economic ties with Africa, launch shipping line to West Africa, Tehran Times (Tehran) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 22 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/510928/Iran-to-strengthen-economic-ties-with-Africa-launch-shipping>

⁷⁴⁸ Energy Ministry to implement 14 mega projects to tackle energy imbalance, Tehran Times (Tehran) 24 March 2025. Access Date: 22 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511170/Energy-Ministry-to-implement-14-mega-projects-to-tackle-energy>

⁷⁴⁹ Iran, Belarus sign rail pact to boost north-south transit, Tehran Times (Tehran) 11 April 2025. Access Date: 22 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511652/Iran-Belarus-sign-rail-pact-to-boost-north-south-transit>

⁷⁵⁰ Iranian delegation visits Afghanistan to advance Khaf-Herat railway, boost transit and trade, Tehran Times (Tehran) 13 April 2025. Access Date: 22 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511750/Iranian-delegation-visits-Afghanistan-to-advance-Khaf-Herat-railway>

⁷⁵¹ Iran to implement 26 economic growth packages in 2025, Tehran Times (Tehran) 13 April 2025. Access Date: 22 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511746/Iran-to-implement-26-economic-growth-packages-in-2025>

⁷⁵² Govt. approves \$7b in foreign investment, Tehran Times (Tehran) 21 April 2025. Access Date: 22 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/512103/Govt-approves-7b-in-foreign-investment>

⁷⁵³ Tehran, Tashkent eye joint investment fund to boost economic ties, Tehran Times (Tehran) 22 April 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/512147/Tehran-Tashkent-eye-joint-investment-fund-to-boost-economic>

On 27 April 2025, Chairman of the National Development Fund Mehdi Ghazanfari and Kyrgyzstan's Minister of Economy and Commerce Bakyt Sydykov signed a EUR50 million credit line agreement.⁷⁵⁴ The credit line is intended for Iranian companies of engineering and technical services to finance their projects in Kyrgyzstan. Iran enhances macroeconomic policy coordination by providing support for the private sector while deepening economic cooperation with Kyrgyzstan.

On 28 April 2025, President Masoud Pezeshkian and Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev agreed to formulate a framework to expand bilateral cooperation in industry, science, economy, security, culture and politics.⁷⁵⁵ Both countries agreed to deepen economic cooperation, suggesting improving connectivity of their financial and transportation networks and increasing trade, production and investment.

On 30 April 2025, the governments of Iran and Niger signed a cooperation agreement during the third meeting of their Joint Economic Committee at the Iran Expo 2025.⁷⁵⁶ The agreement will deepen economic cooperation between the two countries through increased trade and knowledge transfer in mining, energy, industry and technology.

On 30 April 2025, the governments of Iran and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of understanding to develop a terminal and logistics center at Shahid Rajaei Port in Iran.⁷⁵⁷ The joint project will further expand the port's commercial capacity and deepen economic cooperation between the two countries.

Iran has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. The member enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination through executive economic packages, major foreign investment approvals and support for private sector participation in international projects. It has deepened economic cooperation through multiple signed agreements with countries including BRICS partners, focused on trade infrastructure, joint investment funds and port and logistics development. Iran has also taken strong action toward realizing a strong and sustainable recovery by launching large-scale energy projects and advancing its domestic industrial strategy.

Thus, Iran receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Minji Kwak

Russia: +1

Russia has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 12 December 2024, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin chaired the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Council of Heads of Government meeting in Moscow.⁷⁵⁸ Under Russia's chairmanship, the CIS adopted the Energy Cooperation Concept, advanced the CIS Economic Development Strategy and approved a memorandum on digital transformation in the transport sector. These actions reflect macroeconomic policy coordination and deepen economic cooperation within the CIS region.

⁷⁵⁴ NDF signs €50m credit line deal with Kyrgyzstan, Tehran Times (Tehran) 27 April 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025.

<https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/512312/NDF-signs-50m-credit-line-deal-with-Kyrgyzstan>

⁷⁵⁵ Pezeshkian: Tehran, Baku agree on comprehensive plan for bilateral cooperation in various fields, President of Iran (Baku) 28 April 2025. Access Date: 18 June 2025. <https://president.ir/en/158863>

⁷⁵⁶ Iran, Niger sign joint cooperation agreement, Tehran Times (Tehran) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 22 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/512450/Iran-Niger-sign-joint-cooperation-agreement>

⁷⁵⁷ Tehran, Astana sign investment MOU for port terminal in Bandar Abbas, Tehran Times (Tehran) 30 April 2025. Access Date: 22 June 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/512451/Tehran-Astana-sign-investment-MOU-for-port-terminal-in-Bandar>

⁷⁵⁸ Meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of Government, The Russian Government (Moscow) 12 December 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2026. <http://government.ru/en/news/53702/>

On 13 December 2024, the Government of Russia launched a supranational subsidy mechanism to support joint economic projects and endorsed Customs Code amendments to streamline e-commerce logistics across the EAEU, at the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council meeting.⁷⁵⁹ The government also supported finalizing the roadmap for implementing the Eurasian Economic Path Declaration. These actions reflect macroeconomic policy coordination and deepen economic cooperation through regional integration.

On 17 December 2024, Prime Minister Mishustin chaired a strategic session on developing financial instruments and payment infrastructure.⁷⁶⁰ The government announced updates to investment account policies, launched the Financial Market Development project and introduced regulations for cryptocurrency use in foreign trade. These measures aim to increase long-term savings, strengthen domestic payment systems and support financial stability. This action reflects macroeconomic policy coordination and supports a strong and sustainable recovery.

On 17 January 2025, Prime Minister Mishustin met with Iranian President Pezeshkian ahead of Russia and Iran signing a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty.⁷⁶¹ The meeting emphasized bilateral cooperation in trade, energy, transport and education, alongside commitments to implement associated agreements. The treaty lays a long-term foundation for economic coordination and joint development projects. This action supports deepening economic cooperation and contributes to balanced and sustainable economic recovery.

On 2 February 2025, the Bank of Russia expanded the list of countries whose banks could participate in currency trading in Russia.⁷⁶² This increases the efficiency of exchange between members and fosters economic cooperation.

On 4 February 2025, Prime Minister Mishustin chaired a strategic session on implementing macroeconomic policy for sustainable growth.⁷⁶³ He emphasized close coordination with the Bank of Russia and outlined refined policy mechanisms focused on supply-side expansion, low inflation and rising investment. The session reinforced efforts to ensure stable, long-term economic growth. This action reflects macroeconomic policy coordination and supports a strong and sustainable recovery.

On 6 February 2025, the Government of Russia signed a resolution approving the rules for writing off regional debt on budget loans and outlining the permitted uses of the released funds.⁷⁶⁴ This acts as a foundation for economic growth, reflecting a coordinated effort between the federal and regional governments.

On 10 February 2025, Prime Minister Mishustin and Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin announced the launch of a new treasury infrastructure loan mechanism under the Infrastructure for Life national project.⁷⁶⁵ The initiative allocates up to RUB 1 trillion in low-interest loans to support regional housing, utilities, transport and investment projects. The approved rules include oversight mechanisms and performance-based

⁷⁵⁹ Meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, The Russian Government (Moscow) 13 December 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2026. <http://government.ru/en/news/53719/>

⁷⁶⁰ Mikhail Mishustin chaired a strategic session on developing financial instruments and the payment and financial infrastructure, The Russian Government (Moscow) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2026. <http://government.ru/en/news/53753/>

⁷⁶¹ Mikhail Mishustin's meeting with President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Masoud Pezeshkian, The Russian Government (Moscow) 17 January 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2026. <http://government.ru/en/news/53997/>

⁷⁶² Правительство расширило перечень стран, банки которых смогут участвовать в валютных торгах в России, Government of Russia (Moscow) 2 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 31 May 2025 <http://government.ru/news/54119/>

⁷⁶³ Mikhail Mishustin conducts a strategic session on implementing macroeconomic policy for sustainable growth, The Russian Government (Moscow) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2026. <http://government.ru/en/news/54134/>

⁷⁶⁴ Правительство утвердило параметры списания задолженности регионов по бюджетным кредитам Government of Russia (Moscow) 6 February 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 31 May 2025 <http://government.ru/news/54153/>

⁷⁶⁵ Meeting with deputy prime ministers on current issues, The Russian Government (Moscow) 10 February 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2026. <http://government.ru/en/news/54186/>

requirements for regional governments. This action reflects macroeconomic policy coordination and contributes to strong and balanced economic recovery through public infrastructure investment.

On 16 March 2025, First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov met the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman bin Jassim Al Thani during the 5th meeting of the Joint Russian-Qatari Commission on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation.⁷⁶⁶ The ministers discussed trade, bilateral cooperation and digital technologies and the Qatari representatives were invited to take part in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Russia also proposed a Russian-Qatari business forum later in the year. These actions emphasize the cross-border economic activity and further deepen bilateral cooperation with Qatar.

On 19 March 2025, Prime Minister Mishutin announced expanded support for Russia's border and Far Eastern regions, including new free economic zones and RUB4 billion for infrastructure upgrades.⁷⁶⁷ Measures include tax breaks, subsidized loans and funding for roads, lighting and greenhouse modernization to reduce regional disparities. These initiatives promote macroeconomic coordination and contribute to a balanced and inclusive recovery.

On 17 March 2025, Prime Minister Mishutin signed an order to allocate RUB7.7 billion to preferential lending to agricultural exporters.⁷⁶⁸ The funds subsidize loans given out to agriculture enterprises to produce agricultural products, increasing the production and export of goods and raw materials. This action reflects the trade policy of economic growth from trade.

On 21 March 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk met with senior officials from the Belarusian government to review bilateral trade and economic cooperation.⁷⁶⁹ The meeting focused on implementing Union State treaty provisions, expanding transport and port infrastructure and advancing joint import substitution and digitalization projects. These efforts reflect strong action to enhance macroeconomic coordination and deepen economic cooperation.

On 29 March 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk held several bilateral meetings notably with China and Pakistan during the Boao Forum.⁷⁷⁰ The meetings emphasized the need for increased economic cooperation, security and integration between countries.

On 14 April 2025, Prime Minister Mishutin and the deputy prime ministers discussed the Action Strategy in the Interests of Senior Citizens until 2030 and the Energy Strategy until 2050.⁷⁷¹ The former outlines steps to improve healthcare, employment and social inclusion for older citizens, while the latter aims to ensure energy security, promote technological advancement and reduce environmental impacts. Both strategies reflect long-term federal planning aligned with sustainable and inclusive economic recovery.

On 15 April 2025, First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov and Indonesian Minister Coordinating for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto held the 13th meeting of the Russian-Indonesian Joint Commission on

⁷⁶⁶ В Дохе прошло 5-е заседание Совместной Российско-Катарской комиссии по торговому, экономическому и техническому сотрудничеству, Government of Russia (Doha) 15 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54508/>

⁷⁶⁷ Government meeting, The Russian Government (Moscow), 19 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <http://government.ru/en/news/54533/>

⁷⁶⁸ Правительство направит более 7,7 млрд рублей на субсидирование программы льготного кредитования сельхозэкспортёров, Government of Russia (Moscow) 17 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54505/>

⁷⁶⁹ Alexei Overchuk's meeting with members of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, The Russian Government (Moscow), 21 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <http://government.ru/en/news/54564/>

⁷⁷⁰ Рабочий визит Алексея Оверчука в Китай, Government of Russia (Hainan Island) 15 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54631/>

⁷⁷¹ Meeting with deputy prime ministers on current issues, The Russian Government (Moscow) 14 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <http://government.ru/en/news/54750/>

Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation. The parties discussed bilateral economic cooperation in trade, investment and industry. The meeting emphasized the commitment to diversifying the two countries' trade structure. This action supports deepening economic cooperation and contributes to better trade relations and growth.⁷⁷²

On 24 April 2025, the Government of Russia approved the allocation of RUB1.3 billion to compensate rental costs for displaced residents of the Kursk Region.⁷⁷³ The funding aims to alleviate the financial burden on affected households and ensure timely support delivery through federal and regional coordination. This contributes to a more inclusive and balanced recovery by directly addressing displacement-related economic hardship.

On 24 April 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin announced the renovation of 26,000 kilometers of roads under the “Infrastructure for Life” project.⁷⁷⁴ This action aligns with the economic development and inclusion of these roads as the backbone of the network of transport and trade links.

On 24 April 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev met with Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United Arab Emirates to Russia Mohammad Ahmad Aljaber to discuss the cooperation and the creation of a group to develop ecology and environmental protection between the two countries.⁷⁷⁵ This action aligns with sustainable growth as the two countries economically cooperate.

On 29 April 2025, Prime Minister Mishustin chaired a strategic session to evaluate the implementation of Russia's domestic software transition strategy.⁷⁷⁶ The government reported progress on over 160 industrial digitalization projects and announced continued financial and regulatory support to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers. These actions contribute to economic self-sufficiency and digital transformation, aligning with broader goals of sustainable and inclusive recovery.

Russia has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. Russia advanced macroeconomic policy coordination through bilateral meetings with Qatar, Belarus, Indonesia, China, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates focused on trade, infrastructure and digital integration. It deepened economic cooperation via preferential lending to exporters, regional infrastructure investment and industrial digitalization initiatives. It contributed to strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive recovery through funding for energy and transport upgrades, support for displaced residents, programs in newly integrated regions and long-term strategies on energy and senior inclusion.

Thus, Russia receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Natalia Lisa George

⁷⁷² Денис Мантуров провёл 13-е заседание Российско-Индонезийской совместной комиссии по торгово-экономическому и техническому сотрудничеству, Government of Russia (Jakarta) 15 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate.

Access Date: 2 July 2025. <http://government.ru/news/54768/>

⁷⁷³ Government meeting, The Russian Government (Moscow) 24 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025.

<http://government.ru/en/news/54853/>

⁷⁷⁴ Марат Хуснуллин: Порядка 26 тыс. км дорог обновят по нацпроекту «Инфраструктура для жизни» в 2025 году,

Government of Russia (Moscow) 24 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 July 2025.

<http://government.ru/news/54856/>

⁷⁷⁵ Дмитрий Патрушев встретился с Послом Объединённых Арабских Эмиратов Мохаммадом Ахмадом Альджабером,

Government of Russia (Moscow) 24 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 2 July 2025.

<http://government.ru/news/54855/>

⁷⁷⁶ Mikhail Mishustin chairs strategic session on top-grade commercial industrial software, The Russian Government (Moscow) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <http://government.ru/en/news/54902/>

South Africa: +1

South Africa has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 12 November 2024, the South African National Treasury issued two new international bonds totaling USD3.5 billion.⁷⁷⁷ The successful issuance, which attracted a diverse global investor base, reinforces confidence in South Africa's macroeconomic policy framework and fiscal management. This action aligns with enhancing macroeconomic policy coordination by demonstrating effective government action to manage the national economy through international fiscal instruments.

On 19 November 2024, the governments of South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia issued a joint declaration on Digital Public Infrastructure, Artificial Intelligence and Data for Governance.⁷⁷⁸ The statement emphasizes inclusive digital transformation as a driver of growth, job creation and sustainable development, calling for open, interoperable and citizen-focused systems. It supports equitable economic development and reflects coordinated efforts to strengthen digital governance in emerging economies.

On 11 December 2024, South Africa hosted the G20 Finance and Central Bank Deputies Meeting in Johannesburg under its G20 Presidency.⁷⁷⁹ The meeting focused on macroeconomic policy issues including capital flows, development financing, debt sustainability and infrastructure development, with an emphasis on African priorities. This action supports enhancing macroeconomic policy coordination by facilitating organized collaboration among international financial actors on shared economic policy goals.

On 28 February 2025, Minister of Transport Barbara Creecy delivered a speech to the World Bank in which she announced the establishment of the National Logistics Crisis Committee (NLCC).⁷⁸⁰ The NLCC includes representatives from the Presidency, key government departments and the private sector. Its mandate involves securing strategic logistics corridors critical to export-oriented commodities such as coal and iron ore, addressing delays and congestion at major border posts and alleviating traffic along national transport routes. This action reflects ongoing efforts to strengthen economic cooperation and invest in infrastructure supporting international trade.

On 30 October 2024, Minister of Finance Enoch Godongwana, in her address to the World Bank, highlighted the outcomes of the first phase of Operation Vulindlela, underscoring the role of structural reforms in addressing economic constraints.⁷⁸¹ Key results from the initiative include a pipeline of approximately 22,500 megawatts in private sector renewable energy investments, a 50 per cent decrease in the cost of a 1.5GB data bundle and a reduction in the processing time for water use licenses from nearly one year to 90 days. These outcomes provide clear evidence of the commitment to advancing a strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

⁷⁷⁷ Treasury on issuing two new bonds in international capital markets, Government of South Africa (Cape Town) 13 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/treasury-issuing-two-new-bonds-international-capital-markets-13-nov-2024>

⁷⁷⁸ Declaration on Digital Public Infrastructure, AI and Data for Governance – Joint Communiqué from Brazil, South Africa and India, Ministry of Finance (Brasilia) 19 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-sobre-infraestrutura-publica-digital-ia-e-dados-para-governanca-2013-comunicado-conjunto-de-brasil-africa-do-sul-e-india

⁷⁷⁹ National Treasury on first Finance and Central Bank Deputies Meeting held from 11 to 12 December 2024 in Johannesburg, Government of South Africa (Cape Town) 13 December 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/national-treasury-first-finance-and-central-bank-deputies-meeting-held-11-12>

⁷⁸⁰ Minister Barbara Creecy: World Bank Driving Inclusive Growth in South Africa Report launch, South African Government (Pretoria) 28 February 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-barbara-creecy-world-bank-driving-inclusive-growth-south-africa-report>

⁷⁸¹ Minister Enoch Godongwana: 2024 Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement, South African Government (Pretoria) 30 October 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-enoch-godongwana-2024-medium-term-budget-policy-statement-30-oct-2024>

On 1 March 2025, Deputy Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition Zuko Godlimpi and Chilean Vice Minister of Trade Claudia Sanhuenza Riveros convened the 8th Joint Trade and Investment Commission to advance bilateral trade and economic cooperation.⁷⁸² The agreement outlined collaboration on decarbonization, critical minerals beneficiation, value chain development and support for MSMEs and women-led enterprises. These measures deepen economic cooperation and promote inclusive and sustainable recovery.

On 12 March 2025, Minister of Finance Godongwana presented the national budget, outlining policies to stimulate inclusive economic growth and strengthen fiscal stability.⁷⁸³ The budget introduced new infrastructure investments, structural reform measures and public-private partnership regulations aimed at improving productivity and service delivery. These efforts contribute to macroeconomic coordination and support a more sustainable and resilient recovery.

On 13 March 2025, Deputy President Shipokosa Paulus Mashatile delivered a keynote at the BizNews Conference outlining key economic and governance priorities under South Africa's Government of National Unity.⁷⁸⁴ He highlighted structural reforms, the Human Resource Development Strategy, expanded trade diplomacy and investments in industrialization, energy transition and anti-corruption. These commitments advance macroeconomic coordination, sustainable development and inclusive recovery objectives.

On 20 March 2025, Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment Dion George announced initiatives that will significantly contribute to the sustainable management of South Africa's plantations.⁷⁸⁵ These efforts will stimulate rural economic growth in surrounding communities through job creation and the protection of vital natural resources.

On 26 March 2025, the South African National Treasury published a report evaluating the international interoperability and usability of its Green Finance Taxonomy.⁷⁸⁶ The report identifies technical improvements to strengthen sustainable finance practices, facilitate cross-border investment and support climate mitigation efforts. This initiative contributes to sustainable economic recovery by reinforcing South Africa's alignment with global green finance standards.

On 28 March 2025, Minister of Human Settlements Thembu Simelane launched the National Housing Finance Corporation Emerging Developer Incubator Programme to support black-owned and designated group housing developers.⁷⁸⁷ The three-year initiative provides structured capacity building, risk mitigation and post-investment support to strengthen project delivery, enhance access to finance and promote participation in the housing value chain. By advancing inclusive growth and economic opportunity, the program contributes to South Africa's sustainable and balanced recovery objectives.

⁷⁸² Trade, Industry and Competition on South Africa and Chile Strengthening Trade and Cooperation, Government of South Africa (Pretoria) 1 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/trade-industry-and-competition-south-africa-and-chile-strengthening-trade-and>

⁷⁸³ Minister Enoch Godongwana: 2025 Budget Speech, Government of South Africa (Pretoria) 12 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-enoch-godongwana-2025-budget-speech-12-mar-2025>

⁷⁸⁴ Deputy President Mashatile: BizNews Conference Speech, Government of South Africa (Hermanus) 13 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/deputy-president-shipokosa-paulus-mashatile-biznews-conference-13-mar-2025>

⁷⁸⁵ Minister Dion George announces initiatives promoting sustainable management of South Africa's plantations, Government of South Africa. 20 March 2025. Access Date: 7 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-dion-george-announces-initiatives-promoting-sustainable-management>

⁷⁸⁶ Treasury on Assessing International Interoperability and Usability of the South African Green Finance Taxonomy Report, Government of South Africa (Pretoria) 26 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/treasury-assessing-international-interoperability-and-usability-south-african>

⁷⁸⁷ Minister Thembu Simelane: Launch of NHFC Incubation Programme, Department of Human Settlements (Pretoria) 28 March 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-thembu-simelane-launch-nhfc-incubation-programme-28-mar-2025>

On 30 March 2025, the Government of South Africa and the EU agreed to work together under the Mission Innovation.⁷⁸⁸ This included the Clean Hydrogen Mission, to offer safe and sustainable low-carbon climate resilient solutions for all towards achieving the climate neutrality goal from the Paris Agreement, as well as an agreement to continue collaboration to achieve the African Union’s goal to produce over 60 per cent of the vaccines needed in Africa.

On 3 April 2025, Deputy President Mashatile addressed the Gauteng Investment Conference, outlining current and planned economic development strategies in the province.⁷⁸⁹ The speech emphasized implementation of the Growing Gauteng Together 2030 Plan (GGT2030), the Integrated Transport Master Plan and the Township Economic Development Act to support industrial growth, reduce red tape, enhance infrastructure and expand market opportunities.

On 8 April 2025, Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition Parks Tau launched the R500 million Spaza Shop Support Fund.⁷⁹⁰ With this fund, the government is taking a concrete step to formalize and empower the informal sector and by supporting spaza shops, the fund would be enabling entrepreneurs, often women and young people, to participate fully in the economic process.

On 14 April 2025, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Ozzy Lamola concluded a working visit to the Russian Federation in which he co-chaired the 18th Session of the Joint Inter-Governmental Committee on Trade and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) alongside Russian Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Alexander Kozlov.⁷⁹¹ The 18th ITEC Session facilitated a comprehensive review of bilateral cooperation across key sectors, including trade and investment which detailed further strengthening of economic partnerships and exploring opportunities for mutual growth.

On 23 April 2025, Deputy President Mashatile addressed the Financial and Fiscal Commission’s Budget Roundtable, outlining South Africa’s fiscal strategy under the Government of National Unity.⁷⁹² He confirmed agreement on a reduced Value Added Tax increase, reaffirmed commitment to budget transparency and inclusive fiscal planning and emphasized structural reforms focused on industrialization, localization and Black economic empowerment. These macroeconomic policy directions and implementation efforts advance inclusive and sustainable growth in line with the commitment.

South Africa has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. South Africa enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination by implementing inclusive fiscal reforms, structural adjustments and increased budget transparency. It deepened economic cooperation through bilateral commissions with Chile and Russia, EU collaboration on hydrogen and vaccines and regional investment initiatives. It supported strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive recovery through green finance development, informal sector support and programs targeting rural upliftment and disadvantaged groups.

⁷⁸⁸ Declaration of the Eighth South Africa-European Union Summit, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 13 March 2025, Access Date: 7 July 2025. <https://dirco.gov.za/declaration-of-the-eighth-south-africa-european-union-summit-13-march-2025/>

⁷⁸⁹ Deputy President Shipokosa Paulus Mashatile: Gauteng Investment Conference, The Presidency (Pretoria) 3 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/deputy-president-shipokosa-paulus-mashatile-gauteng-investment-conference-03-apr-2025>

⁷⁹⁰ R500 Million Spaza Shop Fund an Investment in Grassroot Economy – Minister Tau, The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, 8 April 2025. Access Date: 7 July 2025. <https://www.thedtic.gov.za/r500-million-spaza-shop-fund-an-investment-in-grassroot-economy-minister-tau/>

⁷⁹¹ Official Statement on the conclusion of Minister Lamola’s Working Visit to the Russian Federation, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 14 April 2025. Access Date: 7 July 2025. <https://dirco.gov.za/official-statement-on-the-conclusion-of-minister-lamolas-working-visit-to-the-russian-federation/>

⁷⁹² Deputy President Paul Mashatile: Financial and Fiscal Commission 2025 Budget Roundtable, The Presidency (Cape Town) 23 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/deputy-president-paul-mashatile-financial-and-fiscal-commission-2025-budget>

Thus, South Africa receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Fiona Mengchen Wang

United Arab Emirates: +1

The United Arab Emirates has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery.

On 22 November 2024, the Ministry of Finance launched the Financial Sustainability Standards Guide for the Federal Government.⁷⁹³ The guide provides an integrated framework to support long-term financial resource stability, enhance transparency and promote sustainable development through improved public financial management.

On 9 December 2024, the Ministry of Finance announced amendments to the Corporate Tax Law, including the introduction of a Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax aligned with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Pillar Two rules and the consideration of Research and Development and high-value employment tax incentives.⁷⁹⁴ These reforms support fiscal sustainability and promote innovation, investment and economic competitiveness, thereby contributing to a balanced and sustainable economic recovery.

On 11 February 2025, the Ministry of Finance hosted three high-level panel discussions during the World Government Summit 2025 in partnership with the International Monetary Fund, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) General Secretariat and Arab Monetary Fund.⁷⁹⁵ The sessions addressed multilateral cooperation, GCC economic resilience and public-private partnerships in social infrastructure, emphasizing coordinated fiscal strategies, financial innovation and sustainable development. These discussions reflect efforts to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination and support inclusive and sustainable economic recovery.

On 13 February 2025, the UAE signed three agreements to strengthen international economic ties.⁷⁹⁶ A financial cooperation MoU with Saudi Arabia supports macro-financial policy coordination, data sharing and joint governance efforts. Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements with Eswatini and Sri Lanka establish legal safeguards to boost bilateral investment and deepen economic cooperation.

On 17 February 2025, Minister of State for Financial Affairs Mohamed bin Hadi Al Hussaini hosted the first UAE-Russia Strategic Financial Dialogue in Abu Dhabi where he emphasized the partnership's role in driving sustainable economic growth.⁷⁹⁷ The meeting aimed to boost financial and investment cooperation through discussions on budget preparation, public-private partnerships and tax coordination and highlighted the recent Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

⁷⁹³ Ministry of Finance Launches the Financial Sustainability Standards Guide for the Federal Government Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 22 November 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-launches-the-financial-sustainability-standards-guide-for-the-federal-government/>

⁷⁹⁴ Ministry of Finance Announces Amendments to the Corporate Tax Law, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 9 December 2024. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-announces-amendments-to-the-corporate-tax-law/>

⁷⁹⁵ Maktoum bin Mohammed: The Ninth Arab Fiscal Forum is a strategic platform to enhance financial and economic integration among Arab countries, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 10 February 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/maktoum-bin-mohammed-the-ninth-arab-fiscal-forum-is-a-strategic-platform-to-enhance-financial-and-economic-integration-among-arab-countries/>

⁷⁹⁶ UAE signs 3 agreements with Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Eswatini on financial cooperation and investment protection and promotion, Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 13 February 2025. Access Date: 4 June 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/uae-signs-3-agreements-with-saudi-arabia-sri-lanka-and-eswatini-on-financial-cooperation-and-investment-protection-and-promotion/>

⁷⁹⁷ UAE Hosts Strategic Financial Dialogue with Russia to Strengthen Financial and Investment Cooperation, UAE Ministry of Finance (Abu Dhabi) 17 February 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/uae-hosts-strategic-financial-dialogue-with-russia-to-strengthen-financial-and-investment-cooperation/>

On 6 March 2025, Minister of State for Foreign Trade Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi announced the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the United Arab Emirates and the Central African Republic to enhance bilateral trade and investment cooperation.⁷⁹⁸ This agreement includes a 98 per cent tariff removal for Central African goods entering the UAE and a 99.5 percent removal for UAE exports, aiming to boost non-oil trade beyond AED3.67 billion over the next five to seven years. It also expands investment access in sectors such as telecommunications, logistics, fintech and advanced technology, aligning with the UAE's strategy for economic diversification and global market reach.

On 8 April 2025, UAE President His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and the Republic of the Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in Abu Dhabi.⁷⁹⁹ The agreement aims to strengthen bilateral trade and investment by eliminating tariffs on nearly all goods within five years, increasing market access for exporting services and supporting economic diversification, with the goal of boosting non-oil trade from USD3.1 billion in 2024 to USD7.2 billion by 2032.

On 9 April 2025, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance participated in the Joint Annual Meetings of Arab Financial Institutions in Kuwait where discussions focused on strengthening Arab financial cooperation, promoting sustainable development as well as addressing fiscal and economic challenges.⁸⁰⁰ The meetings aimed to support regional growth by advancing debt and fiscal risk management strategies, promoting tools such as green bonds and social financing and fostering comprehensive Arab economic integration.

On 16 April 2025, the Ministry of Finance issued Ministerial Decision No. 88 of 2025 adopting all Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Administrative Guidance and commentary on Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules under Pillar Two.⁸⁰¹ This decision aligns the UAE's Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax framework with international standards and minimizes compliance burdens for multinational enterprises. It enhances macroeconomic policy coordination by aligning national tax policy with global fiscal frameworks and OECD best practices.

On 21 April, Minister of State for Financial Affairs Mohamed bin Hadi Al Hussaini, speaking at the 2025 Spring Meetings of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C., reaffirmed the UAE's commitment to supporting global recovery and enhancing economic governance.⁸⁰² These efforts aim to promote sustainable development by advancing innovation, investing in human capital and infrastructure and advocating for the expansion of mechanisms such as the IMF's Resilience and Sustainability Trust to address employment, youth empowerment and digital transformation.

The United Arab Emirates has fully complied with its commitment to enhance macroeconomic policy coordination, deepen economic cooperation and work to realize strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic recovery. The UAE has strengthened macroeconomic coordination through regional and international financial forums and policy reform, deepened economic cooperation with comprehensive

⁷⁹⁸ UAE, Central African Republic CEPA to Boost Trade beyond AED3.67 Billion, Emirates News Agency (Abu Dhabi), 6 March 2025. Access Date: 6 July 2025. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bij2euw-uae-central-african-republic-cepa-boost-trade>

⁷⁹⁹ UAE President, President of Republic of the Congo Witness Signing of CEPA, Emirates News Agency (Abu Dhabi) 8 April 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025. <https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bj2pq0o-uae-president-president-republic-the-congo-witness>

⁸⁰⁰ UAE Participates in Annual Joint Meetings of Arab Financial Institutions, Reaffirming Commitment to Arab Financial Development, Ministry of Finance (Kuwait) 09 April 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/uae-participates-in-annual-joint-meetings-of-arab-financial-institutions-reaffirming-commitment-to-arab-financial-development/>

⁸⁰¹ Ministry of Finance Announces the Issuance of Ministerial Decision Adopting OECD Guidance and Commentary of Global Minimum Tax Rules, Ministry of Finance (Kuwait) 16 April 2025. Access Date: 12 July 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/ministry-of-finance-announces-the-issuance-of-ministerial-decision-adopting-oecd-guidance-and-commentary-on-global-minimum-tax-rules/>

⁸⁰² UAE Concludes Participation in 2025 Spring Meetings of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, Ministry of Finance (Washington, D.C.) 26 April 2025. Access Date: 5 July 2025. <https://mof.gov.ae/uae-concludes-participation-in-2025-spring-meetings-of-the-world-bank-group-and-the-international-monetary-fund/>

partnership agreements and supported sustainable recovery by promoting diversification, green finance and development initiatives.

Thus, the United Arab Emirates receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Hal Glover

7. Climate Change: Removal and Reduction of Greenhouse Gases

“We will strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).”

XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil		0	
China		0	
Egypt		0	
Ethiopia		0	
India		0	
Indonesia	-1		
Iran	-1		
Russia	-1		
South Africa		0	
United Arab Emirates		0	
Average		-0.30 (35%)	

Background

Climate change has been a key commitment of BRICS leaders since the 2009 Yekaterinburg Summit.⁸⁰³ Greenhouse gases (GHGs) were first recognized as a hindrance to combatting the immediate causes and effects of climate change at the 2016 Goa Summit.⁸⁰⁴ Since then, BRICS leaders have made commitments on the removal and reduction of these harmful substances in congruence with environmental and economic commitments as they define it. Nonetheless, GHGs remain a prevalent issue according to the United Nations Environment Programme, which indicated that in 2024, 43 per cent of GHG emissions still needed to be reduced to limit global warming to 1.5°C, the point at which many lower-lying regions will experience potentially irreversible climate damages, such as total inundation of villages, towns and cities.⁸⁰⁵ Thus, the commitment of BRICS leaders to addressing GHGs is crucial for advancing climate resilience and sustainability, including in BRICS countries themselves.

At the 2009 Yekaterinburg Summit, BRICS leaders committed to addressing climate change through the “principle of common but differentiated responsibility.”⁸⁰⁶ The principle accounts for the socioeconomic status of countries to determine their contributions to the development of stable and sustainable energy resources.

At the 2010 Brasilia Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the development of sustainable energy sources to address climate change, emphasizing increasing renewable energy and “efficient fossil fuel usage.”⁸⁰⁷ BRICS leaders also committed to upholding the inclusive, transparent and equitable responsibilities in addressing climate change. This was established in accordance with the 16th Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol.

⁸⁰³ Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries' Leaders, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 June 2009. Access Date: 18 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html>

⁸⁰⁴ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 18 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

⁸⁰⁵ Emissions Gap Report 2024, United Nations Environmental Program (Nairobi) April 2024. Access Date: 22 May 2025.

<https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2024>

⁸⁰⁶ Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries' Leaders, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 June 2009. Access Date: 18 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html>

⁸⁰⁷ 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 April 2010.

Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html>

At the 2011 Sanya Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitments to the development of renewable energy sources and the strengthened implementation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.⁸⁰⁸ BRICS leaders also committed to strengthened cooperation towards “adapting our economy and society to climate change.”

At the 2012 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the development of renewable energy sources.⁸⁰⁹ BRICS leaders also committed to addressing climate change whilst encouraging economic potential through sustainable and inclusive growth.

At the 2013 Durban Summit, BRICS leaders committed to expanding upon the resolutions made at COP 18 through the development of a protocol, legal instrument or another measure enacted with legal force in order to reach a conclusion by 2015.⁸¹⁰

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders committed to expound on climate change solutions developed by the UNFCCC, aiming to reach a conclusion in 2015.⁸¹¹ This reaffirms their commitment to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, as coined at the 2009 Yekaterinburg Summit.

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to building further on climate solutions in accordance with the UNFCCC.⁸¹² To do so, BRICS leaders stressed the importance of scientific knowledge, joint research and technology as a means of developing solutions for climate change.

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS leaders committed to a wider use of natural gas.⁸¹³ Considering the Paris Agreement, BRICS leaders recognized natural gas and nuclear energy as viable solutions to reduce GHG emissions in the long term.

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS leaders committed to further promote green development and low-carbon economy.⁸¹⁴ BRICS leaders reiterated the implementation of the Paris Agreement under the principles of the UNFCCC.

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the environmentally sustainable energy systems transition in adherence with the global sustainable development agenda.⁸¹⁵ This commitment entailed the diversification of energy supply sources, including renewable and low carbon energy sources in accordance with the Paris Agreement.

⁸⁰⁸ Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

⁸⁰⁹ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

⁸¹⁰ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

⁸¹¹ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

⁸¹² VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 18 May 2025. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

⁸¹³ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 18 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-goa.html>

⁸¹⁴ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

⁸¹⁵ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

At the 2019 Brasilia Summit, BRICS leaders affirmed their commitment to the replenishment of the Green Climate Fund by the end of 2019, which would exceed the initial resource mobilization, ensuring that financial contributions by donors match the ambition, needs and priorities of developing countries.⁸¹⁶

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.⁸¹⁷ Specifically, the commitment was aimed at reducing marine plastic litter through the BRICS Clean Rivers Program and acknowledging the importance of collective cooperation on the development and the adoption of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework at COP 15 to the Convention on Biological Diversity.

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation following the COP 26 and the 15th COP to the Conference on Biological Diversity.⁸¹⁸ Additionally, BRICS leaders committed to the adoption of a holistic and multidimensional approach to climate change by calling the Annex II countries to financially and technologically support developing countries to ensure balanced and widespread implementation.

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS leaders committed to opposing green trade barriers and reaffirm their commitment to enhancing global coordination, with emphasis that all measures taken to combat climate change and biodiversity must adhere to the World Trade Organization agreements.⁸¹⁹

At the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders called for enhanced climate finance and acknowledged the need for multilateral development banks and international financial institutions to further scale up climate finance and investments.⁸²⁰ This aimed at assisting developing countries in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals pertaining to climate change and adhering to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to addressing climate change through equitable and cooperative measures, by condemning unilateral measures emphasizing the need for enhanced cooperation on solutions and technologies aimed at reducing GHGs.⁸²¹

Commitment Features

This commitment highlights two key elements: first, advancing collaborative efforts to reduce GHG emissions through actions such as low-carbon technologies, renewable energy and improved energy efficiency; and second, supporting the development and deployment of solutions that remove existing GHGs from the atmosphere, such as reforestation, carbon capture and storage and direct air capture. By emphasizing both mitigation and removal, the commitment underscores the importance of coordinated international action in addressing climate change.

The overarching welfare target is to combat climate change through cooperating on two instruments of 1) non-technological solutions and 2) technological solutions. These instruments respectively achieve the goals of 3) reducing and 4) removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. Thus there are four dimensions to achieve compliance.

⁸¹⁶ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

⁸¹⁷ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 21 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

⁸¹⁸ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 September 2021. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

⁸¹⁹ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

⁸²⁰ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

⁸²¹ Kazan Declaration: Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

Definitions and Concepts

“Strengthen” is understood to mean “to make or become stronger.” In the context of this commitment, it can be understood as referring to increasing action on prior greenhouse gas commitments and related technological initiatives.

“Cooperation” is understood to mean “the action or process of working together to the same end.” In the context of this commitment, it is understood as collective action toward the commitment, such as cooperation in regional or international forums.

“Greenhouse Gases (GHGs)” is understood to mean “gases which exist in Earth’s atmosphere and trap the sun’s radiation, producing heat and allowing for life.” These gases include water vapour, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and ozone, and are released into the atmosphere as a result of various human activities. They are the broader group of gases as a target of reduction and elimination or specific gases within this category which are being targeted by specific solutions or technologies.

“Solution” is understood to mean “an action or process of solving a problem.”⁸²² In the context of this commitment, it refers to actions to reduce or remove GHG that are not technological, such as protecting natural carbon sinks like forests or peatlands.

“Technologies” is understood to mean “capabilities given by the practical application of knowledge in a particular area.” In the context of this commitment, it refers to technological approaches and methods aimed at the biological, chemical or engineered removal of greenhouse gases by recapturing already-emitted greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and ocean.

“Reduction” is understood to mean “the act or process of reducing: the state of being reduced.”⁸²³

“Removal” is understood to mean “the act or process of removing: the fact of being removed.”⁸²⁴

“Range” is understood to mean “the space or extent included, covered, or used”⁸²⁵ or the “scope”⁸²⁶. In the context of this commitment, “range” means a variety of different types of actions across multiple categories including legislation, policy, financing, and international cooperation that together comprehensively address each of the four dimensions.

General Interpretive Guidelines

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to BRICS members that take several (i.e. a “whole range” of 4 dimensions) strong actions that address all four dimensions. Strong actions, both technological and non-technological, for reducing emissions, can include legislation, policies, financing and international cooperation on energy efficiency, low-carbon technologies, carbon capture and storage, clean and renewable energy, and transitioning away from fossil fuels. Actions, both technological and non-technological, for removing existing GHGs from the atmosphere can include may include legislation, policies, financing and international cooperation towards direct air capture, afforestation and reforestation, soil carbon sequestration, ocean-based carbon removal, and similar nature-based or technological carbon removal strategies.

⁸²² Solution, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/solution>

⁸²³ Reduction, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduction>

⁸²⁴ Removal, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 24 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/removal>

⁸²⁵ Range, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/range>

⁸²⁶ Range, Merriam-Webster English Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/range>

Other examples of strong action are entering into international partnerships or technology-sharing agreements, funding or co-developing joint pilot projects on carbon capture and removal, establishing joint research and development centers, engaging in multilateral programs to scale up mitigation and removal technologies, or ratifying binding agreements that promote coordinated climate technology action, or any of these regarding non-technological based or nature-based solutions for reduction and removal of GHGs.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that take strong action in two of the four dimensions, or weak action in all four. For instance, a member may take strong steps to deploy renewable energy and support emissions reduction domestically or in limited bilateral cooperation but take minimal or no action on carbon removal, or a member may invest in reforestation or other removal techniques but fail to engage in broader international coordination on technological emissions reductions. Partial compliance may also be assigned if actions are largely domestic in nature or are not sufficiently sustained, institutionalized or cooperative, or if the member does not meet the “whole range” of solutions (such as by taking only one action on each dimension).

Weak actions include releasing statements of intent with no follow-up, attending climate-related forums without engaging in cooperative efforts, or undertaking isolated, low-impact projects with limited relevance to reduction or removal.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1, will be assigned to the BRICS members that take no action or take weak action in one or fewer of the commitment dimensions. Members will also receive a -1 if their actions contradict the goals of the commitment, such as significantly expanding fossil fuel production or blocking multilateral efforts to advance climate cooperation.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member has taken weak action on three or fewer of the dimensions to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of 1) non-technological solutions and 2) technologies in order to 3) reduce and 4) remove greenhouse gases (GHGs); or the BRICS member has taken action antithetical to the commitment.
0	The BRICS member has taken strong action on two of the four commitment dimensions or weak action in all four.
+1	The BRICS member has taken strong action on all four commitment dimensions.

*Compliance Director: Therese Angeline Reyes
Lead Analyst: Advik Kusumakar*

Brazil: 0

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

On 27 November 2024, Vice President Geraldo Alckmin presented Brazil’s updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) at the 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Baku.⁸²⁷ Brazil pledged to cut net GHG emissions by 59 to 67 per cent below 2005 levels by 2035 (which translates to a reduction of 850 million to 1.05 billion tons of carbon dioxide) and confirmed its goal of carbon neutrality by 2050. The NDC was accompanied by a National Climate Plan and Ecological Transformation Plan, including sectoral mitigation strategies and climate financing tools, further supporting Brazil’s ambition to reduce and remove GHGs.

⁸²⁷ Brazil submits its new NDC — in alignment with the Paris Agreement — to the UN Title, Secretaria de Comunicação Social (Brasília) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil-submits-its-new-ndc-2014-in-alignment-with-the-paris-agreement-2014-to-the-un>

On 13 December 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva signed Law No. 15.042/2024 establishing Brazil's first regulated carbon market.⁸²⁸ The legislation creates the Brazilian GHG Emissions Trading System, defining sectoral emissions caps, tradable quotas and credits from REDD+ projects. It allows for the inclusion of Indigenous and traditional communities as credit generators and aligns with Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, representing a major domestic tool for GHG reduction.

On 10 January 2025, Brazil's Congress passed legislation regulating offshore wind energy development.⁸²⁹ The new law enables the federal government to auction maritime areas for wind farm development, outlines licensing procedures and sets sustainability conditions. Brazil holds over 244 gigawatts (GW) in offshore wind potential and this framework facilitates large-scale clean energy expansion, directly contributing to GHG emission reduction.

On 8 February 2025, the Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) maintained its refusal to license Petrobras for oil drilling near the Amazon mouth, citing environmental risks.⁸³⁰ While President Lula expressed frustration, IBAMA's decision to uphold environmental safeguards demonstrates institutional integrity and precautionary climate policy.⁸³¹

On 14 February 2025, the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, in partnership with the Ministry of Integration and Regional Development, launched the AdaptaClima initiative to support subnational climate adaptation planning.⁸³² The program provides technical assistance and financial resources to help states and municipalities develop local adaptation strategies, enhance resilience to climate impacts and integrate climate considerations into regional planning. The initiative prioritizes vulnerable regions and complements national mitigation efforts, particularly by strengthening institutional capacity in sectors such as water management, urban development, agriculture and public health.

On 25 March 2025, Minister of Environment and Climate Change Marina Silva and Japanese Minister of Environment Keiichiro Asao signed a memorandum seeking to strengthen technical and financial cooperation to promote sustainable development in both countries.⁸³³ This Memorandum of Cooperation covers various strategic areas, notably actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and adapt to climate change, including early warning systems for combating pollution, sustainable waste management, promotion of the circular economy and coastal and offshore ecosystems management.

⁸²⁸ Presidente Lula sanciona lei que cria mercado regulado de carbono no Brasil, Planalto (Brasília) 13 December 2024.

Translation provided by Mariana Cavalca Monteiro Vieira. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2024/12/presidente-lula-sanciona-lei-que-cria-mercado-regulado-de-carbono-no-brasil>

⁸²⁹ Presidente Lula sanciona, com vetos, Lei que cria no Brasil a geração de energia elétrica renovável, por eólicas instaladas no mar territorial do país, Planalto (Brasília) 10 January 2024. Translation provided by Mariana Cavalca Monteiro Vieira. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2025/01/presidente-lula-sanciona-com-vetos-lei-que-cria-no-brasil-a-geracao-de-energia-eletrica-renovavel-por-eolicas-instaladas-no-mar-territorial-do-pais>

⁸³⁰ Técnicos do Ibama recomendam negar licença à Petrobras na Margem Equatorial, CNN Brasil (Brasília) 27 February 2025.

Translation provided by Mariana Cavalca Monteiro Vieira. Access Date: 1 June 2025.

<https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/economia/macroeconomia/tecnicos-do-ibama-recomendam-negar-licenca-a-petrobras-na-margem-equatorial/>

⁸³¹ Lula diz que combustíveis fósseis vão financiar a transição energética, Agência Brasil (Brasília) 24 February 2025. Translation provided by Mariana Cavalca Monteiro Vieira. Access Date: 2 June 2025. <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2025-02/lula-diz-que-combustiveis-fosseis-va-financiar-transicao-energetica>

⁸³² Brazil's Federal Government launches initiative to support states, municipalities in climate change adaptation, Secretaria de Comunicação Social (Brasília) 14 February 2025. Access Date: 1 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2025/02/brazil2019s-federal-government-launches-initiative-to-support-states-municipalities-in-climate-change-adaptation>

⁸³³ Brazil and Japan sign agreement to strengthen cooperation on sustainable development, Brazilian Government (Brasília) 25 March 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mma/pt-br/noticias/brasil-e-japao-firmam-acordo-para-fortalecer-cooperacao-sobre-desenvolvimento-sustentavel>

On 7 April 2025, the Brazilian Development Bank, together with commercial banking company Banco Santander, announced a BRL100 million financing deal for reforestation startup Mombak.⁸³⁴ This marked the first project backed by the BRL10 billion Climate Fund, launched in 2023. Mombak acquires degraded Amazon land and replants native forests, generating tradable carbon credits to offset emissions.

On 8 April 2025, the National Fund on Climate Change Steering Committee approved BRL11.2 billion in climate change mitigation and adaptation projects.⁸³⁵ The funding aims to support reimbursable and non-reimbursable projects dedicated to green projects across the country.

On 15 April 2025, President Lula signed a new regulation that establishes the technical and environmental parameters of energy efficiency, recyclability and safety that vehicle manufacturers and importers must follow for commercialization in Brazil starting in June 2025.⁸³⁶ The text, which regulates the Green Mobility and Innovation Program launched in June 2024, also encourages adherence to vehicle labelling programs that transparently inform consumers about the environmental and energy performance of available models.

On 16 April 2025, the Government of Brazil welcomed the approval of a new regulatory framework for the decarbonisation of international maritime transport.⁸³⁷ This legally binding agreement constitutes the first multilateral initiative to impose mandatory climate limits and burdens on a global sector of the economy. The new framework establishes carbon intensity reduction targets beginning in 2027 for ships with more than 5,000 gross registered tons, which are responsible for 85 per cent of the sector's emissions. It also introduces the application of progressive tariffs on excess emissions and the creation of a USD40 billion multilateral fund by 2030 to support the energy transition of shipping.

On 28 April 2025, the National Treasury launched the second Eco Invest Auction to fund large-scale ecosystem restoration projects.⁸³⁸ This auction, under the Green Pathway Program of Brazil's Ecological Transformation Plan, seeks to mobilize private and public capital to restore one million hectares of degraded land across the Atlantic Forest, Cerrado, Caatinga, Pampas and Pantanal biomes. By offering financial instruments with currency hedges and blended finance, Eco Invest attracts investors to land rehabilitation projects that require soil recovery, reforestation and sustainable agriculture practices.

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of GHGs. It has taken significant action to reduce GHG emissions domestically through technologies such as offshore wind power and approving funds for climate mitigation and adaptation projects. Brazil has also taken strong action domestically to reduce GHG emissions through non-technological solutions, such as the carbon market law, deforestation law, IBAMA regulations and international maritime transportation decarbonization. Brazil has also taken strong action to reduce GHG emissions, using technological and non-technological solutions, through international

⁸³⁴ Santander, BNDES back Mombak reforestation, drawing on Brazil climate fund, Reuters (São Paulo) 7 April 2025. Access Date: 10 July 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/santander-bndes-back-mombak-reforestation-drawing-brazil-climate-fund-2025-04-07/>

⁸³⁵ Climate Fund approves BRL 11.2 billion in investments for 2025, Secretaria de Comunicação Social (Brasília) 16 April 2025. Access Date: 10 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2025/04/climate-fund-approves-brl-11-2-billion-in-investments-for-2025>

⁸³⁶ Decree sets milestones for energy efficiency, recyclability and safety in the automotive industry, Brazilian Government (Brasília) 16 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/abril/decreto-estabelece-marcos-para-eficiencia-energetica-reciclabilidade-e-seguranca-na-industria-automotiva>

⁸³⁷ New regulatory framework for decarbonizing international maritime transport, Brazilian Government (Brasília) 16 April 2025. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 19 June 2025. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/novo-marco-regulatorio-sobre-descarbonizacao-do-transporte-maritimo-internacional

⁸³⁸ Federal Government announces 2nd Eco Invest Auction, focused on restoring degraded lands, Secretaria de Comunicação Social (Brasília) 29 April 2025. Access Date: 9 July 2022. <https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2025/04/federal-government-announces-2nd-eco-invest-auction-focused-on-restoring-degraded-lands>

cooperation, such as pledging emissions reductions at COP29 and signing a memorandum with Japan. However, Brazil has not taken significant action on removing GHGs domestically or through international cooperation.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Mariana Cavalca Monteiro Vieira

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

On 8 November 2024, the National People's Congress approved the country's first Energy Law, strengthening the legal framework governing China's energy sector, supporting energy security and facilitating the country's energy transition. This legislation prioritises addressing carbon emissions and aims to facilitate China's carbon peaking and neutrality targets as well as support renewable energy development and consumption through centralised and distributed systems.

On 12 December 2024, China revised its emission standard for coalbed gas, mandating the use of coalbed gas with a methane concentration higher than 8 per cent as it strives to enhance the emission control of methane. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment affirmed that the revision was driven by the urgent need to combat climate change, enabled by technological advancements.

On 26 March 2025, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment Spokesman Pei Xiaofei announced plans to extend carbon trading markets into carbon-heavy industries such as steel, cement and aluminium smelting. This aims to reduce carbon emissions in China by incentivizing corporations to low-carbon technologies, ultimately limiting economic impacts whilst encouraging sustainable business practices.

On 2 April 2025, the Ministry of Finance unveiled its CNY6 billion sovereign green bond in London, which will enable China to peak its carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.⁸³⁹ This initiative was made under the Framework for Sovereign Green Bonds, which aims to raise capital solely for environmentally sustainable projects in China while also supporting China's transition towards a low-carbon and climate-resilient economy.

On 21 April 2025, Deputy Head of the National Energy Administration He Yang announced a new phase of coal power upgrades to advance its transition toward cleaner and greener energy.⁸⁴⁰ These improvements will focus on stronger support for volatile new energy power, high resilience and lower emissions as well as peak-shaving capability. The upgrades propose four aspects of improvement, including clean and low-carbon, and aim to reduce emissions from coal-fired power while enhancing its flexibility.

China has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of GHGs. China has taken strong action domestically to reduce GHG emissions through technological solutions, such as the newly introduced coal power upgrades. China has also taken strong action domestically to reduce GHG emissions through non-technological solutions, such as approving the first Energy Law, revising emission standards and extending carbon trading markets. However, China has not taken significant action to strengthen international cooperation on reducing GHGs. Moreover, China has not taken significant action to incorporate technological and non-technological solutions in either domestic or international arenas for the removal of GHGs.

⁸³⁹ New framework on sovereign green bonds paves way for green debut on global stage, Climate Cooperation China (Beijing) 15 April 2025. Access Date: 15 July 2025. <https://climatecooperation.cn/climate/china-releases-framework-for-sovereign-green-bonds-paving-way-for-green-debut-on-global-stage/>

⁸⁴⁰ Cleaner coal to complement green wave, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 22 April 2025. Access Date: July 15 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202504/22/content_WS6807390cc6d0868f4e8f1f63.html

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Atrooba Shahid

Egypt: 0

Egypt has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

On 13 January 2025, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MoPMR) launched a human capacity-building workshop in cooperation with the EU and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁸⁴¹ This workshop aimed at energy efficiency and emissions reduction across the petroleum sector.

On 22 February 2025, the MoPMR signed a memorandum of understanding with Greece for cooperation on carbon capture, storage and utilization, during the Egypt Energy Show, marking a formal step toward low-carbon industrial partnerships.⁸⁴² The memorandum aimed to facilitate knowledge exchange between the two countries on the application of carbon capture and storage technologies. It also provided for the development of feasible economic models and technical feasibility studies into potential uses of carbon dioxide, which would support the transition into a sustainable economy.

On 8 April 2025, Deputy Prime Minister for Industrial Development and Industry and Transport Minister Kamel Al Wazir alongside French Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty Éric Lombard, signed a EUR7 billion agreement to build a plant to produce green hydrogen and green ammonia near the Ras Shoukair area.⁸⁴³ The project's total production is expected to reach 1 million tons of green ammonia annually. The agreement aims to support the country's goals in providing clean fuel for use and distribution as well as accelerate efforts to localize the green hydrogen industry in Egypt.

Egypt has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of GHGs. Egypt has taken strong action to strengthen cooperation on reducing GHG emissions through technological and non-technological solutions, such as the human-capacity building workshop with the EU, the Ras Shoukair projects and the memorandum with Greece. However, Egypt has not taken strong action to strengthen cooperation on removing GHGs, as it has only taken a single action domestically on CCS technologies.

Thus, Egypt receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Yuban Yuan

Ethiopia: 0

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

On 26 December 2024, Director General of Ethiopia's Environmental Protection Authority Lelise Neme reaffirmed Ethiopia's commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 68.8 per cent by 2030.⁸⁴⁴ To enhance these

⁸⁴¹ MoPMR Launches Energy Efficiency Training Program in Cooperation with EU, EBRD, Egypt Oil & Gas (Cairo) 13 January 2025. Access Date: 9 June 2025. <https://egyptoil-gas.com/tag/energy-efficiency/>

⁸⁴² Egypt signs MoU on carbon capture & storage with Greece, State Information Service (Cairo) 22 February 2025. Access Date: 9 June 2025. <https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/205007/Egypt-signs-MoU-on-carbon-capture-%26-storage-with-Greece>

⁸⁴³ Egypt, France sign 7-billion-euro agreement to build green hydrogen plant in Ras Shoukair, Egypt State Information Service (Cairo) 8 April 2025. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/206977/Egypt%2c-France-sign-7-billion-euro-agreement-to-build-green-hydrogen-plant-in-Ras-Shoukair?lang=en-us>

⁸⁴⁴ Environmental Protection Authority calls for collaborative action to lower GHG emissions, Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C (Addis Ababa) 26 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.fanamc.com/english/environmental-protection-authority-calls-for-collaborative-action-to-lower-ghg-emissions/>

efforts, the Authority signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with seven key sector institutions to develop a national framework for reducing, reporting and verifying greenhouse gas emissions.

On 17 January 2025, Ethiopia hosted the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Annual Development Conference in Addis Ababa.⁸⁴⁵ In this event, Ethiopia shared its achievements in the green sector, including the Green Legacy Initiative that has planted 40 billion tree seedlings, the use of renewable energy potential and mobilization of multilateral grants to advance hydropower, significant efforts to implement the National Determined Contributions and GHG emissions mitigation strategies.

On 18 February 2025, Minister of Finance Ahmed Shide and Ethiopian Electric Power signed an MoU with the African Trade Insurance Agency (ATIDI).⁸⁴⁶ This agreement establishes a framework for collaboration between Ethiopia and ATIDI and accelerates the transition to clean energy by attracting foreign investment.

On 12 March 2025, Minister of Transport and Logistics Alemu Sime approved the National Strategy for Electric Vehicles (EVs).⁸⁴⁷ This action highlights Ethiopia's commitment to replace fuel-powered vehicles with EVs to reduce GHG emissions from the domestic transport sector and promote a green economy resilient to climate change.

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of GHGs. Ethiopia has taken strong action to strengthen cooperation on non-technological solutions that contribute to the reduction of GHGs through domestic agreements, regional funding partnerships and the National Strategy for EVs, as well as weak actions through verbal reaffirmations of reduction targets. Ethiopia has also taken strong action to strengthen cooperation on non-technological solutions, such as cooperating with the UNDP on tree seedlings. However, there is no evidence of strengthening cooperation through technological or non-technological solutions for the removal of GHGs.

Thus, Ethiopia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Vera Allue

India: 0

India has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

On 19 November 2024, the Solar Energy Corporation of India under the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy signed a Memorandum of Understanding with H2Global Stiftung to establish a collaborative framework to promote green hydrogen initiatives.⁸⁴⁸ The agreement aims to enhance knowledge exchange on market-based mechanisms and foster cooperation between India and importing countries, thus advancing the global green hydrogen economy.

⁸⁴⁵ UNDP lauds Ethiopia's extraordinary achievements in green journey, Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C (Addis Ababa) 17 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.fanamc.com/english/undp-lauds-ethiopias-extraordinary-achievements-in-green-journey71575-2/>

⁸⁴⁶ Ethiopia signs MoU with ATIDI to support renewable energy projects, Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C (Addis Ababa) 18 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.fanamc.com/english/ethiopia-signs-mou-with-atidi-to-support-renewable-energy-projects/>

⁸⁴⁷ National Strategy for Electric Vehicles approved, Fana Broadcasting Corporate (Addis Ababa) 12 March 2025. Access Date: 2 July 2025. <https://www.fanamc.com/english/national-strategy-for-electric-vehicles-approved/>

⁸⁴⁸ SECI signs MoU to promote Green Hydrogen initiatives, the Government of India (New Delhi) 20 November 2024. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2075049>

On 16 January 2025, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) organized a stakeholder consultation workshop on “Financing India’s Green Transition Plan and Adaptation Needs.”⁸⁴⁹ The workshop was part of an ongoing government effort to understand India’s climate financing needs and create stakeholder awareness on the scale of mobilisation needed to accelerate investment in domestic climate resilient development. The workshop emphasized an imminent need to increase investment in climate adaptation.

On 16 April 2025, the MoEF&CC issued a draft of the GHG Emission Intensity Target Rules 2025 under India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme.⁸⁵⁰ This draft mandates that facilities in four high-emission sectors must meet GHG emission intensity targets for 2025-26 and 2026-27 through a “baseline-and-credit” system. Each year of compliance, lower intensity targets are set and facilities emitting below those targets earn carbon credits, while those who exceed targets must purchase credits or pay penalties.

India has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of GHGs. India has taken various legislative and diplomatic actions to strengthen international cooperation on reducing GHG emissions through technological and non-technological solutions, such as signing a memorandum with H2Global Stiftung. India has also taken various actions domestically to reduce GHG emissions, such as through stakeholder workshops and the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme. However, there has not been substantial or quantifiable action in removing GHGs through technological or non-technological solutions.

Thus, India receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Catherine Wu

Indonesia: -1

Indonesia has not complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

On 20 January 2025, Indonesia officially launched the Indonesian Carbon Exchange platform, its first international carbon trading platform, marking a significant step toward achieving Indonesia’s ambitious climate targets.⁸⁵¹ The platform aims to ensure transparency and efficiency in domestic and international carbon unit trading as well as attract foreign investors and drive sustainable development in line with Indonesia’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) commitments.

On 17 March 2025, the Ministry of Industry announced its aim to lead nine industry sub-sectors to partake in carbon trading activities beginning in 2027.⁸⁵² The Ministry’s Head of the Industrial Services Policy Standardization Agency Andi Rizaldi emphasized collecting data on each subsector’s ability to generate carbon emissions for reducing the amount of emissions generated by industries by 912 million tons by 2030, as outlined in Indonesia’s Enhanced NDC document. The Ministry also highlighted Indonesia’s green energy potential (water, wind, solar heat, geothermal, sea waves and bioenergy) and promoted the implementation of eco-friendly practices to help overcome climate change.

⁸⁴⁹ Two-day Workshop on ‘Financing India’s Green Transition Plan and Adaptation Needs’ Begins in City, the Government of India (New Delhi) 16 January 2025. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2093416>

⁸⁵⁰ Climate Change India sets first-ever GHG emission intensity targets under CCTS, Down to Earth (New Delhi) 22 May 2025. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://www.downtoearth.org.in/climate-change/india-sets-first-ever-ghg-emission-intensity-targets-under-ccts>

⁸⁵¹ Indonesia launches international carbon trading platform to accelerate climate goals, TV BRICS (Moscow) 20 January 2025. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://tvbrics.com/en/news/indonesia-launches-international-carbon-trading-platform-to-accelerate-climate-goals/>

⁸⁵² Indonesia targets nine industries for carbon trading by 2027, Antara (Jakarta) 17 March 2025. Access Date: 19 June 2025. <https://en.antaranews.com/news/348777/indonesia-targets-nine-industries-for-carbon-trading-by-2027>

Indonesia has not complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of GHGs. Indonesia has taken steps to reduce GHG emissions through technological and non-technological solutions, limited to the domestic scale. Such actions include the Carbon Exchange Platform, industrial participation in carbon trading and the prospective nationwide surveying for carbon emissions. However, Indonesia has not taken strong action towards strengthening cooperation on technological or non-technological solutions for the removal of GHGs.

Thus, Indonesia receives a score of -1 .

Analyst: Catherine Wu

Iran: -1

Iran has not complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

On 26 October 2024, Iran's Department of Environment announced plans to create a national program to mitigate climate change impacts.⁸⁵³ This initiative aligns with the Seventh National Development Plan (2023–2027), which emphasizes the expansion of a green economy, low-carbon industries and enhanced adaptability to climate change.

Iran has not complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of GHGs. Iran has shown vague intent to engage with domestic partners to reduce GHG emissions through non-technological means, by promoting renewable energy and low-carbon industries in the newly announced national program for climate mitigation. However, Iran has not taken action to strengthen cooperation towards the reduction of GHGs through technological solutions or taken any action to strengthen cooperation towards the removal of GHGs.

Thus, Iran receives a score of -1 .⁸⁵⁴

Analyst: Yuhua Yan

Russia: -1

Russia has not complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

Russia has not taken any action with regards to its commitment to strengthen cooperation through technological and non-technological solutions toward the reduction or removal of GHGs, either domestically or internationally. Russia has not enacted any measures sufficient to merit partial compliance towards the goal of removing and reducing GHGs.

⁸⁵³ Climate change mitigation program on the agenda, Tehran Times (Tehran) 31 May 2025. Access Date: 26 October 2024.

<https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/513746/Iran-China-workshop-on-increasing-climate-change-resilience-underway>

⁸⁵⁴ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources:

<https://trendsresearch.org/insight/cop29-and-iran-overcoming-sanctions-fossil-fuel-dependence-and-harnessing-chinas-role-in-the-clean-energy-transition/>, <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501310533>, <https://ccpi.org/country/irn/>,

<https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/iran/policies-action/>, <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501129949>,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/18/iran-key-services-shut-as-rial-plunges-amid-energy-crisis-regional>,

<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/iran-climate-migration>, and

<https://iranprojectphoenix.org/en/2025/02/28/decarbonization-of-the-irans-economy-by-2050-countrys-blueprint-to-fight-climate-change/>

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1 .⁸⁵⁵

Analyst: Atrooba Shahid

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

On 26 October 2024, Deputy Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment Bernice Swarts participated in the 36th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in Bangkok, Thailand.⁸⁵⁶

On 25 November 2024, Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment Dion George welcomed the outcomes of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 29th Conference of the Parties that took place in Baku, Azerbaijan.⁸⁵⁷ The adoption of Articles 6.2, ensuring accounting and reporting guidance internationally towards their nationally determined contributions, and 6.4, creating a new system to trade high quality carbon credits,⁸⁵⁸ of the Paris Agreement will allow South Africa to initiate new carbon market projects which will facilitate investments in green technologies.

On 23 December 2024, Minister of Electricity and Energy Kgosientso Ramokgopa announced the eight preferred bidders for the 7th Bid Window and the 2nd Bid Window of the Battery Energy Storage Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme.⁸⁵⁹ These 16 renewable energy projects total ZAR44.2 billion in investments and will drive solar and battery development.

On 1 January 2025, President Cyril Ramaphosa enacted the Electricity Regulation Amendment Act 38 of 2024.⁸⁶⁰ This Amendment aims to reform South Africa's electricity sector, introducing a multi-market structure, streamlining licensing requirements for facilities providing electricity and encouraging the development of renewable energy.

⁸⁵⁵ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources:

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2025/04/17/russia-has-no-regard-for-climate-issues_6740314_23.html#,
<https://earth.org/warfare-now-largest-source-of-ukraines-annual-carbon-emissions-report-warns-on-third-anniversary-of-russias-invasion/>, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-claim-emissions-annexed-ukraine-regions-draws-protests-cop29-2024-11-23/>, <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/02/tackling-the-russia-ukraine-wars-environmental-damage-in-the-black-sea?lang=en>, <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2025/02/18/black-sea-oil-spill-political-aspects-of-an-environmental-disaster/>, <https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/04/russian-environmental-attacks-in-ukraine-caused-85-billion-in-damage-kyiv-estimates>, <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-federation/>, and <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/08/06/putin-signs-decree-allowing-russia-to-raise-greenhouse-gas-emissions-a90119>.

⁸⁵⁶ Deputy Minister Swarts to participate at the 36th meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the Ozone layer (MOP 36) in Bangkok, Thailand, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 26 October 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediareleases/swarts_mop36bangkok

⁸⁵⁷ South Africa welcomes COP29 outcomes as a step in the right direction, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 25 November 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediareleases/george_cop29outcomes

⁸⁵⁸ Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, United Nations Climate Change (Bonn) n.d. Access Date: 29 June 2025. <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/article6>.

⁸⁵⁹ Minister Kgosientso Ramokgopa on 8 preferred bidders under Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme and 8 preferred bidders under Battery Energy Storage Independent Power Producer Procurement P, South African Government (Pretoria) 23 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-kgosientso-ramokgopa-8-preferred-bidders-under-renewable-energy>

⁸⁶⁰ Electricity Regulation Amendment Act in force from 1 January 2025, SA Legal Academy (Johannesburg) 18 December 2024. Access Date: 28 May 2025. <https://legalacademy.co.za/news/read/electricity-regulation-amendment-act-in-force-from-1-january-2025>

On 20 January 2025, Deputy Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE) Narend Singh opened the Global Environment Facility Expanded Constituency Workshop in Johannesburg.⁸⁶¹ This four-day workshop brought together government officials, international agencies, multilateral environmental agreements, GEF implementing agencies and civil society organizations from Southern Africa to design strategies to enhance environmental initiatives and strengthen cooperation in the region.

On 7 February 2025, Minister George published South Africa's 9th National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report.⁸⁶² This report estimates the current emissions levels and trends in South Africa, which constitute a foundation for effective GHG mitigation responses.

On 12 February 2025, Minister George announced key actions to accelerate South Africa's green economy, create sustainable jobs and stimulate economic growth.⁸⁶³ These actions are focused on renewable energy, including projects involving solar, wind and hydropower, energy efficiency and circular economy initiatives. The DFFE has implemented streamlined environmental authorisation processes to accelerate project approvals.

On 25 February 2025, Minister George launched the above two key mechanisms to support South Africa's green hydrogen revolution.⁸⁶⁴ The Environmental Impact Assessment Guideline will ensure projects are planned responsibly while the South African Green Hydrogen Potential Atlas helps map promising locations for green hydrogen production.

On 27 February 2025, Minister George announced the conclusion of the first round of consultations on the Sectoral Emissions Targets.⁸⁶⁵ The feedback received will be used to assess the feasibility of the targets, ensuring they support both climate objectives and economic resilience.

On 17 March 2025, President Ramaphosa proclaimed the Climate Change Act, 2024 (Act No. 22 of 2024), setting a legal mandate for nationwide climate change response.⁸⁶⁶ This legislation reaffirms South Africa's commitment to the Paris Agreement and to reduce GHG emissions while forging a low-carbon economy that addresses the just transition and builds community resilience.

On 26 March 2025, the Cabinet of South Africa welcomed the inclusion of 800 megawatts of new generation capacity to the electrical grid in the country.⁸⁶⁷ This infrastructure project is part of the Kusile Power Station which, post completion, will contribute 4800 megawatts to the national grid. It constitutes the first power

⁸⁶¹ Deputy Minister Singh calls on Southern African countries to collaborate to strengthen environmental action through enhancing the impact of global environment facility (GEF) funded programmes, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 20 January 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025.

https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediarelease/singh_globalenvironmentfacility

⁸⁶² Minister George publishes the 9th National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 10 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.dffe.gov.za/media/george_9thnggireport

⁸⁶³ Minister George takes action to boost SA's green economy, create jobs, and drive economic growth, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 12 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025.

https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediarelease/george_actiontoboostsagreeneconomy

⁸⁶⁴ Minister George unveils groundbreaking mechanisms to drive South Africa's green hydrogen revolution, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 25 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025.

https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediarelease/george_greenhydrogenrevolution

⁸⁶⁵ Minister Dr. Dion George, DFFE progresses towards finalizing sectoral emission targets to foster economic growth and green job creation, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 27 February 2025. Access Date: 19 June 2025.

https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediarelease/george_finalizingsectoralemissiontargets

⁸⁶⁶ The Climate Commission welcomes the proclamation of the Climate Change Act, Presidential Climate Commission (Johannesburg) 17 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <https://www.climatecommission.org.za/news-and-insights/the-climate-commission-welcomes-the-proclamation-of-the-climate-change-act>

⁸⁶⁷ Statement on the Cabinet meeting of 26 March 2025, South African Government (Pretoria) 27 March 2025. Access Date: 1 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/cabinet-statements/statement-cabinet-meeting-26-march-2025-27-mar-2025>

station in Africa to utilize Wet Flue Gas Desulphurisation technology that guarantees air quality and supports the reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions.⁸⁶⁸

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of GHGs.⁸⁶⁹ South Africa has taken strong action to reduce GHGs through non-technological means by conducting public consultations on emissions reduction plans, participating in international conferences and regional forums, publishing reports on progress and promoting energy efficiency. South Africa has also taken strong action toward reducing GHGs through technological means by investing in energy projects that guarantee a clean energy transition and initiating domestic infrastructure projects that significantly contribute towards GHG reduction. However, South Africa has not taken strong action toward removing GHGs in any substantial or quantifiable way.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Vera Allue

United Arab Emirates: 0

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs).

On 28 December 2024, the UAE Cabinet enacted Resolution No. 67 of 2024, establishing the National Register for Carbon Credits (NRCC).⁸⁷⁰ This resolution mandates that entities emitting 0.5 million metric tons or more of carbon dioxide equivalent annually must register with the NRCC and implement robust monitoring, reporting and verification systems aligned with international standards such as the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change guidelines and International Organization for Standardization protocols. The NRCC facilitates the issuance and trading of carbon credits, treating them as financial instruments tradable on licensed platforms under the oversight of the Securities and Commodities Authority. This framework not only incentivizes emission reductions but also ensures compliance with the UAE's commitment to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.

On 14 January 2025, Masdar, a state-owned renewable energy company, announced a USD6 billion investment in a 5 GW solar-plus-storage project with 19 GWh battery capacity.⁸⁷¹ This action, in partnership with the UAE Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, introduces a new model of 24/7 clean power to support uninterrupted low-carbon electricity delivery. The system is set to deliver 1 GW of baseload renewable power by 2027 and marks the world's largest solar-storage hybrid plant. This large-scale infrastructure project supports energy decarbonization and is aligned with the commitment to strengthen technologies that contribute to GHG reduction.

On 16 January 2025, Masdar signed a USD15 billion agreement with the Government of the Philippines to co-develop 1 GW of renewables and storage capacity by 2030.⁸⁷² The project is scalable to 10 GW by 2035 and

⁸⁶⁸ Kusile power station: Aligning with SA's environmental goals, ESI Africa (Cape Town) 22 April 2025. Access Date: 29 July 2025. <https://www.esi-africa.com/industry-sectors/generation/kusile-power-station-aligning-with-sas-environmental-goals/>

⁸⁶⁹ Under the leadership of Minister Dr. Dion George, DFFE progresses towards finalizing sectoral emission targets to foster economic growth and green job creation, Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 27 February 2025. Access Date: 28 May 2025. https://www.dffe.gov.za/mediarelease/george_finalizingsectoralemissiontargets

⁸⁷⁰ Cabinet Resolution No. (67) of 2024 Concerning the National Register for Carbon Credits, UAE Legislation (Abu Dhabi) 10 June 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. <https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/legislations/2521>

⁸⁷¹ UAE's Masdar announces \$6 bln project to deliver reliable clean power, Reuters (Abu Dhabi) 14 January 2025. Access Date: 27 May 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/uaes-masdar-launches-facility-produce-1gw-uninterrupted-renewable-energy-2025-01-14/>

⁸⁷² Philippines, UAE's Masdar agree \$15 bln renewable energy project, Reuters (Manila) 16 January 2025. Access Date: 26 May 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/philippines-uaes-masdar-agree-15-blb-renewable-energy-project-2025-01-16/>

supports sustainable development abroad. This partnership, backed by the UAE government and aligned with the BRICS commitment to international cooperation on climate technology, contributes to GHG mitigation beyond national borders.

On 7 March 2025, Assistant Foreign Minister for Energy and Sustainability Abdulla Ahmed Balalaa met EU officials in Brussels to align efforts on renewable energy, energy efficiency, water resilience and climate adaptation.⁸⁷³ The visit reinforced partnerships, such as with the European Investment Bank, to expand clean energy infrastructure and sustainability investments.

On 22 April 2025, in a special Earth Day edition of “For Our Emirates We Plant,” Emirates Environmental Group, with government and community support, planted 1,200 mangrove saplings at Mangrove Beach, Umm Al Quwain. This brought the Emirates Environmental Group’s (EEG) total plantings to over 2.1 million trees, which have sequestered around 186,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide to date. The initiative aligns with the member’s pledge to plant 100 million mangroves by 2030 and constitutes a technological solution for emission removal.

On 29 April 2025, UAE hosted the World Bank’s Global Flaring and Methane Reduction Steering Committee Meeting.⁸⁷⁴ The UAE also pledged USD100 million in reducing Methane, a climate pollutant.

The United Arab Emirates has partially complied with its BRICS climate commitment to strengthen cooperation on a whole range of solutions and technologies that contribute to the reduction and removal of GHGs. The UAE has taken strong action to reduce GHG emissions through technological and non-technological solutions in both domestic and international arenas, including launching a national carbon credit registry, investing in large-scale renewable energy infrastructure, introducing decarbonization incentives for industry, collaborating with the EU and planting saplings. However, the UAE has only taken one action towards removes GHGs through technological solutions in the form of collaborating domestically on a reforestation initiative.

Thus, the United Arab Emirates receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Mariana Cavalca Monteiro Vieira

⁸⁷³ UAE and EU Strengthen Cooperation on Energy, Climate, and Water in Lead-Up to COP30 and 2026 UN Water Conference, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Abu Dhabi) 7 March 2025. Access Date: 9 July 2025. <https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2025/3/7/7-3-2025-uae-eu#>

⁸⁷⁴ UAE Hosts World Bank’s Global Flaring and Methane Reduction Steering Committee Meeting in Abu Dhabi (Abu Dhabi) 2 May 2025. Access Date: 14 August 2025. <https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/5/2/2-5-2025-UAE-abu-dhabi>

8. International Institutional Reforms: Support Necessary World Trade

Organization Reforms

“We reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary WTO [World Trade Organization] reform to enhance the WTO’s resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity”

XVI BRICS Summit Kazan Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil		0	
China		0	
Egypt	-1		
Ethiopia		0	
India	-1		
Indonesia	-1		
Iran	-1		
Russia	-1		
South Africa		0	
United Arab Emirates	-1		
Average		-0.60 (20%)	

Background

The World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995 and based in Geneva, has long acted as a mediator for international trade and a source of assistance for developing nations.⁸⁷⁵ At the 2024 Kazan Summit, BRICS leaders reiterated their support for a “rules-based, open, transparent, fair, predictable, inclusive, equitable, non-discriminatory, consensus-based multilateral trading system”.⁸⁷⁶ Past BRICS summits have often focused on reforming the WTO in order to ensure an equitable global trade framework, and push for the interests of developing members and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to be considered. Under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025, which seeks to promote collaboration among BRICS members towards positive economic outcomes, BRICS leaders expressed their “commitment to the rules and principles of the multilateral trading system ... as well as the avoidance of unilateralism and protectionist measures that run counter to the spirit and rules of the WTO”.⁸⁷⁷

At the 2009 Yekaterinburg Summit, BRIC leaders emphasised the vital role of international trade and foreign direct investment in supporting global economic recovery.⁸⁷⁸ They called for collective efforts to improve the international trade and investment environment and urged the international community to uphold the stability of the multilateral trading system. The leaders also highlighted the importance of resisting trade protectionism and advancing comprehensive and balanced outcomes under the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Agenda.

At the 2010 Brasília Summit, BRIC leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a rules-based multilateral trading system as an essential component for maintaining fairness, openness and predictability in international

⁸⁷⁵ WTO in brief, World Trade Organization (Geneva) 2018. Access Date: 22 May 2025.

https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr_e.htm

⁸⁷⁶ XVI BRICS Summit, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 22 May 2025.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

⁸⁷⁷ Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) November 2020. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/2020-strategy.html>

⁸⁷⁸ Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 June 2009. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html>

commerce.⁸⁷⁹ They pledged to oppose protectionist measures, including disguised restrictions, and encouraged other states to do likewise. The leaders called for the successful conclusion of the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks through a balanced and inclusive agreement that upholds its development focus and reflects progress achieved to date. They also expressed firm backing for Russia's efforts to join the WTO.

At the 2012 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders welcomed Russia's accession to the WTO, viewing it as a step towards enhancing the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the multilateral trading system.⁸⁸⁰ They reiterated their shared commitment to defending the integrity of the rules-based trade framework and emphasised the importance of collective efforts to preserve its stability. The leaders also called on the international community to reject both overt protectionist policies and indirect barriers that hinder global trade.

At the 2013 Durban Summit, BRICS leaders reiterated their endorsement of a multilateral trading system governed by principles of openness, transparency and predictability.⁸⁸¹ They reaffirmed their commitment to advancing the Doha Round negotiations, grounded in the progress achieved thus far and aligned with its development-oriented mandate. The leaders stressed that any new ideas or negotiating strategies must uphold the foundational values of the Doha Round and serve its developmental objectives. They also expressed hope that the upcoming Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali would produce tangible and equitable outcomes that reflect the priorities of the world's most vulnerable economies.

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders reiterated their commitment to ensuring equity, inclusivity and fairness in global economic, financial and trade governance, recognising the diverse capacities and development stages of countries.⁸⁸² They advocated for a more open and competitive global economy grounded in efficient resource distribution and the unrestricted movement of goods. Expressing appreciation for the outcomes of the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, the leaders renewed their backing of the multilateral trading system and stressed the need to finalise the Doha Round through a post-Bali work programme by the end of the year. The leaders also welcomed progress on implementing the Agreement on Trade Facilitation and called for targeted assistance to least developed and vulnerable WTO members. Emphasising the central role of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism in safeguarding the system's reliability, they pledged to deepen cooperation on its reform. Additionally, the leaders acknowledged the growing relevance of regional trade agreements, emphasising that such arrangements should reinforce the multilateral framework by remaining inclusive, transparent and non-discriminatory.

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS leaders marked the twentieth anniversary of the World Trade Organization by reaffirming their commitment to reinforcing a global trading system rooted in transparency, fairness and rules-based governance.⁸⁸³ They recognised the WTO as the central forum for setting international trade norms and expressed support for collective efforts to uphold and strengthen its institutional role. While acknowledging the growing role of bilateral, regional and plurilateral trade agreements, the leaders emphasised that such arrangements must remain transparent, inclusive and aligned with WTO principles to ensure they complement, rather than fragment, the multilateral trading system.

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their strong backing of the multilateral trading system, highlighting the WTO's central role in upholding an open, rules-based, transparent and inclusive global trade

⁸⁷⁹ 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 April 2020. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html>

⁸⁸⁰ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

⁸⁸¹ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

⁸⁸² The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

⁸⁸³ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 22 May 2025. http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

framework grounded in development priorities.⁸⁸⁴ They acknowledged the proliferation of regional, bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, but stressed that such initiatives should act as supportive mechanisms to the multilateral system rather than substitutes for it. The leaders urged negotiating parties in these arrangements to align their efforts with WTO principles, promoting transparency, inclusivity and coherence with established global trade rules.

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS leaders restated their commitment to ensuring an inclusive and transparent multilateral trading system through the WTO, which would allow for the advantages of globalization to be equally shared among all countries.⁸⁸⁵ The leaders pledged to strongly resist protectionism and to work collaboratively to strengthen and enforce current WTO rules. They also called for the Bali and Nairobi Ministerial Conference outcomes to be effectively implemented and expressed hope that the upcoming ministerial conference in Argentina would yield positive results.

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders acknowledged the importance of the WTO in upholding a rules-based and transparent multilateral international trading system and reiterated their continued commitment to pursuing inclusivity and sustainable development as part of the global economic framework.⁸⁸⁶ They expressed concern for the increased challenges that the organization faces, including the delayed selection of new Appellate Body Members and called on all members to work collaboratively to pursue solutions to these obstacles. The leaders specifically noted the centrality of the WTO Dispute Settlement System as a way to promote security and predictability and pledged to work towards incorporating the interests of developing members within the WTO's legal framework.

At the 2019 Brasília Summit, BRICS leaders reiterated their commitment to preserving and upholding the WTO as a pillar of the multilateral trading system, in order to promote a transparent, open, inclusive and rules-based international framework.⁸⁸⁷ Ahead of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference, the leaders also acknowledged the urgent need for WTO reform, which would allow the organization to protect its central values and effectively incorporate the interests of developing members and LDCs. The leaders once again stressed the importance of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and called on all members to urgently resume the selection process for new Appellate Body Members.

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, BRICS leaders restated their support for the crucial role that the WTO plays in upholding the core principles of multilateral trade and called on all members to remain opposed to unilateral and protectionist initiatives.⁸⁸⁸ The leaders noted that the majority of WTO members are developing nations and endorsed necessary reforms that would allow their interests to be included within the organization's framework. The leaders once again called on WTO members to collaboratively strive towards the restoration of the Appellate Body, in order to effectively maintain dispute settlement procedures.

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders conveyed their support for a rules-based global trading system characterized by inclusivity, transparency and multilateralism and stressed the importance of the WTO in preserving this vision.⁸⁸⁹ They also urged the realization of necessary reforms to the organization, including the rejection of protectionism and the inclusion of a wider range of interests within the WTO's agenda. The leaders

⁸⁸⁴ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

⁸⁸⁵ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

⁸⁸⁶ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

⁸⁸⁷ Brasília Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasilia.html>

⁸⁸⁸ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

⁸⁸⁹ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 September 2021. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

renewed their calls for the restoration of the WTO Dispute Settlement system and for the swift selection of Appellate Body Members.

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS leaders maintained their objective of pursuing meaningful reform of the WTO, in order to promote an open, transparent and rules-based multilateral trading system, as well as with the aim of incorporating the rights and interests of developing nations and LDCs through special and differential treatment.⁸⁹⁰ They called upon WTO members to avoid protectionist measures and urged them to pursue a resolution to the Appellate Body selection crisis. The leaders also welcomed the positive outcomes of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference and expressed hope for further progress to be made at its 13th iteration.

At the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders emphasized the WTO's role in maintaining an inclusive, predictable and fair multilateral trading system and reiterated their support for special and differential treatment towards developing members within the organization.⁸⁹¹ They repeated their calls for a resolution to the ongoing impasse within the Appellate Body selection process and urged WTO members to pursue the restoration of a functional dispute settlement mechanism. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment to support positive reforms to the WTO, with the goal of elaborating a concrete agenda in the buildup to the 13th WTO Ministerial Conference.

Commitment Features

At the 2024 Kazan Summit, leaders reiterated “the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy and promote development and inclusivity.”⁸⁹² There are therefore five criteria for WTO reform: resilience, authority, efficacy, development and inclusivity.

Definitions and Concepts

“Reiterate” refers to “commitments that have been established in the past.”⁸⁹³ While such language does not indicate a new initiative, it implies that states are expected to continue or renew efforts in the relevant area. In this context, “reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025” signals that BRICS members are upholding a previously agreed-upon commitment and are expected to continue taking actions in support of WTO reform.

“Support” refers to the “action or act of providing aid, assistance, or backing up an initiative, or entity.”⁸⁹⁴ In this context, it refers to BRICS members aiding or reinforcing efforts to advance WTO reforms. Such support may include backing reforms that take into account the interests of all members, particularly developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs).⁸⁹⁵

“Actions” refers to acting “in order to get a particular result.”⁸⁹⁶ In this context, it refers to concrete steps taken by BRICS members to achieve the objectives outlined in the commitment.

⁸⁹⁰ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

⁸⁹¹ XV BRICS Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 22 May 2025. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

⁸⁹² XVI BRICS Summit, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 October 2024. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/241023-declaration.html>

⁸⁹³ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 23 May 2025. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁸⁹⁴ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 23 May 2025. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁸⁹⁵ Joint Statement by BRICS Trade Ministers on Multilateral Trading System and the WTO Reform, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 2020. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/200723-trade-wto.pdf>

⁸⁹⁶ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 23 May 2025. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

“Inclusivity” is understood to mean “all parties are included in the discussion and decision-making process taking into account relative capabilities.”⁸⁹⁷ In this context, it refers to efforts that ensure broad participation in WTO processes, particularly by developing countries and least developed countries, so that their perspectives and capacities are considered in decision-making.

“Development” refers to “the process in which someone or something grows or changes and becomes more advanced.”⁸⁹⁸ In this context, it means advancing the economic capacities and trade opportunities of WTO members, particularly developing countries and least developed countries. Promoting development refers to BRICS members taking actions or supporting reforms that help integrate these countries more effectively into the global trading system, enabling them to benefit more fully from international trade.

“Promote” refers to supporting ongoing efforts, renewing past initiatives, or introducing new actions in a given area.⁸⁹⁹ In this context, it refers to BRICS members taking steps that advance development and inclusivity within the WTO, whether by building on existing initiatives or introducing new ones that help ensure more equitable participation and benefits for all members, particularly developing countries and LDCs.

“Efficacy” refers to the “ability of something to produce the intended result.”⁹⁰⁰ In this context, it means the WTO’s capacity to fulfill its core functions, including facilitating negotiations, resolving disputes and ensuring compliance with trade rules. Enhancing efficacy refers to BRICS members taking actions or supporting reforms that strengthen the WTO’s ability to deliver on its mandate efficiently and reliably.

“Resilience” refers to the “ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change.”⁹⁰¹ In this context, it means the WTO’s capacity to withstand external shocks such as global crises, trade disruptions, or political challenges and continue functioning effectively. Enhancing resilience refers to BRICS members taking actions or supporting reforms that strengthen the WTO’s ability to adapt to changing global conditions while maintaining stability in the multilateral trading system.

“Authority” refers to the “moral or legal right or ability to control.”⁹⁰² In this context, it means the WTO’s recognized capacity to govern international trade relations, enforce rules and resolve disputes. Enhancing authority refers to BRICS members taking actions that reinforce the WTO’s legitimacy, strengthen member compliance and support the organization’s central role in the global trading system.

General Interpretive Guidelines

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to BRICS members that take some strong action to support necessary WTO reform covering all five of the following areas: 1. resilience 2. authority 3. efficacy 4. development and, 5. inclusivity. It is not necessary for the member to take five separate actions, however, the member must take more than one strong action that enhances all five of the criteria to achieve full compliance. Strong action includes active participation in relevant WTO meetings.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that take strong action in a minimum of two of the five criteria or less than strong action in at least four of the five criteria. Less than strong action includes passive participation in relevant WTO meetings, namely attending but not actively participating. Should no publicly available evidence be found on member’s active participation, this will result in a score of

⁸⁹⁷ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 23 May 2025. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁸⁹⁸ Development, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/development>

⁸⁹⁹ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 23 May 2025. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁹⁰⁰ Efficacy, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/efficacy>

⁹⁰¹ Resilience, Merriam Webster n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resilience>

⁹⁰² Authority, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 23 May 2025. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/authority>

0. Less than strong action also includes verbal reiterations of support, unilaterally or at other fora other than the WTO.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1 , will be assigned if the BRICS member takes weaker/less than strong action in only three or fewer of the five criteria, or takes action that is directly and explicitly antithetical to the commitment, such as acting in bad faith to undermine WTO reform.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member has taken weaker action to support WTO reform in three or fewer of the five criteria for advancing World Trade Organization (WTO) reform of: 1) Resilience, 2) Authority, 3) Efficacy, 4) Development and 5) Inclusivity; or has taken action directly and explicitly antithetical to the commitment.
0	The BRICS member has taken strong action to support necessary WTO reform in at least two of, or weaker action in at least four of, the criteria for advancing WTO reform of: 1) Resilience, 2) Authority, 3) Efficacy, 4) Development and 5) Inclusivity.
+1	The BRICS member has taken strong action to support necessary WTO reform in all five of the criteria for advancing WTO reform of: 1) Resilience, 2) Authority, 3) Efficacy, 4) Development and 5) Inclusivity.

Compliance Director: Hamza Noor

Lead Analyst: Isra Omar

Brazil: 0

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance its resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

On 28 October 2024, Vice President Geraldo Alckmin stressed government agreement with the recommendations from the Business 20 (B20) group ahead of Brazil's Rio G20 Summit.⁹⁰³ The recommendations called for WTO reform within a broader framework that prioritize sustainable development and the promotion of gender equity. This action supports WTO reform within the criteria of development and inclusivity.

On 18 November 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva alongside the other leaders of the G20 issued the 2024 declaration at the summit hosted by the Brazilian government in Rio de Janeiro.⁹⁰⁴ The declaration reemphasized the importance of an inclusive and equitable global trade system with the WTO at its core and reiterated support for WTO reform to better fulfill this mandate and bring growth and prosperity to all.

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity. Across various statements, Brazil has stressed the WTO's authority as well the importance of reform in pursuing development, inclusivity and efficiency. This demonstrates weak action along four of the five criteria.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Bebram Hathi

⁹⁰³ G20: Brazilian government and business agree on WTO reform, Agência Brasil (São Paulo) 28 October 2024. Access Date: 25 June 2025. <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/economia/noticia/2024-10/g20-brazilian-government-and-business-agree-wto-reform>

⁹⁰⁴ G20 Rio de Janeiro Leaders' Declaration, Global Governance Reform Program (Toronto) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2024/241118-declaration.html>

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance its resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

On 5 November 2024, Vice Minister of Commerce Li Fei participated in the “WTO at 30 and China: History and Evolution” forum during the Hongqiao International Economic Forum in Shanghai.⁹⁰⁵ Minister Li stated that China would continue to deepen its engagement in WTO reform, particularly in safeguarding the multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. He emphasized China’s intent to support inclusive rulemaking and defend the rights of developing members.

On 18 February 2025, Ambassador Li Chenggang, China’s Permanent Representative to the WTO, addressed the WTO General Council.⁹⁰⁶ He reaffirmed China’s support for restoring a fully functional dispute settlement system by the 14th Ministerial Conference and advocated for the inclusion of the E-Commerce Agreement into the WTO framework. Li also emphasized China’s commitment to concluding the second phase of fisheries subsidy negotiations, demonstrating China’s active engagement in WTO reform and support for inclusive and resilient development.

On 21 February 2025, Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala on the sidelines of the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Johannesburg.⁹⁰⁷ During the meeting, Minister Wang reaffirmed China’s firm support for the WTO’s multilateral trading system and pledged continued backing for WTO reform efforts, particularly those aimed at supporting the Global South and advancing inclusive development.

On 11 April 2025, Ministry of Commerce Director-General Han Yong met with the WTO Chief of Staff Bright Okogun at a signing ceremony in Geneva to confirm China’s contribution of USD500,000 to support WTO-led training programs for officials from developing economies and least-developed countries.⁹⁰⁸ The funding, channelled through the WTO Global Trust Fund, will help build capacity in areas such as agriculture, services and trade facilitation, reinforcing China’s commitment to a resilient, inclusive multilateral trading system.

China has partially complied with its commitment to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO’s resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity. China has taken strong action to advocate for WTO reform that highlights authority and inclusivity such as through hosting the “WTO at 30” forum. Moreover, it has iterated verbal statements underscoring the authority of the WTO and the importance of reform to furthering resilience, efficiency, development and inclusivity. Thus, China has demonstrated strong action along two dimensions and weak actions along all five.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Bijan Davis

⁹⁰⁵ Providing more Chinese wisdom in global economic governance, China International Import Expo Bureau (Shanghai) 6 November 2024. Access Date: 30 May 2025. <https://www.ciie.org/zbh/en/Forum/NewsRelease/20241106/46530.html>

⁹⁰⁶ Statements by H.E. Ambassador LI Chenggang at the February GC Meeting, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (Geneva) 18 February 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. https://wto.mofcom.gov.cn/meetingsandstatements/art/2025/art_Obad3452d0d948da861d8738da0ab016.html

⁹⁰⁷ Wang Yi Meets with WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Geneva) 22 February 2025. Access Date: 30 May 2025. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202502/t20250222_11560551.html

⁹⁰⁸ China gives USD 500,000 to support WTO-led training programmes for developing economies, World Trade Organization (Geneva) 11 April 2025. Access Date: 13 July 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres25_e/pr975_e.htm

Egypt: -1

Egypt has not complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance its resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

On 28 January 2025, Minister of Foreign Affairs Badr Abdelatty reiterated Egypt's commitment to the WTO's development of a more multilateral, rules-based international trade system during a meeting with WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in Geneva.⁹⁰⁹ Minister Adelatty stressed his support for the preferential treatment of developing countries at the forefront of the trade agreement and Egypt's commitment to maintaining its active and constructive engagement in all WTO mechanisms to reach a consensus on the main issues under discussion, especially those related to reforming the organization's dispute settlement system, the negotiations on reforming the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and encouraging special and preferential treatment for developing countries. These statements represent support for reforms that enhances the WTO's authority and promote development and inclusivity.

Egypt has not complied with its commitment to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity. Egypt has actively met with WTO officials where it verbally reaffirmed support for reforms that enhance the WTO's authority and promote development and inclusivity. This constitutes weak action along three of the five dimensions.

Thus, Egypt receives a score of -1.⁹¹⁰

Analyst: Suneet Bains

Ethiopia: 0

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance its resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

On 5 December 2024, Minister of Trade and Regional Integration and WTO Chief Negotiator Kassahun Gofe Balami met with WTO Deputy Director-General Xiangchen Zhang on behalf of an Ethiopian delegation, reaffirming Ethiopia's strong commitment to restarting and accelerating its WTO accession.⁹¹¹ Minister Balami expressed gratitude for the assistance of the WTO Secretariat, emphasizing how this has been critical to the inclusion of Ethiopia in the WTO as a least-developed country, noting how WTO accession would support the inclusion and liberalization of acceding economies.

On 16 February 2025, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met with WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to discuss Ethiopia's WTO ascension.⁹¹² Prime Minister Ahmed and Director-General Okonjo-Iweala discussed how Ethiopia's domestic economic reforms can accelerate Ethiopia's ascension, with Director-General Okonjo-Iweala affirming the WTO's readiness to work with Ethiopia.

On 19 March 2025, Minister Balami led Ethiopia's delegation during the 5th meeting of the Working Party on the country's WTO accession.⁹¹³ Minister Balami stated that Ethiopia wishes to finalize the ascension process

⁹⁰⁹ FM: Egypt backs WTO goals, principles, State Information Services (Cairo) 28 January 2025. Access Date: 6 October 2025.

<https://us.sis.gov.eg/Story/204544/FM-Egypt-backs-WTO-goals%2C-principles?lang=en-us>

⁹¹⁰ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources: <https://www.presidency.eg/>,

<https://www.mfa.gov.eg/>, <https://us.sis.gov.eg/>, <https://www.wto.org/>, <https://sis.gov.eg/>

⁹¹¹ Ethiopia accession steering committee signals resumption of talks in early 2025, World Trade Organization (Geneva) 11 December 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/acc_11dec24_e.htm

⁹¹² DG Okonjo-Iweala meets Ethiopia's PM, Steering Committee to accelerate WTO accession, World Trade Organization (Addis Ababa) 16 February 2025. Access Date: 6 August 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news25_e/dgno_16feb25_e.htm

⁹¹³ Ethiopia resumes accession negotiations with target of WTO membership by MC14, World Trade Organization (Geneva) 19 March 2025. Access Date: 6 August 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news25_e/acc_19mar25_e.htm

in the coming months and see Ethiopia join the WTO at the 14th Ministerial Conference. Minister Balami also highlighted how Ethiopia's domestic economic reforms aimed to make Ethiopia fully compliant to WTO rules.

On 23 April 2025, Minister of Finance Ahmed Shide attended the 24th Horn of Africa Initiative ministerial meeting.⁹¹⁴ During the meeting, WTO Deputy Director-General Johanna Hill welcomed the progress in WTO ascension negotiations for Ethiopia, noting that Ethiopia's ascension meaningfully advances the WTO's goals of universality.

Ethiopia has partially complied with its commitment to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity. Ethiopia is not a member of the WTO, however its steps to join the WTO constitutes strong action in enhancing the authority of the WTO as the highest authority for global trade as well as the organization's efficacy for managing multilateral trade relations.

Thus, Ethiopia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Suneet Bains

India: -1

India has not complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance its resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

India has not complied with its commitment to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity. India has not taken substantive action with regard to this commitment.

Thus, India receives a score of -1.⁹¹⁵

Analyst: Bebram Hathi

Indonesia: -1

Indonesia has not complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance its resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

On 16 November 2024, Minister of Trade Budi Santoso reasserted Indonesia's support for WTO reform at the 35th Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum ministerial meeting.⁹¹⁶ Minister Santoso highlighted the WTO's role as a central pillar of the global trade system, the importance of reform in ensuring the WTO can better address diverse challenges and enabling developing countries to have fair and equitable access to global trade.

Indonesia has not complied with its commitment to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity. Indonesia has expressed verbal support for the WTO's authority as well as reform to advance resilience, inclusivity, efficacy and development. However, it has taken no strong or concrete actions.

⁹¹⁴ DDG Hill discusses WTO accessions at Horn of Africa Initiative ministerial meeting, World Trade Organization (Geneva) 23 April 2025. Access Date: 6 August 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news25_e/acc_29apr25_e.htm

⁹¹⁵ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources:
<https://pmindiaun.gov.in/pages/MTUOMA>, ddnews.gov.in, mea.gov.in, pib.gov.in, wto.org

⁹¹⁶ Indonesia supports WTO reform for inclusive, sustainable trade, Antara (Jakarta) 16 November 2024. Access Date: 30 June 2025. <https://en.antaranews.com/news/334653/indonesia-supports-wto-reform-for-inclusive-sustainable-trade>

Thus, Indonesia receives a score of -1 .⁹¹⁷

Analyst: Salma Somerville

Iran: -1

Iran has not complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance its resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

Iran is not a member of the WTO and has not taken any action to support WTO reform.

Thus, Iran receives a score of -1 .⁹¹⁸

Analyst: Bijan Davis

Russia: -1

Russia has not complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

On 11 November 2024, Russia hosted the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. At its conclusion, Russia issued a joint statement alongside representatives from the African Union Commission and African states.⁹¹⁹ Support was affirmed for the centrality of the WTO in the global trade system, inclusive reform and efforts to restore the efficacy of the WTO dispute system.

Russia has not complied with its commitment to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity. Russia has issued statements stressing the WTO's authority and the importance of inclusive and effective reform. This constitutes weak action along three of the five dimensions. However, it has taken no strong or concrete actions to advance reform.

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1 .⁹²⁰

Analyst: Ernest Tang

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

On 18 March 2025, South Africa hosted the first G20 Trade and Investment Working Group meeting of its presidency.⁹²¹ The agenda highlights WTO's central role in the global trade system as well as the significance

⁹¹⁷ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources: indonesia.go.id, wto.org, kemlu.go.id, ekon.go.id, thejakartapost.com, antaranews.com

⁹¹⁸ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources: wto.org, irangov.ir, mfa.gov.ir

⁹¹⁹ Joint Statement of the First Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum (Russian Federation, Sirius Federal Territory, 10 November 2024), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 11 November 2024. Access Date: 6 October 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/russia_africa/1980876/

⁹²⁰ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources: wto.org, economy.gov.ru, kremlin.ru, mid.ru

⁹²¹ South Africa Successfully Hosts First G20 Trade and Investment Working Group Meeting, Department: Trade, Industry, and Competition (Praetoria) 21 March 2025. Access Date: 2 October 2025. <https://www.thedtic.gov.za/south-africa-successfully-hosts-first-g20-trade-and-investment-working-group-meeting/>

of reform particularly in the development dimension alongside broader themes of inclusive growth, global resilience and inclusivity.

On 10 April 2025, President Cyril Ramaphosa delivered a speech on the 30th anniversary of the WTO to reaffirm the nation's support for WTO reform, particularly regarding its policies for developing countries and more inclusive trade, reinforcing the commitment to promote development and inclusivity at the WTO.⁹²²

On 24 April 2025, South Africa hosted the second G20 Trade and Investment Working Group Meeting. The meeting's agenda explicitly highlighted the importance of WTO Reform, particularly regarding its development projects for lower-income countries. South Africa, as host, played an active part in pushing for such reforms, reinforcing its commitment to promote development and inclusivity at the WTO.⁹²³

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity. South Africa has taken strong action by hosting various working group meetings targeting WTO reform along the dimensions of development, inclusivity and efficacy. Moreover, South Africa has stressed the importance of reform towards authority, resilience, efficacy, development and inclusivity.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Ernest Tang

United Arab Emirates: -1

The United Arab Emirates has not complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance its resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity.

The United Arab Emirates has not complied with its commitment to reiterate the decision under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 to take actions to support the necessary WTO reform to enhance the WTO's resilience, authority and efficacy, and promote development and inclusivity. By participating in the Second G20 Trade and Investment Working Group Meeting, the UAE has taken strong action to promote development and inclusivity within the context of WTO Reform.

Thus, the United Arab Emirates receives a score of -1.⁹²⁴

Analyst: Salma Somerville

⁹²² President Cyril Ramaphosa: 30th Anniversary of World Trade Organization, South African Government (Cape Town) 10 April 2025. Access Date: 18 July 2025. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-30th-anniversary-world-trade-organisation-10-apr-2025>

⁹²³ South Africa Hosts Second G20 Trade and Investment Working Group Meeting, G20 (South Africa) 8 May 2025. Access Date: 18 July 2025. <https://g20.org/track-news/south-africa-hosts-second-g20-trade-and-investment-working-group-meeting/>

⁹²⁴ This score of non-compliance was determined after consulting the following sources: mofa.gov.ae, moet.gov.ae, wto.org, wam.ae