



BRICS RESEARCH GROUP

2023 BRICS Johannesburg Summit Final Compliance Report

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Contents

Research Team	3
Compliance Directors	3
Group Analysts	3
Preface	4
Introduction and Summary	5
Methodology and Scoring System	5
The Breakdown of Commitments	5
Selection of Commitments	5
Compliance Scores	6
Table 1: Distribution of BRICS Commitments Across Issue Areas, 2009–2023	7
Table 2: 2023 BRICS Johannesburg Summit Priority Commitments	8
Table 3: 2023 BRICS Johannesburg Summit Final Compliance Scores	9
Table 4: BRICS Compliance Scores, 2020–2023	10
Table 5: 2023 BRICS Johannesburg Summit Final Compliance Scores by Commitment	10
1. Regional Security: Peacekeeping in Africa	11
2. Non-Proliferation: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space	23
3. Crime and Corruption: Illicit Financial Flows	37
4. Food and Agriculture: Agricultural Cooperation and Sustainable Agriculture	48
5. Development: African Union Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area	68
6. Tourism and Culture: Sustainable and Inclusive Tourism	84
7. Financial Regulation: Contingent Reserve Arrangement	90
8. Environment: Global Biodiversity Targets	96
9. Education: Mutual Recognition of Academic Qualifications	110
10. Tourism and Culture: Protection and Promotion of Cultural Heritage	122

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Preface

The BRICS Research Group has been assessing progress made by the BRICS members in implementing commitments their leaders make at each summit since the 2011 Sanya meeting. These reports monitor each member's efforts to implement a carefully chosen selection of the many commitments produced at each summit. They are offered to the general public and to policy makers, academics, civil society, the media and interested citizens around the world in an effort to make the BRICS's work more transparent, accessible and effective, and to provide scientific data to enable the meaningful analysis of the causes of compliance and the impact of this important informal international institution. Previous reports are available at the BRICS Information Centre at <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/compliance> and at the Center for International Institutions Research of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration available at <http://www.ranepa.ru/eng/ciir-ranepa/research-areas/brics/analytics>.

This current final report analyses compliance performance by BRICS countries with 10 priority commitments selected from the commitments made by the leaders at Johannesburg II Summit on 23 August 2023. The report covers actions taken by the BRICS members to implement those commitments between 24 August 2023 and 10 May 2024. The BRICS Research Group relies on publicly available information, documentation and media reports for its assessments. To ensure accuracy, comprehensiveness and integrity, we encourage comments from stakeholders. Indeed, scores can be recalibrated if new material becomes available. All feedback remains anonymous. Responsibility for the contents of this report lies exclusively with the authors and analysts of the BRICS Research Group. Please send any comments to the BRICS Research Group at brics@utoronto.ca.

John Kirton
Director, BRICS Research Group

Introduction and Summary

The 2023 BRICS Johannesburg Final Compliance Report, prepared by the BRICS Research Group (based at the University of Toronto), analyses compliance performance by BRICS countries with 10 priority commitments drawn from the total 129 commitments made by the leaders at the Johannesburg Summit, which was held on 23 August 2023.

Methodology and Scoring System

This report draws on the methodology developed by the G7 Research Group, which has been monitoring G7 compliance since 1996 and adapted for monitoring G20 performance since 2008.¹The use of this time-tested methodology provides for cross-institutional, cross-member and cross-issue consistency and thus allows compatibility and comparability of the compliance performance by different summit institutions and establishes a foundation for evidence-based assessment of the effectiveness of these institutions.²

The methodology uses a scale from -1 (0%) to +1 (100%), where +1 (50%) indicates full compliance with the stated commitment, -1 indicates a failure to comply or action taken that is directly opposite to the stated goal of the commitment, and 0 indicates partial compliance or work in progress, such as initiatives that have been launched but are not yet near completion and whose final results can therefore not be assessed.³Each member receives a score of -1, 0 or +1 for each commitment.

The Breakdown of Commitments

At the Johannesburg Summit in 2023, the BRICS leaders focused on five priorities: the African Continental Free Trade, transforming education and skills development, collaboration towards achieving a Just Transition, enhancing multilateralism and achieving the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development. The theme was “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development and Inclusive Multilateralism.” The topics discussed included strengthening the meaningful participation of women in peace processes; global governance reform; strengthening post-pandemic socio-economic recovery; addressing climate change through economic transformation of targeted industries.

Selection of Commitments

For each compliance cycle (that is, the period between summits), the research team selects commitments that reflect the breadth of the BRICS agenda and the priorities of the summit’s host, while balancing the selection to allow for comparison with past and future summits.⁴The selection also takes into account the breakdown of issue areas and the proportion of commitments in each one (see Table 1). The primary criteria for selecting a priority commitment for assessment are the comprehensiveness and relevance to the summit, the BRICS and the world. Selected commitments must meet secondary criteria such as measurability and ability to comply within a year. Tertiary criteria include significance, as identified by relevant stakeholders in the host country and scientific teams. Of the 129 commitments made at the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, the BRICS Research Group selected 10 priority commitments for its compliance assessment (see Table 2).

¹The Compliance Coding Manual is available at <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/index.html#method>.

²Informal summitry institutions are defined as international institutions with limited membership, relatively low bureaucracy and reliance on open, flexible and voluntary approaches. Regular meetings of the heads of states and governments who engage on a wide range of international, regional and domestic politics stand at the pinnacle of such international arrangements, which involve many actors operating according to established procedures on two levels: domestic and international. Commitments contained in the collectively agreed documents are not legally binding but their implementation is stimulated by peer pressure. Among such bodies engaged in global and regional governance are G7, G20, BRICS, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and others.

³The formula to convert a score into a percentage is $P=50 \times (S+1)$, where P is the percentage and S is the score.

⁴Guidelines for choosing priority commitments, as well as other applicable considerations, are available in the Compliance Coding Manual.

Compliance Scores

Compliance for the 2023 Johannesburg Summit final report is -0.20 (40%) (see Table 3).

By country, Brazil earned the highest compliance score at $+0.30$ (65%). China followed with a score of -0.10 (45%), followed by Russia with -0.30 (35%), South Africa with -0.40 (30%) and India with -0.50 (25%) (see Table 4).

By issue, the commitments on food and agriculture received the highest score, with $+0.80$ (90%). The commitment on protecting cultural heritage education earned the next highest score, with $+0.60$ (80%), followed by the commitment on mutually recognizing academic qualifications with $+0.20$ (60%). The remaining commitments achieved 0 or lower compliance, with the lowest for the commitment on peacekeeping in Africa, with -1.00 (0%) (see Table 5).

Table 1: Distribution of BRICS Commitments Across Issue Areas, 2009–2023

Issue Area	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Energy	5	9	1	2					6	2	2	3		2	3
Finance		3	1			6	6	5	9	5	1			2	3
Climate change		1	6	3	1	1	1	1	3		3	1	3	2	4
Macroeconomic policy		1	5	1	5	7	6	4	4	3	1	2	2	5	14
Trade	1	2	5	3	6	8	30	7	21	18	8	2	3	12	5
International cooperation	1	2	5	3	6	8	30	7	21	18	8	8	7	10	3
Socioeconomic	1	1	3	2		7	5	2		2					3
Development	1	5	1	3	10	4	4	2	11	6	2	3	4	21	7
Natural disasters	1	1	1											1	
Food and agriculture	3		1	1		1	17		5	3		2	1	3	4
ICT and digital economy			2			1	17	3	12	3	2	3	4	15	4
Science and education	1	1	1		2	5							1	4	6
Health			1	1		1	6	2	6	1		4	5	14	4
Human rights			1		1	2	5		2		1		3	5	4
Accountability			1												
Regional security	1		1	4	8	6	6	4	12	7	4	7	1	8	6
Terrorism			1	1	2	2	1	4	7	3	1	2	7	4	2
Culture		1				3	1	2	3			1		3	5
Sport		1													2
IFI reform	1	2	1	2	9	8	3	2	5	2	2	1	1	1	
Non-proliferation					1			1	2		1		2	7	1
Crime and corruption						4	10	3	8	6	10	3	7	7	6
Environment						1	1	1	3	3	3		2	1	7
Tourism							1			1					4
International taxation										4	5	1		2	
Space												1			
Inter-BRICS cooperation												1			19
IGO reform													4	19	3
Peace and security													1	6	2
Good governance														4	
Labour and employment														3	5
Infrastructure														1	1
Total	15	31	38	32	47	68	130	45	125	73	49	45	58	162	127

Notes: ICT = information and communication technologies; IFI = international financial institution; IGO = intergovernmental organization.

Table 2: 2023 BRICS Johannesburg Summit Priority Commitments

	Issue Area	Commitment
1	Regional Security: Peacekeeping in Africa	In this regard we support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African States.
2	Non-Proliferation: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space	We reassert our support for ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and of its weaponization, including through negotiations to adopt a relevant legally binding multilateral instrument.
3	Crime and Corruption: Illicit Financial Flows	We will enhance international cooperation through collaborative information-sharing networks, and mutual legal assistance to combat illicit financial flows.
4	Food and Agriculture: Agricultural Cooperation and Sustainable Agriculture	We also agree to promote consumer protection in e-commerce by advancing the implementation of the BRICS Framework for Consumer Protection in E-Commerce.
5	Development: African Union Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area	We reiterate our support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area.
6	Tourism and Culture: BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism	We acknowledge the urgent need for tourism industry recovery and the importance of increasing mutual tourist flows and will work towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures, which can shape a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.
7	Financial Regulation: BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement	We reiterate our commitment to the continued strengthening of the CRA [Contingent Reserve Arrangement] [and look forward to the successful completion of the sixth Test-Run later in 2023].
8	Environment: Global Biodiversity Targets	We thus undertake to strive towards the implementation of all the global goals and targets of the KMGBF [Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework], in accordance with the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and national circumstances, priorities and capabilities in order to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature.
9	Education: Mutual Recognition of Academic Qualifications	We support the principle of facilitating mutual recognition of academic qualifications amongst BRICS countries to ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students and recognition of qualifications obtained in each other's countries subject to compliance of applicable domestic laws.
10	Tourism and Culture: Protection and Promotion of Cultural Heritage	We agree to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of our cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage.

Table 3: 2023 BRICS Johannesburg Summit Final Compliance Scores

	Issue	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa	Average	
1	Regional Security: Peacekeeping in Africa	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1.00	0%
2	Non-Proliferation: PAROS	0	0	0	0	0	0	50%
3	Crime and Corruption: Illicit Financial Flows	0	-1	-1	0	-1	-0.60	20%
4	Food and Agriculture: Agricultural Cooperation and Sustainable Agriculture	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+0.80	90%
5	Development: African Union's Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Zone	+1	-1	-1	0	0	-0.20	40%
6	Tourism and Culture: Sustainable and Inclusive Tourism	+1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-0.60	20%
7	Financial Regulation: Contingent Reserve Arrangement	-1	+1	-1	-1	-1	-0.60	20%
8	Environment: Global Biodiversity Targets	0	-1	-1	0	-1	-0.60	20%
9	Education: Mutual Recognition of Academic Qualifications	+1	0	0	0	0	+0.20	60%
10	Tourism and Culture: Protection and Promotion of Cultural Heritage	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+0.60	80%
	Average	+0.30	-0.30	-0.50	-0.10	-0.40	-0.20	40%
		65%	35%	25%	45%	30%		

Note: PAROS = Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

Table 4: BRICS Compliance Scores, 2020–2023

	2023 Johannesburg		2022 Beijing				2021 Delhi		2020 Moscow	
	Final		Final		Interim		Final		Final	
Brazil	+0.30	65%	+0.28	64%	+0.06	53%	+0.50	75%	+0.41	71%
China	-0.10	45%	+0.50	75%	+0.28	64%	+0.85	93%	+0.41	71%
Russia	-0.30	35%	+0.22	61%	-0.06	47%	+0.65	83%	+0.47	74%
South Africa	-0.40	30%	+0.44	72%	+0.28	64%	+0.35	68%	+0.24	62%
India	-0.50	25%	+0.50	75%	+0.22	61%	+0.60	80%	+0.65	82%
Average	-0.20	40%	+0.42	68%	+0.13	56%	+0.53	76%	+0.44	82%

Table 5: 2023 BRICS Johannesburg Summit Final Compliance Scores by Commitment

1	Food and Agriculture: Agricultural Cooperation and Sustainable Agriculture	+0.80	90%
2	Tourism and Culture: Protection and Promotion of Cultural Heritage	+0.60	80%
3	Education: Mutual Recognition of Academic Qualifications	+0.20	60%
4	Non-Proliferation: PAROS	0	50%
5	Development: African Union's Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Zone	-0.20	40%
6	Crime and Corruption: Illicit Financial Flows	-0.60	20%
	Environment: Global Biodiversity Targets		
	Financial Regulation: Contingent Reserve Arrangement		
	Tourism and Culture: Sustainable and Inclusive Tourism		
10	Regional Security: Peacekeeping in Africa	-1.00	0%

Note: PAROS = Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; AfCFTA = African Continental Free Trade Area

1. Regional Security: Peacekeeping in Africa

“In this regard we support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African states.”

XV BRICS Summit: Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

Country	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil	-1		
Russia	-1		
India	-1		
China	-1		
South Africa	-1		
Average		-1.00 (0%)	

Background

In 2011, the BRICS countries were concurrently present in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Since then, the BRICS leaders have emphasized strengthening multilateral approaches to address issues under the scope of the UNSC, specifically the conflicts occurring on the African continent.⁵

On 14 April 2011, the BRICS leaders expressed their concern with the turbulence in the West and North African regions in the Sanya Declaration. The BRICS leaders called for restraint on the use of force and for the respect of each country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁶

On 27 March 2013, the BRICS leaders reconvened for the fifth BRICS summit in South Africa and called upon the UNSC to increase cooperation with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) with the aim of achieving conflict resolution in North Africa, the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. The BRICS leaders also commended the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the AU and Mali in restoring its territorial integrity and sovereignty during times of armed conflict. Moreover, the BRICS leaders, vis-à-vis the acts of violence against civilians in the Central African Republic (CAR), announced that they “are ready to work with the international community to assist in this endeavour and facilitate progress to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.” They also expressed their concern by the instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and welcomed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region.⁷

On 15 July 2014, the BRICS leaders adopted the Fortaleza Declaration in which they expressed their “deep concern at the deterioration of the security and the humanitarian situation in West Africa” while recalling the progress made in addressing political and security challenges within the region. They also praised the international community’s efforts in addressing instability in Africa and its coordination by the AU. Additionally, the BRICS leaders reiterated their concern with the instability in the CAR, recognizing the efforts of the AU and the Economic Community of Central African States to restore stability, as well as the establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR. The BRICS leaders reaffirmed their “readiness to work with the international community to assist the CAR in accelerating the implementation of the political process of the country.” Furthermore, the BRICS leaders underscored the efforts by the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), regional and sub-regional organizations in restoring peace and stability to the DRC. In

⁵ Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

⁶ Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

⁷ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

addition, the BRICS leaders welcomed the decision made at the AU Malabo Summit to create the interim African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), allowing a quick response to crisis situations.⁸

On 25 September 2014, the BRICS Foreign Ministers shared their concern over conflict in Africa and their view that “the main role in tackling African conflicts should be played by African themselves with active support from the UN and the international community, through the African Union and its Peace and Security Council.”⁹

On 22 May 2015, the BRICS Deputy Foreign Ministers convened to discuss the Situation in the Middle East (West Asia) and North Africa. The Ministers noted the escalation of armed conflict in Libya and called for efforts to “foster inter-Libyan dialogue by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Libya Bernardino Leon, by the neighboring countries and by the African Union.”¹⁰

On 9 July 2015, the BRICS leaders expressed their concern regarding the escalation of the armed conflict in Libya and their support for fostering inter-Libyan dialogue during the seventh summit in Ufa, Russia.¹¹

On 29 September 2015, the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs “welcomed the efforts to resolve conflicts in Africa led by Africa.” The Ministers shared their belief that “the African Stand-by Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises that are being operationalized in the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture have a significant potential in the maintenance of peace and stability on the African continent.”¹²

On 20 September 2016, the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs highlighted the need to “enhance further the efforts to resolve conflicts in Africa led by Africa in collaboration with the UN and the international community.” The Ministers repeated that the “African Stand-by Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis that are being operationalized within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture can contribute significantly to the maintenance of peace and stability on the African continent.”¹³

On 16 October 2016, the BRICS leaders expressed that they “support the AU’s efforts to resolving conflicts through its peace and security architecture, in collaboration with the United Nations and the continent’s regional organisations, and to contribute towards lasting and sustainable peace and security in Africa.” They also applauded the decision of the AU’s Assembly to operationalize its Peace Fund, allowing for the financing of its peace and security operations, and called upon the UN, the AU and regional organisations to continue addressing political and security instability within the region.¹⁴

On 4 September 2017, in the Xiamen Declaration, commended the efforts of the AU, African countries and sub-regional organisations in “addressing regional issues and maintaining regional peace and security” and stressed the importance of bilateral collaboration between the AU and the UN. They also announced their

⁸ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

⁹ Press Release on the Meeting of BRICS Foreign Ministers, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 25 September 2014. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140925-foreign.html>

¹⁰ Press Release on the Meeting of BRICS Deputy Foreign Ministers on the Situation in the Middle East (West Africa) and North Africa, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 22 May 2015. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150522-foreign-deputies.html>

¹¹ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 22 January 2024. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

¹² Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 September 2015. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150929-foreign.html>

¹³ Press Release: Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 20 September 2016. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/160920-foreign.html>

¹⁴ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

support for efforts in “resolving the issues in DRC, Libya, South Sudan, Somalia, CAR and Western Sahara.”¹⁵

On 21 September 2017, the BRICS Foreign Ministers expressed their concern over conflicts and situations in Africa, among other regions, while underscoring political and diplomatic solutions to resolve conflicts.¹⁶

On 26 July 2018, the BRICS leaders applauded the AU’s efforts in resolving and managing conflicts in the region and in strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture.¹⁷

On 26 September 2019, the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations commended the AU for its contributions to resolving and managing conflicts in Africa and welcomed enhanced cooperation between the UN and the AU Peace and Security Council.¹⁸

On 14 November 2019, the BRICS leaders called for peaceful collaboration to solve the crisis in Libya, specifically through a “Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process.”¹⁹

On 4 September 2020, the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs called for “international support for regional and sub-regional initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and security in Africa based on the principle ‘African solutions to African problem’ as articulated by Africans themselves.”²⁰

On 17 November 2020, the BRICS leaders called for international support for initiatives to strengthen peace and security at the regional and sub-regional level in the African continent. They recalled the principle “African solutions to African problems” and underscored the importance of collaboration between the UN and the AU.²¹

On 23 June 2022, the BRICS leaders convened for the Beijing summit and praised the efforts of the AU, African countries and sub-regional organisations in addressing regional challenges and maintaining peace and security. Moreover, they emphasized bilateral cooperation between the AU and the UN.²²

On 23 August 2023, the BRICS leaders, commending the efforts of the UN, the AU and sub-regional organisations in addressing challenges in maintaining peace and security and resolving international disputes and conflicts, restated the “African solutions to African problems” principle as the basis for conflict resolution. In light of this principle, the BRICS leaders stated: “we support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African States.”²³

¹⁵ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

¹⁶ Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations in New York, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 21 September 2017. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170921-foreign.html>

¹⁷ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

¹⁸ Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 September 2019. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/190926-foreign.html>

¹⁹ Brasilia Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasilian.html>

²⁰ Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2020. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/200904-foreign.pdf>

²¹ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

²² XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

²³ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

Commitment Features

Commitment: “In this regard we support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African states.”

This commitment exists within the context of the “African solutions to African problems” principle which the BRICS leaders believe “should continue to serve as the basis for conflict resolution.” On the basis of this principle, the BRICS leaders “support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African States.”²⁴

Definitions and Concepts

In this commitment, “support” means “the action, or act of providing aid, assistance, or backing up an initiative, or entity.”²⁵ “Peace” is defined as “freedom from civil disturbance.”²⁶ “Efforts” is defined as serious attempts to achieve a particular end.²⁷ “On the continent” means the African continent (and not elsewhere as in Haiti). “Strengthening” is defined as “to make or become stronger.”²⁸ “Relevant” is defined as “having significant and demonstrable bearing on the matter at hand.”²⁹ “Capacities” is referred to as “the facility or power to produce, perform, or deploy.”³⁰

General Interpretive Guidelines

One important element of this commitment is support for peace efforts, thus taking any actions that support violent methods of conflict resolution or cooperation with entities that actively destabilise or pose a threat to regional security will result in noncompliance. An additional crucial aspect of the commitment is strengthening the peace-building and peacekeeping capacities of African states, indicating that the BRICS member must directly – either alone, bilaterally or multilaterally (including international/regional/sub-regional organisations) – assist African states in achieving regional security by providing resources that allow African states to solve their problems with no direct foreign intervention. Therefore, direct involvement in a security issue by non-African BRICS members or calling for non-African actors to intervene will result in noncompliance. In other words, actions that do not conform to the “African solutions to African problems” principle go against the commitment. Weak actions such as verbal affirmations of supporting African peace efforts or commending the efforts of relevant regional and sub-regional organisations indicate noncompliance.

Strong actions for this commitment include providing concrete, material support for African actors on the regional, sub-regional and national levels. This does not include any action with conditional demands attached. There are two ways in which a member can strengthen the peace-building/peacekeeping capacities of African states: financial and diplomatic support. Financial support can be composed of non-conditional funding, funding humanitarian assistance or post-conflict reconstruction and development. Diplomatic support can be characterized as contributing to African-led policy agreements that aim to strengthen peace

²⁴ XV Brics Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS 2023 South Africa (Sandton) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://brics2023.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Jhb-II-Declaration-24-August-2023-1.pdf>

²⁵ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 2 February 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

²⁶ Definition of peace, Merriam-Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peace>

²⁷ Definition of efforts, Merriam-Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/efforts>

²⁸ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 2 February 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

²⁹ Definition of relevant, Merriam-Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relevant>

³⁰ Definition of capacity, Merriam-Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relevant>

and security in Africa, hosting diplomatic negotiations between disputing parties or aiding in peace-building initiatives.

Currently, the African continent is predominantly experiencing destabilization and conflict in the following zones: the Sahel region, South Sudan, Sudan, Libya, the DRC, Somalia, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic.³¹ In order to achieve full compliance, BRICS members must support African peace efforts in at least four of the aforementioned zones. A score of partial compliance includes supporting African peace efforts in two to three of the listed zones. A noncompliant score involves taking strong action in zero to one of the listed zones.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member did not support African peace efforts or support African peace efforts in more than one predominant zone of conflict in Africa.
0	The BRICS member supported African peace efforts in two to three predominant zones of conflict in Africa.
+1	The BRICS member supported African peace efforts in four or more predominant zones of conflict in Africa.

*Affiliated Co-Chair: Pantéa Jamshidi Nouri
Compliance Director and Lead Analyst: Kiara Senanayake*

Brazil: -1

Brazil has not complied with its commitment to support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African states.

On 30 August 2023, the government of Brazil expressed support for the African Union (AU) and other regional actors in confronting the political situation in the Gabonese Republic and urged all parties to find a peaceful solution to the current crisis.³²

On 5 September 2023, following escalation of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the government of Brazil urged all parties of the conflict to abide by human rights and International Humanitarian Law.³³ The government also reaffirmed its support for regional and international acts towards stabilizing the DRC. It further welcomed the establishment of an interministerial commission to investigate anti-UN peacekeeping demonstrations that occurred in the city of Goma, which resulted in at least seven casualties.³⁴

On 22 September 2023, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the G77 Member States and China met for the 47th annual meeting.³⁵ The Ministers called on international actors to “strengthen African efforts in addressing the root causes of conflict in the continent” and called for the United Nations to “support efforts of African countries to achieve durable peace.”

³¹ Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations (Washington D.C.) n.d. Access Date: 27 March 2024. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker>

³² Political crisis in Gabon, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 30 August 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/political-crisis-in-gabon>

³³ Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 5 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/situation-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-1>

³⁴ At least 7 killed in anti-UN protests in Congo’s Goma, Reuters (Goma) 30 August 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/least-7-killed-anti-un-protests-congos-goma-2023-08-30/>

³⁵ Ministerial Declaration of the 47th G77 and China Annual Meeting-New York, September 22, 2023, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 23 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/ministerial-declaration-of-the-g77-and-china-new-york-september-22-2023>

On 20 September 2023, BRICS Foreign Affairs/International Relations Ministers convened for their annual meeting, during which they commended the efforts of the UN, the AU and relevant sub-regional actors in addressing regional security challenges, such as post-conflict reconstruction, promotion of peacebuilding and maintaining peace and security.³⁶ The Ministers recalled the importance of using peaceful methods of conflict resolution, reiterating the “African solutions to African problems” principle.

Brazil has not complied with its commitment to support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African states. Brazil’s actions towards fulfilling this commitment were purely verbal expressions of support for African peace efforts and did not take any concrete actions to strengthen the relevant capacities of African states.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of –1.

Analyst: Pantéa Jamsbidi Nouri

Russia: –1

Russia has not complied with its commitment to support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African states.

On 20 September 2023, BRICS Foreign Affairs/International Relations Ministers convened for their annual meeting, during which they commended the efforts of the United Nations, the African Union and relevant sub-regional actors in addressing regional security challenges, such as post-conflict reconstruction, promotion of peacebuilding and maintaining peace and security.³⁷ The Ministers recalled the importance of using peaceful methods of conflict resolution, reiterating the “African solutions to African problems” principle.

On 29 April 2024, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov met Sudanese Army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.³⁸ Deputy Minister Bogdanov stated Russia’s support for the Sudanese Army in its conflict with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

On 3 May 2024, Russia deployed troops to Niger’s Airbase 101 at the international airport in the capital city Niamey to support Niger in its fight against Islamic insurgency in the south.³⁹ Though there is no confirmation of the number of troops, they are “said to military trainers.”

On 6 May 2024, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar to discuss future partnerships.⁴⁰ Minister Lavrov stated Russia’s support in assisting countries in the Sahara-Sahel region to “increase combat capability.”

On 7 May 2024, Minister Lavrov met with Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Sierra Leone Timothy Musa Kabba, where they discussed “the strengthening of political dialogue

³⁶ Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations – Joint Statement – New York, September 20, 2023, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 20 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/meeting-of-brics-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-international-relations-2023-joint-statement-2023-new-york-september-20-2023>

³⁷ Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations – Joint Statement – New York, September 20, 2023, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 20 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/meeting-of-brics-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-international-relations-2023-joint-statement-2023-new-york-september-20-2023>

³⁸ Russian envoy meets Sudan’s army commander in show of support, Reuters (n.d.) 29 April 2024. Access Date: 16 May 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-envoy-meets-sudans-army-commander-show-support-2024-04-29/>

³⁹ Russians sent to Niger airbase occupied by US troops, BBC (London) 3 May 2024. Access Date: 16 May 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68949809>

⁴⁰ Russian and Nigerian foreign ministers holds talks in Moscow, Africanews (n.d.) 3 May 2024. Access Date: 16 May 2024. <https://www.africanews.com/2024/03/06/russian-and-nigerian-foreign-ministers-hold-talks-in-moscow/>

and trade, economic, cultural and other forms of cooperation.”⁴¹ Additionally, the ministers highlighted “the priority of political and diplomatic methods of defusing crises in Africa.”

Russia has not complied with its commitment to support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African states. Russia assisted several zones of conflict in Africa, including Niger, Sudan, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, particularly in terms of military assistance.

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1 .

Analyst: Kiara Senanayake

India: -1

India has not complied with its commitment to support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African states.

On 20 September 2023, BRICS Foreign Affairs/International Relations Ministers convened for their annual meeting, during which they commended the efforts of the United Nations, the African Union and relevant sub-regional actors in addressing regional security challenges, such as post-conflict reconstruction, promotion of peacebuilding and maintaining peace and security.⁴² The Ministers recalled the importance of using peaceful methods of conflict resolution, reiterating the “African solutions to African problems” principle.

On 22 September 2023, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the G77 Member States and China met for the 47th annual meeting.⁴³ The Ministers called on international actors to “strengthen African efforts in addressing the root causes of conflict in the continent” and called for the UN to “support efforts of African countries to achieve durable peace.”

On 25 September 2023, as a major step to boost India’s ties with Africa, India deployed Military Attachés (or Defense Attachés) – military officers who represent their country’s defense interests in foreign countries – from India’s army, navy, and air force to Ethiopia, Mozambique and the Ivory Coast.⁴⁴ Attachés “assist in defence cooperation, training, procurement and security.” This effort indicates India’s commitment to strengthening its defense and security relationships with African nations by fostering military-to-military cooperation, sharing intelligence and engaging in defense diplomacy.

India has not complied with its commitment to support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African states. India sent defense attachés to only one zone of conflict (Ethiopia) on the African continent.

Thus, India receives a score of -1 .

Analyst: Salma Amer Safarini

⁴¹ Press release on Acting Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Sierra Leone Timothy Musa Kabba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 7 May 2024. Access Date: 16 May 2024. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1948785/

⁴² Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations – Joint Statement – New York, September 20, 2023, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 20 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/meeting-of-brics-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-international-relations-2023-joint-statement-2023-new-york-september-20-2023>

⁴³ Ministerial Declaration of the 47th G77 and China Annual Meeting-New York, September 22, 2023, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 23 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/ministerial-declaration-of-the-g77-and-china-new-york-september-22-2023>

⁴⁴ India to post more military attaches in Africa, New Indian Express, (New Delhi) 25 September 2023. Access Date: 12 May 2024. <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2023/Sep/25/india-to-post-more-military-attachesin-africa-2617949.html>

China: –1

China has not complied with its commitment to support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African states.

On 20 September 2023, BRICS Foreign Affairs/International Relations Ministers convened for their annual meeting, during which they commended the efforts of the United Nations, the African Union and relevant sub-regional actors in addressing regional security challenges, such as post-conflict reconstruction, promotion of peacebuilding and maintaining peace and security.⁴⁵ The Ministers recalled the importance of using peaceful methods of conflict resolution, reiterating the “African solutions to African problems” principle.

On 22 September 2023, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the G77 Member States and China met for the 47th annual meeting.⁴⁶ The Ministers called on international actors to “strengthen African efforts in addressing the root causes of conflict in the continent” and called for the UN to “support efforts of African countries to achieve durable peace.”

On 11 January 2024, China donated 8,808 tents to South Sudan amid the influx of returnees escaping conflict in Sudan.⁴⁷ Chinese Ambassador to South Sudan Ma Qiang highlighted the mediation efforts by South Sudan and called for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Sudan.

On 20 January 2024, after a trip to Egypt, Tunisia, Togo and Cote d’Ivoire, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that “China looks forward to the restoration of peace and the achievement of stability and development in the region as soon as possible” while stressing the need to resolve differences via dialogue.⁴⁸

On 15 March 2024, President Xi Jinping met with Angolan President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, during which the Chinese president reaffirmed his support for the “African solutions to African problems” principle in maintaining peace and stability in the region.⁴⁹

On 2 September 2024, President Xi received President Ramaphosa on a state visit to China. Both sides called on the international community to support African regional organisations like the AU in their efforts to solve regional issues in line with the African solutions to African problems principle. Both sides additionally agreed to enhance cooperation in conflict areas of Africa and to protect the peace and security of the continent.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations – Joint Statement – New York, September 20, 2023, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 20 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/meeting-of-brics-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-international-relations-2013-joint-statement-2013-new-york-september-20-2023>

⁴⁶ Ministerial Declaration of the 47th G77 and China Annual Meeting-New York, September 22, 2023, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 23 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/ministerial-declaration-of-the-g77-and-china-new-york-september-22-2023>

⁴⁷ China donates tents to shelter returnees, flood victims in South Sudan, The State Council (Xinhua) 11 January 2024. Access Date: 10 September 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202401/11/content_WS659f41a1c6d0868f4e8e2f19.html

⁴⁸ Chinese FM recaps New Year trip to four African countries, The State Council (Xinhua) 20 January 2024. Access Date: 10 September 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202401/20/content_WS65adcd9ac6d0868f4e8e359a.html

⁴⁹ Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Angolan President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing) 15 March 2024. Access Date: 23 June 2024. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202403/t20240322_11266176.html

⁵⁰ Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa on the Occasion of the 2nd State Visit to China by H.E. President Cyril Ramaphosa and the Establishment of an All-Round Strategic Cooperative Partnership in a New Era, South African Government (Johannesburg) 2 September 2024. Access Date: 10 September 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/joint-statement-between-china-and-south-africa-2nd-state-visit>

On 4 September 2024, President Xi met with President of the Libyan Presidency Council Mohamed al-Menfi to announce a strategic partnership between both countries. President Xi expressed China's support for Libya safeguarding its national sovereignty and achieving peace and stability via dialogue.⁵¹

On 6 September 2024, President Xi met with Chairman of Sudan's Sovereignty Council Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan during the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).⁵² Xi expressed China's support in Sudan protecting its national sovereignty and wished for Sudan to "restore peace and stability at an early date."

On 6 September 2024, President Xi met with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud during the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa. President Xi said China will "continue to provide assistance to international peacekeeping operations in Somalia and support the country in enhancing its capabilities of independent development."⁵³

China has not complied by contributing to African peace efforts on the continent of Africa through strengthening the relevant capacities of African states. China took weak actions toward this commitment in the form of verbal expressions of support and meeting with high-level officials, in addition to providing humanitarian assistance to South Sudan in light of the crisis in Sudan.

Thus, China receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Pantéa Jamsbidi Nouri

South Africa: -1

South Africa has not complied by contributing African peace efforts on the continent of Africa through strengthening the relevant capacities of African states.

On 31 August 2023, Deputy President Paul Mashatile concluded a working visit to South Sudan with the goal of assessing recent developments and progress in implementing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), discussing barriers to peace, discussing solutions and strengthening bilateral ties between both countries. Deputy President called on the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) and relevant parties to the R-ARCSS to strengthen their commitment to implementing the R-ARCSS, which includes "community disarmament, demobilisation of ex-combatants and their re-integration into peaceful civilian life, and the integration of remaining combatant forces into a national force with a single command structure, among others."⁵⁴

On 20 September 2023, BRICS Foreign Affairs/International Relations Ministers convened for their annual meeting, during which they commended the efforts of the United Nations, the African Union (AU) and relevant sub-regional actors in addressing regional security challenges, such as post-conflict reconstruction, promotion of peacebuilding and maintaining peace and security.⁵⁵ The Ministers recalled the importance of

⁵¹China, Libya establish strategic partnership as leaders meet in Beijing, The State Council (Xinhua) 4 September 2024. Access Date: 10 September 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202409/04/content_WS66d861d0c6d0868f4e8ea9ad.html

⁵²Xi meets chairman of Sudan's Sovereignty Council, The State Council (Xinhua) 6 September 2024. Access Date: 10 September 2024.

⁵³Chinese, Somali presidents elevate bilateral ties, The State Council (Xinhua) 6 September 2024. Access Date: 10 September 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202409/06/content_WS66dac9c5c6d0868f4e8eaad1.html

⁵⁴Deputy President Paul Mashatile concludes Working Visit to South Sudan, South African Government (Johannesburg) 31 August 2023. Access Date: 10 September 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/deputy-president-paul-mashatile-concludes-working-visit-south-sudan-31-aug>

⁵⁵ Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations – Joint Statement – New York, September 20, 2023, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 20 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/meeting-of-brics-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-international-relations-2013-joint-statement-2013-new-york-september-20-2023>

using peaceful methods of conflict resolution, reiterating the “African solutions to African problems” principle.

On 22 September 2023, South Africa reiterated its support for continental and regional initiatives to ensure peace in South Sudan amid the current war it is enduring.⁵⁶ Deputy President Paul Mashatile emphasized that South Africa “will continue to support the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and African Union-led initiatives aimed at ensuring peace and prosperity in South Sudan.” This came after Deputy President Mashatile’s visit to South Sudan from 29-31 August 2023, which “enabled him to familiarise himself with the South Sudan peace process and its challenges.” Upon this, he announced that South Africa will commit to supporting South Sudan in hosting peaceful national elections in December 2024.

On 22 September 2023, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the G77 Member States and China met for the 47th annual meeting.⁵⁷ The Ministers called on international actors to “strengthen African efforts in addressing the root causes of conflict in the continent” and called for the UN to “support efforts of African countries to achieve durable peace.”

On 29 October 2023, South Africa and Ethiopia agreed to “strengthen their ‘long-standing historical relations’ in the military field and further extend mutually beneficial cooperation,” primarily within the military education and training sector.⁵⁸ The two African countries reached an agreement to share military modernization experiences and foster an environment conducive to exchange.

On 29 November 2023, South Africa hosted its ninth meeting with the China-South Africa Defence Committee.⁵⁹ Throughout the meeting, the two BRICS countries exchanged concerns for the “international and regional security situation, national defence and military development in each country and bilateral military exchanges and cooperation” between them. The two parties discussed the potential of expanding their cooperation by adding new connotations to the China-South Africa comprehensive strategic partnership.

On 4 January 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa received leader of the Rapid Support Forces General Mohamed Dagalo of Sudan to discuss the ongoing situation in Sudan and the role of civil society in seeking solutions to address the situation.⁶⁰ Ramaphosa reiterated his support for dialogue between parties to the conflict and recalled the need for a ceasefire.

On 12 February 2024, South Africa announced its plan to contribute 2,900 troops to the Southern African Development Community force with the goal of combatting armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).⁶¹ Eastern Congo has been a hotspot for conflict between armed groups fighting over land and

⁵⁶ SA reiterates support for continental initiatives to ensure peace in South Sudan, Republic of South Africa News, (Johannesburg). 22 September 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-reiterates-support-continental-initiatives-ensure-peace-south-sudan>

⁵⁷ Ministerial Declaration of the 47th G77 and China Annual Meeting-New York, September 22, 2023, Ministry of External Relations (Brasília) 23 September 2023. Access Date: 20 June 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/ministerial-declaration-of-the-g77-and-china-new-york-september-22-2023>

⁵⁸ Ethiopia & South Africa Agree to Strengthen Military Cooperation, Sputnik News Africa (Addis Ababa) 29 October 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://en.sputniknews.africa/20231029/ethiopia--south-africa-agree-to-strengthen-military-cooperation-1063172909.html>

⁵⁹South Africa hosts China-South Africa Defence Committee, Defence Web (Johannesburg) 12 DECEMBER 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.defencenews.co.za/editors-pick/south-africa-hosts-china-south-africa-defence-committee/>

⁶⁰ President Cyril Ramaphosa meets leader of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on developments towards peace in Sudan, South African Government (Johannesburg) 4 January 2024. Access Date: 25 June 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-meets-leader-rapid-support-forces-rsf-developments>

⁶¹ South Africa to deploy 2,900 troopers to fight armed groups in eastern Congo, Reuters (Johannesburg) 12 February 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africa-deploy-2900-troops-fight-armed-groups-eastern-congo-2024-02-12/>

resources, killing hundreds of thousands of people and displacing more than 7 million. South African forces will join troops from Tanzania and Malawi in carrying out an offensive mandate to support Congo's army.

On 25 February 2024, President Ramaphosa met with President Felix Tshisikedi of the DRC, President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi and President Lazarus Chakwera of Malawi in Namibia.⁶² The officials discussed “efforts towards the restoration of peace and security in the eastern DRC.”

On 3 March 2024, President Ramaphosa met with Vice President of the Transitional Sovereign Council of the Republic of Sudan Malik Agar Eyre Nganyoufa to discuss developments towards peace in Sudan.⁶³ Ramaphosa expressed his support for dialogue between parties to the conflict and called for a ceasefire.

On 15-16 April 2024, President Ramaphosa met with President of Uganda Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, during which they discussed their views on regional security and reaffirmed their commitment to continue bilateral efforts towards peace and stability in Africa.⁶⁴

On 24 April 2024, President Ramaphosa announced that it would extend the employment of the South African National Defense Force in Mozambique and the DRC.⁶⁵ This extension serves to combat acts of terrorism in northern Mozambique and to fulfill South Africa's international obligation to MONUSCO in the DRC.

On 28 May 2024, President Ramaphosa expressed concern regarding the escalating armed conflict in Sudan, calling for the immediate end to the conflict via Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led inclusive dialogue.⁶⁶

On 2 September 2024, President Ramaphosa visited President Xi Jinping on a state visit in China. Both sides called on the international community to support African regional organisations like the AU in their efforts to solve regional issues in line with the African solutions to African problems principle. Both sides additionally agreed to enhance cooperation in conflict areas of Africa and to protect the peace and security of the continent.⁶⁷

On 18 September 2024, President Ramaphosa welcomed the two-year extension of South Sudan's transitional government. He called on South Sudanese parties and the transitional government to maintain a peaceful atmosphere and to allocate all necessary resources in order to deliver fair and free elections. Additionally,

⁶² President Cyril Ramaphosa concludes visit to Republic of Namibia, South African Government (Johannesburg) 25 February 2024. Access Date: 25 June 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-concludes-visit-republic-namibia-25-feb-2024>

⁶³ President Cyril Ramaphosa receives briefing on Sudan, South African Government (Johannesburg) 3 March 2024. Access Date: 25 June 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-receives-briefing-sudan-03-mar-2024>

⁶⁴ Communique on occasion of official visit by President Cyril Ramaphosa to Uganda, South African Government (Johannesburg) 16 April 2024. Access Date: 25 June 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/communique-occasion-official-visit-president-cyril-ramaphosa-uganda-16-apr>

⁶⁵ President Cyril Ramaphosa on extension of employment of South African National Defense Force, South African Government (Johannesburg) 24 April 2024. Access Date: 25 June 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-extension-employment-south-african-national-defense>

⁶⁶ Presidency expresses grave concern at escalating conflict in Sudan and attacks in El Fasher, Capital of North Darfur, South African Government (Johannesburg) 28 May 2024. Access Date: 10 September 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/presidency-expresses-grave-concern-escalating-conflict-sudan-and-attacks-el>

⁶⁷ Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa on the Occasion of the 2nd State Visit to China by H.E. President Cyril Ramaphosa and the Establishment of an All-Round Strategic Cooperative Partnership in a New Era, South African Government (Johannesburg) 2 September 2024. Access Date: 10 September 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/joint-statement-between-china-and-south-africa-2nd-state-visit>

President Ramaphosa called on the East African bloc and the international community to support the government and the people of South Sudan in their efforts for peace and democracy.⁶⁸

South Africa has not complied with its commitment to support African peace efforts on the continent through strengthening the relevant capacities of African states. South Africa has participated in meetings with African leaders and other global partners to discuss and enhance peace efforts, its decision to contribute troops in carrying out an offensive mandate against illegally armed groups in the DRC undermines the requirement that countries must take peaceful actions towards fulfilling this commitment.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Salma Amer Safarini

⁶⁸President Cyril Ramaphosa welcomes South Sudan transitional government extension, South African Government (Johannesburg) 18 September 2024. Access Date: 18 September 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-welcomes-south-sudan-transitional-government>

2. Non-Proliferation: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

“We reassert our support for ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and of its weaponization, including through negotiations to adopt a relevant legally binding multilateral instrument.”

XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil		0	
Russia		0	
India		0	
China		0	
South Africa		0	
Average		0 (50%)	

Background

Historically, commitments specifically addressing the non-proliferation of weapons only appear sporadically in BRICS Leaders’ Declarations. However, BRICS members have repeatedly demonstrated accord on PAROS. BRICS members’ commitment to PAROS reflects a stated commitment both to sustainability and peace in outer space, and to conditional non-proliferation.

BRICS members approach PAROS and outer space sustainability through party status in relevant treaties, and participation in pertinent diplomatic fora. Each of the five BRICS members has ratified the United Nations’ 1967 Outer Space Treaty.⁶⁹ This binding agreement reduces the potential for conflict in space by banning territorial claims and the introduction of nuclear weapons to outer space.⁷⁰ Each BRICS member state also sends a national delegation to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), which is currently negotiating a binding multilateral PAROS treaty.⁷¹ The BRICS states’ shared treaty obligations and the international fora in which they participate are springboards for cooperative, multifaceted PAROS action.

At the 2011 Sanya Summit, BRICS members cursorily discussed cooperation on outer space security affairs.⁷² In their Declaration, members affirmed the importance of peace in outer space, as part of a wider thrust for scientific cooperation.

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS members further elucidated their shared outer space policy vision.⁷³ In their Declaration, members called for international negotiations towards a broad outer space activities agreement, honouring peace and the prevention of an outer space arms race. Particularly to PAROS, the BRICS members welcomed the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space,

⁶⁹ Status of International Agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2023, United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Vienna) 20 March 2023. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2023/aac_105c_22023crp/aac_105c_22023crp_3_0_html/AC105_C2_2023_CRP03E.pdf

⁷⁰ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (Vienna) n.d. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html>

⁷¹ Outer Space, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva) n.d. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<https://disarmament.unoda.org/topics/outerspace/>

⁷² Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 9 March 2024.

<http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

⁷³ Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 9 March 2024.

<http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) by members Russia and China. Members also asserted that a treaty affecting PAROS ought to be a priority for the CD.

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS members added to previous commitments with new pledges in the areas of outer space cooperation and proactive PAROS measures.⁷⁴ Members committed to cooperate further to facilitate and promote peaceful, scientific uses of outer space, through joint action within the bloc and within international fora such as the CD and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). Members also affirmed the importance of equity in access to peaceful use of outer space, calling for the international community to consider the needs of developing countries while developing both international and domestic space policies.

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS members noted new developments, including a concerted effort for all states to adopt a weapons no-first-placement policy in outer space and the UNCOPUOS' 2018 target for consensus-building on space activities sustainability guidelines.⁷⁵ Members also reaffirmed commitments from the two previous summits.

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS members sharpened their rhetoric against a potential outer space arms race.⁷⁶ Members called upon all states to respect existing international law pertaining PAROS and peaceful uses of outer space, while emphasizing the need to expand upon the existing legal framework through negotiations at the CD. Members also welcomed the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), tasked with presenting policy guidance on non-proliferation and disarmament issues such as PAROS and prevention of outer space conflict.

At the 2019 Brasilia Summit, BRICS members reaffirmed previous commitments, and noted the GGE's inability to come to consensus on PAROS policy guidance.⁷⁷ Members reaffirmed the importance of establishing a right to develop peaceful space technologies, and stressed the need for an international binding PAROS treaty.

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, BRICS members reaffirmed previous commitments and noted the development of Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs), while emphasizing that TCBMs should not replace movement towards a binding, multilateral PAROS treaty.⁷⁸

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS members reaffirmed their previous commitments, namely support for the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and guidelines on peaceful space operations proposed by the UNCOPUOS.

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS members reaffirmed support for PAROS, the PPWT and the role of TCBMs in preventing weaponization in space.

Commitment Features

At the 2023 Johannesburg II summit, leaders “reassert[ed] our support for ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.”⁷⁹ Members also committed to the “prevention of an arms race in

⁷⁴ Brasilia Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 10 March 2024.

<http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasilgia.html>

⁷⁵ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

⁷⁶ 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

⁷⁷ Brasília Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasilgia.html>

⁷⁸ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

⁷⁹ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 12 March 2024. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

outer space (PAROS) and of its weaponization.” A central component of BRICS members’ commitment is participating in “negotiations to adopt a relevant legally binding multilateral instrument.” The commitment text implies two pledges by BRICS members: to promote sustainable space activities in the long-term and to take measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, including through negotiations towards a binding treaty to that end.

Definitions and Concepts

“Long-term sustainability” is understood to mean “the ability to maintain the conduct of space activities indefinitely into the future,” promoting equitable, peaceful and multi-generational access and execution of space activities.⁸⁰ This definition draws from the scope of topic-relevant guidelines drafted by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs and UNCOPUOS. Within the context of this commitment, and especially in light of the BRICS members’ support of a binding multilateral instrument, relevant actions such as assent to new TCBMs or ratification of new treaties often aspire to hold for the foreseeable future. These actions are considered to have a long-term time horizon, as unless a time horizon spanning less than 10 years is stipulated, PAROS and sustainability actions are assumed to aspire towards permanence.

“Outer space activities” is understood to mean “the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.”⁸¹ This definition draws from language in Resolution A/RES/75/35, adopted by the UN General Assembly concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Outer space activities are also commonly understood to refer to the scientific examination and investigation of outer space.

“Prevention of an arms race in outer space” is understood to mean “strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space,” and examination of “further measures ... in the series for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements” to that end.⁸² This definition also draws from language in Resolution A/RES/75/35.

“Weaponization” is understood to mean “the act of using something as a way of attacking a person or a group.”⁸³ In this context, the weaponization of outer space is understood to refer to the stockpiling or use of weapons in outer space, and the conception of outer space as an appropriate domain for interstate conflict.

“Negotiation” is understood to mean “the process of discussing something with someone in order to reach an agreement with them.”⁸⁴

“Legally binding” is understood to mean any “lawful action, consciously agreed to by two or more entities, establishing lawful accountability.”⁸⁵ In this context, legal bind may refer generally to domestic legal obligations or to international law, and the relevant obligations are elucidated through ratified treaties and relevant customary law.

⁸⁰ Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (Vienna) January 2021. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/PromotingSpaceSustainability/Publication_Final_English_June2021.pdf

⁸¹ A/RES/75/35 Prevention of an arms race in outer space, United Nations General Assembly (New York) 7 December 2020. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n20/354/20/pdf/n2035420.pdf?token=OGYVkwLvy5gCO309CX&fe=true>

⁸² A/RES/75/35 Prevention of an arms race in outer space, United Nations General Assembly (New York) 7 December 2020. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n20/354/20/pdf/n2035420.pdf?token=OGYVkwLvy5gCO309CX&fe=true>

⁸³ Weaponization, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/weaponization>

⁸⁴ Negotiation, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 12 March 2024.

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/negotiation>

⁸⁵ Legally Binding, The Law Dictionary n.d. Access Date: 12 March 2024. <https://thelawdictionary.org/legally-binding/>

“Multilateral” is understood to mean “involving or participated in by more than two parties.”⁸⁶

“Instrument” is understood to mean “a formal legal document (such as a deed, bond, or agreement.)”⁸⁷

General Interpretive Guidelines

Taken together, BRICS members have committed to act towards permanently preserving the ability of states to equitably and peaceably engage in space exploration and space scientific activities, and to prevent an arms race in outer space, especially through negotiating a legally binding treaty to that end. This commitment implies two dimensions of compliance: protecting the sustainability of outer space activities, and action towards preventing an arms race in outer space.

In the first area of compliance, long-term sustainability of space activities, BRICS members take strong actions in complying with this commitment by, inter alia:

- Modeling peaceful space activities (ex. engaging in peaceful and responsible space travel and scientific projects);
- Investing in, or otherwise facilitating, public and private projects that aim to engage in peaceful space activities;
- Promoting equity in access to outer space activities through developing new pathways for partnership, which may include knowledge-sharing and capacity-building within and outside of BRICS;
- Signing, negotiating or ratifying relevant bilateral or multilateral treaties;
- Taking diplomatic, economic, or international judicial action against states that derogate from existing obligations to exclusively use space peaceably; and
- Implementing or enforcing restrictions upon the conduct of public and private entities within their jurisdiction in outer space, in line with promoting sustainability and equity of access to outer space activities.

In the second area, concerning PAROS and the negotiation of a relevant multilateral treaty, BRICS members take strong actions in complying with this commitment by, inter alia:

- Signing and/or ratifying relevant binding bilateral or multilateral agreements; or
- Any significant action generally applicable to the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons, such as action to reduce weapons stockpiles.

The above is a non-exhaustive list demonstrating examples of “strong” actions, for scoring purposes. “Weak” actions include verbal reaffirmations on their own and participation in international fora discussing the topic that do not focus directly on negotiating a binding treaty (e.g., UNCOPUOS).

BRICS members will receive a score of +1 if they take strong action in both commitment areas: promoting long-term sustainability of outer space activities, and acting to prevent an arms race in outer space.

BRICS members will receive a score of 0 if they take strong action in either promoting long-term sustainability of outer space activities or acting to prevent an arms race in outer space, while taking only weak

⁸⁶ Multilateral, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 12 March 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/multilateral>

⁸⁷ Instrument, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 12 March 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/instrument>

action in the other aspect of the commitment. A score of 0 will also be awarded if the member takes weak action in both areas.

BRICS members will receive a score of –1 if they take zero action on either area of the commitment or only take weak action in one area. Members will also receive a –1 score if they act in direct contravention of the commitment, as this is considered negative compliance.

Scoring Guidelines

–1	The BRICS member has not promoted the long-term sustainability of outer space activities or acted to prevent an arms race in outer space, or has taken weak action in one aspect and none in the other aspect, or has actively contravened either or both aspects.
0	The BRICS member has adopted weak actions to promote the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, or has taken strong action in one commitment aspect and weak action in the other.
+1	The BRICS member has opted strong actions to promote the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

*Affiliated Co-Chair: Luca B. Rampersad
Compliance Director and Lead Analyst: Sofiya Sapeba*

Brazil: 0

Brazil has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).

On 20 October 2023, the delegation of Brazil to the United Nations General Assembly participated in debate surrounding frameworks for measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Ambassador Flavio Soares Domico proposed the development of norms on responsible behaviour to address immediate concerns, followed by the establishment of legally binding instruments to reinforce this in the long-term.⁸⁸

On 30 October 2023 to 3 November 2023, Brazil assumed the presidency of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) during the 35th Plenary Meeting in Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian government aimed to strike a balance between controlling missile technologies and eliminating barriers to access, exchange, and develop these technologies for legitimate purposes.⁸⁹

On 29 November 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation, in collaboration with the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, the Brazilian Space Agency and the Brazilian Air Force, held a seminar on the Brazilian Space Program. This meeting brought together major players in the Brazilian space sector to discuss and plan for prospects domestically and internationally; overall, this represents a meaningful initiative to promote the strategic importance of investing in space technology in Brazil.⁹⁰

On 2 February 2024, Director of the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) Clezio Marcos De Nardin addressed the Technical and Scientific Subcommittee of the United Nations' Committee on the

⁸⁸ Debate on Disarmament Aspects of Outer Space Exposes First Committee Rift over Ways to Sustain Space Security, Prevent Domain's Weaponization, United Nations (New York) 20 October 2023. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3723.doc.htm>.

⁸⁹ Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) – Rio de Janeiro, October 30 – November 3, 2023, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Rio de Janeiro) 1 November 2023. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/plenary-meeting-of-the-missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr-rio-de-janeiro-october-30-november-3-2023>

⁹⁰ 12th Plenary Meeting Brazil – US CEO Forum, Government of Brazil (Brasília) 15 December 2023. Access Date: 21 July 2024. https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/documentos/forum-ceos-2023/eng-brazilian-progress-report-2023-ceo_forum.pdf.

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. De Nardin emphasized various bilateral and multilateral projects that model peaceful uses of outer space. Projects of interest include two new satellites jointly developed with China under the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite Program, and a BRICS-wide collaboration to develop a “constellation” of remote sensing satellites.⁹¹

On 10 April 2024, Brazil and Chile signed a declaration to boost satellite technology cooperation at the Fidae 2024 International Air and Space Fair. This agreement, led by both Minister of Defence José Monteiro Filho and Minister of National Defence of Chile Maya Fernández Allende, seeks to increase collaboration between each Latin American country’s space development programmes.⁹²

On 3 May 2024, President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva and Prime Minister of Japan Fumio Kishida issued a joint communiqué pledging further allyship and cooperation in various domains. Within this joint declaration, the two leaders pledged to increase collaboration between their respective space agencies, modeling non-military uses of outer space.⁹³

On 8 May 2024, the permanent Secretariat of Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries announced a collaborative effort between Brazil and China, as they prepare new satellites for South America. Brazil and China are to announce a joint meteorological satellite during the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Concertation and Cooperation (Cosban) meeting in June. This endeavor highlights continued efforts by the Brazilian government to collaborate with other states in peaceful space-faring activities.⁹⁴

On 27 May 2024, Brazil participated in exercise Resolute Sentinel 2024 (RS24), which brought together more than 66 combined joint space experts to enhance cross-organizational collaboration and strengthen partnerships globally, with the ultimate aim of increasing integrated deterrence and promoting global security. Notably, teams in Colombia, Brazil, and Peru conducted operations through commercially available technology rather than military systems, given limited availability of U.S. Space Force’s imagery and tracking tools. These activities showcase Brazil’s ability to work with other states globally and regionally, and are a significant step in promoting international norms in outer space.⁹⁵

On 26 June 2024, Brazil participated in the 828th meeting of UNOOSA. Under Item 15, the Brazilian delegation expressed their support for Romania’s proposal to establish an Action Team on Lunar Activities Consultation (ATLAC), while also stressing the importance of benefitting all countries in space exploration endeavours, regardless of their degree of economic or scientific development.⁹⁶

⁹¹Diretor do INPE representa a Ministra Luciana Santos na 61ª sessão do Subcomitê Técnico e Científico (STSC) do COPUOS, Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (Brasília) 2 February 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/inpe/pt-br/assuntos/ultimas-noticias/diretor-do-inpe-representa-a-ministra-luciana-santos-na-61a-sessao-do-subcomite-tecnico-e-cientifico-stsc-do-copuos>

⁹² Chile-Brazil Satellite Collaboration Takes Off, The Rio Times (Rio de Janeiro) 10 April 2024. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <https://www.riotimesonline.com/chile-brazil-satellite-collaboration-takes-off/>

⁹³Comunicado Conjuntosobre o Fortalecimento da Parceria Estratégica e Global Brasil-Japão, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 3 May 2024. Access Date: 29 May 2024. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/comunicado-conjunto-sobre-o-fortalecimento-da-parceria-estrategica-e-global-brasil-japao

⁹⁴ Brazil and China prepare new satellites for South America, Permanent Secretariat of Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macao) 8 May 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. https://forumchinapl.org.mo/en/economic_trade/view/7983

⁹⁵RS24 enhances global space domain awareness with partner nations, U.S. Space Command (Arizona) 10 June 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. <https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/3801812/rs24-enhances-global-space-domain-awareness-with-partner-nations/>

⁹⁶ Item 15 – Exploração Espacial e Inovação – Elementos para intervenção nacional, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 2024 (Vienna) 26 June 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/2024/statements/15_Brazil.pdf

On 27 June 2024, representatives of the Brazilian Space Agency and Brazilian Cooperation Agency visited the Mexican Space Agency as part of a framework set in the 8th Meeting of the Mexico-Brazil Technical Cooperation Working Group. During this visit, both agencies agreed to develop a Mexico-Brazil initiative as per the Artemis Accords to advance Moon-faring missions.⁹⁷

On 23 August 2024, Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira wrote an op-ed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer celebrating Brazil-Philippines relations, specifically noting a future trip to Manila in which Brazilian and Filipino officials will discuss future avenues for cooperation in outer space.⁹⁸

Brazil has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Brazil has taken strong action toward ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities by cooperating with several nations, in South America and beyond, on projects emphasizing a peaceful use of outer space. They take the cardinal principle of space exploration for all into consideration and ensure peaceful outer space progress. However, they have only taken weak action via verbal reaffirmations regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Amelia Hui

Russia: 0

Russia has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).

On 19 October 2023, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Konstantin Vorontsov submitted draft UNGA resolutions on “No first placement of weapons in outer space,” “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities,” and “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space” to the First Committee.⁹⁹

On 1 February 2024, Russian-Chinese consultations on outer space security took place in Beijing.¹⁰⁰ Both sides emphasized the importance of the earliest launch of negotiations on a multilateral legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space.

On 15 March 2024, the Russian government approved the draft law to be submitted to the State Duma, on the ratification of the agreement on cooperation with China for the joint construction and operation of the International Lunar Research Station.¹⁰¹

On 11 April 2024, Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia raised concerns regarding a draft resolution prohibiting placement of nuclear weapons in outer space, presented to the UN Security Council (UNSC) by

⁹⁷ Mexico and Brazil agree on greater collaboration in space matters: AEM, Mexico Now (Mexico City) 27 June 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. <https://mexico-now.com/mexico-and-brazil-agree-on-greater-collaboration-in-space-matters-aem/>

⁹⁸New Horizons for Brazil-PH Friendship (Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 23, 2024), Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 23 August 2024. Access Date: 15 September 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs/articles/mauro-vieira-2023/new-horizons-for-brazil-ph-friendship-philippine-daily-inquirer-august-23-2024>

⁹⁹Statement by Konstantin Vorontsov, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, at the Thematic Debate on “Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)” in the First Committee of the 78th Session of the UN General Assembly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 20 October 2023. Access Date: 12 May 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/regprla/1910747/

¹⁰⁰Press release on Russian-Chinese consultations on outer space security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 1 February 2024. Access Date: 12 May 2024. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1929055/

¹⁰¹Government approves draft law on ratifying Russia-China agreement to build International Lunar Research Station, The Russian Government, Government Decisions (Moscow) 15 March 2024. Access Date: 12 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/docs/51116/>

the United States of America and Japan.¹⁰² Particularly, Representative Nebenzia noted that the draft resolution SC/15678 only seeks to instill a non-development obligation for nuclear weapons, rather than all weapons.

On 24 April 2024, Russia proposed an amendment to UNSC resolution SC/15678. The Russian amendment would have called for a ban on all weapons in outer space. The amendment failed, and Russia vetoed the initial resolution.¹⁰³

On 8 July 2024 President Vladimir Putin hosted Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi for the annual Russia-India Summit.¹⁰⁴ President Putin and Prime Minister Modi celebrated cooperation between ISRO and Roscosmos, its Russian counterpart, while mutually pledging to support the long-term sustainability of space activities through UNCOPUOS and UNOOSA.

Russia has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space. Russian cooperation with international partners meets the first part of the commitment regarding long-term sustainability of outer space activities. However, Russia has failed to take strong action on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Thus, Russia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Sofiya Sapeha

India: 0

India has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).

On 26 October 2023, the Indian representative to the United Nations General Assembly remarked during the meeting of the Fourth Committee that it is necessary to strengthen international legal frameworks for outer space activities to ensure the safety and security of all space assets. The representative also noted COPUOS (Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space) and UNOOSA (United Nations Office on Outer Space Affairs)'s important roles in encouraging the peaceful uses of outer space, and that India is honoured to chair the New Working Group on Guidelines for Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.¹⁰⁵

On 20 December 2023, the Department of Space of India published the India Space Policy 2023, which outlines India's commitments to establish a "framework to ensure safe and sustainable space operations in compliance with relevant international space debris mitigation guidelines", as well as organize international cooperation regarding global space governance.¹⁰⁶ The Policy also notes ongoing cooperation between the

¹⁰²Remarks to the press by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia with regard to the US-proposed draft resolution on nuclear weapons in outer space, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations (New York) 11 April 2024. Access Date: 12 May 2024. https://russiaun.ru/en/news/stakeout_110424

¹⁰³ Security Council Fails to Adopt First-Ever Resolution on Arms Race in Outer Space, Due to Negative Vote by Russian Federation, United Nations (New York) 24 April 2024. Access Date: 12 May 2024. <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15678.doc.htm>

¹⁰⁴ Joint Statement following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 9 July 2024. Access Date: 15 September 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2031946>

¹⁰⁵ India Statement 76th session of the UN General Assembly Fourth Committee Joint General Debate, United Nations ND. Access Date: 16 May 2024. https://www.un.org/en/ga/fourth/76/pdf/India_en_item_53.pdf

¹⁰⁶ Indian Space Policy 2023, India Department of Space (Bengaluru) 2023. Access Date: 16 May 2024. https://www.isro.gov.in/media_isro/pdf/IndianSpacePolicy2023.pdf

Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the United States' National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to launch the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) satellite.¹⁰⁷

On 16 April 2024, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Chairman and Department of Space Secretary Shri Somanath S. commented at the 42nd Annual Meet of Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) that it intends to carry out the Debris Free Space Missions (DFSM) initiative, wherein all Indian space actors, governmental and non-governmental actors will achieve debris-free space missions by 2030.¹⁰⁸

On 8 July 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russia for the annual Russia-India Summit.¹⁰⁹ President Putin and Prime Minister Modi celebrated cooperation between ISRO and Roscosmos, its Russian counterpart, while mutually pledging to support the long-term sustainability of space activities through UNCOPUOS and UNOOSA.

On 23 July 2024, Minister of Finance Nirmala Sitharaman announced a INR10 billion USD119 million venture capital fund to expand its space sector with the intent to increase India's space economy by 5 times within the next 10 years. The fund particularly targets the private sector, encouraging private sector innovation and participation in the expansion of India's space economy.¹¹⁰

India has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). In the first area of compliance, long-term sustainability of space activities, India has taken strong actions in complying with this commitment by modeling peaceful space activities, such as the ISRO's work with NASA to launch the NISAR satellite and implementing or enforcing restrictions upon the conduct of public and private entities within their jurisdiction in outer space. India has sought strong action in line with promoting sustainability and equity of access to outer space activities, including through the India Space Policy 2023, which defines the regulations for private enterprises to conduct outer space affairs.¹¹¹ India has not taken strong action on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and negotiations to adopt a relevant legally binding multilateral instrument. India has also shown several instances of "weak" actions on top of these "strong actions", such as verbal reaffirmations and participation in international fora discussing the topic that do not focus directly on negotiating a binding treaty, such as UNOOSA.

Thus, India receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Joy Kwak

China: 0

China has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS).

On 3 October 2023, China opened its uncrewed Chang'e-8 mission for international cooperation. This mission aims to set up a permanent habitat on the south pole of the moon and is led by the China National Space Administration (CNSA). This announcement at the 74th International Astronautical Congress in

¹⁰⁷ This US-Indian Satellite Will Monitor Earth's Changing Frozen Regions, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Pasadena) 10 January 2024. Access Date: 16 May 2024. <https://nisar.jpl.nasa.gov/news/57/this-us-indian-satellite-will-monitor-earths-changing-frozen-regions/>

¹⁰⁸ India's Intent on Debris-Free Space Missions - Explained, Indian Space Research Organisation (Bengaluru) 19 April 2024. Access Date: 16 May 2024. https://www.isro.gov.in/Debris_Free_Space_Missions.html

¹⁰⁹ Joint Statement following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 9 July 2024. Access Date: 15 September 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2031946>

¹¹⁰ Indian Government to Establish Space Startup Venture Capital Fund (Sydney) 25 July 2024. Access Date: 27 July 2024. <https://spaceanddefense.io/indian-government-to-establish-space-startup-venture-capital-fund/>

¹¹¹ Indian Space Policy 2023, India Department of Space (Bengaluru) 2023. Access Date: 16 May 2024. https://www.isro.gov.in/media_isro/pdf/IndianSpacePolicy2023.pdf

Azerbaijan demonstrates China's willingness to collaborate with states on ensuring outer space activities are sustainable from a geopolitical lens.¹¹²

On 20 October 2023, the delegation of China jointly submitted a draft treaty with the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament during a UN General Assembly debate. This treaty intends to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space, and the threat or use of force against outer space objects.¹¹³

On 25 April 2024, the CNSA underscored partnerships with their Latin American and Caribbean counterparts through the 2024 China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum Wuhan Declaration. This document promotes the development of outer space infrastructure through collaboration, while upholding UN Sustainable Development Goals.¹¹⁴

On 3 May 2024, the CNSA launched its Chang'e-6 robot from Wenchang Space Launch Center. Its mission is to collect precious rock and soil from the far side of the Moon, which faces permanently away from Earth. This work demonstrates China's ambitions to further collaborative peaceful outer space activities and will produce answers to important questions in the scientific community.¹¹⁵

On 6 May 2024, during the 78th UN General Assembly session, the delegation of China called upon the international community to preserve the "peaceful nature of outer space," noting the desire for powerful state actors to seek hegemony in the realm.¹¹⁶ The Chinese delegation emphasized the importance of updating the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space Against the Earth to reflect modern circumstances.

On 11 May 2024, China delivered Chang'e-6 mission cube satellite data to Pakistan, strengthening ties between the two states on lunar exploration.¹¹⁷

On 13 May 2024, China's first collaborative satellite with France, the Space Variable Object Monitor (SVOM), was delivered to the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan province. This development marks sixty years since China established formal diplomatic relations with France and represents continued joint efforts in peaceful outer space exploration.¹¹⁸

On 19 June 2024, the Chinese delegation to the UNCOPUOS entered a week-long round of discussions regarding the peaceful use of outer space. China emphasized the right of all countries to peacefully use space technology and is actively working to achieve sustainable development in the sector. Notably, the delegation reiterated the need to prevent the weaponization of an arms race in outer space and declared that individual countries must not be allowed to "exaggerate and abuse security threats" to influence space-related decisions.

¹¹² China offers to collaborate on lunar mission as deadlines loom, Reuters (London) 3 October 2023. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/china-offers-collaborate-lunar-mission-deadlines-loom-2023-10-03/>.

¹¹³ Debate on Disarmament Aspects of Outer Space Exposes First Committee Rift over Ways to Sustain Space Security, Prevent Domain's Weaponization, United Nations (New York) 20 October 2023. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3723.doc.htm>.

¹¹⁴ 2024 China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum Wuhan Declaration, China National Space Administration (Wuhan) 25 April 2024. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c10514240/content.html>.

¹¹⁵ China's Chang'e-6 robot lands on Moon's far side, BBC (Beijing) 2 June 2024. Access Date: 20 July 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cxeejp0y2pjo>.

¹¹⁶ 'Outer Space Should Never Be an Arena for Militarization', Delegate Tells General Assembly Debate on Moscow's Veto of Resolution Aimed at Curbing Arms Race, United Nations (New York). 6 May 2024. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12597.doc.htm>.

¹¹⁷ Update: China delivers Chang'e-6 mission cube satellite data to Pakistan, Xinhua News (Beijing) 11 May 2024. Access Date: 20 July 2024. <https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c10529860/content.html>.

¹¹⁸ China-France 60 Years On: SVOM collaboration satellite ready to be delivered to launch center, Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai Municipality (Shanghai) 13 May 2024. Access Date: 20 July 2024. <https://stcsm.sh.gov.cn/news/20240513/29387a4dcedb458a865ba84c1b729fa7.html>.

This exemplifies China's verbal commitment to peaceful outer space activities, and their intolerance for actors who break this international standard.¹¹⁹

On 25 June 2024, China's Chang'e-6 returned from the far side of the Moon, carrying 1935.3 grams of samples. It landed in Siziwang Banner and was then delivered to Beijing, where the lunar samples were collected. This landing marks a successful mission led by China, in collaboration with the European Space Agency, France, Italy, and Pakistan.¹²⁰

On 23 July 2024, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted 19 recommendations for commitments to be made during preparatory sessions leading up to the 2026 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).¹²¹ Among these, the Ministry calls upon NPT signatories to commit to peaceful uses of outer space and to support ongoing work at the Conference on Disarmament to produce a legally binding PAROS treaty.

China has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of PAROS. China has taken strong action toward ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities through modelling peaceful space uses and facilitating peaceful space uses by other states; however, China took weak action in preventing an arms race in outer space.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Amelia Hui

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On 24 October 2023, Chair of the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) and South African representative Mathu Joyini emphasized the cruciality of peaceful uses of outer space, and proper legal and policy frameworks, to reaching the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Joyini also affirmed that the sustainability of outer space activities is necessary for ensuring the future viability of space assets.

On 19 January 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa reaffirmed South Africa's commitment to peace and non-proliferation in a speech at the 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, saying that disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control are imperative to ensure a secure world.¹²²

On 1 February 2024, South Africa, as part of the delegation from the Africa Group to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), encouraged states to work exclusively toward the peaceful use of outer space and maintained that an arms race to space is contrary to the principle of peaceful uses of outer space. Their joint statement urged other countries at the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee

¹¹⁹李松大使在联合国外空委第67届会议 - 上的一般性发言, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2024 (Vienna) 19 June 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/2024/statements/5_China.pdf.

¹²⁰China's Chang'e-6 collects 1,935.3 grams of samples from moon's far side, Xinhua News (Beijing) 29 June 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. <https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c10573163/content.html>.

¹²¹ Nuclear arms control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People's Republic of China (Beijing) 23 July 2024. Access Date: 15 September 2024.

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg_663340/jks_665232/kjfywj_665252/202407/t20240723_11458633.html

¹²² Country statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa during 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, South African Government (Pretoria) 19 January 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-country-statement-during-19th-summit-non-aligned-movement>

meeting for 2024 to increase cooperation between UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) and the African Union Commission (AUC) including through a stronger legal framework.¹²³

On 26 February 2024, South African Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Rapulane Molekane submitted South Africa's Instrument of Acceptance of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi.¹²⁴ This commits South Africa to accept the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which stipulates the inclusion of "physical protection requirements for nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transportation[as well as] criminalizes offences related to illicit trafficking and sabotage of nuclear material or nuclear facilities."

On 27 February 2024, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Grace Naledi Mandisa Pandor announced at the Conference on Disarmament that South Africa would continue to commit to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.¹²⁵ She expressed regret that there are items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament that have not been engaged with, such as a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which it worried would contribute to further conflict in the future.

On 19 April 2024, a South African representative noted at the General Debate of the UN Disarmament Commission that urgent progress must be made on the Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and urged a review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.¹²⁶

On 26 April 2024, a South African representative remarked to the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS's 63rd Session that "As a party to four UN Treaties South Africa is committed to the development of these frameworks for the peaceful use of outer space" and that it is necessary for actors to conform to international space law and relevant UN guidelines to safeguard the peaceful use of outer space.¹²⁷ The representative also announced to the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space's 63rd Session that South Africa's Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Competition hosted the 2023 Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot Court for university law students across Africa, and will be hosting the 2024 regional space law moot courts as well to build capacity in space law understanding and implementation.

On 22 May 2024, South Africa's Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Competition hosted the 2024 Africa Round of the Manfred Lachs Moot Court Competition to build capacity in space law understanding and

¹²³ Africa Group Statement for the Sixty-First Session of the Scientific and Technical Sub-committee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNOOSA (Vienna) 9 February 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/stsc/2024/Statements/4_AfricanGroup.pdf

¹²⁴ South Africa deposits Instrument of Acceptance of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Pretoria) 26 February 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://dirco.gov.za/south-africa-deposits-instrument-of-acceptance-of-the-amendment-to-the-convention-on-the-physical-protection-of-nuclear-material/>

¹²⁵ Statement by H.E. Dr Grace Naledi Mandisa Pandor Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa to the High-Level Segment of the 2024 Conference on Disarmament, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Pretoria) 27 February 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://dirco.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Country-Statement-by-Minister-Naledi-Pandor-High-Level-Segment-of-the-2024-Conferene-on-Disarmament-in-Geneva-27-February-2024.pdf>

¹²⁶ Statement by South Africa during the General Debate of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, UN Journal (Vienna). 19 April 2024. Access Date: 16 May 2024. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/12.0090/2024040111000000/toT68F79ptRD/q3zahngCKHYF_en.pdf

¹²⁷ Statement by the Republic of South Africa, South African Council for Space Affairs (Pretoria) 15-26 April 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. http://www.sacsa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/LSC_Agenda-6_Desk.pdf

implementation in university students.¹²⁸ South Africa also hosted the Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot Court in 2023.

On 23 May 2024, a South African delegation participated in the BRICS Joint Committee on Space Cooperation. During the Committee, a draft joint statement was introduced, which mentioned “unit[ing] in preventing the deployment of any weaponry in space and to abstain from actions that could jeopardise the integrity of the space environment and the enduring viability of space missions” and “refraining from utilising civilian space infrastructure for undisclosed purposes”.¹²⁹ During the meeting, Russia proposed the establishment of a BRICS space council, to which South African National Space Agency (SANSA) CEO Humbulani Mudau stated that “We see the Russian proposal to create a BRICS space council. We will develop our cooperation in this direction; South Africa supports this initiative.”¹³⁰ At the Committee, SANSA also signed Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with the Space Science and Geospatial Institute of Ethiopia and the Institute of Biomedical Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences to encourage closer bilateral partnerships in space initiatives.

On 10 June 2024, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of BRICS countries produced a Joint Statement emphasizing their support for “ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and of its weaponization.”¹³¹ While the Ministers agreed that the Outer Space Treaty (OST) contains PAROS-related provisions, they stressed the “need to discuss a legal multilateral instrument on PAROS.” They also emphasized in the Statement that “practical and non-binding and voluntary commitments such as Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs), may also contribute to PAROS.”

On 28 August 2024, SANSA hosted the National Space Conference in Pretoria, with the theme “Space Science and Innovation for Sustainability.”¹³² The agenda includes various plenaries and networking sessions to connect public and private stakeholders and facilitate sustainable uses of outer space.¹³³

South Africa has partially complied with ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of PAROS. In the first area of compliance, long-term sustainability of space activities, South Africa has taken strong action, through ratifying a relevant bilateral or multilateral treaty by handing over South Africa’s Instrument of Acceptance of the Amendment to the CPPNM to the IAEA. In the second area, concerning PAROS and the negotiation of a relevant multilateral treaty, South Africa takes primarily weak action in complying with this commitment. South Africa’s encouragement of cooperation between UNOOSA and the AUC through a stronger legal framework at COPUOS and fielding of a delegation to the UN Conference on Disarmament are examples of relevant actions, though South Africa has ratified or signed no relevant agreements this cycle. Various verbal reaffirmations are noted under both domains.

¹²⁸ Africa Round of the Manfred Lachs Moot Court Competition, held virtually, by Judges seating at the CSIR Knowledge Commons from 22nd– 24th May 2024, South African Council for Space Affairs (Pretoria) 12 June 2024. Access Date: 27 July 2024 <http://www.sacsa.gov.za/africa-round-of-the-manfred-lachs-moot-court-competition-held-virtually-by-judges-seating-at-the-csir-knowledge-commons-from-22nd-24th-may-2024/>

¹²⁹Excerpts from the BRICS Heads of Space Agencies Meeting, Space in Africa (Lagos) 25 May 2024. Access Date: 27 July 2024. (<https://spaceinafrica.com/2024/05/25/excerpts-from-the-brics-heads-of-space-agencies-meeting/>)

¹³⁰ BRICS Joint Committee on Space Cooperation held recently in Russia, South African National Space Agency (Centurion) 10 June 2024. Access Date: 27 July 2024. (<https://www.sansa.org.za/2024/06/brics-joint-committee-on-space-cooperation-held-recently-in-russia/>)

¹³¹ Joint Statement of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations, Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India (New Delhi) 10 June 2024. Access Date: 27 July 2024. (<https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37860/Joint+Statement+of+the+BRICS+Ministers+of+Foreign+AffairsInternational+Relations>)

¹³² National Space Conference, South African Council for Space Affairs (Pretoria) 23 August 2024. Access Date: 15 September 2024. <http://www.sacsa.gov.za/national-space-conference/>

¹³³ National Space Conference 2024, Space Science for Innovation and Sustainability, Event Programme, Department of Science and Innovation (Pretoria) n.d. Access Date: 15 September 2024. <http://www.sacsa.gov.za/national-space-conference/>

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Joy Kwak

3. Crime and Corruption: Illicit Financial Flows

“We will enhance international cooperation through collaborative information-sharing networks, and mutual legal assistance to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets subject to domestic laws and regulations of BRICS countries.”

XV BRICS Summit: Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil		0	
Russia	-1		
India	-1		
China		0	
South Africa	-1		
Average		-0.60 (20%)	

Background

The five BRICS members are parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the only legally binding universal anti-corruption instrument.¹³⁴ The Convention focuses on five main areas of work: preventive measures, criminalization and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange. As UNCAC parties, the BRICS countries have consistently placed anti-corruption on the agenda of their leaders’ summits.

On 27 March 2013, the BRICS leaders adopted the eThekweni Declaration, listing anti-corruption as a new area of cooperation to be explored.¹³⁵

On 15 July 2014, the BRICS leaders committed “to combat domestic and foreign bribery, and strengthen international cooperation, including law enforcement cooperation, in accordance with multilaterally established principles and norms, especially the UNCAC.”¹³⁶ This represents the first explicit commitment to anti-corruption made by BRICS leaders.

On 9 July 2015, BRICS leaders declared corruption a legal challenge requiring international cooperation and reaffirmed their commitment to the UNCAC.¹³⁷ Additionally, they announced the establishment of a BRICS Working Group on Anti-Corruption Cooperation.

On 1 November 2015, the BRICS Working Group on Anti-Corruption convened for the first time in Antalya, Türkiye.¹³⁸ The Working Group expressed its intention to work with the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group and other relevant multilateral fora.

On 16 October 2016, the BRICS leaders stated: “we support the strengthening of international cooperation against corruption, including through the BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group, as well as on matters related to asset recovery and persons sought for corruption.”¹³⁹

¹³⁴ United Nations Convention against Corruption, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (New York City) 14 December 2005. Access Date: 28 December 2020. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/uncac.html>

¹³⁵ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation, BRICS Information Centre (Durban) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

¹³⁶ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

¹³⁷ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 22 January 2024. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

¹³⁸ Media Note on the Informal Meeting of the BRICS Leaders on the Margins of the G20 Summit in Antalya, BRICS Information Centre (Antalya) 15 November 2015. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/151115-antalya.html>

On 4 September 2017, BRICS leaders met for the ninth BRICS summit in Xiamen, China. They declared their support for enhancing BRICS anti-corruption cooperation and reaffirmed their commitment to experience-sharing and compiling a compendium on fighting corruption. They also reiterated their support for strengthening anti-corruption collaboration through the BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group and based on the UNCAC and other international legal instruments.¹⁴⁰

On 27 July 2018, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to international cooperation within the framework of Chapter IV of UNCAC and committed to strengthening international cooperation under the BRICS Working Group on Anti-Corruption Cooperation, stating that “subject to our domestic legal systems, we will cooperate in an anti-corruption law enforcement, extradition of fugitives, economic and corruption offenders and repatriation in matters relating to assets recovery and other related criminal and non-criminal matters involving corruption and call on the international community to deny safe haven to corrupt persons and proceeds of corruption.”¹⁴¹

On 28 June 2019, the BRICS leaders held an informal meeting on the margins of the G20 summit and reaffirmed their commitment to fighting corruption, promoting international anti-corruption cooperation, strengthening legal frameworks, improving mutual efforts in prosecuting corrupt persons, and “recogniz[ing] the need to strengthen cooperation, subject to domestic legal systems, in anti-corruption law enforcement, extradition of fugitives, economic and corruption offenders, and in recovering stolen assets.”¹⁴²

On 26 July 2019, the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Relations reiterated their commitment “to strengthen[ing] the legal framework related to the resolution of cases of corruption, in accordance with the UNCAC and other multilateral principles and norms.”¹⁴³

On 14 November 2019, the BRICS leaders stated their “commitment to fight corruption, inter alia, through the strengthening of domestic legal frameworks, as appropriate, to more effectively address cases of corruption. We remain committed to adopting integrity measures in the public sector and promoting integrity standards in private enterprises and to build a stronger global commitment to a culture of intolerance towards corruption. We will maintain our ongoing efforts on anti-corruption law enforcement cooperation and returning of assets, including on civil and administrative proceedings. We will make full use of the BRICS Meeting on Asset Recovery and strengthen experience-sharing and case-cooperation on asset recovery among BRICS countries. We will enhance our exchange of views within multilateral frameworks such as UNCAC and the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, with the aim of joining efforts in denying safe haven to economic and corruption offenders and to facilitate the repatriation of proceeds of crime.”¹⁴⁴

On 4 September 2020, the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Relations met virtually as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and reaffirmed “their commitment to promote international anti-corruption cooperation and strengthen BRICS collaboration, subject to domestic legal systems, on issues

¹³⁹ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

¹⁴⁰ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

¹⁴¹ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

¹⁴² Joint Statement on BRICS Leaders’ Informal Meeting on the Margins of G20 Summit, BRICS Information Centre (Osaka) 28 June 2019. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/190628-osaka.html>

¹⁴³ Media Statement: Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations, BRICS Information Centre (Rio de Janeiro) 26 July 2019. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/190726-foreign.html>

¹⁴⁴ Brasilia Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasil.html>

related to anti-corruption law enforcement, including on extradition of fugitives, economics and corruption offenders and in recovering stolen assets.”¹⁴⁵

On 17 November 2020, the BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to promote international cooperation in anti-corruption, especially “in light of the 2021 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly against corruption, strengthen BRICS collaboration, including within multilateral frameworks, subject to domestic legal systems, on all issues related to anti-corruption law enforcement, including on matters related to asset recovery and denying safe haven to corrupt persons and proceeds of corruption.”¹⁴⁶

On 9 September 2021, BRICS leaders adopted the New Delhi Declaration, in which they stated: “we reaffirm stronger cooperation and commitment to action on international anti-corruption issues, including within multilateral frameworks, subject to domestic legal systems, especially on matters related to asset recovery, denying safe havens to corrupt persons and identification of proceeds of corruption. We will continue to enhance anti-corruption capacity building through various education and training programs. We welcome the 2021 special session of the UN General Assembly on challenges and measures to prevent and combat corruption and strengthen international cooperation, and reiterate our commitment to implement its political declaration.”¹⁴⁷

On 23 June 2022, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to “strengthening international cooperation against corruption.” They further welcomed the BRICS Initiative on Denial of Safe Haven to Corruption and the first BRICS Anti-Corruption Ministerial Meeting, further committing to “strengthen anti-corruption capacity building through education and training programs and enhance anti-corruption exchanges and cooperation within multilateral frameworks.”¹⁴⁸

On 23 August 2023, the BRICS leaders met for the 15th BRICS summit in Johannesburg, reaffirming their commitment to “strengthen international cooperation and our collaboration against corruption and continue to implement the relevant international agreements in this regard, in particular the United Nations Convention against Corruption.” They pledged to “enhance international cooperation through collaborative information-sharing networks, and mutual legal assistance to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigations, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets subject to domestic laws and regulations of BRICS countries.”¹⁴⁹

Commitment Features

This BRICS commitment reads: “We will enhance international cooperation through collaborative information-sharing networks, and mutual legal assistance to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets subject to domestic laws and regulations of BRICS countries.”¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ From coronavirus to terrorism to trade: What was discussed at BRICS meet, India Today (New Delhi) 5 September 2020. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/from-coronavirus-terrorism-trade-what-discussed-brics-meet-1718897-2020-09-05>

¹⁴⁶ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

¹⁴⁷ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (New Delhi) 9 September 2021. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

¹⁴⁸ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Group (Beijing) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

¹⁴⁹ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://brics2023.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Jhb-II-Declaration-24-August-2023-1.pdf>

¹⁵⁰ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://brics2023.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Jhb-II-Declaration-24-August-2023-1.pdf>

Definitions and Concepts

The word “enhance” means “to heighten or intensify.”¹⁵¹ “International cooperation” is defined as a “common effort” or “association of persons for common benefit” on the international scale.¹⁵² “Collaborative” signifies “involving two or more people working together for a special purpose.”¹⁵³ “Information-sharing” is defined as “the fact of different departments, companies, etc. using the same information.”¹⁵⁴ “Networks” refers to “a large system consisting of many similar parts that are connected together to allow movement or communication between or along the parts.”¹⁵⁵

“Mutual legal assistance” refers to “a process by which States seek for and provide assistance to other states in servicing of judicial document and gathering evidence.”¹⁵⁶

“Combat” refers to striving to reduce or eliminate.¹⁵⁷ “Illicit” is defined as “not permitted” or “unlawful.”¹⁵⁸ “Financial flows” signifies “a situation in which a large amount of money or goods moves from one company, organisation, or place to another.”¹⁵⁹

“Countering” refers to acting in opposition to something, offsetting or nullifying.¹⁶⁰ “Safe havens” refers to a place that allows corrupt individuals to live with impunity.¹⁶¹

“Support” in means the BRICS member should assist or provide aid in the investigation, prosecution and recovery phases of asset recovery.¹⁶² “Investigation” refers to “the act or process of examining a crime, problem, statement, etc. carefully, especially to discover the truth.”¹⁶³ “Prosecution” is defined by “the act of officially accusing someone of committing an illegal act, esp. by bringing a case against that person in a court of law.”¹⁶⁴ “Recovery of stolen assets” refers to “the process by which the proceeds of corruption transferred abroad are recovered and repatriated to the country from which they were taken or to their rightful owners.”

¹⁵¹Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 2 February 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

¹⁵²Definition of cooperation, Merriam-Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 26 June 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cooperation>

¹⁵³Definition of collaborative, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 24 June 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/collaborative>

¹⁵⁴Definition of information sharing, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 24 June 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/information-sharing>

¹⁵⁵Definition of network, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 24 June 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/network?q=Networks>

¹⁵⁶Mutual legal assistance (MLA), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Rome) May 2018. <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-11/key-issues/mutual-legal-assistance.html>

¹⁵⁷Definition of combat, Merriam-Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 26 June 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/combat>

¹⁵⁸ Definition of illicit, Merriam-Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/illicit>

¹⁵⁹Definition of flow, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 24 June 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/flow>

¹⁶⁰ Definition of counter, Merriam-Webster (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/counter>

¹⁶¹ BRICS Initiative on Denial of Safe Haven to Corruption, BRICS 2022 China (Beijing) June 2022. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/dtxw/202206/P020220608765769502751.pdf>

¹⁶² Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 2 February 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

¹⁶³ Definition of investigation, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/investigation>

¹⁶⁴ Definition of prosecution, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/prosecution>

“Subject to domestic laws and regulations of BRICS countries” means that actions taken towards this commitment must be “contingent on”¹⁶⁵ the current laws and regulations provided by the legal regimes of the BRICS members.

General Interpretive Guidelines

Through both “collaborative information-sharing networks” and “mutual legal assistance,” the commitment stipulates three main areas of work in anti-corruption for BRICS countries: 1) combatting illicit financial flows, 2) countering safe havens, and 3) supporting the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets. Moreover, the commitment aims to “enhance international cooperation,” meaning that only actions that are bilateral or multilateral in nature on an international level can count towards compliance.

Both components – collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance – must be satisfied in each of the three pillars of the commitment, in order for the BRICS member to score full compliance. In addition, given the strong action verb leading the commitment, verbal reaffirmations of the commitment text or passive participation in international meetings on anti-corruption do not constitute sufficient evidence for full compliance. Policy actions that contribute to compliance must demonstrate a certain level of significance and concrete decision. For example, BRICS members can fulfill the “collaborative information-sharing networks” by launching a research platform with other countries. On the other hand, BRICS members can participate in legal assistance programs in partnership with other countries to fulfill the “mutual legal assistance” criterion.

First, the BRICS member must demonstrate actions in both collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance in combatting illicit financial flows. To comply with the first dimension of this commitment, for example, BRICS members can take actions to combat illicit financial flows by creating initiatives that aim to increase fiscal transparency. BRICS members can also collaborate with other governments on creating an independent body that seeks to identify suspicious financial transactions and publicize payments between the public and private sectors.¹⁶⁶

Second, the commitment stipulates that the BRICS leaders commit to collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance on countering safe havens. BRICS members can comply with this dimension by denying entry or visas to individuals alleged to be engaged in corrupt activities or creating legal frameworks that facilitate denial of entry to corrupt individuals and groups.¹⁶⁷

Third, the commitment states that the BRICS members must “support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets.” To fulfill this third pillar of the commitment, for example, BRICS members can engage in actions that support the return of stolen property obtained using corrupt methods and cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of offenses regarding stolen assets.¹⁶⁸ This dimension of the commitment requires BRICS members to take action in all three phases of asset recovery. For example, if a BRICS member takes action in the investigation of stolen assets and prosecution of a suspected corrupt person, but has not taken action to recover the stolen assets, then the BRICS member will only receive a partial compliance score.

For full compliance, a BRICS member must take strong action to fulfil all three components of the commitment, and through both collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance.

¹⁶⁵Definition of subject, Merriam-Websters (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 24 June 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subject>

¹⁶⁶ Illicit financial flows and measures to counter them: An introduction, Anti-Corruption Resource Center (Bergen) 8 October 2012. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://www.u4.no/publications/illicit-financial-flows-and-measures-to-counter-them-an-introduction>

¹⁶⁷ G20 Common Principles for Actions: Denial of Safe Haven, Transparency International (Berlin) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/guide/international-anti-corruption-commitments/8275>

¹⁶⁸ Convention highlights, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (New York City) n.d. Access Date: 22 January 2024. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/convention-highlights.html>

If a BRICS member only takes strong action in one or two of the three components, or weak action (for example, only mutual legal assistance and no collaborative information-sharing networks across the three components), the BRICS member would score a 0 for partial compliance.

If a BRICS member takes no action to advance any component of the commitment, it would be assigned a score of -1 for non-compliance. Similarly, if the BRICS member takes action against the objective of this commitment, it is considered non-compliant.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member did not take any action on any of the three components of 1) combating illicit financial flows, 2) countering safe havens, or 3) supporting the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets.
0	The BRICS member took strong action on one or two of the three components of 1) combating illicit financial flows, 2) countering safe havens, or 3) supporting the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets, or took weak on any or all of the three components.
+1	The BRICS member took strong action on all three components of 1) combating illicit financial flows, 2) countering safe havens, or 3) supporting the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets.

*Affiliated Co-Chair: Pantéa Jamshidi Nouri
Compliance Director and Lead Analyst: Sara Cai*

Brazil: 0

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to enhance international cooperation through collaborative information-sharing networks, and mutual legal assistance to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets subject to domestic laws and regulations of BRICS countries.

On 31 August 2023, Minister of the Comptroller General of the Union (CGU) Vinícius de Carvalho participated in a global conference organized by the United Nations on the use of data to combat transnational corruption.¹⁶⁹ This conference focused on measuring and evaluating corruption and aimed to provide participants with a platform to share policies and programs.

On 13 October 2023, Brazil assumed the presidency of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group.¹⁷⁰ Later, Brazil announced that formulating and implementing principles, standards and international instruments, particularly in the UN for preventing corruption and recovering assets would be the overall coordination priority of its presidency.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ Ministro da CGU participa da Conferência Global, em Viena, sobre a utilização de dados para a melhoria da mensuração da corrupção, Controladoria-Geral da União (Brasília) 31 August 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2023/08/ministro-da-cgu-participa-da-conferencia-global-em-viena-sobre-a-utilizacao-de-dados-para-a-melhoria-da-mensuracao-da-corrupcao>

¹⁷⁰ Brasil anuncia em reunião da OCDE que irá presidir o Grupo Anticorrupção do G20 durante o ano de 2024, Controladoria-Geral da União (Brasília) 13 October 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2023/10/brasil-anuncia-em-reuniao-da-ocde-que-ira-presidir-o-grupo-anticorrupcao-do-g20-durante-o-ano-de-2024>

¹⁷¹ Brasil announces priorities during the presidency of the Anti-Corruption WG of the G20, G20 Brasil (Brasília) 14 December 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.g20.org/en/news/brazil-announces-priorities-during-the-presidency-of-the-anti-corruption-wg-of-the-g20>

On 9 November 2023, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJPS) met with representatives from nine Southern Common Market (Mercosur) countries.¹⁷² The parties discussed various proposals for strengthening legal cooperation between Mercosur members, the creation of an international police community in the Americas (Ameripol), joint intelligence action against digital criminal processes, and drafting a treaty on collaborative action against transnational crime.

On 16 November 2023, officials from the CGU participated in a multinational meeting between the Network of Agents to Combat Transnational Bribery in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹⁷³ This meeting focused on reviewing challenges and possible training and improvements to international cooperation towards the investigation and prosecution of transnational corruption.

On 18 February 2024, the CGU signed a memorandum of understanding with the African Union on collaboration in the fight against corruption.¹⁷⁴ The agreement lays out a foundation for future joint actions and serves as an exchange of experiences and strategies for combatting corruption.

On 25 March 2024, the MJPS hosted an event to discuss Brazil's new national asset recovery policy and national asset recovery policies in Latin American countries on the sidelines of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group. The event aimed to exchange experiences regarding asset recovery and good practices among event attendees.¹⁷⁵

On 12 April 2024, the MJPS participated in the 18th conference of the Ministers of Justice representing eight countries from the Community of Countries of Official Portuguese Language.¹⁷⁶ During the meeting, officials discussed combatting transnational organized crime and corruption via continued investment into technologies allowing for greater digital information transparency and security.

On 26 April 2024, the MJPS signed a letter of intent with the United Kingdom National Crime Agency.¹⁷⁷ The two parties declared their intention to work more closely together to police transnational crimes including illicit financial activities such as money laundering.

On 15 May 2024, the Brazilian government in partnership with the government of Mozambique organized an anti-crime technical training session.¹⁷⁸ Brazilian authorities trained Mozambican public servants on how to identify and combat money laundering and corruption, among other transnational criminal acts.

¹⁷² Ministros dos países do Mercosul se reúnem em Brasília para fortalecer a cooperação contra o crime organizado, Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública (Brasília) 9 November 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/ministros-dos-paises-do-mercosul-se-reunem-em-brasilia-para-fortalecer-a-cooperacao-contra-o-crime-organizado>

¹⁷³ CGU participa de reunião da Rede de Agentes de Combate ao Suborno Transnacional da América Latina e Caribe, Controladoria Geral da União (Brasília) 16 November 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2023/11/cgu-participou-de-reuniao-da-rede-de-agentes-de-combate-ao-suborno-transnacional-da-america-latina-e-caribe>

¹⁷⁴ Brasil fortalece laços e ações anticorrupção com países africanos, Controladoria Geral da União (Brasília) 18 February 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2024/02/brasil-fortalece-lacos-e-aco-es-anticorruptao-com-paises-africanos>

¹⁷⁵ MJSP hosts G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group event, Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Brasília) 25 March 2024. Access Date: 10 September 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/mjsp-e-sede-de-evento-do-grupo-de-trabalho-anticorruptao-do-g20>

¹⁷⁶ Brasil reforça cooperação internacional com países da língua portuguesa no âmbito da Justiça, Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública (Brasília) 12 April 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/brasil-reforca-cooperacao-internacional-com-paises-da-lingua-portuguesa-no-ambito-da-justica>

¹⁷⁷ Lewandowski e Andrei Rodrigues firmam acordo de cooperação policial em Londres, Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública (Brasília) 26 April 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/lewandowski-e-andrei-rodrigues-firmam-acordo-de-cooperacao-policial-em-londres>

On 24 June 2024, Minister Carvalho met with other members of GTAC for a second technical meeting.¹⁷⁹ During this meeting they debated approaches towards combatting corruption, namely the merits of using of positive reinforcement to encourage the private sector to foster integrity versus focusing on sanctioning of illicit commercial dealings.

On 29 July 2024, a delegation from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security met with their American counterparts to discuss a partnership to combat illegal economic activities.¹⁸⁰ The two parties sought greater alignment to enforce environmental regulations and in particular dissuade corruption and money laundering in the timber and cattle sectors.

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to enhance international cooperation through collaborative information-sharing networks, and mutual legal assistance to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets subject to domestic laws and regulations of BRICS countries. Brazil has established multilateral collaboration with a variety of countries and international organizations to combat corruption and transnational monetary crimes. They have invested into training and technology to improve investigative detection capabilities, cooperated in international strategic and legal information sharing, and taken a leadership role in spearheading international policy on combatting transnational crime. However, they have failed to take strong action to specifically address and root out safe havens.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Sara Cai

Russia: -1

Russia has not complied with its commitment to enhance international cooperation to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets through collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance.

On 17 November 2023, Russia participated in the fifth Meeting of BRICS Heads of Prosecution Services, held under the theme “Strengthening international cooperation in respect of complex transnational crimes with an emphasis on asset recovery.”¹⁸¹ This meeting focused on exchanging best practices, enhancing cooperation through collaborative information-sharing networks, and building cooperation on issues of legal assistance among BRICS nations.

On 17-18 of April 2024, the Government of Russia hosted the first BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group meeting in Moscow.¹⁸² The meeting focused on enhancing collaborative efforts among BRICS members to

¹⁷⁸ Missão técnica planeja terceira etapa de capacitação de magistrados de Moçambique, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (Brasília) 15 May 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/abc/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/missao-tecnica-planeja-terceira-etapa-de-capacitacao-de-magistrados-de-mocambique>

¹⁷⁹ Brasil é elogiado pelos países membros do G20 por iniciativas em medidas de integridade e inteligência artificial, Controladoria Geral da União (Brasília) 28 June 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 20 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2024/06/brasil-e-elogiado-pelos-paises-membros-do-g20-por-iniciativas-em-medidas-de-integridade-e-inteligencia-artificial>

¹⁸⁰ Brasil e EUA alinham estratégias de combate à corrupção e à lavagem de dinheiro em crimes ambientais, Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública (Brasília) 29 July 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 31 August 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/brasil-e-eua-alinham-estrategias-de-combate-a-corrupcao-e-a-lavagem-de-dinheiro-em-crimes-ambientais>

¹⁸¹ BRICS nations' prosecution bodies commit to enhance cooperation, South African Government News (Pretoria) 22 August 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/brics-nations-prosecution-bodies-commit-enhance-cooperation>

¹⁸² First BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group Meeting, BRICS Russia 2024 (Moscow) 5 December 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://brics-russia2024.ru/en/news/zasedanie-antikorruptsionnoy-rabochey-gruppy/>

combat corruption through information-sharing and mutual legal assistance. This event aimed to provide members with strategies and knowledge to strengthen their anti-corruption frameworks and promote joint initiatives to tackle corruption effectively.

On 7 June 2024, Russia chaired the second meeting of the BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group, focusing on enhancing international cooperation to tackle corruption.¹⁸³ During the meeting, participants discussed common approaches to intensifying cooperation in fighting corruption and asset recovery. The agenda included the development of anti-corruption education, continuing professional training, and a special event on anti-corruption education and professional training, supported by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Russia has not complied with its commitment to enhance international cooperation to tackle crime and corruption. Despite the Russian Government's participation in BRICS working groups focused on combating corruption through collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance, these efforts have not led to significant, concrete actions that address any of the three components of the commitment through international cooperation.

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Divvy Gupta

India: -1

India has not complied with its commitment to enhancing international cooperation to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets through collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance.

On 17 November 2023, India actively participated in the fifth Meeting of BRICS Heads of Prosecution Services under the theme "Strengthening international cooperation in respect of complex transnational crimes with an emphasis on asset recovery."¹⁸⁴ This meeting focused on enhancing collaboration among BRICS members through information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance to effectively combat transnational crimes and recover stolen assets.

On the 17-18 April 2024, India actively participated in the first BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group meeting held in Russia.¹⁸⁵ This conference aimed to enhance collaboration among BRICS countries in combating corruption through information-sharing and mutual legal assistance. India, along with other BRICS members, discussed strategies to strengthen international cooperation in addressing corruption and improving legal frameworks to effectively recover stolen assets.

On 7 June 2024, India attended the second BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group meeting held under the Russian chairmanship in Vienna.¹⁸⁶ The meeting focused on drafting a key position document on enhancing the effectiveness of anti-corruption cooperation and asset recovery. Discussions included the Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption and organizing anti-corruption education and training events in cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

¹⁸³ Second BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group Meeting, BRICS Russia 2024 (Moscow) 7 June 2024. Access Date: 20 July 2024. <https://brics-russia2024.ru/en/news/o-vtorom-zasedanii-antikorrupcionnoy-rabochey-gruppy-briks-pod-rossiyskim-predsdatelstvom/>

¹⁸⁴ BRICS nations' prosecution bodies commit to enhance cooperation, South African Government News (Pretoria) 22 August 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/brics-nations-prosecution-bodies-commit-enhance-cooperation>

¹⁸⁵ First BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group Meeting, BRICS Russia 2024 (Moscow) 5 December 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://brics-russia2024.ru/en/news/zasedanie-antikorrupcionnoy-rabochey-gruppy/>

¹⁸⁶ Second BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group Meeting, BRICS Russia 2024 (Moscow) 7 June 2024. Access Date: 20 July 2024. <https://brics-russia2024.ru/en/news/o-vtorom-zasedanii-antikorrupcionnoy-rabochey-gruppy-briks-pod-rossiyskim-predsdatelstvom/>

India has not complied with its commitment to enhance international cooperation to tackle crime and corruption. India attended international meetings on anti-corruption to discuss asset recovery strategies during the Anti-Corruption Working Group and discussed enhancing collaboration during the fifth Meeting of BRICS Heads of Prosecution Services. However, these are not strong actions and additional steps are needed to fully address all components of the commitment through comprehensive international cooperation.

Thus, India receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Divvy Gupta

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to enhancing international cooperation to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets through collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance.

On 16 November 2023, the Chief Grand Prosecutor and Prosecutor General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate of China Ying Yong virtually attended the fifth Meeting of the Heads of Prosecution Services of the BRICS.¹⁸⁷ Ying Yong stated China's willingness to share experiences to enhance members' understanding of issues requiring mutual legal assistance including combating transnational crime such as money laundering and recovering illegal assets.

On 17 December 2023, the State Council introduced new rules in a decree on the supervision and administration of non-bank payment institutions.¹⁸⁸ The new rules are meant in part to guard against illicit fundraising, money laundering and other criminal activities in addition to facilitating the sound and stable development of the sector.

China has partially complied with the commitment to enhance international cooperation to deal with crime and corruption. Although China has not taken significant steps to enhance international cooperation, they have publicly restated their support within BRICS working groups. Further, China has taken a step domestically to combat illicit financial flows by putting in place new regulations around non-bank payment institutions.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: JR Wikkerink

South Africa: -1

South Africa has not complied with its commitment to enhancing international cooperation to combat illicit financial flows, counter safe havens and support the investigation, prosecution and recovery of stolen assets through collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance.

On 17 November 2023, the Government of South Africa participated in the fifth Meeting of BRICS Heads of Prosecution Services under the theme "Strengthening international cooperation in respect of complex transnational crimes, with an emphasis on asset recovery."¹⁸⁹ As part of the meeting, the need to exchange

¹⁸⁷Ying Yong attends the 5th Meeting of the Heads of Prosecution Services of the BRICS Countries via video and delivers opening remarks and keynote speech, en.spp.gov.cn (Beijing) 16 November, 2023. Access Date: 12 May 2024. https://en.spp.gov.cn/2023-11/16/c_950759.htm

¹⁸⁸China issues rules on supervision, administration of non-bank payment institutions, The State Council of The People's Republic of China (Beijing) 17 December 2023. Access Date: 12 May 2024, http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202312/17/content_WS657ea0e5c6d0868f4e8e244f.html

¹⁸⁹BRICS nations' prosecution bodies commit to enhance cooperation, South African Government News Agency (Pretoria) 17 November 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/brics-nations-prosecution-bodies-commit-enhance-cooperation>

best practices, strengthen cooperation through collaborative information-sharing networks and build cooperation on issues of legal assistance was reiterated.

On 15 December 2023, Minister of Justice and Correctional Services Ronald Lamola addressed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.¹⁹⁰As part of his speech, he expressed appreciation for the work done by the Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for Southern Africa to eliminate safe havens in the region.

On the 17-18 of April 2024, the BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group met to focus on enhancing asset recovery across borders, strengthening international cooperation in fighting corruption and addressing the implementation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.¹⁹¹ South Africa recommitted their support for a common position on asset recovery and further recommended developing a BRICS network for rapid information sharing.

South Africa has not complied with the commitment to enhance international corruption to deal with crime and corruption. The Government of South Africa has taken part in working groups organized between BRICS countries to discuss combatting corruption through collaborative information-sharing networks and mutual legal assistance. However, this has not resulted in strong, tangible action to fulfill any of the three components of the commitment through international cooperation.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of -1.

Analyst: JR Wikkerink

¹⁹⁰Minister Ronald Lamola: United Nations Convention Against Corruption, South African Government (Pretoria) 15 December 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-ronald-lamola-united-nations-convention-against-corruption-15-dec-2023>

¹⁹¹South Africa attends first BRICS Anti-Corruption Working Group Meeting in Russia, Department of Public Service South Africa (Pretoria) 29 April 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.dpsa.gov.za/thepublicservant/2024/04/29/south-africa-attends-first-brics-anti-corruption-working-group-meeting-in-russia/>

4. Food and Agriculture: Agricultural Cooperation and Sustainable Agriculture

“Recognizing that BRICS countries produce one third of the world’s food, we reaffirm our commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide.”

XV BRICS Summit: Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

Country	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil			+1
Russia		0	
India			+1
China			+1
South Africa			+1
Average	+0.80 (90%)		

Background

Food and agriculture first appeared in the BRICS summit communiqués in 2009. With BRICS members providing one third of the world’s food supply, strengthening agricultural cooperation and promoting rural development represent significant areas of collaboration among the BRICS members.

On 16 June 2009, the BRICS adopted the Joint Statement on Food Security, in which they acknowledged the effects of the global financial crisis on food security and called for multilateral efforts as a response.¹⁹²

On 26 March 2010, the first meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development took place in Moscow, Russia. During the meeting, the Ministers proposed creating an Agricultural Expert Working Group (AEWG). The AEWG drafted the 2012-2016 Action Plan.

On 14 April 2011, in the Sanya Declaration, the BRICS leaders announced that they “will carry out closer cooperation on food security.”¹⁹³

On 30 October 2011, the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development held their second meeting and called for enhanced multilateral efforts with international and regional organisations in food security, and global food and agriculture, and for continued collaboration in world food security. BRICS Ministers also announced that they will “actively enhance the coordination and cooperation with other countries in the field of agriculture.” Moreover, the Ministers adopted the 2012-2016 Action Plan for Agricultural Cooperation, identifying five priority areas.¹⁹⁴

On 29 March 2012, the BRICS leaders convened for the fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi. Following the second meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, the leaders encouraged the Ministers to “take this process forward with particular focus on the potential of cooperation amongst the BRICS to contribute effectively to global food security and nutrition through improved agriculture

¹⁹² BRIC’s Joint Statement on Global Food Security, BRICS 2023 (Johannesburg) 16 June 2009. Access Date: 20 January 2024. https://brics2023.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/BRICS-Joint-Statement-on-Global-Food-Security-Yekaterinburg_16-June-2009-1.pdf

¹⁹³ Sanya Declaration, BRICS 2023 (Johannesburg) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <https://brics2023.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/III-BRICS-SummitSanya-Declaration-14-April-2011.pdf>

¹⁹⁴ Joint Declaration of the Second Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, BRICS Parma (Parma) 30 October 2011. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <https://www.brics.unipr.it/wedit/uploads/contentuti/95/joint-declaration-of-the-second-meeting-of-brics-ministers-of-agriculture-and-agrarian-development-chengdu-china-october-30-2011.pdf>

production and productivity, transparency in markets and reducing excessive volatility in commodity prices, thereby making a difference in the quality of lives of the people particularly in the developing world.”¹⁹⁵

On 29 October 2013, BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development convened for the third time in Pretoria and “resolved that the enhancement of agricultural cooperation among BRICS countries is of great significance for ensuring global food security and agricultural development towards attaining sustainable development, eradicating poverty and achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals.”¹⁹⁶

On 15 July 2014, the BRICS leaders met for the sixth BRICS summit and released the Fortaleza Declaration, in which they announced their commitment to promote agricultural cooperation, “to exchange information regarding strategies for ensuring access to food for the most vulnerable population,” to reduce the negative consequences of climate change on food security and adapt agriculture to climate change.¹⁹⁷

On 13 March 2015, the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development met for their fourth meeting in Brasilia, during which they “agreed that the Group would exchange views amongst themselves and with BRICS representations to the UN in New York, in particular, on the negotiations of Sustainable Development Goals in the context of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and to other UN instances where matters related to agriculture, agrarian and rural development are being discussed.”¹⁹⁸

On 9 July 2015, the BRICS leaders published the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership during the seventh BRICS Summit in Russia. Agricultural cooperation was one of the main priority areas for cooperation, focusing on 1) the development of a general strategy for ensuring access to food for the most vulnerable population, 2) trade and investment promotion, 3) basic agricultural information exchange system, 4) agricultural technology cooperation and innovation, and 5) reduction of negative impact of climate change on food security and adaptation of agriculture to climate change.¹⁹⁹

On 9 October 2015, the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to further advance agricultural cooperation.²⁰⁰

On 23 September 2016, the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, while expressing their concerns regarding the impacts of climate change on agriculture, declared “we shall therefore promote adoption of climate resilient agricultural technologies and enhance adaptive capacity through continuous exchange of information and sharing of experiences with respect to our relevant national policies, plans, programs and research.” They also noted progress “in enhancing agriculture technology cooperation.”²⁰¹

On 4 September 2017, BRICS leaders agreed to increase cooperation in five priority areas: 1) food security and nutrition; 2) adaptation of agriculture to climate change 3) agricultural technology cooperation and innovation 4) agricultural trade and investment 5) the application of information and communication technologies (ICT) in agriculture. Additionally, the leaders adopted the 2017-2020 Action Plan for

¹⁹⁵Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 19 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

¹⁹⁶ Third Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 October 2013. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/131029-agriculture.html>

¹⁹⁷ Sixth BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS 2023 (Johannesburg) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <https://brics2023.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/140715-leaders-Fortaleza-Declaration.pdf>

¹⁹⁸ Joint Declaration of the 4th Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 13 March 2015. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150315-agriculture.html>

¹⁹⁹ The Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership, BRICS Information Centre (Ufa) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-partnership-strategy-en.html>

²⁰⁰ Joint Declaration of the 5th Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 October 2015. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/151009-agriculture.html>

²⁰¹ Joint Declaration of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 September 2016. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/160923-agriculture.html>

Agricultural Cooperation of BRICS Countries as one of the Xiamen summit's cooperation outcome documents.²⁰²

On 26 September 2019, the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture reiterated their commitment to deepen agricultural cooperation, and expressed their willingness “to strengthen mechanisms and enhance communication and coordination on major international issues, such as the encouragement of new solutions for food production increase, entrepreneurship in agritech startups, increase in international trade, fulfillment of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and food security in developing countries.” Additionally, the Ministers expressed their commitment to “implementing the BRICS Action Plan 2017-2020 for Agricultural Cooperation” and will to “make continuous efforts in improving mechanisms of cooperation to promote further development of agriculture.”²⁰³

On 14 November 2019, the BRICS leaders, acknowledging the BRICS economies as leading producers of agricultural goods internationally, underscored “the importance of BRICS cooperation in agriculture.” The leaders highlighted “the importance of science-based agriculture and of deploying ICT” and “the need of ensuring food security, food safety, addressing malnutrition, eliminating hunger and poverty through increased agricultural production, productivity, sustainable management of natural resources and trade in agriculture among the BRICS countries.”²⁰⁴

On 23 September 2020, the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development held their 10th meeting virtually hosted by Russia. The Ministers called for multilateral efforts to develop an information sharing system with the goal of exchanging agricultural information and enhancing technology transfer, and improve agricultural production and food security.²⁰⁵

On 17 November 2020, the BRICS leaders committed to “reinforce the resilience of agriculture, rural areas and farmers in light of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic through deepening agricultural cooperation including South-South and the promotion of comprehensive development of rural areas, through forms of support compatible with World Trade Organization rules on agriculture. Rural development is of great significance to the balanced improvement of the world agricultural production, food security and the implementation of sustainable goals in agriculture.”²⁰⁶

On November 2020, the BRICS leaders released the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025. The Strategy included a dedicated section for food security under the heading of “sustainable development,” in which they expressed their willingness “provide food security, improve nutrition and facilitate access to food for all,” “promote cooperation in the area of building sustainable food systems, inter alia through increasing the level of agricultural productivity,” and “reinforce the resilience of agriculture including through deepening agricultural South-South cooperation.”²⁰⁷

On 27 August 2021, the BRICS leaders adopted the Action Plan 2021-2024 for Agricultural Cooperation of BRICS Countries. The action plan includes six priority areas: strengthening agricultural value chains for food security and welfare of farmers, conservation and promotion of agrobiodiversity for nutrition and

²⁰² BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.pdf>

²⁰³ Bonito Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 September 2019. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/190926-agriculture.html>

²⁰⁴ Brasília Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasilvia.html>

²⁰⁵ Joint Declaration of the X Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 September 2020. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/200923-agriculture.pdf>

²⁰⁶ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

²⁰⁷ Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) November 2020. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/2020-strategy.html>

sustainability, enabling climate change adaptation via enhancement of food resilience and agricultural production systems through sustainable use of natural resources, cooperation in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary measures and One Health Approach and trade development.²⁰⁸

On 8 June 2022, the BRICS Ministers of Agriculture held their 12th meeting under the theme “Strengthening BRICS Cooperation for Coordinated Agricultural and Rural Development.” The Ministers committed to further BRICS cooperation to increase South-South agricultural cooperation on food security and to fulfill the objectives of the Action Plan 2021-2024. The Ministers also created the BRICS Strategy on Food Security Cooperation, listing cooperation areas in the pursuit of strengthening intra-BRICS agricultural cooperation and expanding food security.²⁰⁹

On 23 June 2022, the BRICS leaders committed to “furthering agricultural cooperation and driving sustainable agricultural and rural development of BRICS countries aimed at safeguarding food security of BRICS countries and the world.”²¹⁰

On 23 August 2023, the BRICS leaders adopted the Johannesburg II Declaration, in which they reaffirmed the commitment to “strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide.”²¹¹

Commitment Features

Definitions and Concepts

“Reaffirm” means to “affirm again, whereby affirm is to assert strongly, state as fact, confirm or ratify a judgment.”²¹² Within the context of this commitment, “reaffirm commitment” refers to commitments made in the past.²¹³ This term indicates that new efforts are required for this commitment in an area that has been established in the past.

“Strengthen” means “to make or become stronger.”²¹⁴

“Agricultural cooperation” is understood to mean “working together towards a shared aim” on matters pertaining to “the practice or work of farming.”²¹⁵

“Promote” means to “support or renew old efforts or create new efforts in the area.”²¹⁶

²⁰⁸ Action Plan 2021-2024 for Agricultural Cooperation of BRICS Countries, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 August 2021. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210827-agriculture-action-plan.pdf>

²⁰⁹ Joint Declaration of the Twelfth Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 8 June 2022. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/2022/2022-agriculture-P020220707528998012230.pdf>

²¹⁰ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

²¹¹ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

²¹² Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 20 January 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

²¹³ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 20 January 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

²¹⁴ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 20 January 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

²¹⁵ Cooperation, Oxford Learners’ Dictionaries (Oxford) n.d. Access Date: 22 June 2024.

<https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/cooperation>; Agriculture, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 22 June 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/agriculture>

²¹⁶ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 20 January 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

“Sustainable agriculture” refers to “farming that meets the needs of existing and future generations, while ensuring profitability, environmental health and social and economic equity. It favours techniques that emulate nature – to preserve soil fertility, prevent water pollution and protect biodiversity. It is also a way to support the achievement of global objectives, like the Sustainable Development Goals and Zero Hunger.”²¹⁷

“Rural development” refers to “any course of action designed to promote economic growth, modernization, increase in agricultural production and the creation of a framework in which to fulfill primary needs, such as education, health and supply of water in rural areas.”²¹⁸

“Enhancing” is understood to mean “to increase or further improve the good quality, value or status of somebody/something.”²¹⁹

“Food security” is understood to mean “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”²²⁰ Food security is contingent upon the fulfillment of four prongs: that food must be available on the supply-side, that food must be accessible economically and physically, that individuals must be able to utilize the nutritional value of food, and that the availability, accessibility and utility of food must be stable over time.

General Interpretive Guidelines

The overarching goal of the commitment is to enhance food security within BRICS and worldwide. This indicates that the commitment requires collaboration with both BRICS and non-BRICS countries. There are three instruments to achieve this goal: 1) strengthen agricultural cooperation, 2) promote sustainable agriculture, and 3) promote rural development of BRICS countries. For full compliance the BRICS member must take strong action in most, or two out of three, of the criteria.

Examples of strong action for BRICS members to strengthen agricultural cooperation include creating new bilateral and multilateral partnerships to increase agricultural trade, collaborating with relevant international fora, signing memorandums of understanding, collaborating with lower income countries to support food security, exchanging information, etc.

Examples of strong action to promote sustainable agriculture include investing in sustainable or green technology, supporting innovative techniques such as no tilling or diversified crops, improving water use and efficiency, implementing climate resilient practices, and supporting women small holders.

Examples of strong action to promote rural development in BRICS countries include domestic, or intra-BRICS bilateral or multilateral, investment to improve access to water, food, education, health services, social services, housing or other primary needs in rural communities. Owing to the text’s particular language, this commitment comprises only domestic or intra-BRICS actions. No actions taken by BRICS members to promote rural development in non-BRICS countries will be considered.

Examples of weak action across all three criteria include attending meetings, verbal reiterations of support and making speeches.

²¹⁷A beginner’s guide to sustainable farming, United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi) 17 June 2021. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/beginners-guide-sustainable-farming>

²¹⁸Rural Development, United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi) n.d. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <https://leap.unep.org/en/knowledge/glossary/rural-development>

²¹⁹Enhance, Oxford Learners’ Dictionary (Oxford) n.d. Access Date: 22 June 2024.

<https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/enhance?q=enhance>

²²⁰ What is Food Security? World Bank Group (Washington D.C.) n.d. Access Date: 22 June 2024.

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/food-security-update/what-is-food-security>

Thus, a score of full compliance, or +1, is given if the BRICS member takes strong action in most of the criteria, such as by taking strong action in all three instruments but only does so domestically and intra-BRICS for one of those instruments, by taking strong action in two of the instruments with domestic and intra-BRICS actions taken in each, or another similar combination.

A score of partial compliance, or 0, is assigned to BRICS members that take strong action in at least 50% of the commitment, such as strong action in one or two instruments in either BRICS or non-BRICS countries. For example, if a BRICS member strongly promotes rural development within the BRICS and strongly promotes sustainable agriculture in a non-BRICS country, without taking action in or taking weak action to strengthen agricultural cooperation, then the BRICS member will be assigned a score of 0.

Non-compliance, denoted by a score of -1, is assigned to BRICS members that have not taken any actions to comply with the present commitment within the compliance cycle, have taken actions that explicitly and directly are antithetical to the commitment, or have taken weak action in less than approximately 50% of the commitment, such as by only issuing a verbal reiteration of support for one instrument.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member did not take any action or exclusively weak action to strengthen agricultural cooperation or promote sustainable agriculture domestically or internationally or to promote rural development domestically or in other BRICS members.
0	The BRICS member took strong action to strengthen agricultural cooperation OR to promote sustainable agriculture domestically OR internationally OR to promote rural development domestically or in other BRICS members, while taking weak to no action in the other domains.
+1	The BRICS member took strong action to strengthen agricultural cooperation AND to promote sustainable agriculture domestically or internationally AND to promote rural development domestically or in other BRICS members, or strong action in at least two of these three domains.

*Affiliated Co-Chair: Luca B. Rampersad
Compliance Director and Lead Analyst: Ridhima Sinha*

Brazil: +1

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide.

On 2 November 2023 Brazil and India signed two Memoranda of Understanding on cooperation in the area of food safety and vegetable oil industries, thereby strengthen their relations in agricultural and climatic research with an aim to combat hunger and make food available to all.²²¹ The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock emphasised the significance of cooperative production and cooperative marketing in the agricultural sector can help address the crisis that has hit global trade in food with India.

On 5 December 2023, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock participated in the China-Brazil panel for Sustainable Agriculture and Green Supply Chain during COP28. The meeting highlighted the importance of a joint approach to addressing global challenges, highlighting the need for investments in sustainable technology, environmental protection strategies and biodiversity enhancement for an environmentally responsible future.²²²

²²¹ Cooperatives Are the Solution for Hunger, Farmers' Woes: Brazil Agriculture Minister, the Hindu (New Delhi) 2 November 2023. Access Date: 13 September 2024. <https://www.thehindu.com/business/agri-business/cooperatives-are-the-solution-for-hunger-farmers-woes-brazil-agriculture-minister/article67489626.ece>.

²²² Brasil e China Discutem Parcerias Para Uma Agricultura Ambientalmente Responsável, Agência Gov (Brasília) 6 December 2023. Translated by Google Translate. Access Date: 8 May 2024. <https://agenciagov.abc.com.br/noticias/202312/brasil-e-china-discutem-parcerias-para-uma-agricultura-ambientalmente-responsavel>

On 4 May 2024, Brazil and Japan signed 38 agreements during the visit of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Brasília. Agreements included the collaboration in agriculture and land recovery for degraded areas, a notable area of focus, with a particular emphasis on food security and the mitigation of global warming.²²³

On 6 May 2024, Brazil and Japan signed a Cooperation Memorandum for the recovery of degraded areas with both states reaffirming their commitment to cooperation in areas such as food security, forest conservation, and sustainable development. Japan is set to become the inaugural contributor to Brazil's National Program for the Conversion of Degraded Pastures into Sustainable Agricultural and Forestry Production Systems. The initiative targets the conversion of approximately 40 million hectares of underproductive pastures into agriculturally viable zones within a decade, holding the potential to effectively double Brazil's food production capacity without resorting to deforestation or disturbing native vegetation.²²⁴

On 11 May 2024, Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply Carlos Fávaro presented proposals for technical and agricultural cooperation to the ambassadors representing the League of Arab States during a meeting held at the Embassy of Palestine in Brasília. The meeting facilitated discussions on collaboration in technical and agricultural sectors among representatives from 16 members of the league, including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt and Iraq, highlighting Brazil's commitment to bolstering ties with Arab countries.²²⁵

On 20 May 2024, Minister Fávaro met with Japanese Ambassador Teiji Hayashi the vice-president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Sachiko Imoto at the Japanese Embassy in Brazil to discuss the progress of the National Program for the Conversion of Degraded Pastures into Sustainable Agricultural and Forestry Production Systems.²²⁶ This aims to recover degraded areas and is a sustainable plan, which ensures food security while respecting environmental concerns, thereby abiding by Brazil's commitment for an agriculturally secure and sustainable future.

On 12 June 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva opened the Priority Investment Forum 2024 with the theme "Invest in Dignity," focusing discussions on sustainable energy, technological innovation and social inclusion.²²⁷ President Lula highlighted Brazil's commitment to sustainability and food security, showcasing its ability to expand agriculture while respecting the environment and emphasising the USD15 billion fund allocated to promote sustainable agriculture.

On 3 July 2024, Federal Government launched 24/25 Harvest Plan with BRL400.59 billion for corporate agriculture aiming at boosting the Brazilian agricultural sector, offering credit lines, incentives and agricultural

²²³ Brazil and Japan Signed 38 Agreements during the Visit of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Brasília, Government of Brazil (Brasilia) 19 April 2024. Access Date: 5 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/05/brazil-and-japan-signed-40-agreements-during-the-visit-of-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-to-brasilia>

²²⁴ Brazil and Japan sign Cooperation Memorandum for the recovery of degraded areas, Government of Brazil (Brasilia) 6 May 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/agricultura/en/news/brazil-and-japan-sign-cooperation-memorandum-for-the-recovery-of-degraded-areas>

²²⁵ Minister Fávaro presented proposals for technical and agricultural cooperation to the ambassadors of the League of Arab States, Government of Brazil (Brasilia) 11 May 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/agricultura/en/news/minister-favaro-presented-proposals-for-technical-and-agricultural-cooperation-to-the-ambassadors-of-the-league-of-arab-states>

²²⁶ Brasil e Japão reafirmam compromisso de restaurar terras degradadas para uso produtivo, Planalto (Brasilia). Access Date: 15 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/secom/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2024/05/brasil-e-japao-reforcam-compromisso-com-o-programa-de-recuperacao-de-areas-degradadas>

²²⁷ "Lula: o Brasil oferece estabilidade abundante aos investidores, Planalto (Brasilia). Access Date: 15 July 2024. Translated by Google Translate. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/06/lula-brazil-offerece-estabilidade-abundante-aos-investidores>

policies for medium and large producers.²²⁸ This action signifies Brazil's proactive engagement in ensuring a developed rural economy.

On 9 July 2024, President Lula da Silva and Bolivian President Luis Alberto Arce Catacora held a bilateral meeting highlighting strategic issues including agriculture, energy and infrastructure, as well as joint actions aimed at protecting the environment and energy transition.²²⁹ This policy aims to strengthen commercial cooperation between the two states, particularly in the production of fertilizers, while also promoting energy transition initiatives such as natural gas, wind energy and ethanol production.

On 24 July 2024, President Lula da Silva, alongside international authorities, launched the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, an initiative aimed at eradicating hunger and poverty through global partnerships and resource mobilization.²³⁰ This aligns with Brazil's G20 presidency agenda, which emphasizes food security and the elimination of extreme poverty by 2030, aligning with Brazil's commitment of ensuring food security.

On 5 August 2024, Minister Fávaro and the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in agricultural technical development between Mapa, further strengthening their relations in sustainable agricultural practices.²³¹ The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock emphasized the importance of collaborative programs and projects in advancing agricultural systems, reinforcing Brazil's commitment to promoting sustainable agriculture.

On 20 August 2024, Brazil and South Korea held strategic meetings led by Mapa's Secretary of Trade and International Relations, Roberto Perosa, and agricultural attaché Ricardo Zanatta, to enhance bilateral relations and discuss market access for Brazilian agricultural products.²³² The discussions focused on finalizing the recognition of regionalization concerning Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, securing access for Brazilian beef and expanding the authorized export area for pork in the South Korean market- ensuring global food security.

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide. Brazil has taken strong action to promote and establish sustainable agriculture and strengthen agricultural cooperation through memorandums as well as agreements, both domestically and globally, while showing weak efforts in promoting rural development within Brazil or in any other BRICS member.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Arushi Chbikara

²²⁸ Governo Federal Lança Plano Safra 24/25 Com R\$ 400,59 Bilhões Para Agricultura Empresarial, Ministério da Agricultura e Pecuária (Brasília). 3 July 2024. Access Date: 27 August 2024. Translated by Google Translate. <https://www.gov.br/agricultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/governo-federal-lanca-plano-safra-24-25-com-r-400-59-bilhoes-para-agricultura-empresarial>.

²²⁹ Presidentes Lula e Luis Arce se reúnem para fortalecer a cooperação Brasil-Bolívia, Planalto (Brasília). Access Date: 15 July 2024. Translated by Google Translate. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/07/presidentes-lula-luis-encontro-arce-para-fortalecer-a-cooperacao-brasil-bolivia>

²³⁰ World Leadership Endorse Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, Planalto (Brasília). 25 July 2024. Access Date: 27 August 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/07/world-leadership-endorse-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty>.

²³¹ Minister Fávaro Signs Memorandum of Understanding for Agricultural Technical Cooperation with Chile, Planalto (Brasília) 5 August 2024. Access Date: 27 August 2024. Translated by Google Translate. <https://www.gov.br/agricultura/en/news/minister-favaro-signs-memorandum-of-understanding-for-agricultural-technical-cooperation-with-chile>.

²³² Mapa Advances Negotiations for New Market Access in South Korea, Planalto (Brasília) 27 August 2024. Access Date: 27 August 2024. Translated by Google Translate. <https://www.gov.br/agricultura/en/news/mapa-advances-negotiations-for-new-market-access-in-south-korea>

Russia: 0

Russia has partially complied with the commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide.

On 17 October 2024, Russia and China signed a grain supply contract. This contract would mutually benefit both the Corridor and the Belt and Road Initiative and establish the necessary infrastructure and framework for increased exports.²³³

On 23 November 2023, the Subcommittee on Customs Tariff and Non-tariff Regulation, Protective Measures in Foreign Trade of the Government Commission on Economic Development and Integration adopted a series of actions to protect domestic Russian markets and export supply. These actions include moves to establish an export tariff quota on essential grains, a ban on the export of durum wheat and tariffs on certain meats.²³⁴

On 25 November 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak chaired the 18th meeting of the Russian-Turkish Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation. Agriculture was one of the key themes listed as areas for strong bilateral cooperation, signing a final protocol. In addition, The Turkish Ministry of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change and the Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and Cartography of Russia also signed a MoU to the same effect.²³⁵

On 11 December 2023, Russia joined the COP28 UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems and Climate Action. The declaration emphasized countries to consider climate-related changes when pursuing agricultural and food projects.²³⁶

On 20 December 2023, Morocco and Russia met at the Sixth Session of the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum to explore further agricultural cooperation strategies. Both parties signed a joint declaration to strengthen agricultural cooperation is included under the Sustainable Development section, which calls for greater research towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals through science and technology.²³⁷

On 1 January 2024, President Vladimir Putin prepared a speech discussing the start of the BRICS summit held in Russia, outlining key areas to promote cooperation, including environmental protection, ensuring energy and food security.²³⁸

On 2 April 2024, Russian Deputy Minister of Agriculture Sergey Levin held discussions with Vietnamese Ambassador Dang Minh Khoi regarding the promotion of agricultural cooperation between both countries.

²³³ Russia and China sign largest contract for grain supply, TASS (Beijing) 18 October 2023. Access Date: 19 April 2024. <https://tass.com/economy/1692339>

²³⁴ The Subcommittee on Customs and Tariff Regulation adopted a number of decisions to protect the domestic market and expand the supply, Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation (Moscow). 23 November 2023. Access Date: 19 Apr, 2024. https://en.economy.gov.ru/material/news/the_subcommittee_on_customs_and_tariff_regulation_adopted_a_number_of_decisions_to_protect_the_domestic_market_and_expand_the_supply.html

²³⁵ Alexander Novak chairs the 18th meeting of the Russian-Turkish Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, The Russian Government (Moscow). 25 November 2023. Access Date: 19 April 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/50223/>

²³⁶ Russia joined COP28 UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, President of Russia (Moscow). 11 December 2023. Access Date: 19 April 2024. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/administration/72984>

²³⁷ Joint Declaration of the Sixth Session of the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum at the Ministerial Level, Marrakesh, Kingdom of Morocco, 20 December 2023, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow). 20 December 2023. Access Date: 19 April 2024. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/rso/1922267/

²³⁸ Address by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on the start of Russia's BRICS Chairmanship (Moscow). 1 Jan 2024. Date Accessed: 11 July 2024. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73202>

Both agreed to expand the list of enterprises eligible to export agricultural and fishery products into the other's markets.²³⁹

On 22 April 2024, representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and 40 Russian enterprises attended the China-Russian Agricultural Economic and Trade Cooperation Fair in Xi'an, aimed at promoting cooperation and agricultural trade between both countries.²⁴⁰

On 16 May 2024, President Putin paid a state visit to Chinese President Xi Jinping to celebrate the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between both countries.²⁴¹ A joint statement was released, outlining areas of mutual cooperation and benefit, including a commitment to increased agricultural trade and establishing zones of agricultural cooperation states.

On 9 July 2024, President Putin hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit.²⁴² As part of the summit, both leaders released a joint statement reaffirming friendly relations between both states, and outlining future plans to expand their partnership. Within the statement included commitments to growing agricultural trade, establishing sustainable fertilizer trade, information exchange in agriculture and food science and technology, and mutual support for the launch of the BRICS Contact Group on Climate Change and Sustainable Development.

On 21 August 2024, Russia and China held their 29th regular meeting, where Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Chinese Premier Li Qiang convened to discuss economic and trade cooperation.²⁴³ Both leaders signed a joint communiqué affirming their commitment to enhancing bilateral relations. The communiqué highlights their intention to actively expand agricultural trade by broadening the categories of agricultural products allowed for exports. Additionally, both parties agreed to boost the export of Russian processed meat exports to China.

Russia has partially complied with the commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide. Russia has made demonstrable efforts to strengthen bilateral relationships in agricultural trade and express its commitment to increasing the exchange of goods. It has promoted agricultural cooperation with BRICS members, notably China; however, recommendations to raise barriers to agricultural trade represent negative compliance with the commitment.

Thus, Russia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Grace Ho Lan Chong

²³⁹ Vietnam, Russia discuss stronger agriculture cooperation (Hanoi). 3 April 2024. Access Date: 30 April 2024. <https://en.nhandan.vn/vietnam-russia-discuss-stronger-agriculture-cooperation-post134510.html>

²⁴⁰ China (Shaanxi)- Russia Agricultural Economic and Trade Cooperation Fair, Bonagro (Nanjing) 24 April 2024. Access Date: 30 April 2024. <https://www.bonagrain.com/en/index.php?c=article&a=detail&id=181>

²⁴¹ Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Deepening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Interaction Relations Entering a New Era, in the Context of the 75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Two Countries, (Moscow). 16 May 2024. Translated by: Google translate. Date Accessed: July 7, 2024. <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/6132>

²⁴² Joint Statement following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit, Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi). 9 Jul 2024. Date Accessed: 11 July 2024. <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37940/Joint+Statement+following+the+22nd+IndiaRussia+Annual+Summit>

²⁴³ China, Russia to expand bilateral economic, trade cooperation (Beijing). 22 August 2024. Access Date: 26 August 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202408/22/content_WS66c6338cc6d0868f4e8ea23c.html

India: +1

India has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide.

On 29 August 2023, Union Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare Minister Narendra Singh Tomar met with the Minister for Trade & Export Growth, Agriculture, Biosecurity and for Rural Communities of New Zealand, Damien O'Connor, to discuss strengthening agricultural cooperation and partnership. Discussions included market access for agricultural products and cooperation on promoting millet and both sides highlighted the potential of an upcoming Memorandum of Cooperation on horticulture.²⁴⁴

On 4 September 2023, the Department of Agricultural Research and Education and the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmer Welfare organized the G20 Technical Workshop on "Climate Resilient Agriculture." The workshop facilitated discussions on scientific and innovative solutions required to address emerging challenges and reduce uncertainty in agriculture food systems. Various foreign delegates from G20 members and senior officials from relevant Indian ministries attended the workshop.²⁴⁵

On 19 September 2023, Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and Minister Tomar jointly unveiled initiatives aimed at enhancing the fiscal stability of farms in India, through initiatives such as an expansion of the Kisan Credit Card program and a manual to help farmers access the Weather Information Network Data System, promoting prudent agricultural decision-making in line with anticipated weather fluctuations. These initiatives underscore the government's prioritization of agriculture and rural economy, noting the significant increase in the agriculture budget over the years.²⁴⁶

On 9 October 2023, President Draupadi Murmu inaugurated the International Research Conference on 'From Research to Impact: Towards Just and Resilient Agri-Food Systems', hosted by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Gender Impact Platform. One of the key themes of the conference is climate-smart agriculture, exploring resilient and sustainable agricultural practices that promote gender equality and social inclusion.²⁴⁷

On 13 October 2023, the ICAR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Start-up Incubation & Innovation Center, exploring and establishing further collaborations to drive advancements and innovations in agriculture.²⁴⁸

On 2 November 2023, Minister of State for Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare Sushri Shobha Karandlaje met Brazilian Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, Mr. Carlos Favaro, highlighted the potential for

²⁴⁴A meeting was held between Union Agriculture & Farmers' Welfare Minister Shri Narendra Singh Tomar and Minister for Trade & Export Growth, Minister for Agriculture, Minister for Biosecurity, Minister for Land Information and Minister for Rural Communities of New Zealand Shri Damien O'Connor, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 29 August 2023. Access Date: 11 May 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasframePage.aspx?PRID=1953302>

²⁴⁵Department of Agricultural Research and Education organizes G20 Technical Workshop on Climate Resilient Agriculture on 4th – 6th September 2023 in Hyderabad, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 4 September 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1954625>

²⁴⁶Revolutionizing Indian Agriculture: MoA&FW Unveils Game-Changing Initiatives for Farmers, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 19 September 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1958864>

²⁴⁷ PRESIDENT OF INDIA INAUGURATES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON 'FROM RESEARCH TO IMPACT: TOWARDS JUST AND RESILIENT AGRI-FOOD SYSTEMS', Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 9 October 2023. Access Date: 5 August 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasframePage.aspx?PRID=1965884>

²⁴⁸Memorandum of Understanding signed between ICAR Indian Agricultural Research Institute and Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur to support incubators and start-ups, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 13 October 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1967453>

further strengthening cooperation between India and Brazil in various areas of agriculture, including food processing, agro-industry and agricultural research and development.²⁴⁹

On 22 November 2023, the Indian Mission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare organized the ASEAN-India Millet Festival 2023 in South Jakarta, Indonesia, aiming to promote awareness and market creation for millets and millet-based products among ASEAN Member states.²⁵⁰ The exhibition for the festival also aims to foster collaboration between ASEAN countries, celebrate cultural and culinary diversity, and promote sustainable millet practices.

On 30 October 2023, Minister Karandlaje inaugurated the International Workshop on Food Loss and Waste Prevention in the South Asian Region in New Delhi.²⁵¹ This workshop, jointly organized by the ICAR and the Thünen Institute, was attended by around 120 delegates from various countries, emphasizing the importance of bringing forward proven technologies and practices from developed and developing countries to reduce food wastage.

On 5 December 2023, India announced a USD250 million credit line intended to enhance agricultural productivity in Kenya.²⁵² Kenyan President William Ruto extended an offer of land to Indian agribusiness firms for cultivating crops like millets in November. In exchange, India has pledged to promote its companies' investments in Kenya's agricultural sector, spanning equipment and technology.

On 6 December 2023, Minister Tomar met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Business and International Cooperation of Suriname Albert R. Ramdin to express satisfaction with the progress made during the recent Joint Working Group meeting on Agriculture and allied sectors.²⁵³ Appreciating Suriname's efforts in millet cultivation, Tomar underscored India's advancements in agricultural technology and expressed willingness to share expertise with Suriname.

On 8 December 2023, Minister Karandlaje and European Commissioner for Agriculture Janusz Wojciechowski convened a meeting in New Delhi to discuss agricultural policies and initiatives towards sustainable food systems and India-EU Free Trade Agreement negotiations and bilateral agreements on Organic Products.²⁵⁴

On 14 December 2023, Union Minister of Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare and Tribal Affairs Arjun Munda inaugurated the ASEAN-India Millet Festival in New Delhi, emphasizing the transformative potential of

²⁴⁹MoS Shobha Karandlaje interacts with Brazilian delegation led by Mr Carlos Favaro, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 2 November 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1974218>

²⁵⁰ASEAN-India Millet Festival 2023 kick starts at the Kota Kasablanka Mall, a prominent shopping destination in South Jakarta, Indonesia on 22nd November 2023, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 22 November 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1978720>

²⁵¹MoS Shobha Karandlaje inaugurates International Workshop on Food Loss and Waste Prevention in South Asian Region at New Delhi today, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 30 October 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1973010>

²⁵²India offers Kenya a US\$250m credit line to boost agriculture, Nanyang Technological University Singapore (Singapore) 11 December 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.ntu.edu.sg/cas/news-events/news/details/india-offers-kenya-a-usd250m-credit-line-to-boost-agriculture>

²⁵³Union Minister Shri Narendra Singh Tomar meets Minister of Suriname Mr Albert R. Ramdin at New Delhi today, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 6 December 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1983321>

²⁵⁴Minister of State for Agriculture & Farmers Welfare Sushri Shobha Karandlaje and H.E. Mr. Janusz Wojciechowski, European Commissioner for Agriculture hold a meeting at New Delhi today, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 8 December 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1984159>

millets in agriculture, climate resilience and food security.²⁵⁵ The festival aimed to raise awareness and establish a larger market for millet and millet-based products.

On 24 January 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare orchestrated a significant workshop on Increasing Maize Production.²⁵⁶ This workshop served as a crucial platform for dialogue and collaborative strategies aimed at advancing maize cultivation in India, significant in enhancing food security.

On 29 January 2024, Minister Munda launched the Framework for Voluntary Carbon Market in the Agriculture Sector and Accreditation Protocol of Agroforestry Nurseries.²⁵⁷ This initiative not only supports farmers but also accelerates the adoption of sustainable agriculture practices, aligning with India's commitment to environmental and sustainable development and climate action.

On 14 February 2024, Minister Munda met with the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, in New Delhi.²⁵⁸ They discussed ASEAN-India cooperation in agriculture, covering sustainable farming practices, curbing crop burning, advancing digital technology in agriculture, and minimizing harmful agrochemicals, among other topics.

On 21 February 2024, Minister Karandlaje met the Premier of Saskatchewan Province of Canada, Scott Moe, to discuss Saskatchewan's ongoing trade relationship with India, particularly focusing on pulses, potash, agricultural technologies and research partnerships. ²⁵⁹Karandlaje proposed exploring cooperation in biotechnology, agri-tech and wastewater treatment, emphasizing the need for strengthened knowledge exchange and technology transfer in sustainable agriculture through regular Technical Group meetings.

On 20 March 2024, the ICAR and Dhanuka Agritech Limited signed a MoU to collaborate on delivering new agricultural technologies to farmers.²⁶⁰ The focus of this initiative is to promote climate-friendly agricultural practices and natural farming methods to adapt to changing environmental conditions.

On 26 April 2024, Indian representatives attended the 11th India-New Zealand Joint Trade Committee, where both countries expressed their intent to deepen collaboration across various sectors including Pharma, Agriculture and Food Processing Industries.²⁶¹

On 3 May 2024, India and the Netherlands conducted the 12th round of Foreign Office Consultations in The Hague, exploring cooperation in priority sectors such as the Water, Agriculture & Health agenda, Science &

²⁵⁵Union Minister Shri Arjun Munda inaugurates ASEAN-India Millet Festival today at New Delhi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 14 December 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1986254>

²⁵⁶Prof. Ramesh Chand, Member, NITI Aayog chairs the workshop on 'Increasing Maize Production' today at New Delhi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 24 January 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1999333>

²⁵⁷Launch of Framework for Voluntary Carbon Market in Agriculture Sector and Accreditation Protocol of Agroforestry Nurseries, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 29 January 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2000331>

²⁵⁸Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with Minister of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare of India, Press Information Bureau (Jakarta) 14 February 2024. Access Date: 11 May 2024. <https://asean.org/secretary-general-of-asean-meets-with-minister-of-agriculture-and-farmers-welfare-of-india/>

²⁵⁹A meeting between MoS Shobha Karandlaje and Premier of Saskatchewan Province of Canada H.E. Mr. Scott Moe was held today at New Delhi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 21 February 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2007803>

²⁶⁰MoU signed between Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Dhanuka Agritech Limited, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 20 March 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2015646>

²⁶¹India and New Zealand to have deeper collaboration in Pharma, Agriculture and Food Processing Industries, among others, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 2 May 2024. Access Date: 11 May 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2019407>

Technology and High-tech & Innovation.²⁶² Both sides also emphasized leveraging new technologies like semiconductors and green hydrogen to deepen ties.

On 12 June 2024, Union Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan discussed the 100-day action plan for agriculture with senior officials, aligning with Prime Minister Modi's vision.²⁶³ The meeting focused on enhancing agricultural production, productivity, and quality, ensuring timely availability of quality inputs for farmers and boosting exports of agricultural products.

On 19 June 2024, the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE) in India and the Australian Government collaborated to enhance India's agriculture sector through the Australia-India Critical Agriculture Skills Pilot Project.²⁶⁴ The initiative, developed after thorough consultations, has launched six pilot projects in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Telangana, introducing new roles like Digital Agriculture Extension Promoter and Carbon Farming Practitioner.

On 27 June 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture hosted a workshop in New Delhi titled "Unleashing India's Agribusiness Potential through Innovative Agri Value Chain Financing."²⁶⁵ The event gathered senior government officials, experts, and stakeholders to discuss agricultural financing dynamics. Chairman Nabard K.V. Shaji, called for the establishment of public infrastructure in rural areas, such as facilities for processing, branding and marketing agricultural products.

On 9 July 2024, India and Russia committed to increasing their bilateral trade to over USD100 billion by 2030.²⁶⁶ The plan involved using national currencies, expanding trade routes, and strengthening collaboration in energy, agriculture, infrastructure, and the digital economy.

On 12 July 2024, the government unveiled the 'Agri Fund for Start-Ups & Rural Enterprises' (AgriSURE) at a Pre-Launch Stakeholder meet in Mumbai.²⁶⁷ This initiative aims to drive innovation and sustainability in India's agricultural sector with the establishment of an INR 7.5 Billion Category-II Alternative Investment Fund (AIF).

On 16 July 2024, Minister Chouhan inaugurated the 96th Foundation and Technology Day of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) in New Delhi.²⁶⁸ At the event, Minister of State for Agriculture and Farmers' Welfare Ramnath Thakur recognized the progress made in agriculture but highlighted the need for

²⁶²India, Netherlands Hold Foreign Office Consultations, Agree To Further Strengthen Bilateral Ties, DD News (The Hague) 3 May 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://ddnews.gov.in/en/india-netherlands-hold-foreign-office-consultations-agree-to-further-strengthen-bilateral-ties/>

²⁶³Union Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan held a meeting regarding the 100 days action plan of the Agriculture & Farmers' Welfare Ministry, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 12 June 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2024760>

²⁶⁴MSDE partners with Australian Government to energise Agriculture Sector of India with emerging skills, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 19 June 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2026734>

²⁶⁵Ministry of Agriculture Hosts National Workshop on Unleashing India's Agribusiness Potential through Innovative Agri Value Chain Financing in New Delhi, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 27 June 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2029147>

²⁶⁶India and Russia set \$100 billion trade goal by 2030, cooperation in energy, agriculture, Economic Times (Mumbai) 9 July 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-and-russia-set-100-billion-trade-goal-by-2030-cooperation-in-energy-agriculture/articleshow/111613541.cms?from=mdr>

²⁶⁷The Government to soon launch an 'Agri Fund for Start-Ups & Rural Enterprises' (AgriSURE) to provide support to Startup and Agripreneurs, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 12 July 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2032838>

²⁶⁸Union Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan inaugurates the 96th Foundation and Technology Day of Indian Council of Agricultural Research today, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 16 July 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2033705>

better grain storage solutions and emphasized the importance of developing non-toxic fertilizers and reducing their harmful effects to ensure food safety.

On 18 July 2024, Minister Chouhan met with Malaysian Minister for Plantations and Commodities Datuk Seri Johari Abdul Ghani in New Delhi.²⁶⁹ During the meeting both sides discussed strengthening cooperation in the oil palm sector and other fields. They focused on collaborating on the National Mission on Edible Oil—Oil Palm, addressing market access issues and formalizing agricultural cooperation.

On 26 July 2024, Minister Chouhan provided a written response in the Rajya Sabha on the use of precision agriculture and technology to increase crop yield and address global food security.²⁷⁰ Mr. Chouhan explained that precision agriculture uses tools such as GPS, sensors, and drones to collect detailed data on soil and crop health, enabling farmers to optimize resource use and reduce waste. He also emphasized the role of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) in minimizing chemical pesticide reliance, promoting ecological balance, and enhancing sustainability in agriculture.

On 26 July 2024, Minister Chouhan provided a written response in the Rajya Sabha on the use of space technology to promote sustainable agriculture.²⁷¹ He outlined projects like FASAL, CHAMAN, and KISAN, which use satellite data for crop forecasting, soil mapping, and drought assessment, helping farmers optimize resources and improve crop management.

On 9 August 2024, Minister Choudhary updated the Indian parliament on the formation of high-powered committees to enhance research at the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR).²⁷² These committees review ICAR's research programs and provide recommendations, while ICAR conducts region-specific research and collaborates with State Agricultural Universities to address local agricultural challenges and promote sustainable farming practices.

On 12 August 2024, Minister Chouhan and New Zealand Minister Mr. Todd McClay held a high-level bilateral meeting in New Delhi.²⁷³ They discussed enhancing cooperation in the horticulture sector, including a proposed Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC), and agreed to strengthen the agricultural partnership between India and New Zealand. The meeting also covered trade improvements, such as supporting Indian pomegranate exports and resuming New Zealand's pine log exports to India, and emphasized expanding collaboration in research and development, particularly in horticulture and cage fisheries.

On 14 August 2024, Union Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan launched the 'ASEAN-India Fellowship for Higher Education in Agriculture and Allied Sciences' at ICAR, New Delhi.²⁷⁴ The initiative will award 50 fellowships over five years to boost agricultural cooperation and collaboration between India and ASEAN through postgraduate studies and joint research.

On 16 August 2024, Minister Chouhan, along with Ministers of State for Agriculture and Rural Development, met with ministry employees to commit to fulfilling Prime Minister Modi's Independence Day vision for

²⁶⁹India and Malaysia to increase cooperation in the field of Oil palm and other sectors, Press Information Bureau (New Delhi) 18 July 2024. Access Date: 21 July 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2034036>

²⁷⁰Use of Precision Agriculture and Technology to increase crop yield, Press Information Bureau (Delhi) 26 July 2024. Access Date: 28 August 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2037406>

²⁷¹Use of Space Technology in Agricultural Sector, Press Information Bureau (Delhi) 26 July 2024. Access Date: 28 August 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2037650>

²⁷²High Powered Committee to revamp research efforts of Indian Council of Agricultural research, Press Information Bureau (Delhi) 9 August 2024. Access Date: 28 August 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2043790>

²⁷³High level bilateral meeting between Union Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan and New Zealand Minister Mr. Todd McClay, Press Information Bureau (Delhi) 12 August 2024. Access Date: 28 August 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2044632>

²⁷⁴Union Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan launches 'ASEAN-India Fellowship' for Higher Education in Agriculture and Allied Sciences today in PUSA, New Delhi, Press Information Bureau (Delhi) 14 August 2024. Access Date: 28 August 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2045361>

agriculture and rural development.²⁷⁵ Pledging to work with increased dedication and effort, Chouhan emphasized a collective commitment to achieving the roadmap for 2047 and contributing to a developed India through agriculture and rural development.

India has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide. India has prioritized sustainable agriculture practices aimed at improving productivity while minimizing environmental impact. It has also implemented various initiatives and programs agreed upon within the BRICS framework to enhance agricultural cooperation, such as new agricultural-technological practices and inaugurating the ASEAN-India Millet Festival.

Thus, India receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Ridhima Sinha

China: +1

China has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide.

On 6 September 2023, the member states of ASEAN and the People's Republic of China made a joint statement to deepen agricultural cooperation, recognizing the integral role of agriculture in national development and committing to take practical measures towards sustainable practices and regional collaboration.²⁷⁶ This commitment aims to fortify sustainable agriculture within China and extend cooperation across ASEAN countries, strategically focusing on promoting sustainable agriculture and fostering international partnerships.

On 7 December 2023, China opened the world's tallest unmanned vegetable farm in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, to enhance agricultural efficiency and sustainability.²⁷⁷ This step aimed at ensuring a stable local food supply in future urban environments to expand cultivation space, showcases China's proactive approach to ensuring food security through sustainable agriculture and advancement.

On 19 December 2023 President Xi Jinping outlined the agricultural and rural priorities for 2024 including increasing grain yields, enhancing the seed industry, and implementing modern agricultural practices to ensure national food security and boost rural development.²⁷⁸ This demonstrates China's active role in ensuring sustainable agriculture through rural development.

On 18 January 2024, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Tang Renjian and U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack co-chaired the seventh meeting of the China-U.S. Agricultural Cooperation Joint Committee in Washington, emphasizing agricultural cooperation, promoting bilateral agricultural cooperation and stabilizing food and agricultural development expectations.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵Union Minister Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan pledges to fulfill PM Modi's Independence Day Vision for Agriculture and Rural Development, Press Information Bureau (Delhi) 16 August 2024. Access Date: 28 August 2024. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2046026>

²⁷⁶ ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Deepening Agricultural Cooperation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Jakarta) 6 September 2023. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://asean.org/asean-china-joint-statement-on-deepening-agricultural-cooperation/>

²⁷⁷ China Unveils World's First Unmanned 20-Storey Vertical 'plants Factory', Global Times (Beijing) 3 December 2023. Access Date: 10 May 2024, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202312/1302908.shtml>

²⁷⁸ China Vows to Build Itself into an Agricultural Powerhouse, with Food Security, All-Round Rural Revitalization Prioritized, Global Times (Beijing) 20 December 2023. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202312/1304019.shtml>

²⁷⁹ China, U.S. Restart Agricultural Cooperation Mechanism, CGTN News (Beijing) 20 January 2024. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-01-20/China-U-S-restart-agricultural-cooperation-mechanism-1qvMGg5VaEw/p.html>

On 25 January 2024, the EU Delegation to China and the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture hosted “Farmland Ecosystems: EU-China Sustainable Agriculture,” a seminar with valuable insights on sustainable practices such as water conservation, dryland farming and pollution reduction, to highlight ongoing agri-research and agricultural collaboration.²⁸⁰

On 4 July 2024, China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States pledged to expand their agricultural cooperation to address global climate change, food security crises and alleviate poverty, at the third China-CELAC Ministerial Forum on Agriculture.²⁸¹ This showcases China’s proactive approach at dealing with all three parts of the commitment by ensuring food security, promoting agricultural cooperation and attempting to alleviate poverty.

On 6 July 2024, President Xi met with Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon, emphasizing China’s willingness in strengthening synergy of development strategies with Tajikistan including the deepening of agricultural cooperation between the two states.²⁸²

On 12 July 2024, President Xi met with Prime Minister of Solomon Islands Jeremiah Manele in Beijing to safeguard core interests and address major concerns and deepen cooperation in areas such as rural development, sustainable development and climate change response.²⁸³

On 29 July 2024, President Xi met with President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Jose Ramos-Horta to enhance cooperation and economic development.²⁸⁴ The discussions centered on advancing agricultural collaboration, including rice cultivation, advance cooperation in terms of fisheries and poverty reduction, highlighting China’s commitment to global agricultural cooperation.

On 1 August 2024, Vice Premier Liu Guozhong urged measures to ensure bumper harvest following recent flooding to safeguard China’s food security.²⁸⁵ This highlights China’s proactive strategy to maintain food security within its province despite challenges.

On 16 August 2024, Vice Premier Guozhong called for robust measures to advance rural revitalization, stressing the need for sustained efforts to boost grain production and develop diverse food resources.²⁸⁶ This highlights China’s commitment towards rural development but also its actions towards ensuring a food security.

On 26 August 2024, Vice Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs Deng Xiaogang and Peru's Ministry of Agrarian Development and Irrigation Angel Manero Campos discussed agricultural cooperation, with China highlighting the need of developing infrastructure for the advancement of the regions and agronomic

²⁸⁰ EU Delegation to China Hosts Seminar on Farmland Ecosystems: EU-China Sustainable Agriculture, European Union External Action (Brussels) 25 January 2024. Access Date: 10 May 2024. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/eu-delegation-china-hosts-seminar-farmland-ecosystems-eu-china-sustainable-agriculture_en?s=166

²⁸¹ Intl Cooperation on Agriculture Strengthened. Access Date: 16 July 2024.

http://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/04/content_WS668606b8c6d0868f4e8e8db2.html.

²⁸² Xi Says China Ready to Strengthen Synergy of Development Strategies with Tajikistan. Access Date: 16 July 2024.

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/06/content_WS6688349ac6d0868f4e8e8ecf.html.

²⁸³ Xi Meets Prime Minister of Solomon Islands. Access Date: 16 July 2024,

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/12/content_WS6690efdec6d0868f4e8e91f5.html.

²⁸⁴ Xi Holds Talks with Timor-Leste President, Urges Promoting Bilateral Ties. (Beijing) 29 July 2024. Access Date: 27 August 2024.

http://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/29/content_WS66a70b04c6d0868f4e8e98d5.html

²⁸⁵ Chinese Vice Premier Calls for Ensuring Bumper Harvest after Flooding. (Zhengzhou) 2 August 2024. Access Date: 27 August 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202408/02/content_WS66ac11cdc6d0868f4e8e9aac.html

²⁸⁶ Chinese Vice Premier Urges Efforts to Advance Rural Revitalization. (Fuzhou) 17 August 2024. Access Date: 27 August 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202408/17/content_WS66bfd71bc6d0868f4e8ea009.html

production.²⁸⁷This underscores China's commitment to active engagement in agricultural cooperation and promoting food security.

On 27 August 2024, the Nepal Southern Agricultural Science and Technology Park was launched in Bharatpur to increase rice production in Nepal and boost grain production by conducting experimental demonstrations of Chongqing hybrid rice varieties and rice cultivation techniques.²⁸⁸ Additionally, China and Nepal will collaborate on greenhouse vegetable cultivation and livestock and fish breeding. This project enhances agricultural cooperation and supports food security between the two countries.

China has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide. Beyond engaging in joint statements and organizing impactful meetings and seminars, China has actively pursued initiatives that support rural development to strengthen food security, thereby demonstrating steadfast adherence to its commitment.

Thus, China receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Arushi Chhikara

South Africa: +1

South Africa has fully complied with the commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide.

On 30 August 2023, the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development launched a blended finance fund focused on financing alternative energy solutions and energy-intensive agricultural activities.²⁸⁹ This Agro Energy Fund aims to incentivize farmers to invest in alternative energy sources.

On 5 September 2023, Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development Minister Thoko Difiza led the 2nd Uganda-South Africa Trade and Investment Summit in Kampala, Uganda, focusing on agro-industry and accelerating investments and trade between both countries.²⁹⁰

On 18 October 2023, South Africa participated in the third meeting of the South Africa-Netherlands Joint Commission for Cooperation.²⁹¹ The meeting included discussions regarding agricultural partnership and reactivated the Bilateral Committee on Agriculture which focuses on identifying opportunities for bilateral cooperation. Representatives agreed to continue bilateral cooperation in areas of climate-smart agriculture, science and research related to agriculture and commercial partnerships in areas of green agriculture.

On 26 October 2023, the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development Thoko Didiza, KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Agriculture and Rural Development Super Zuma and the Food and Agriculture

²⁸⁷ Peru and China Seek to Strengthen Cooperation in the Agricultural Sector (Lima) 26 August 2024. Access Date: 27 August 2024. <https://www.freshplaza.com/asia/article/9652447/peru-and-china-seek-to-strengthen-cooperation-in-the-agricultural-sector/>

²⁸⁸ China-Nepal Agricultural Technology Park Launched in Southern Nepal (Kathmandu). 27 August 2024 Access Date: 27 August 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202408/28/content_WS66ce5e28c6d0868f4e8ea492.html

²⁸⁹ Blended finance fund to assist farmers alleviate energy challenges, SA News (Durban) 30 August 2023. Access Date: 19 April 2024. <https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/blended-finance-fund-assist-farmers-alleviate-energy-challenges>

²⁹⁰ Didiza to lead SA delegation to Trade and Investment Summit in Uganda, SA News (Durban) 4 September 2024. Access Date: 19 April 2024. <https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/didiza-lead-sa-delegation-trade-and-investment-summit-uganda>

²⁹¹ Joint Communiqué of the Third Meeting of the South Africa – The Netherlands Joint Commission for Cooperation, Government of Netherlands (Amsterdam) 18 October 2023. Access Date: 19 April 2024. <https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-statements/2023/10/18/joint-commission-for-cooperation-south-africa-the-netherlands>

Organization of the UN participated in World Food Day.²⁹² As part of the festivities, the minister and senior officials highlighted efforts to establish food gardens and agricultural cooperatives.

On 5 December 2023, South Africa participated in the 42nd African Association for Public Administration Roundtable Conference, held in Livingstone, Zambia. South Africa's Mpumalanga Department of Agriculture, Rural Development and Land Reform won the gold medal with their submission of the Smart Agricultural Box.²⁹³ The designs prioritize efficient vegetable cultivation, particularly in regions that lack sufficient area for traditional farming methods.

On 25 January 2024, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development of South Africa met with delegation members of the Eurasian Economic Commission.²⁹⁴ As part of the negotiations, a wide range of issues within the field of agriculture were discussed including the incorporation of digitalization and technology to improve efficiency, crop production, and certification of organic produce.

On 25 January 2024, the Transforming Food Systems and Agriculture through Research Initiative in Partnership with Africa, held its second general assembly in Senegal.²⁹⁵ Under the co-presidency of the Agricultural Research Council in South Africa and Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement in France, the members validated TSARA's scientific agenda and action plan in alignment with the initiative's objectives to address global socio-economic and environmental challenges. Since its original inception in 2022, eight thematic groups have been established and over 20 starter projects have been launched.

On 12 February 2024, South Africa participated in the Consortium Europe-Africa on Research and Innovation for Food Systems Transformation, as part of an African Union and European Union collaboration.²⁹⁶ South African participated as project implementation partners in the ARC Institute for Soil Climate and Water, the Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network and the National Research Foundation.

South Africa has fully complied with the commitment to strengthen agricultural cooperation and promote sustainable agriculture and rural development of BRICS countries for enhancing food security both within BRICS and worldwide. South Africa has demonstrated clear attempts to prioritize environmental protection and climate change mitigation in its agricultural policy, through its bilateral relationships. It has also shown efforts to provide aid in the development of rural agriculture and demonstrated efforts to support small-scale farmers in transitioning to green tech.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of +1.

²⁹² Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development celebrates World Food Day in KwaZulu-Natal, 26 Oct, South African Government (Pretoria) 24 October 2023. Access Date: 19 April 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-advisories/government-activities/agriculture-land-reform-and-rural-development-2>

²⁹³ Mpumalanga Climate Smart Agricultural Intervention for Food Security Wins Gold Medal in Zambia, The Public Servant (Arcadia) 12 December 2023. Access Date: 19 April 2024. <https://www.dpsa.gov.za/thepublicservant/2023/12/12/climate-smart-agricultural-intervention-for-food-security-wins-gold-medal-in-zambia/>

²⁹⁴ EEC and relevant ministries of South Africa discussed prospects for cooperation, Office of the Eurasian Economic Commission (Moscow) 26 January 2024. Access Date: 30 April 2024. <https://eec.eaeunion.org/en/news/eeek-i-profilnye-ministerstva-yuar-obsudili-perspektivy-sotrudnichestva/>

²⁹⁵ The TSARA initiative confirms its commitment to transforming agrifood systems through research and innovation in partnership with Africa, Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (Montpellier) 26 January 2024. Access Date: 30 April 2024. <https://www.cirad.fr/en/press-area/press-releases/2024/2nd-general-assembly-of-the-tsara-initiative>

²⁹⁶ CEA-FIRST, the Consortium Europe Africa on Research and Innovation for Food Systems Transformation Project Kicks off, Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (Accra) 16 February 2024. Access Date: 30 April 2024. <https://farafrica.org/2024/02/16/cea-first-the-consortium-europe-africa-on-research-and-innovation-for-food-systems-transformation-project-kicks-off/>

Analyst: Grace Ho Lan Chong

5. Development: African Union Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area

“We reiterate our support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa’s efforts towards integration, including through the operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area.”

XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil			+1
Russia	-1		
India	-1		
China		0	
South Africa		0	
Average		-0.20 (40%)	

Background

Economic development has been a cornerstone initiative of the BRICS Group. Ever since the first BRICS summit, member states have agreed to various plans and initiatives to foster sustainable development between member states in a wide range of economic sectors. In addition to broad-based commitments related to development, BRICS members have specifically undertaken a number of commitments related to the development of the African continent.

At the 2009 Yekaterinburg Summit, BRICS leaders called for a reformed economic and financial infrastructure based on democratic and transparent decision-making, a solid legal basis, compatibility between national regulatory policies and international standards, and a stronger risk management system.²⁹⁷ The leaders also recognized the importance of foreign direct investment and aiding the poorest countries in the global initiative to recover from the 2008 financial crisis. These measures represent the first time BRICS leaders have outlined their commitments towards international development.

At the 2010 Brasilia Summit, BRICS leaders iterated their support of the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and recognized the potential setback that the financial crisis could have on achieving these goals, especially due to the crisis’ impact on the poorest countries.²⁹⁸ The BRICS leaders called for implementing policies that would fulfill the MDGs 2015 and offering aid to the poorest countries to help them fulfill the MDGs. With respect to the African continent, BRICS leaders also called upon the international community to fight poverty, taking into account the special needs of developing countries, especially less developed countries, small islands and African countries.

At the 2011 Sanya Summit, BRICS leaders stated that major economies should coordinate their macroeconomic policies in order to ensure strong and sustainable economic growth.²⁹⁹ The leaders also supported reforms and refinements to the international monetary system as well as implementing policies to address excessive volatility in commodity prices. Furthermore, the leaders also reiterated their support for fulfilling the MDGs, and stated that sustainable development was the key to alleviating poverty and fulfilling the MDGs. With respect to the African continent, BRICS leaders made a stand-alone commitment to support

²⁹⁷ Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders, BRICS Information Center (Yekaterinburg) 16 June 2009. Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html>

²⁹⁸ 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement, BRICS Information Center (Brasilia) 15 April 2010. Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html>

²⁹⁹ Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Sanya) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

infrastructure development in Africa and its industrialization within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

At the 2012 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders called for speeding up the implementation of reforms to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as calling for a more representative international financial architecture that includes developing countries.³⁰⁰ The leaders also agreed to continue their efforts to ensure the success of the Doha Round, and safeguard the global trade system led by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The leaders also reiterated their support for policies to accelerate sustainable growth and development in order to combat poverty, hunger and malnutrition in many countries. With respect to the African continent, BRICS leaders recognized the importance of stability and security in North Africa, expressed their commitment to the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa and committed to cooperate on accelerating the diversification and modernization of African countries within the framework of NEPAD.

At the 2013 Durban Summit, BRICS leaders recognized the importance of regional integration for Africa's sustainable growth.³⁰¹ The leaders called for economic policies implemented in Europe, North America and Japan to be aware of the impacts of those policies have on other economies of the world and reaffirmed their commitment to for sustainable growth and development. The leaders reaffirmed their support for reforms to international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO, and also reaffirmed their support for the UN as foremost multilateral forum to bring about sustainable development. BRICS leaders put a particular emphasis on the African continent during the Durban Summit, including reaffirming support for the continent's integration efforts, declaring support for the industrialization process within the framework of the NEPAD and acknowledging the central role of the African Union (AU).

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders established the New Development Bank (NDB) to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable economic development in BRICS member states and emerging economies.³⁰² The leaders voiced their disappointment at the failure to implement the IMF reforms proposed in 2010 and welcomed the goals set by the World Bank Group on combating poverty and promoting shared prosperity. The leaders also reaffirmed their support for the Doha Round negotiations regarding the WTO, and also reaffirmed their support for the UN's developmental initiatives, especially the mandate of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. With respect to the African continent, BRICS leaders reiterated their commitment from the BRICS Leaders-Africa retreat to develop BRICS-Africa cooperation, particularly with respect to infrastructure development and industrialization. Leaders also commended international efforts in addressing instability in Africa and expressed concern regarding certain crises (e.g., South Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic, etc.).

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS leaders adopted the Strategy for the BRICS Economic Partnership for expanding trade and investment, manufacturing and minerals processing, energy, agricultural cooperation, science, technology and innovation, financial cooperation, connectivity and cooperation between BRICS members.³⁰³ The leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to the post-2015 development agenda that will be approved by an UN summit following a review of the MDGs. BRICS leaders also issued various statements regarding security and stability crises in Libya, South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali among others. The Ufa Summit is the first BRICS summit taking place after the AU's adoption of Agenda 2063.

³⁰⁰ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Center (New Delhi) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

³⁰¹ BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation, BRICS Information Center (Durban) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

³⁰² The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Fortaleza) 15 July 2014, Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

³⁰³ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Ufa) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 7 April 2024. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS leaders welcomed the African Union's development goals and aspirations enshrined in Agenda 2063, promised to support Africa's implementation of the Agenda's programmes and committed to continue engaging in joint endeavours to advance Africa's solidarity, unity, and strength through support measures for regional integration.³⁰⁴ The leaders also voiced their support for the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and committed to lead by example in implementing the 2030 Agenda. The Goa Summit is the first time BRICS leaders have explicitly mentioned the African Union's Agenda 2063.

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their strong support for implementing the various programmes under Agenda 2063.³⁰⁵ The leaders also called for greater cooperation between BRICS countries on the economy, industry and energy in order to foster economic growth and development. The leaders also acknowledged the detrimental effects of corruption on sustainable development. With respect to the African continent, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen cooperation with Africa and help the continent to address illegal wildlife trade, promote employment and infrastructure development and industrialization.

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their support for implementing the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs and argued that it was the best guideline for alleviating the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis.³⁰⁶ The leaders continued to call for reforms to International Financial Institutions such as the WTO. With respect to the Africa continent, BRICS leaders expressed support for Agenda 2063 and efforts towards intensified integration and development in the continent, including implementing the Agreement on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Leaders also reaffirmed their readiness to develop further cooperation with Africa, including with respect to addressing COVID-19, and called for international support for regional peace initiatives.

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders acknowledged the ways that the COVID-19 pandemic has transformed the global economy.³⁰⁷ Leaders calls for integrating digital and technological means of addressing the COVID-19 pandemic and guiding policy into their implementation of the SDGs. With respect to the African continent, BRICS leaders endorsed the BRICS Joint Statement on Strengthening and Reforming the Multilateral System, which advocating for making instruments of global governance more inclusive, especially for Africa.

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS leaders recognized the importance of infrastructure development in promoting economic growth and development.³⁰⁸ The leaders also noted that the COVID-19 pandemic has wiped away years of progress on the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs, and reaffirmed their commitment to achieving the 2030 Agenda in all its three dimensions – economic, social and environmental. The leaders also noted the breakthrough applications in digital technologies, such as Big Data and Artificial Intelligence may play an important role in sustainable development. With respect to the African continent, BRICS leaders expressed support for Agenda 2063 and integration efforts through the development of the AfCFTA. Leaders expressed their support for Africa in attaining economic recovery and sustainable development in the post pandemic era.

³⁰⁴ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Goa) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-goa.html>

³⁰⁵ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Xiamen) 27 March 2017.. Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

³⁰⁶ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Moscow) 17 November 2020, Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

³⁰⁷ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Center (New Delhi) 9 September 2021, Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

³⁰⁸ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Beijing) 23 June 2022, Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

Commitment Features

At the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, leaders committed to “reiterate our support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa’s efforts towards integration, including through the operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area.”³⁰⁹

Definitions and Concepts

“Reiterate” is a low-binding commitment verb that is understood to mean to state or do over again.³¹⁰

“Support” is a low-binding commitment verb that is understood to mean “the action, or act of providing aid, assistance, or backing up an initiative, or entity.”³¹¹

“African Union” is the continental body consisting of the 55 members that make up the countries of the African Continent, officially launched in 2002 to replace the Organization of African Unity.³¹²

“Agenda 2063” is the African Union’s 50-year plan for inclusive and sustainable social and economic development.³¹³ The Agenda includes both broad targets for economic and social development and also more concise 10-year implementation plans.

“Integration” is understood to mean incorporation as equals into society or an organization of individuals of different groups.³¹⁴

“Operation” is understood to mean performance of a practical work or of something involving the practical application of principles or processes.³¹⁵

“African Continental Free Trade Area” is one of the Flagship Projects of the African Union’s Agenda 2063.³¹⁶ The Free Trade Area aims to create a single market for goods and services encompassing all African Union members, in addition to aiming to strengthen Africa’s common voice in global trade negotiations. The African Union aims to create this Free Trade Area by gradually liberalizing markets through successive rounds of negotiations.

General Interpretive Guidelines

There are two welfare targets in this commitment: to support the AU’s development agenda and to support the AU’s goal integration particularly via regional free trade. Strong action towards each of these overarching welfare targets must be evident to achieve full compliance.

On the first part to support the AU’s Agenda 2063, there are several sub-parts. The AU’s Agenda 2063 has 20 goals that outline specific priority areas within each. To illustrate examples: Goal 1 seeks “a high standard of living” to be achieved by prioritizing decent work, income equality, disability protection and liveable habitats; Goal 6 seeks “an ocean economy for economic growth” by prioritizing marine resources, energy and

³⁰⁹ XVBRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 9 September 2021, Access Date: 7 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

³¹⁰ Reiterate, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: 8 April 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reiterate>

³¹¹ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 10 June 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf.

³¹² About the African Union, African Union (Addis Ababa) 2024, Access Date: 8 April 2024. <https://au.int/en/overview>

³¹³ Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want., African Union (Addis Ababa) 2024, Access Date: 8 April 2024. <https://au.int/en/overview>

³¹⁴ Integration, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: 8 April 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/support>

³¹⁵ Operation, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: 8 April 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/operation>

³¹⁶ The African Continental Free Trade Area, African Union (Addis Ababa) 2024, Access Date: 8 April 2024. <https://au.int/en/overview>

transport; Goal 10 seeks “world class infrastructure” by prioritizing communication and connectivity infrastructure across Africa.

For full compliance with this part of the commitment, the BRICS member must show strong support for most of the 20 goals of the Agenda 2063, which is at least 15. “Strong” is defined as actions that fall within the priorities identified under the goals of Agenda 2063 and that are tangible, such as policy, financial, legislative, diplomatic (such as in the case of Goal 13 on “peace and security”) or memorandums of understanding (such as in the case of Goal 19 “Africa as a global partner”). Broadly, actions such as verbal reiterations of support, attending conferences, or speeches will count towards less than strong or weaker action, and thus partial compliance.

However, this report takes into consideration specific exceptions, such as under Goal 16 where strong action towards promoting cultural heritage could include a public awareness speech. Thus partial compliance with this part of the commitment means taking either strong action in at least half, or 10, of the 20 goals, or some combination of strong and less than strong action that reasonably equates to achieving at least 50% of the 20 goals.

On the second part of this commitment, to support Africa’s integration through operationalizing the AfCFTA, BRICS members must take strong (i.e., at least five) actions to either implement commitments under the AfCFTA or provide support for the institutional infrastructure that implements and/or administers the Agreement.

Examples of strong actions for this part of the commitment include: eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers on goods and services amongst the parties, cooperating on trade-related issues (e.g., customs, trade facilitation, intellectual property rights, competition, investment, etc.) amongst the parties, providing resources for the AfCFTA institutions referenced in Articles 9-14, entering into Phase II negotiations, undertaking domestic actions to bring about the Agreement’s entry into force (as referenced in Articles 22-26), submitting amendments to the Agreement, etc. Weaker actions include verbal reaffirmation and attending conferences or workshops.

Thus, full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to BRICS members that have taken extensive action to support the implementation of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 by strongly supporting at least 15 of its 20 goals and through strongly supporting the operationalization of the AfCFTA.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that have taken extensive action either to support the implementation of Agenda 2063 by strongly supporting at least 15 of its 20 goals but have taken no action to support the operationalization of the AfCFTA, or vice versa. A partial compliance is also assigned if a BRICS member has taken some action in both parts of the commitment.

–1, will be assigned if the BRICS members have taken weak or no action across very few of the 20 goals of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and weak or no action to support the operationalization of the AfCFTA.

Scoring Guidelines

–1	taken strong action in nine or fewer of the 20 goals of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, or weak action in any of the 20 goals, and has taken three or fewer actions to implement the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) or provide support for its infrastructure.
0	has taken strong action to support at least 10 of the 20 goals of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 or at least four actions to implement the AfCFTA or provide support for its infrastructure, or some of both.
+1	has taken strong action to support at least 15 of the 20 goals of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and at least five actions to implement the AfCFTA or provide support for its institutional infrastructure.

*Affiliated Co-Chair: Ashton Mathias
Compliance Director and Lead Analyst: Sara Cai*

Brazil: +1

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to reiterate support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

On 25 August 2023, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva promoted an expanded partnership with Angola in his speech at the Angolan Parliament, focusing on economic and infrastructure advancements that support the African Union's (AU) Agenda 2063.³¹⁷ The initiative aims to enhance African integration through cooperation in sectors like agriculture, education, and energy.

On 26 August 2023, President Lula advocated for converting International Monetary Fund debts into infrastructure investments in Africa.³¹⁸ The initiative aims to enhance African development and strengthen ties within the Global South, aligning with efforts to promote sustainable growth and integration.

On 3 September 2023, Brazil inaugurated the São Paulo-Johannesburg flight route, enhancing connectivity and engagement with the African continent.³¹⁹ This initiative aims to facilitate increased travel and trade, supporting broader economic and social collaboration between Brazil and Africa.

On 26 September 2023, the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) authorized South African Airways to operate flights, enhancing connectivity between Brazil and Africa with direct flights.³²⁰ This move fosters economic and social exchanges crucial for regional integration. Additionally, ANAC signed a technical cooperation agreement with Mozambique's civil aviation authority, aimed at boosting collaboration on aviation security issues.

On 22 January 2024, Brazil advocated for the AU to become a permanent member of the G20.³²¹ This action aims to amplify Africa's voice in global economic discussions.

On 15 February 2024, President Lula affirmed Brazil's dedication to the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty.³²² This commitment aims to strengthen Brazil's ties with Africa and addressing critical issues of hunger and poverty on the continent.

On 18 February 2024, President Lula promoted sustainable agricultural practices and energy solutions during his visit to Ethiopia.³²³ This commitment aims to foster mutual growth and the strategic partnerships necessary for enhancing Africa's role in the global economy.

³¹⁷ In the National Assembly of Angola, Lula defends a new investment agenda with the African country, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 25 August 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2023/08/na-assembleia-nacional-de-angola-lula-defende-nova-agenda-de-investimentos-com-o-pais-africano>

³¹⁸ At the end of his visit to Angola, Lula defends more partnerships with Africa and other countries in the Global South, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 26 August 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2023/08/em-encerramento-de-visita-a-angola-lula-defende-mais-parcerias-com-a-africa-e-outros-paises-do-sul-global>

³¹⁹ Federal Government and LATAM inaugurate new Brazil-Africa route at Guarulhos Airport, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 3 September 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/secom/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2023/09/governo-federal-e-latam-inauguram-nova-rota-brasil-africa-no-aeroporto-de-guarulhos>

³²⁰ ANAC authorizes South African Airways to operate in Brazil, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 26 September 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/anac/pt-br/noticias/2023/anac-autoriza-a-south-african-airways-a-operar-no-brasil-1>

³²¹ G20 Radio Bulletin 13 - African Union at the G20: a geopolitical and economic leap for the continent, G20 Brazil 2024 (Brasilia) 22 January 2024. Access Date: 6 May 2024. <https://www.g20.org/en/news/g20-radio-bulletin/g20-radio-bulletin-13-african-union-at-the-g20-a-geopolitical-and-economic-leap-for-the-continent>

³²² Brazilian President strengthens relations and takes agenda to fight hunger to the African Union, which debuts at G20, G20 Brazil 2024 (Brasilia) 15 February 2024. Access Date: 6 May 2024. <https://www.g20.org/en/news/brazilian-president-strengthens-relations-and-takes-agenda-to-fight-hunger-to-the-african-union-which-debuts-at-g20>

On 19 February 2024, President Lula announced the creation of a cooperation outpost with the AU focused on sectors like agriculture, health, and education.³²⁴ This initiative aims to enhance economic collaboration and develop inclusive policies that benefit all African Union member states.

On 21 February 2024, the Brazilian government announced its investment in agricultural technology transfers and vocational training programs.³²⁵ The goal is to promote sustainable farming practices and enhance food security.

On 22 February 2024, Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira met with South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor and Indian Minister of State for External Affairs V. Muraleedharan for India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) in Rio de Janeiro.³²⁶ The aim of this meeting was to strengthen the IBSA Fund and promote cooperation on global issues, focusing specifically on supporting the AU's Agenda 2063 to enhance African integration and sustainable development.

On 23 April 2024, Brazil established the Rio Branco Institute's cooperation outpost with the AU in Addis Ababa.³²⁷ This initiative aims to enhance the capability of the AU to achieve its Agenda 2063 by promoting cooperative projects in agriculture, health, and education, thereby supporting economic and social development across Africa.

On 24 April 2024, President Lula proposed the transformation of part of the debt owed by African countries into development investments, during discussions with Akinwumi Adesina, president of the African Development Bank.³²⁸ This proposal aims to alleviate financial burdens on African nations, enabling them to redirect resources toward infrastructure, healthcare, and education.

On 7 May 2024, President Lula emphasized the importance of reforming global governance and supporting the fight against hunger during the Brazilian presidency of the G20.³²⁹ These efforts align with the AU's Agenda 2063, promoting sustainable development and deeper integration across Africa.

³²³ President Lula's press conference during visit to Ethiopia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 18 February 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil/interviews/president-lulas-press-conference-during-visit-to-ethiopia>

³²⁴ Speech by President Lula at the opening of the 37th African Union Summit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 19 February 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 6 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil/speeches/speech-by-president-lula-at-the-opening-of-the-37th-african-union-summit>

³²⁵ School feeding: cooperation between Brazil and Africa is highlighted in official trip to Ethiopia, World Food Programme (Brasilia) 21 February 2024. Access Date: 6 May 2024. <https://centrodeexcelencia.org.br/en/alimentacao-escolar-cooperacao-entre-brasil-e-africa-e-destaque-em-viagem-oficial-a-etiofia/>

³²⁶ Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) – Rio de Janeiro, February 22, 2024, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 22 February 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 8 May 2024. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/reuniao-de-ministros-das-relacoes-exterores-do-forum-de-dialogo-india-brasil-africa-do-sul-ibas-2013-rio-de-janeiro-22-de-fevereiro-de-2024

³²⁷ Acts adopted on the occasion of the visit of the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, Naledi Pandor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 23 April 2024. Access Date: 6 May 2024. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/atos-adotados-por-ocasio-da-visita-da-chanceler-da-africa-do-sul-brasilia-23-de-abril-de-2024

³²⁸ Lula argues that G20 priorities can contribute to Africa's development, G20 Brazil 2024 (Brasilia) 24 April 2024. Access Date: 6 May 2024. <https://www.g20.org/en/news/lula-argues-that-g20-priorities-can-contribute-to-africas-development>

³²⁹ Lula reinforces the importance of promoting the fight against hunger and changes in global governance during the G20 Presidency, G20 Brazil 2024 (Brasilia) 7 May 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2024/05/lula-reforca-importancia-de-pautar-combate-a-fome-e-mudancas-na-governanca-global-na-presidencia-do-g20t>

On 13 May 2024, Secretary for Africa and the Middle East Ambassador Carlos Duarte chaired the 3rd Brazil-Morocco Political Consultations Meeting at the Itamaraty Palace.³³⁰ The goal is to strengthen development cooperation, enhance trade and investment and foster regional and multilateral partnerships.

On 20 May 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation announced the seminar "Brazil-Africa: New bridges over the river called the Atlantic," specifically celebrating Africa Day.³³¹ The goal is to strengthen Brazil's relations with African countries and support the AU's Agenda 2063 through dialogue on climate change, energy transition, global governance and combating hunger and inequality.

On 23 May 2024, President Lula announced Brazil's commitment to strengthening ties with Africa by signing a memorandum of understanding on arts, culture, and heritage with Benin's President Patrice Talon.³³² The aim of this agreement is to preserve cultural links and enhance cooperation in cultural exchange.

On 11 June 2024, Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira emphasized Brazil's commitment to a fairer international order during the BRICS Outreach meeting.³³³ The goal is to advocate for greater representation of developing countries in global governance and economic structures.

On 13 June 2024, Minister Vieira signed a Memorandum of Understanding with South Africa's Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor to expand bilateral cooperation in diplomatic training.³³⁴ This agreement aims to enhance capacity building and foster collaboration in support of the African Union's Agenda 2063 and African integration efforts.

On 14 June 2024, President Lula emphasized the importance of African countries as essential allies in addressing global challenges.³³⁵ The goal is to foster economic growth, social inclusion, and sustainable development in Africa.

On 19 June 2024, Minister Vieira actively participated in the African Union Summit and hosted the 6th Regional Conference of the African Diaspora in Salvador.³³⁶ The goal is to promote African integration and foster economic development through skilled collaboration.

³³⁰The 3rd Brazil-Morocco Political Consultations Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 13 May 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/the-3rd-brazil-morocco-political-consultations-meeting>

³³¹Seminar "Brazil-Africa: New bridges over the river called Atlantic", Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 20 May 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 July 2024. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/seminario-201cbrasil-africa-novas-pontes-sobre-o-rio-chamado-atlantico201d

³³²Speech by President Lula on the occasion of Africa Day in the presence of the President of Benin, Patrice Talon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 23 May 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas/presidente-da-republica/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-discursos/discorso-do-presidente-lula-por-ocasio-do-dia-da-africa-na-presenca-do-presidente-do-benim-patrice-talon>

³³³Address by Minister Mauro Vieira at the BRICS Outreach meeting - Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, June 11, 2024, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 11 June 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs/speeches/mauro-vieira-2023/address-by-minister-mauro-vieira-at-the-brics-outreach-meeting-nizhny-novgorod-russia-june-11-2024>

³³⁴Visit of the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 13 June 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/instituto-rio-branco/noticias/visita-da-ministra-de-relacoes-internacionais-e-cooperacao-da-africa-do-sul>

³³⁵Speech by President Lula at the external segment of the G7 Summit in Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 14 June 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/es/centro-de-contenidos/discursos-articulos-y-entrevistas/presidente-de-la-republica-federativa-de-brasil/discursos/discorso-del-presidente-lula-en-el-segmento-externo-de-la-cumbre-del-g7-en-italia>

On 25 June 2024, the Brazilian government announced the authorization for Brazil to export live cattle and buffalo for breeding, as well as milk and dairy products, to Nigeria.³³⁷ The goal is to boost economic growth and development in Africa by enhancing agricultural productivity and trade.

On 8 July 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock strengthened technical and commercial relations with South Africa and Ethiopia by holding bilateral meetings with public and private entities in the agricultural sector.³³⁸ The goal is to promote mutual benefits in agribusiness.

On 10 July 2024, ICMBio announced Brazil would be initiating a South-South Cooperation project with Benin to protect sea turtles and other marine animals.³³⁹ The goal is to enhance environmental conservation and sustainable development in line with the African Union's Agenda 2063 and further African integration.

On July 24, 2024, President Lula announced Brazil's commitment to supporting the implementation of the African Union's Agenda 2063 and advancing African integration by participating in the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty.³⁴⁰ The initiative aligns with the goals of sustainable development and economic integration across the African continent.

On August 12, 2024, President Lula announced Brazil's commitment to enhancing cooperation with Africa through infrastructure projects, trade facilitation, and sustainable development initiatives.³⁴¹ This effort aims to foster stronger ties with African nations and support regional growth and collaboration.

On 16 August 2024, Brazil announced the hosting of the African Diaspora Conference in the Americas in collaboration with the AU and Togo.³⁴² The goal is to foster stronger ties between Africa and its diaspora, aligning with broader Pan-Africanism efforts.

On 26 August 2024, the Government of Brazil organized the African Diaspora Conference in the Americas, facilitating dialogue between African and American leaders.³⁴³ The goal is to strengthen ties between Africa and its diaspora, fostering sustainable development and deeper integration across the continent.

³³⁶Intervention by the Minister of State at the Public Hearing of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee of the Chamber of Deputies (CREDN), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 19 June 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores/discursos-mre/mauro-vieira/intervencao-do-senhor-ministro-de-estado-na-audiencia-publica-da-comissao-de-relacoes-exteriores-e-de-defesa-nacional-da-camara-dos-deputados-credn>

³³⁷ Opening of the Nigerian market for Brazilian livestock products - Joint Note MAPA/MRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 25 June 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 July 2024. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/abertura-de-mercado-na-nigeria-para-produtos-da-pecuaria-brasileira-nota-conjunta-mapa-mre

³³⁸Map strengthens technical and commercial relations with South Africa and Ethiopia, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Brasilia) 8 July 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 17 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/agricultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/mapa-reforca-relacoes-tecnicas-e-comerciais-com-afrika-do-sul-e-etiofia>

³³⁹ICMBio participates in prospecting mission in the Gulf of Benin, Africa, Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (Brasilia) 10 July 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 17 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/icmbio/pt-br/assuntos/centros-de-pesquisa/tartarugas-marinhas-e-biodiversidade-marinha-do-leste/comunicacao/ultimas-noticias/icmbio-participa-de-missao-de-prospeccao-no-golfo-de-benim-afrika>

³⁴⁰Lula announces Global Alliance against Poverty and says Brazil will be removed from the Hunger Map by 2026, Plateau (Brasilia) 24 July 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 August 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2024/07/lula-anuncia-alianca-global-contra-pobreza-e-diz-que-brasil-saira-do-mapa-da-fome-ate-2026>

³⁴¹Speech by President Lula at the Brazil-Chile Business Forum, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 12 August 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 26 August 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil/speeches/speech-by-president-lula-at-the-brazil-chile-business-forum>

³⁴²African Union , Togo and Brazil hold African Diaspora Conference in the Americas, Ministry of Racial Equality (Brasilia) 16 August 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 25 August 2024. https://www.gov.br/igualdaderacial/pt-br/assuntos/copy2_of_noticias/uniao-africana-togo-e-brasil-realizam-conferencia-da-diaspora-africana-nas-americas

On 29 August 2024, Brazil hosted the 6th African Diaspora Conference in the Americas in Salvador to foster dialogue on Pan-Africanism, historical memory, and reparative justice.³⁴⁴ The event reflects the nation's dedication to strengthening ties with the African continent and promoting racial equality.

Brazil has taken extensive action to support the implementation of the African Union's Agenda 2063 by strongly supporting over 15 of its 20 goals and has strongly supported the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Zone. Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to reiterate support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

Thus, Brazil receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Chloe Gergi

Russia: -1

Russia has failed to comply with its commitment to reiterate support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

On 4 December 2023, during a ceremony to present diplomatic credentials, President Vladimir Putin noted that Russia provided targeted support to the Burundi to develop its healthcare system.³⁴⁵ Targets for this aid include an Infectious Diseases Study Centre in Bujumbura in October and the opening of another mobile medical laboratory projected for early 2024.

On 23 January 2024, President Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi participated in a cement pouring ceremony related to Egypt's first nuclear power plant, the El-Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant.³⁴⁶ The Rosatom state corporation is the lead constructor on the project. President Putin also referenced ongoing work to create a Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal region, highlighted joint projects in the fuel and energy sector and stated Russia would do its best to efficiently involve Egypt in the BRICS work.

On 8 April 2024, President Putin held a working meeting with the Head of the Federal Agency for Fishery Ilya Shestakov where the latter indicated he was working with his African counterparts to conduct a survey of fish stocks in African countries to better understand fish stock sustainability.³⁴⁷

On 19 July 2024, Russia committed to strengthening security cooperation with African states to counter terrorism, extremism, and transnational organized crime.³⁴⁸ This support for peace operations enhances conflict resolution capacities, promoting stability and sustainable development across the continent.

³⁴³Press Conference on the African Diaspora Conference in the Americas, Palmares Cultural Foundation (Brasilia) 26 August 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 27 August 2024. <https://www.gov.br/palmares/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/coletiva-de-imprensa-sobre-a-conferencia-da-diaspora-africana-nas-americas>

³⁴⁴Brazil hosts the 6th African Diaspora Conference in the Americas, held in Salvador, Ministry of Racial Equality (Brasilia) 29 August 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 August 2024. https://www.gov.br/igualdaderacial/pt-br/assuntos/copy2_of_noticias/brasil-sedia-a-6a-conferencia-da-diaspora-africana-nas-americas-realizada-em-salvador

³⁴⁵ Ceremony to present diplomatic credentials, Office of the President of Russia (Moscow) 4 December 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/35>

³⁴⁶ Ceremony for pouring the first concrete into the foundation of power unit of El-Dabaa NPP, Office of the President of Russia (Moscow) 23 January 2024. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/29>

³⁴⁷ Meeting with Head of Federal Agency for Fishery Ilya Shestakov, Office of the President of Russia (Moscow) 8 April 2024. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/17>

³⁴⁸Amid Rising Tensions, Emerging Threats in Eurasia, Assistant Secretary-General, Briefing Security Council, Notes Regional Organizations Can Help Build Bridges, United Nations (New York) 19 July 2024. Access Date 26 July 2024. <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15769.doc.htm>

On 21 August 2024, Russian specialists commit to cooperate closely and efficiently with The Great African Expedition and the Federal Agency for Fisheries to increase the efficacy of fishing conducted by our African partners, therefore improving Africa's food security, and create a resilient and prosperous future together.³⁴⁹

Russia has failed to comply with its commitment to reiterate support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalisation of the AfCFTA. It has provided weak to no support to relevant countries across most of the African Union's 20 goals and has taken no steps to support the operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area.

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Dacian Dawes

India: -1

India has failed to comply with its commitment to reiterate support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

On 10 October 2023, Minister of Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal announced India would be partnering with Tanzania in sectors like education, skill development, and technology, specifically supporting the African Union (AU)'s Agenda 2063 and efforts toward further African integration.³⁵⁰ The goal is to foster inclusive and sustainable growth for the populations of Africa and India.

On 31 October 2023, NITI Aayog, India's national policy think tank, announced India would be hosting a series of Feeder Thematic Workshops.³⁵¹ The goal is to foster a more inclusive and sustainable world through collaboration in various critical areas like trade, security, and infrastructure development.

On 23 January 2024, the National Centre for Good Governance, an apex-level autonomous institution of the Government of India, announced the commencement of a Two-Week Advanced Leadership Development Programme on Public Policy and Governance for Civil Servants of the African Region.³⁵² The goal is to enhance governance and administrative capacities across African states.

On 14 February 2024, the Indian Coast Guard announced that the Offshore Patrol Vessel ICGS Varaha made a strategic port call at Maputo Port, Mozambique.³⁵³ The goal is to strengthen maritime cooperation and security in the region.

On 14 June 2024, Prime Minister Lula announced Brazil would be partnering with African nations in the fields of Artificial Intelligence and energy, focusing on collaborative projects to enhance technological and

³⁴⁹ Greetings to organisers and participants of the Great African Expedition, Office of the President of Russia (Moscow) 21 August 2024. Access Date: 27 August 2024. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74917>

³⁵⁰ India-Tanzania to work for the collective good of Africa and India: Shri Piyush Goyal at India Tanzania Investment Forum, Ministry of Commerce & Industry (New Delhi) 10 October 2023. Access Date: 8 May 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1966397>

³⁵¹ Workshop on India-African Union (AU) collaboration to be held tomorrow, NITI Aayog (New Delhi) 31 October 2023. Access Date: 8 May 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1973561>

³⁵² A Two-Week Advanced Leadership Development Programme on Public Policy and Governance for Civil Servants of African Region was inaugurated in Mussoorie, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions (New Delhi) 23 January 2024. Access Date: 8 May 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1998796>

³⁵³ Indian Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Vessel ICGS Varaha makes a port call at Maputo Port, Mozambique as part of strategic overseas deployment to East Africa, Ministry of Defence (New Delhi) 14 February 2024. Access Date: 8 May 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2006124>

energy infrastructure.³⁵⁴The goal is to foster sustainable development and support the AU's Agenda 2063 through international cooperation and technological advancement.

On 24 June 2024, Minister of Communications and Development of Northeastern Region Shri Jyotiraditya M Scindia announced India would be organizing the 'India Africa Postal Leaders Meet' in India, specifically supporting stronger Indo-Africa ties through the platform of postal services.³⁵⁵ The goal is to enhance collaboration and capacity building in the postal sector to support the operationalization of the AfCFTA.

On 21 August 2024, India announced its support for the implementation of the AU's Agenda 2063 and general efforts toward further African integration by highlighting its investments in infrastructure, its extensive bilateral trade and investment with Africa, and its backing of the AU's inclusion in the G20.³⁵⁶ The goal is to enhance economic cooperation, support Africa's development, and integrate Africa more deeply into the global economy.

India has failed to comply with its commitment to reiterate support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalisation of the AfCFTA. India has announced various initiatives such as education partnerships and maritime cooperation, but the actual implementation and impact of these initiatives, especially with respect to the AfCFTA, have been extremely limited. India has also not taken action across a breadth of at least nine AU Agenda 2063 goals.

Thus, India receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Chloe Gergi

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to reiterate support to the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

On 27 August 2023, during a symposium on China-Africa relations, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Li stated that China has signed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation documents with 52 African countries and the AU Commission in support of the AfCFTA.³⁵⁷ Deputy Speaker of the Tanzanian National Assembly Mussa Azzan Zungu reiterated the BRI has provided infrastructure funding for many East African countries.

On 1 September 2023, President Xi Jinping and President of Benin Patrice Athanase Guillaume Talon announced the establishment of a China-Benin Strategic Partnership.³⁵⁸ President Xi affirmed that China will work with Benin to align the BRI and the Global Development Initiative with Agenda 2063, highlighted existing cooperation in health care and in vocational skills training in the form of the "Luban workshops," and said China encourages businesses to invest in Benin.

³⁵⁴Prime Minister participates in the Outreach session on Artificial Intelligence and Energy, Africa and the Mediterranean at the G7 Summit, Prime Minister's office (New Delhi) 14 June 2024. Access Date: 13 July 2024.

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2006124>

³⁵⁵'India Africa Postal Leaders Meet' being held in India, Ministry of Communications (New Delhi) 24 June 2024. Access Date: 13 July 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2028361>

³⁵⁶Text of the Vice-President's Address at 19th CII India-Africa Business Conclave, Vice President's Secretariat (New Delhi) 21 August 2024. Access Date: 29 August 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2047219>

³⁵⁷ China-proposed BRI provides solid platform for international cooperation: symposium speakers, Belt and Road Portal of the People's Republic of China (Dar es Salaam) 28 August 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024.

<https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/OND9KJ6B.html>

³⁵⁸ China, Benin establish strategic partnership as heads of state hold talks in Beijing, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 1 September 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024.

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202309/01/content_WS64f1cde7c6d0868f4e8df032.html

On 15 September 2023, China and Zambia upgraded their bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative Partnership.³⁵⁹ As part of the Partnership, the two countries agreed, inter alia, on the necessity to reform the United Nations Security Council to boost Africa's voice, agreed to increase cooperation under the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, deepen cooperation under the BRI, establish a green development strategic partnership and encourage more Chinese businesses to invest in Zambian manufacturing.

On 15 November 2023, China held the Second Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Agriculture, where government officials noted that China has provided capacity building for training system that has benefited one million small farmers, pledged to assist the continent with respect to food security and agricultural modernization in line with Agenda 2063, and launched the China-Africa Centre for Tropical Agricultural Science and Technology.³⁶⁰

On 11 March 2024, the Chinese Mission to the AU and the AU Commission jointly launched the 2024 iteration of the Chinese Short-Term Seminars for the AU, which aims to train AU staff members in fields including food security, governance, green economy and human resource management.³⁶¹ Mohammed Belhocine, AU commissioner for education, science and technology, stated the program seminars will help the AU realize its Agenda 2063 goals.

On 25 April 2024, Ambassador to Uganda Zhang Lizhong participated in a handover ceremony whereby China provided food aid to Uganda through the provision of funds to the World Food Programme.³⁶² Ambassador Lizhong noted the aid provision was, in part, to implement China's commitment to provide emergency food assistance to African countries in need and to broadly tackle continental food insecurity.

On 11 May 2024, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade signed an agreement with the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry.³⁶³ This deal was made on the sidelines of China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo and signals a closer partnership involving greater information sharing and increasing trade between the two countries.

On 31 May 2024, President Xi and Tunisian President Kais Saied announced a strategic partnership between China and Tunisia.³⁶⁴ This partnership will involve mutual cooperation for the promotion of greater development in both nations. China aims to support Tunisia in areas including ones identified as part of AU goals such as education, healthcare, and sustainable development.

³⁵⁹ Full text: Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Zambia on Establishing the Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative Partnership, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 15 September 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202309/15/content_WS650462d9c6d0868f4e8df7a3.html

³⁶⁰ 2nd Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Agriculture Convened, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China (Sanya) 15 November 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024. https://english.moa.gov.cn/news_522/202311/t20231117_301290.html

³⁶¹ China-sponsored short-term training seminars for AU launched in Ethiopia, Belt and Road Portal of the People's Republic of China (Addis Ababa) 10 March 2024. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/01EEU30K.html>

³⁶² Remarks by H.E. Ambassador Zhang Lizhong at the Handover Ceremony of China's Food Assistance to Uganda through WFP, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Uganda (Karamoja) 25 April 2024. Access Date: 10 June 2024. https://ug.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202404/t20240425_11288685.htm

³⁶³ Trade organizations of China, Kenya ink deal to foster business ties, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 11 May 2024. Access Date: 1 August 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202405/11/content_WS663ec447c6d0868f4e8e6fd3.html

³⁶⁴ China, Tunisia establish strategic partnership, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 31 May 2024. Access Date: 1 August 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202405/31/content_WS6659ae71c6d0868f4e8e7b3a.html

On 22 June 2024, China in conjunction with Ethiopia organized the Beijing-Ethiopia business promotion conference in Addis Ababa.³⁶⁵ This conference brought together top business leaders from both countries to foster closer economic ties. As part of the event, Chinese and Ethiopian enterprises signed memorandums of understanding for cooperation on enhancing business relations and information sharing.

On 11 July 2024, President Xi met with President Umaro Sissoco Embalo of Guinea-Bissau.³⁶⁶ As part of talks, the two signed bilateral documents of cooperation on development in areas such as the mining sector.

On 26 July 2024, China promised to help contribute to Africa's development by strengthening parasport cooperation through a pact with Angola, offering material support, and sending sports equipment to various African nations to promote inclusive development and empower people with disabilities.³⁶⁷

On 26 July 2024, China committed to enhancing technical collaboration with Ethiopia through technology transfer, human resource development, and the building of scientific institutions.³⁶⁸ This collaboration intends to create a strong innovation ecosystem in Ethiopia by encouraging creativity, entrepreneurship, and technical progress.

On 29 July 2024, Minister of Industry and Information Technology Jin Zhuanglong committed to developing data centres, 5G and 6G technologies and mobile communication infrastructure in Africa.³⁶⁹ The collaboration also encourages businesses, think tanks, and academic institutions to strengthen their capacities to support a "digital Africa."

On 13 August 2024, Chinese Ambassador to Zambia Han Jing encouraged further Chinese-Zambian transportation sector collaboration during a meeting with Zambian Minister of Transport and Logistics Frank Tayali. This included reviving the Tanzania-Zambia Railway and constructing new highways and airports.³⁷⁰ The purpose of this partnership is to promote Zambia's internal connectivity and economic growth while fortifying bilateral connections, all of which contributes to the development of Africa and complies with African Union's goals for African futures.

On 23 August 2024, China sponsored the Mmopane-Block 8 road project in Botswana, which aimed to alleviate traffic congestion and enhance local infrastructure.³⁷¹ This project, which aims to improve infrastructure, promote regional connectivity, and advance sustainable development throughout Africa, is a part of a larger effort between China and Botswana to cooperate economically and technologically under the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

³⁶⁵Beijing holds business promotion conference in Ethiopia to augment trade, investment ties, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 23 June 2024. Access Date: 1 August 2024.

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202406/23/content_WS66776160c6d0868f4e8e8732.html

³⁶⁶Chinese, Guinea-Bissau presidents hold talks, elevate ties, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 11 July 2024. Access Date: 1 August 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/11/content_WS668f1541c6d0868f4e8e910a.html

³⁶⁷ China, Angola sign MoU to enhance para sport cooperation, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 26 July 2024. Access Date: 26 August 2024.

http://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/26/content_WS66a387fcc6d0868f4e8e97b0.html

³⁶⁸ China, Ethiopia to enhance cooperation in science, technology, innovation, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 26 July 2024. Access Date: 26 August 2024.

http://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/27/content_WS66a4341dc6d0868f4e8e97ec.html

³⁶⁹ China, Africa move to strengthen digital cooperation, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 29 July 2024. Access Date: 26 August 2024. http://english.www.gov.cn/news/202407/30/content_WS66a821e0c6d0868f4e8e990b.html

³⁷⁰ China, Zambia seek enhanced cooperation in transport sector, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 14 August 2024. Access Date: 26 August 2024.

http://english.www.gov.cn/news/202408/14/content_WS66bbe8bbc6d0868f4e8e9e4f.html

³⁷¹ China, Botswana sign letters of exchange for China-aided road project, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 24 August 2024. Access Date: 26 August 2024.

http://english.www.gov.cn/news/202408/24/content_WS66c93c08c6d0868f4e8ea38b.html

China has partially complied with its commitment to reiterate support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. While China has taken strong action towards supporting African partners in implementing the goals of the African Union Agenda 2063, it has not taken action across a breadth of more than 15 Agenda 2063 goals. Further, China has taken limited action to support the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Dacian Dawes

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to reiterate support to the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

On 25 August 2023, the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy Gwede Mantashe inaugurated the first African Critical Minerals Summit held in Johannesburg.³⁷² The conference brought together leaders, policymakers, and businessmen to collaborate on leveraging Africa's critical mineral resources to fuel both its own economic development as well as global sustainable energy development.

On 10 September 2023, following previous South African advocacy and the accession of the AU at the G20's New Delhi Summit, President Cyril Ramaphosa publicly welcomed the AU into the group at a leadership summit.³⁷³ Moreover, during the summit, South Africa participated in the EU-African Leaders' meeting focusing on discussion and collaboration made possible by AU's G20 newfound membership. This represents an important step towards Africa's integration with the international system.

On 28 November 2023, President Ramaphosa hosted the third African Union Men's Conference on Positive Masculinity in Pretoria. Leaders in this conference focused on exploring and collaborating on drafting a convention protecting women and girls from violence.³⁷⁴ This is in line with the social developmental facet of the African Union's 2063 Agenda.

On 17 February 2024, President Ramaphosa attended the 37th African Union Leaders' Summit.³⁷⁵ This iteration of the summit is focused on developing education among members and the South African delegation took on a prominent role with participation in several high-level committees.

On 29 January 2024, the Government of South Africa officially exported the first shipment of goods under the terms defined by the AfCFTA.³⁷⁶ This represents a strong step towards operationalizing the AfCFTA.

³⁷² Minister Gwede Mantashe opens inaugural African Critical Minerals Summit, 29 to 30 Aug, Government of South Africa (Pretoria) 25 August 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-advisories/conferences-summits-seminars-and-workshops/minister-gwede-mantashe-opens-0>

³⁷³ President Cyril Ramaphosa welcomes membership of the African Union in the G20, Government of South Africa (Pretoria) 10 September 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-welcomes-membership-african-union-g20-10-sep-2023>

³⁷⁴ 3rd Men's Conference on Positive Masculinity. "Consolidating Commitments Towards the African Union Convention on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls," African Union (Addis Ababa) 27 November 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://au.int/en/newsevents/20231127/3rd-mens-conference-positive-masculinity-consolidating-commitments-towards>

³⁷⁵ President Cyril Ramaphosa participates at 37th African Union Heads of State and Government Summit, Government of South Africa (Pretoria) 17 February 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-cyril-ramaphosa-participates-37th-african-union-heads-state-and>

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to reiterate support to the AU Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalisation of the AfCFTA. It has taken action and a leadership position in hosting summits focused on collaboration on various aspects of development in accordance with the AU 2063 Agenda, but has not taken strong action across over 15 AU Agenda 2063 goals. Further, its actions with respect to the operationalization of the AfCFTA were weak.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Sara Cai

³⁷⁶ South Africa to launch the start of its preferential trade under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) in Durban on Wednesday 31 January, Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (Pretoria) 29 January 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.thedtic.gov.za/south-africa-to-launch-the-start-of-its-preferential-trade-under-the-african-continental-free-trade-agreement-afcfta-in-durban-on-wednesday-31-january/>

6. Tourism and Culture: Sustainable and Inclusive Tourism

“We acknowledge the urgent need for tourism industry recovery and the importance of increasing mutual tourist flows and will work towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures, which can shape a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.”

XV BRICS Summit: Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil			+1
Russia	-1		
India	-1		
China	-1		
South Africa	-1		
Average	-0.60 (20%)		

Background

Tourism has been an important topic of discussion for intra-BRICS cooperation. The fourth BRICS summit in 2012 was the first time that cooperation in tourism had been encouraged. The adoption of the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism in 2021 represented a shift from strictly verbal support for increasing tourism to tourism becoming a recurring theme of cooperation among the BRICS leaders.

On 29 March 2012, the BRICS leaders encouraged “expanding the channels of communication, exchanges and people-to-people contact amongst the BRICS” in several areas including tourism.³⁷⁷

On 27 March 2013, the BRICS leaders met for the fifth BRICS summit in Durban, South Africa, during which they listed tourism as a new area of cooperation to be explored.³⁷⁸

On 9 July 2015, the BRICS leaders announced their commitment to “create favourable conditions for long-term cooperation in the field of tourism.”³⁷⁹

On 26 July 2018, the BRICS leaders recalled the growth in intra-BRICS tourism and welcomed the initiative to create the BRICS Working Group on Tourism. The working group “will exchange knowledge, experience and best practices in the areas of travel trade, air connectivity, tourism infrastructure, culture and medical tourism, barriers to tourism marketing, tourism safety and support – financial, insurance and medical.”³⁸⁰

On 17 November 2020, in the Moscow Declaration, the BRICS leaders recognized tourism as a driving force for the BRICS economies. The BRICS leaders welcomed dialogue in tourism cooperation in light of effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on tourism.³⁸¹

On 13 July 2021, the BRICS Tourism Ministers forged the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism with the goal of creating a more “resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.” There are nine areas in which the

³⁷⁷ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

³⁷⁸ BRICS and Africa: Partnerships for Development, Integration and Industrialisation, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 27 March 2013. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

³⁷⁹ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 20 January 2024. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

³⁸⁰ BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

³⁸¹ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

Alliance can accelerate action: 1) mainstreaming sustainability; 2) achieving the Sustainable Development Goals; 3) the transition to renewable sources of energy; 4) supporting conservation efforts; 5) creating jobs in the tourism sector; 6) social inclusion of vulnerable groups such as youth and women; 7) meeting the needs of micro, small and medium enterprises; 8) placing greater focus on health and hygiene; and 9) promoting more secluded destinations.³⁸²

On 22 June 2023, the BRICS leaders recalled the “urgent need for tourism industry recovery and the importance of increasing mutual tourist flows” and announced that it will “work towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures, which can shape a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.”³⁸³

On 23 August 2023, the BRICS leaders met for the 15th summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, during which they acknowledged the “urgent need for tourism industry recovery and the importance of increasing mutual tourist flows” and announced their commitment to “work towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures, which can shape a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.”³⁸⁴

Commitment Features

The commitment reads: “We acknowledge the urgent need for tourism industry recovery and the importance of increasing mutual tourist flows and will work together towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures, which can shape a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.”

Definitions and Concepts

“Strengthening” means “to make or become stronger.”³⁸⁵ Within the context of this commitment, “further strengthening” implies the continuation of efforts to make something stronger.

General Interpretive Guidelines

The first part of this commitment acknowledges the urgent need for the BRICS members’ tourism industries to recover from the economic shocks of recent years (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic) and recognizes the importance of increasing mutual tourist flows.

As outlined above, the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism consists of nine objectives. This report interprets “strengthening the Alliance” as efforts to strengthen implementation of the Alliance and its core objectives. Thus for full compliance, the BRICS member must take strong action in most of the nine objectives, or at least seven, and there must be evidence that the BRICS members cooperated to achieve at least some of these objectives. Thus if all actions by the BRICS members are domestic and lack any cooperative component, this will lower the members’ scores. What constitutes strong action will be guided by the Alliance itself, such as transitioning to renewable energy within hospitality sectors or promoting rural tourism.

A score of 0 for partial compliance entails the BRICS member taking strong action that work towards strengthening four to six of the nine objectives, or more weak actions. Weak actions can include verbal iterations of support, speeches, or simply attending meetings without actively participating in them.

³⁸² Ministerial Communiqué of BRICS Tourism Ministers’ Meeting, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 13 July 2021. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210713-tourism.pdf>

³⁸³ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

³⁸⁴ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 20 January 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

³⁸⁵ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 2 February 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

A score of –1 will result if the BRICS member takes weaker action in three or fewer actions of the commitment, or takes action that is directly and explicitly antithetical to the commitment.

Scoring Guidelines

–1	The BRICS member took weak action in three or fewer areas towards strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures for a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.
0	The BRICS member took strong action in four to six areas towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures for a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector, or took weak actions in four or more actions, or took a combination of weak and strong actions in four or more areas.
+1	The BRICS member took strong action in seven to nine areas towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures for a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.

Affiliated Co-Chair: Pantéa Jamshidi Nouri
Compliance Director: Sofiya Sapeba

Brazil: +1

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism.

On 30 October 2023, the Ministry of Tourism released a statement celebrating the return of direct flights between Brazil and South Africa.³⁸⁶ After the National Civil Aviation Agency’s authorization, South African Airlines will operate flights between Cape Town and Guarulhos on 31 October, and direct flights will begin between Cape Town and São Paulo on 6 November. The new flight offerings increase air connectivity and promote tourism between Brazil and South Africa.

On 16 December 2023, the Ministry of Tourism announced a partnership with the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation and the Brazilian Tourism Board (Embratur) to promote sustainable tourism in Brazil.³⁸⁷

On 2 January 2024, the Ministry of Tourism accredited 276 travel agencies as suitable to accommodate tourists from China for group trips.³⁸⁸ The expansion of options for Chinese tourists incentivizes travel from China to Brazil.

On 4 January 2024, the Ministry of Tourism announced that it would enter into two Decentralized Execution Terms agreements, with the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁶ Novos voos semanais ampliam a conexão entre Brasil e África do Sul, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 16 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/novos-voos-semanais-ampliam-a-conexao-entre-brasil-e-africa-do-sul>

³⁸⁷ Parceria entre MTur, ICMBio, Embratur e MMA promoverá turismo sustentável em unidades de conservação, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 16 December 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/mtur-fecha-acordo-para-promover-turismo-sustentavel-em-unidades-de-conservacao>

³⁸⁸ MTur credencia 276 agências de viagens que atuarão na recepção de turistas chineses, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 2 January 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/mtur-divulga-lista-de-agencias-de-viagens-que-atuarao-na-recepcao-de-turistas-chineses>

On 23 January 2024, Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism Ana Carlos Lopes addressed the Ibero-American Conference of Tourism Ministers and Entrepreneurs in Madrid, Spain.³⁹⁰ Secretary Lopes reaffirmed that Brazil's tourism promotion strategy involves a sustainability focus, particularly through incorporating the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals.

On 21 February 2024, the Ministry of Tourism fielded a delegation to the Lençóis Maranhenses National Park.³⁹¹ Ministry officials visited the National Park, a conservation area and a popular ecotourism destination, and met with local officials. The Ministry will incorporate their experiences and consultation into an action plan for supporting sustainable tourism in the surrounding area.

On 20 March 2024, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Ports and Airports and Embratur announced a joint initiative to attract international flights to Brazil, known as the International Tourism Acceleration Program (PATI).³⁹² Through PATI, the agencies seek to strengthen air connectivity between Brazil and designated strategic markets. BRICS members South Africa and China are considered strategic markets by Embratur.³⁹³ PATI will prioritize public-private partnerships with socially and environmentally conscious contractors who, for instance, use less carbon-intensive aircraft, have committed to implementing the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals and/or carry policies to prevent cross-border trafficking in persons, especially women and girls.

On 29 April 2024, the Ministry of Tourism released a statement celebrating a Memorandum of Understanding between Brazil and China on facilitating tourist flow between the two countries, coordinated through PATI.³⁹⁴ Notably, the agreement facilitates a new direct flight from Beijing to São Paulo, which the Ministry says will cut the typical travel time from around 30 hours to around 26 hours.

On 7 May 2024, the Ministry of Tourism released data on job openings generated by the tourism industry in March.³⁹⁵ The Ministry, relying on employment statistics from the Ministry of Labor and Employment, reported that the tourism sector generated around 17.4 thousand new job openings across the month.

On 10 May 2024, Minister Sabino announced that the Ministry of Tourism would mobilize BRL100million to Pará.³⁹⁶ The new funding is earmarked for developing infrastructure and supporting entrepreneurs as the state

³⁸⁹ MTur destinará mais de R\$ 5 milhões em acordos com UFRN e UFRJ para desenvolvimento de ações climáticas e de turismo responsável, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 4 January 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/mtur-destinara-mais-de-r-5-milhoes-em-acordos-com-ufrn-e-ufrj-para-desenvolvimento-de-aco-es-climaticas-e-de-turismo-responsavel>

³⁹⁰ Em Madri, Brasil reafirma o compromisso de desenvolver o turismo de forma sustentável, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 23 January 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 3 July 2024.

³⁹¹ MTur faz visita técnica aos Lençóis Maranhenses para construir plano de ação com foco no desenvolvimento turístico da região, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 21 February 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/mtur-faz-visita-tecnica-aos-lencois-maranhenses-para-construir-plano-de-acao-com-foco-no-desenvolvimento-turistico-da-regiao>

³⁹² Governo Federal lança programa para atrair voos internacionais, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 20 March 2024. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/governo-federal-lanca-programa-para-atrair-voos-internacionais>

³⁹³ PUBLIC CALL NOTICE Nº4/2024, Embratur (Brasília) 20 March 2024. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://embratur.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Public-Notice-no.-04-wording-given-by-1a.-Retificacao.pdf>

³⁹⁴ Brasil e China mais perto! Voos direto entre os dois países já são realidade, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 29 April 2024. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/brasil-e-china-mais-perto-voos-direto-entre-os-dois-paises-ja-sao-realidade>

³⁹⁵ Turismo gera mais de 17,4 mil postos de trabalho em março, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 7 May 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/turismo-gera-mais-de-17-4-mil-postos-de-trabalho-em-marco>

³⁹⁶ MTur destina R\$ 100 milhões do Fungetur ao Pará para preparação da COP 30, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 10 May 2024. Access Date: 6 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/mtur-destina-r-100-milhoes-do-fungetur-ao-para-para-preparacao-da-cop-30>

prepares to host the 30th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in late 2024.

On 15 May 2024, the Chamber of Deputies approved an agreement between Brazil and UN Tourism to establish UN Tourism's third office, and first in the Americas, in Rio de Janeiro.³⁹⁷ The UN Tourism office in Brazil will act to further support the tourism industry in the Americas, and promote sustainable tourism in line with flagship UN initiatives.

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism. Strong actions taken by the Brazilian Ministry of Tourism, including the establishment of PATI and supports for entrepreneurs in the state of Pará, impute to seven of the nine prongs of the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism, with no strong action found regarding tourism to off-beat areas and health and hygiene. Brazil has also taken strong action in tandem with BRICS members to promote tourism, most notably China and South Africa.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Luca B. Rampersad

Russia: -1

Russia has failed to comply with its commitment to work towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures, which can shape a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.

Russia has not taken strong action nor expressed verbal support to strengthen the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism.

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1.³⁹⁸

Analyst: Pantéa Jamshidi Nouri

India: -1

India has failed to comply with its commitment to work towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures, which can shape a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.

India has not taken any bilateral/multilateral actions nor made any verbal commitments to strengthen the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism.

Thus, India receives a score of -1.³⁹⁹

Analyst: Gayatri Varma

³⁹⁷ Plenário da Câmara aprova acordo sobre instalação de escritório da ONU Turismo no Brasil, Ministério do Turismo (Brasília) 16 May 2024. Access Date: 3 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/turismo/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/plenario-da-camara-aprova-acordo-sobre-instalacao-de-escritorio-da-onu-turismo-no-brasil>

³⁹⁸ This non-compliance was determined after searching the following websites:

<http://government.ru/en/news/?dt.till=05.07.2024&dt.since=25.08.2023>, <https://www.reuters.com/site-search/?query=Russia+BRICS+tourism&offset=0>,

<https://www.cnn.com/search?q=Russia+BRICS+Tourism&from=0&size=10&page=1&sort=newest&types=all§ion=>

³⁹⁹This non-compliance was determined after searching the following websites: <https://pib.gov.in/Allrel.aspx>,

<https://tourism.gov.in/press-release>, <https://msme.gov.in/memorandum-of-understandings>, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?51/Press_Releases

China: –1

China has failed to comply with its commitment to work towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures, which can shape a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.

On 24 October 2024, China attended the BRICS Tourism Ministers meeting hosted by South Africa in Cape Town. During the meeting, the BRICS countries agreed to “further their cooperation in order to achieve a sustainable and inclusive tourism recovery.”⁴⁰⁰

China has not taken any strong actions to strengthen the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism and has only attended the BRICS Tourism Ministers meeting to discuss intra-BRICS cooperation in achieving a sustainable and inclusive tourism recovery.

Thus, China receives a score of –1.

Analyst: Pantéa Jamshidi Nouri

South Africa: –1

South Africa has failed to comply with its commitment to work towards further strengthening the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism to promote measures, which can shape a more resilient, sustainable and inclusive tourism sector.

On 24 October 2023, Minister Patricia de Lille delivered a speech during the BRICS Tourism Ministers meeting in Cape Town. The meeting focused on sustainable and inclusive tourism recovery, aimed to exchange information and experiences from each BRICS member’s tourism sector, reach an agreement on key policy priorities and explore cooperation priorities in mainstreaming sustainable policies for a more green tourism economy.⁴⁰¹

South Africa has only met with BRICS members for the Tourism Ministers meeting in Cape Town to discuss sustainable and inclusive tourism recovery and has not taken any strong actions to strengthen the BRICS Alliance for Green Tourism.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of –1.

Analyst: Gayatri Varma

⁴⁰⁰ BRICS members agree on further cooperation for sustainable tourism recovery, The State Council (Xinhua) 25 October 2023. Access Date: 2 July 2024. http://english.www.gov.cn/news/202310/25/content_WS65386abbc6d0868f4e8e09d9.html

⁴⁰¹ Minister Patricia De Lille: Opening sesión of BRICS Tourism Ministers meeting, South African Government (Cape Town) 24 October 2023. Access Date: 2 July 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-patricia-de-lille-opening-session-brics-tourism-ministers-meeting-24>

7. Financial Regulation: Contingent Reserve Arrangement

“We reiterate our commitment to the continued strengthening of the CRA [Contingent Reserve Arrangement].”

XV BRICS Summit: Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil	-1		
Russia			+1
India	-1		
China	-1		
South Africa	-1		
Average		-0.60 (20%)	

Background

In past summits, BRICS members have collaborated to establish alternatives to traditional global financial institutions. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), established in 2014 through the Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement is one such institution.⁴⁰² The objective is to be a “framework for the provision of support through liquidity and precautionary instruments in response to actual or potential short-term balance of payments pressures” between the BRICS members.

Key details of the CRA include:

- Parties made an initial commitment of USD100 billion in resources;⁴⁰³
- The resource access limit for a given member is a function of the resource contribution of the member in question and a multiplier set out in Article 5 of the Treaty; and, finally,
- In line with the Treaty preamble that the CRA “complement(s) existing international monetary and financial arrangements,” 70 per cent of the resource drawings available for a given member is, *inter alia*, conditional on the evidence of an on-track conditional financing arrangement between the member and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (herein referred to as “the IMF-linked portion”). The remaining 30 per cent of resource drawings available for a given member are thus referred to as “the de-linked portion.”

Parties requesting new support or renewing existing support must not be in arrears with (i.e., must not owe money to) the other Parties or multilateral and regional financial institutions as per Article 14 of the Treaty. Secondly, such Parties must also comply with the surveillance and provision of information obligations of the IMF and must ensure that any CRA transactions rank at least paripassu (i.e. on equal ranking) as other present or future, unsecured (i.e. without collateral, in essence) external debt repayments made by the requesting Party to other creditors.

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, BRICS leaders announced the signing of the Treaty, agreeing on the creation of the CRA framework and setting out the terms and conditions of the organization’s operations.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰² Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 31 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-treaty.html>

⁴⁰³ Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 31 April 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-treaty.html>

⁴⁰⁴ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 13 March 2024. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

At the 2015 Ufa Summit, BRICS leaders welcomed the entry into force of the CRA and the signing of the BRICS Inter-Central Bank Agreement that set the technical parameters of the operations of the CRA.⁴⁰⁵

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS leaders expressed their satisfaction with the operationalization of the CRA.⁴⁰⁶ Similar sentiments were expressed in the 2017 Xiamen declaration.⁴⁰⁷

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders welcomed the steps that had been taken toward strengthening the CRA. Moreover, they welcomed the first successful test-run of the framework's de-linked portion of the mechanism.⁴⁰⁸

In a similar manner, the 2019 Brasilia Declaration welcomed the successful completion of a second test run that added encashment (i.e., the payment of outstanding claims in cash) of the de-linked portion of the mechanism as an added element of complexity.⁴⁰⁹

The 2020 Moscow Declaration welcomed the third successful test run that added advanced payments as an added element of complexity.⁴¹⁰ The Leaders also welcomed the BRICS Economic Bulletin as an annual analytical document.

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders acknowledged the importance of strengthening the CRA and supported improvements in the framework for coordination with the IMF.⁴¹¹ Moreover, they recognized the completion of a fourth test run.

At the 2022 Beijing Summit, BRICS leaders continued their acknowledgment of the importance of strengthening the CRA, supported improvements in the framework for coordination with the IMF and welcomed amendments to the Treaty to enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of CRA mechanisms.⁴¹² Furthermore, they looked forward to the successful completion of the fifth CRA test-run later that year.

At the 2023 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders continued stressing the importance of the CRA for “mitigating the effects of a crisis situation, complementing existing international financial and monetary arrangements, and contributing to the strengthening of the global financial safety net.”⁴¹³ Moreover, they reiterated their commitment “to the continued strengthening of the CRA” and welcomed “the successful completion of the sixth Test-Run later in 2023.” Lastly, they announced support for amendments to fix “outstanding technical issues on the Inter-Central Bank Agreement.”

⁴⁰⁵ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 13 March 2024. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

⁴⁰⁶ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 13 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

⁴⁰⁷ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 13 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

⁴⁰⁸ 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 13 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

⁴⁰⁹ Brasília Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 13 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasil.html>

⁴¹⁰ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 13 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

⁴¹¹ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 9 September 2021. Access Date: 13 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

⁴¹² XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 13 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

⁴¹³ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Toronto) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 13 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

Commitment Features

The commitment reads as follows: “We reiterate our commitment to the continued strengthening of the CRA and look forward to the successful completion of the sixth Test-Run later in 2023.”

Definitions and Concepts

To define the key terms in this commitment, “reiterate” is a low-binding commitment verb that in conjunction with “continued” is understood to indicate a previously established commitment that should be furthered with new actions in the area.⁴¹⁴

Meanwhile, to “strengthen” is defined as “to make or become stronger.”⁴¹⁵

General Interpretive Guidelines

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to BRICS members who take at least four strong and new actions to strengthen the CRA.

Examples of strong actions include the publication (or devoting resources to the publication) of the annual BRICS Economic Bulletin, completing a test-run of the de-linked or IMF-linked portion of the CRA, implementing an actual draw of the CRA, increasing resources allocated to the CRA, proposing amendments (e.g., on safeguards, information sharing, membership) to the Treaty or the underlying technical documentation or publishing evaluation reports of the CRA and its test-runs.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members who take two or three strong and new actions or at least four weak actions, such as continuing past efforts without strengthening those efforts. This could include attending meetings but not actively participating in them, such as with the IMF (to either discuss the CRA or to act as a representative of the CRA) or at CRA Technical Group or CRA Research Group Meetings.

Non-compliance, or a score of –1, will be assigned to BRICS members that not only failed to take new action to support the CRA but also failed to reiterate or continue past actions taken in support of the CRA. Mere verbal support falls into this category.

Scoring Guidelines

–1	The BRICS member has taken one or no strong and new actions or four or fewer weak actions to strengthen the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) or has failed to renew or has terminated previously taken initiatives that supported the CRA.
0	The BRICS member has maintained or renewed previous initiatives or has taken two or three strong and new actions or has taken five or more weak actions to support the CRA.
+1	The BRICS member has taken four or more strong and new actions to further strengthen the CRA.

*Affiliated Co-Chair: Ashton Mathias
Compliance Director and Lead Analyst: Ankit Timari*

Brazil: –1

Brazil has failed to comply with its commitment to the continued strengthening of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).

Brazil has not made reference to the CRA in any government publications or speeches since the last BRICS summit and has not otherwise taken any actions with respect to the CRA.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁴ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 30 April 2024.http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf.

⁴¹⁵ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 14 May 2024.http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of –1.

Analyst: Asbton Mathias

Russia: +1

Russia has fully complied with its commitment to the continued strengthening of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).

On 29 December 2023, the Central Bank of Russia noted that the South African Reserve Bank published the 2023 BRICS Economic Bulletin.⁴¹⁷ They further noted the CRA’s System for Exchange of Macroeconomic Information research group drafted the Bulletin and that the Bank of Russia first proposed the concept of the Bulletin during Russia’s 2020 chairmanship of the BRICS.⁴¹⁸

On 7 February 2024, Deputy Minister of Finance Ivan Chebeskov and First Deputy Governor of the Bank of Russia Vladimir Chistyukhin reiterated Russia’s priorities for the financial track during its chairmanship of BRICS, including the better functioning of the BRICS Pool of Conventional Currency Reserves, dedicating the next BRICS Economic Bulletin to the effects of the high interest rate environment and strengthening the integration of central banks of new BRICS members.⁴¹⁹

On 28 February 2024, Deputy Governor Chistyukhin stated one of the main priorities of Russia’s chairmanship of BRICS is to improve the CRA mechanism. This includes obtaining consensus on certain amendments to the Agreement, including those related to the use of national currencies within the mechanism.⁴²⁰

On 5 March 2024, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov referenced the founding of the CRA in 2014 as proof of the growing influence of BRICS on the global economy and stated that BRICS will continue to develop the CRA, particularly in reducing reliance on the US dollar.⁴²¹

On 16 April 2024, Russia convened a meeting of BRICS central banks, where they discussed improvement and expansion of the BRICS Pool of Conventional Currency Reserves and forming infrastructures for payment (“BRICS Bridge”) and settlement and clearing (“BRICS Clear”).⁴²²

On 27 April 2024, Russia updated its 2024 BRICS Presidency website to state that the top priorities for the fiscal track include improving the CRA mechanism, conducting the 7th Test Run with alternate eligible currencies, issuing the 5th BRICS Economic Bulletin and exploring establishing a common settlement and depositary infrastructure for the BRICS countries.⁴²³

⁴¹⁶The following sources were consulted in order to determine the given country was in non-compliance: gov.br, mfa.gov.br, bcb.gov.br, camara.leg.br and tesourotransparente.gov.br.

⁴¹⁷ BRICS central banks continue to publish economic bulletins, Central Bank of Russia (Moscow) 29 December 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=18340>

⁴¹⁸ BRICS central banks continue to publish economic bulletins, Central Bank of Russia (Moscow) 29 December 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=18340>

⁴¹⁹ BRICS financial track priorities for 2024 identified, Central Bank of Russia (Moscow) 7 February 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=638430134826667432ic.htm#highlight=brics>

⁴²⁰ First meeting of BRICS countries’ central banks in 2024, Central Bank of Russia (Moscow) 28 February 2024. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=18470>

⁴²¹ Aide to the President of Russia for Foreign Policy Yuri Ushakov’s interview with TASS, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Botswana (Gaborone) 5 March 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. https://botswana.mid.ru/en/press-service/news/aide_to_the_president_of_russia_for_foreign_policy_yuri_ushakov_s_interview_with_tass/

⁴²² Bank of Russia holds coordination meeting of BRICS countries’ central banks, Central Bank of Russia (Moscow) 16 April 2024. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=18617>

⁴²³ Russia’s 2024 BRICS Presidency, Central Bank of Russia (Moscow) 27 April 2024. Access Date: 10 June 2024. https://www.cbr.ru/eng/about_br/ip/brics/

Russia has fully complied with its commitment to the continued strengthening of the CRA. Russia has articulated at least four priorities with respect to the CRA, including achieving consensus on the use of national currencies, conducting a 7th Test Run, issuing the 5th BRICS Economic Bulletin, integration of new BRICS members and exploring a common settlement infrastructure. Russia has also reiterated its past efforts towards strengthening of the CRA.

Thus, Russia receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Khanak Gupta

India: -1

India has failed to comply with its commitment to the continued strengthening of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).

On 15 December 2023, the Ministry of Finance published its 2022-2023 Annual Report, which reported that under China's presidency of BRICS in 2022, members conducted the 5th CRA Test Run of the IMF-linked portion, without the use of alternative currencies, published the 3rd BRICS Economic Bulletin and achieved significant progress on amending the CRA.⁴²⁴

India has made reference to the CRA once in government publications since the last BRICS summit and has not otherwise taken any actions with respect to the CRA.

Thus, India receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Ankit Timari

China: -1

China has failed to comply with its commitment to the continued strengthening of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).

China has not made reference to the CRA in any government publications or speeches since the last BRICS summit and has not otherwise taken any actions with respect to the CRA.⁴²⁵

Thus, China receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Khanak Gupta

South Africa: -1

South Africa has failed to comply with its commitment to the continued strengthening of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).

On 19 September 2023, the Parliamentary Budget Office released their Quarterly Economic Brief, referencing the CRA as an alternative institution to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.⁴²⁶

On 27 September 2023, the Parliamentary Budget Office released a report regarding the intersection between BRICS and the promotion of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area, which framed the CRA as a

⁴²⁴ Annual Report 2022-2023, Ministry of Finance (New Delhi) 29 December 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024.

https://dipam.gov.in/dipam_docs/annualReport/Annual_Report_2022-23.pdf

⁴²⁵The following sources were consulted in order to determine the given country was in non-compliance: mof.gov.cn, english.gov.cn, pbc.gov.cn and mofcom.gov.cn.

⁴²⁶ Quarterly Economic Report No. 38 – September 2023, Parliamentary Budget Office of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (Cape Town) 19 September 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024.

https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/Quarterly_Economic_Briefs/2023/3-september/02-10-2023/Quarterly_Economic_Brief_19_September_2023.pdf

complementary network of country insurance and lending instruments created in the context of increasingly frequent balance of payment shocks.⁴²⁷

South Africa has failed to comply with its commitment to the continued strengthening of the CRA. South Africa has referenced the necessity of the CRA in two publications but has not otherwise taken new actions, weak or strong, with respect to the CRA.⁴²⁸

Thus, South Africa receives a score of –1.

Analyst: Ashton Mathias

⁴²⁷ BRICS and Africa Partnership – Promotion and Acceleration of Regional Integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), Parliamentary Budget Office of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (Cape Town) 27 September 2023. Access Date: 10 June 2024. https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/Occasional_Papers/2023/4-september/02-10-2023/Brief_BRICS-PF_27_Sep.pdf

⁴²⁸The following sources were consulted in order to determine the given country was in non-compliance: resbank.co.za, gov.za, nationalgovernment.co.za, treasury.gov.za, thepresidency.gov.za, dirco.gov.za and thedtic.gov.za.

8. Environment: Global Biodiversity Targets

“We thus undertake to strive towards the implementation of all the global goals and targets of the KMGBF, in accordance with the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and national circumstances, priorities and capabilities in order to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature.”

XV BRICS Summit: Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil		0	
Russia	-1		
India	-1		
China		0	
South Africa	-1		
Average		-0.60 (20%)	

Background

The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) was implemented on 19 December 2022 in Montreal. The framework contains four long-term goals for 2050 and 23 action-oriented global targets for 2030.⁴²⁹

In 1992, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development was signed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. The Rio Declaration reaffirmed the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. The goal of the Rio Declaration was to establish “a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and people, working towards international agreements which respect the interests of all and protect the integrity of the global environment and developmental system, [and] recognizing the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth.”⁴³⁰

At the 2009 Yekaterinburg Summit,⁴³¹ the 2011 Sanya Summit,⁴³² the 2012 New Delhi Summit,⁴³³ the 2014 Fortaleza Summit⁴³⁴ and the 2015 Ufa Summit,⁴³⁵ BRICS leaders acknowledged the importance of sustainable development through the implementation of the Rio Declaration and other multilateral agreements on the environment and biodiversity.⁴³⁶

⁴²⁹ Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on Biological Diversity (Montreal) 19 December 2022. Access Date: 20 March 2024. <https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-15/cop-15-dec-04-en.pdf>

⁴³⁰ Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992, United Nations (Rio de Janeiro) 14 June 1992. Access Date: 10 January 2020. <https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/environmental.development.rio.declaration.1992/portrait.a4.pdf>

⁴³¹ Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders, BRICS Information Centre (Yekaterinburg) 16 June 2009. Access Date: 20 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html>

⁴³² Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Sanya) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 20 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

⁴³³ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (New Delhi) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 21 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

⁴³⁴ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Fortaleza) 15 July 2014. Access Date: 21 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

⁴³⁵ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Ufa) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 21 March 2024. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

⁴³⁶ Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders, BRICS Information Centre (Yekaterinburg) 16 June 2009. Access Date: 10 January 2020. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html>

On 22 April 2015, BRICS environment ministers held their first meeting in Moscow. They expressed their support for the creation of a platform “for sharing environmentally sound technologies...that can assist in addressing environmental challenges.”⁴³⁷

On 15-16 September 2016, BRICS environment ministers met to discuss “air and water pollution, efficient management of waste and sustainable management of biodiversity.” Further, the ministers acknowledged the importance of BRICS participation in environmental cooperation initiatives.

At the 2016 Goa Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and welcomed the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.⁴³⁸

On 22-23 June 2017, BRICS environment ministers met in Tianjin, China, where they restated their commitment to implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement. The ministers also discussed the importance of signing a BRICS Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation and developing an environmental cooperation framework agreement in the future.⁴³⁹

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, BRICS leaders agreed to take concrete action with respect to biodiversity conservation and supported China’s hosting of the meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2020.⁴⁴⁰

On 18 May 2018, BRICS environment ministers held their fourth meeting. The ministers once again reiterated their commitment to implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement. The ministers also acknowledged the progress made on the Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation.⁴⁴¹

At the 2018 Johannesburg Summit, BRICS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs. Furthermore, BRICS leaders pledged to “strengthen BRICS cooperation in energy, especially in transitioning to more environmentally sustainable energy systems supportive of the global sustainable development agenda, balanced economic growth and the collective socio-economic wellbeing of our citizens.”⁴⁴²

On 15 August 2019, the BRICS environment ministers met in São Paulo for the fifth BRICS environment ministers meeting. The theme of the meeting was “contribution of urban environmental management to improving the quality of life in cities.” The ministers advanced dialogue on key themes, one of which was the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework. At this meeting, the BRICS environment ministers committed to contributing and supporting the development of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and to the successful outcomes of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the Convention on Biological

⁴³⁷ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Ufa) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 10 January 2020. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

⁴³⁸ 8th BRICS Summit: Goa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Goa) 16 October 2016. Access Date: 10 January 2020. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/161016-go.html>

⁴³⁹ Third Meeting of BRICS Environment Ministers Tianjin Statement on Environment, BRICS Information Centre (Tianjin) 23 June 2017. Access Date: 10 January 2020. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

⁴⁴⁰ Third BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Xiamen) 4 September 2017. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

⁴⁴¹ Joint Statement for the Fourth BRICS Ministers of Environment Meeting, BRICS Information Centre (Zimbali) 18 May 2018. Access Date: 10 January 2020. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180518-environment.html>

⁴⁴² BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution, BRICS Information Centre (Johannesburg) 26 July 2018. Access Date: 21 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/180726-johannesburg.html>

Diversity (CBD). The BRICS ministers agreed to prioritize biodiversity conservation and develop a biodiversity cooperation mechanism.⁴⁴³

At the 2019 Brasilia Summit, BRICS members committed to supporting the development of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework, to deepening dialogue on biodiversity, and expected that the Access and Benefit Sharing pillars of the CBD is well discussed at the COP in Kunming in 2020.⁴⁴⁴

On 30 July 2020, the BRICS environment ministers met virtually. The environment ministers acknowledged “the importance of working together to adopt the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework at COP15, including implementation of support mechanisms.”⁴⁴⁵

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, BRICS members acknowledged the importance of cooperating towards the development of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework at COP15 in a way that addresses, in a balanced manner, the three pillars of the Convention.⁴⁴⁶

On 27 August 2021, the BRICS environment ministers met virtually to discuss global environmental and climate challenges. The ministers acknowledged the importance of achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Goals and reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate closely in leading up to COP15.⁴⁴⁷

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, BRICS members stressed the importance of adopting a Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework addressing the objectives of the CBD in a balanced way.⁴⁴⁸

On 23 August 2023, BRICS leaders committed to “actively participate in international 17 biodiversity-related conventions, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), its protocols and advancing the implementation of its Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF), Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and working towards the Global Initiative on Reducing Land Degradation and Enhancing Conservation of Terrestrial Habitats.”⁴⁴⁹

Commitment Features

At the 2023 Johannesburg II Summit, leaders committed to “undertake to strive towards the implementation of all the global goals and targets of the KMGBF, in accordance with the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and national circumstances, priorities and capabilities in order to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature.”⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴³ Joint Statement for the 5th BRICS Ministers of Environment Meeting, BRICS Information Center (Sao Paulo) 15 August 2019. Access Date: 22 March 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/190815-environment.html>

⁴⁴⁴ Brasilia Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Brasilia) 14 November 2019. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/191114-brasilia.html>

⁴⁴⁵ 6th Meeting of BRICS Environment Ministers, BRICS Information Center (Moscow) 30 July 2020. Access Date: 22 March 2024. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/200730-environment.pdf>

⁴⁴⁶ XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Center (New Delhi) 17 November 2020. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html#:~:text=Given%20the%20BRICS%20share%20in,crisis%20and%20ensuring%20economic%20growth>

⁴⁴⁷ 7th Meeting of BRICS Environment Ministers, BRICS Information Center (New Delhi) 27 August 2021. Access Date: 22 March 2024. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210827-environment.pdf>

⁴⁴⁸ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Center (New Delhi) 9 September 2021. Access Date: 10 June 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

⁴⁴⁹ XV BRICS Summit: Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Johannesburg) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 22 March 2024. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

⁴⁵⁰ XV BRICS Summit: Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Johannesburg) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 22 March 2024. <http://brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

Definitions and Concepts

“Undertake” is understood to mean “to take upon oneself, set about, or attempt.”⁴⁵¹

“Strive” is understood to mean “try hard, make efforts, struggle or contend.”⁴⁵²

“Implementation” is understood to mean “the process of making something active or effective.”⁴⁵³

The KMGBF consists of four global goals, to be completed by 2050. These goals align with the 2050 Vision on biodiversity.⁴⁵⁴

The KMGBF also contains 23 action-oriented global targets across three commitment areas. Targets 1-8 focus on “reducing threats to biodiversity.” The theme of targets 9-13 is “meeting people’s needs through sustainable use and benefit-sharing.” Targets 14-23 focus on “tools and solutions for implementation and mainstreaming.”⁴⁵⁵

General Interpretive Guidelines

The commitment is focused on striving towards implementing the four global goals and 23 targets in the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. The four overarching global goals, to be met by 2050, are to 1) protect and restore; 2) prosper with nature; 3) share benefits fairly; and 4) invest and collaborate. The 23 targets, set to be met by 2030, absorb the four overarching goals; the targets are designed to achieve the goals.

Thus, for compliance, BRICS members need only take action towards the targets. The commitment states that the BRICS will strive to implement “all” the targets. For this compliance report, taking into account the one-year time compliance period, “all” is interpreted as “most.”

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to BRICS members that take strong action in at least 14 of the 23 targets. Strong action includes legal, policy, financing or other like actions. Weak action includes verbal reiterations of support, attending meetings, one-time awareness campaigns and the like.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that take strong actions in at least 11 of the 23 targets or weak actions in more than 11 targets.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1, will be assigned if the BRICS member has taken weak action towards fewer than 11 of the 23 targets, or has taken any actions that are directly and explicitly antithetical to the commitment.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS country took weak action in fewer than 11 of the 23 targets in the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework(KMGBF).
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⁴⁵¹ Undertake, Merriam-Webster (Springfield) Access Date: 24 March 2024.

<https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/undertake>

⁴⁵² Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020.

Access Date: 22 March 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁴⁵³ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020.

Access Date: 22 March 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁴⁵⁴ Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on Biological Diversity (Montreal) 19 December 2022. Access Date: 20 March 2024. <https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-15/cop-15-dec-04-en.pdf>

⁴⁵⁵ Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on Biological Diversity (Montreal) 19 December 2022. Access Date: 20 March 2024. <https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-15/cop-15-dec-04-en.pdf>

0	The BRICS country took strong action towards at least 11 of the 23 KMGBF targets or weaker action on more than 11 targets.
+1	The BRICS country took strong action towards at least 14 of the 23 KMGBF targets.

*Affiliated Co-Chair: Ashton Mathias
Compliance Director and Lead Analyst: Peter Ma*

Brazil: 0

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to implement the global goals and targets of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature.

On 8 December 2023, Minister of Environment and Climate Change Marina Silva and German Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock signed a BRL134 million agreement to fund forest restoration projects on 400,000 hectares of land to restore the natural water distribution between the Amazon and Cerrado biomes.⁴⁵⁶ The agreement was part of a larger support package provided by Germany worth BRL540 million, which included funding for mercury pollution monitoring, climate change mitigation and adaptation programs and marine biodiversity initiatives. Accordingly, Brazil has taken steps to fulfill Targets 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the KMGBF.

On 1 April 2024, Minister Marina Silva and the President of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) Aloizio Mercadante signed a contract to transfer BRL10.4 billion to BNDES Climate Fund to finance climate change mitigation and adaptation projects.⁴⁵⁷ The Climate Fund regulates funding under six modules: resilient and sustainable urban development; green industry; transport logistics, public transportation and green mobility; energy transition; native forests and hybrid resources; and green services and innovation. By transferring funds to the Climate Fund, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Targets 7, 8, 12 and 13 of the KMGBF.

On 9 April 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva established the Union with Municipalities for Reducing Deforestation and Forest Fires in the Amazon Program, part of the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon, which will allocate BRL 730 million to 70 municipalities that were responsible “for 78 per cent of deforestation in the Amazon in 2022.”⁴⁵⁸ This initiative will promote sustainable development to reduce deforestation and restore the degraded ecosystem. By establishing the union to prevent deforestation and promote sustainable development, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Targets 10 and 20 of the KMGBF.

On 17 April 2024, Colombian President Gustavo Petro confirmed Colombia’s participation in the Tropical Forest Forever Initiative (Fundo Floresta Tropical para Sempre [FFTS]), a green investment fund proposed and monitored by the Brazilian Ministry of Environment and Climate Change. The central aim of the FFTS

⁴⁵⁶ Brazil and Germany launch springs areas restoration agreement at COP28, Presidencia da Republica (Brasilia) 9 December 2023. Access Date: 4 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2023/12/brazil-and-germany-launch-springs-areas-restoration-agreement-at-cop-28>

⁴⁵⁷ Federal government signs contract for BRL10.4 billion from the Climate Fund, Presidencia da Republica (Brasília) 3 April 2024. Access Date: 4 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/04/federal-government-signs-contract-for-brl-10-4-billion-from-the-climate-fund>

⁴⁵⁸ “Taking care of the Amazon means taking care of life,” says Lula as he launches partnership with municipalities to combat deforestation, Presidencia da Republica (Brasilia) 10 April 2024. Access Date: 4 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/04/taking-care-of-the-amazon-means-taking-care-of-life-says-lula-as-he-launches-partnership-with-municipalities-to-combat-deforestation>

initiative is to invest green assets in countries who are taking actions to conserve their forests.⁴⁵⁹ The proposal outlines a fixed annual sum of money for each hectare of standing forest and a rebate for each hectare of forest cleared or degraded. The FFTS initiative aims to regulate the climate and preserve forest biodiversity and water sources by coordinating conservation policies. By supporting Colombia through the Initiative, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Targets 10 and 19 of the KMGBF.

On 3 May 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, the Ministry of Agrarian Development and Family Agriculture, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency signed the Green Partnership Japan-Brazil initiative which aims to regulate funding to the National Program for the Conversion of Degraded Pastures into Sustainable Agricultural and Forestry Production Systems (PNCPPD).⁴⁶⁰ The PNCPPD will restore 40 million hectares of degraded agricultural land to promote food security. This initiative will minimize the impact of global warming, strengthen cooperation between country members, and enhance sustainability in agriculture. By signing the partnership with Japan, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Targets 7, 10, 11 and 20 of the KMGBF.

On 22 May 2024, the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change detailed the selection process for land reform settlements for members of the National Agrarian Reform Program that provided services to reduce deforestation and conserve native vegetation.⁴⁶¹ A budget of BRL60 million will be distributed in two annual payments on a per person basis using the following criteria: BRL1000 for reducing deforestation between 25% to 50%, BRL2400 for reducing deforestation between 51% to 75%, and BRL 3600 for reducing deforestation over 75% (the percentage are in comparison to the previous period, 2023). By incentivizing individuals to take actions against deforestation through the Reform Program, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Target 2, and 3 of the KMGBF.

On 5 June 2024, President Lula signed the “Pact for the Prevention and Control of Fires in the Pantanal and the Amazon” with the state governors of Amazonas, Pará, Acre, Roraima, Mato Grosso do Sul and Mato Grosso.⁴⁶² This initiative enforces collaborative conservation efforts between the federal and state governments as they coordinate their actions to prevent and combat threats to the biodiversity and vegetation, such as fires, in the Pantanal and the Amazon. By signing the Pact, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Target 3 of the KMGBF.

On 5 June 2024, President Lula decreed the creation of the São Desidério Caves Natural Monument and the Sauim-de-Coleira Wildlife Reserve.⁴⁶³ The São Desidério Caves Natural Monument encompasses a 16,000 hectares conservation unit in the São Desidério municipality. The Sauim-de-Coleira Wildlife Reserve includes 15,300 hectares of conservation land in the Itacoatiara municipality to protect the Sauim-de-Coleira endangered species. By taking action to establish the reserves, thus conserving water and land ecosystems and protect endangered wild species from extinction, Brazil has taken action to fulfil Target 2 and 3 of the KMGBF.

⁴⁵⁹ Colombia confirms accession to forest fund proposed by Brazil at COP28, Presidência da República (Brasília) 20 April 2023. Access Date: 3 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/04/colombia-confirms-accession-to-forest-fund-proposed-by-brazil-at-cop28>

⁴⁶⁰ Brazil and Japan signed 38 agreements during the visit of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Brasília, Presidência da República (Brasília) 4 May 2024. Access Date: 4 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/05/brazil-and-japan-signed-40-agreements-during-the-visit-of-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-to-brasilia>

⁴⁶¹ Brazilian Ministry of Environment issues notice to compensate settlers for reducing Amazon deforestation, Presidência da República (Brasília) 24 May 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/05/brazilian-ministry-of-environment-issues-notice-to-compensate-settlers-for-reducing-amazon-deforestation>

⁴⁶² On World Environment Day, president takes steps to protect Pantanal and Amazon, Presidência da República (Brasília) 7 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/06/on-world-environment-day-president-takes-steps-to-protect-pantanal-and-amazon>

⁴⁶³ On World Environment Day, president takes steps to protect Pantanal and Amazon, Presidência da República (Brasília) 7 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/06/on-world-environment-day-president-takes-steps-to-protect-pantanal-and-amazon>

On 5 June 2024, President Lula signed the decree to create the National Program for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Mangroves, which aims to promote the “conservation, recovery, and sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystem services” of mangroves.⁴⁶⁴ By taking action to minimize the impact of climate change on mangroves and manage biodiversity loss, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Target 1, 2 and 3 of the KMGBF.

On 5 June 2024, President Lula launched the National Bioeconomy Strategy.⁴⁶⁵ The plan aims to establish the National Bioeconomy Commission and develop the National Bioeconomy Development Plan. The National Bioeconomy Strategy targets the following objectives: promoting sustainable use of biological resources, investing resources to create bioproducts, diversify the bioeconomy by creating new products and services, generate employment and integrate communities, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. By launching the Strategy to establish the Commission and the Development Plan, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Target 14 of the KMGBF.

On 5 June 2024, President Lula established the Resilient Green Cities Programme that aims to equip Brazilian cities with urban, environmental and climate policies to foster more sustainable practices, create urban ecosystem services, and increase resilience to climate change.⁴⁶⁶ The programme will create, expand, recover and improve green areas and water resources, propose sustainable urban-environmental planning and management, strengthen capacity of state and municipal governments to mitigate for greenhouse gas emissions, and support scientific research and technological solutions for sustainable urban development. By establishing the programme, Brazil has taken action to fulfil Targets 11, 12, and 21 of the KMGBF.

On 18 June 2024, President Lula implemented the Green Seal Program which standardizes and certifies sustainable Brazilian products and services.⁴⁶⁷ The Program’s certification criteria include, but are not limited to: production traceability, carbon footprint, solid waste and energy efficiency. By implementing the program, which aims to regulate consumption reduce waste, and promote more sustainable consumer practices, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Target 16 of the KMGBF.

On 19 June 2024, the Federal Official Gazette published the “Federal Government’s Multi Year Plan for 2024-2027” which outlines the policies of the government from 2024 to 2027.⁴⁶⁸ Among the plan includes provisions for addressing deforestation and facing the climate emergency. By publishing the plan and its associated provisions on deforestation and climate change, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Target 10 of the KMGBF.

⁴⁶⁴On World Environment Day, president takes steps to protect Pantanal and Amazon, Presidência da República (Brasília) 7 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/06/on-world-environment-day-president-takes-steps-to-protect-pantanal-and-amazon>

⁴⁶⁵On World Environment Day, president takes steps to protect Pantanal and Amazon, Presidência da República (Brasília) 7 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/06/on-world-environment-day-president-takes-steps-to-protect-pantanal-and-amazon>

⁴⁶⁶Decree No. 12.041 establishing the Resilient Green Cities Programme, United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi) 5 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. <https://leap.unep.org/en/countries/br/national-legislation/decreo-no-12041-establishing-resilient-green-cities-programme>

⁴⁶⁷Brazil launches Green Seal Program to standardize and certify sustainable products and services, Presidência da República (Brasília) 20 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/06/brazil-launches-green-seal-program-to-standardize-and-certify-sustainable-products-and-services>

⁴⁶⁸Multi-Year Plan (PPA) 2024-2027 decree on governmental policies is published, Presidência da República (Brasília) 20 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/06/multi-year-plan-ppa-2024-2027-decreo-on-governmental-policies-is-published>

On 21 August 2024, the Executive, Judicial and Legislative branches of the Brazilian Government signed the Pact for Ecological Transformation.⁴⁶⁹ The Pact called for the protection of biodiversity regeneration. By signing the Pact, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Target 10 of the KMGBF.

On 22 August 2024, the government of Brazil and the government of the United Kingdom issued a Joint Statement on International Climate Cooperation.⁴⁷⁰ In the Joint Statement, the two countries agreed to halt and reverse forest loss by 2030. By issuing the Joint Statement, Brazil has taken steps to fulfil Target 10 of the KMGBF.

Brazil has partially complied with its commitment to implement the global goals and targets of the KMGBF to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature. It has taken extensive action covering 11 of the 23 Targets of the KMGBF.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Quanita Khan

Russia: -1

Russia has failed to comply with its commitment to implement the global goals and targets of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature.

On 1 September 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Victoria Abramchenko announced that an additional 29 cities, mainly in Siberia and the Russian Far East, will implement quotas for emissions of hazardous pollutants.⁴⁷¹ Cities joining their quota will be required to design and implement a comprehensive plan to reduce emissions and pollutants in the atmosphere. These plans may involve the modernization of municipal infrastructure, the environmental modernization of industrial enterprises, transferring private households to environmentally friendly heating solutions, or implementing environmentally friendly public transport solutions. By taking efforts to reduce emissions and pollution, Russia has taken steps to fulfill Targets 7 and 8 of the KMGBF.

On 4 September 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Abramchenko announced that RUB43 billion will be allocated for the “Improvement of the Volga” project.⁴⁷² The project is intended to reduce wastewater discharges into the Volga River and eliminate accumulated environmental damage which threatens the Volga. Russia’s provision of additional funding for the project means that Russia has taken steps to fulfill Target 11 of the KMGBF.

On 5 September 2023, Prime Minister Mishustin signed an order to allocate an additional RUB230 million to the Volgograd Region to improve the health of rivers and reservoirs in the lower reaches of the Volga

⁴⁶⁹Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário assinam Pacto pela Transformação Ecológica, Government of Brazil (Brasilia) 21 August 2024. Access Date: 16 September 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://www.gov.br/mma/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/executivo-legislativo-e-judiciario-assinam-pacto-pela-transformacao-ecologica>

⁴⁷⁰Declaração Conjunta Brasil-Reino Unidos sobre Cooperação Internacional em Clima, Government of Brazil (Brasilia) 22 August 2024. Access Date: 16 September 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://www.gov.br/mma/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/declaracao-conjunta-brasil-reino-unido-sobre-cooperacao-internacional-em-clima>

⁴⁷¹ Виктория Абрамченко: с 1 сентября 2023 года в 29 городах стартует эксперимент по квотированию вредных выбросов, Government of Russia (Moscow) 1 September 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/49399/>

⁴⁷² Виктория Абрамченко провела совещание по реализации федерального проекта «Оздоровление Волги» нацпроекта «Экология», Government of Russia (Moscow) 4 September 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/49422/>

River.⁴⁷³ By allocating additional funds to improve the health of the Volga, Russia has taken steps to fulfill Target 11 of the KMGBF.

On 3 October 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Abramchenko expressed her support for proposals to protect endangered species in the Altai Republic during her working trip to the Altai Republic.⁴⁷⁴ She stressed the importance of protecting the Altai Republic's endangered snow leopards, calling for further measures to protect the habitats of snow leopards. Following the meeting, the Deputy Prime Minister instructed the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, together with the region, to prepare an action plan to combat poaching and preserve rare species of animals living in the Altai Republic. By taking action to protect and preserve endangered wildlife, Russia has taken steps to fulfill Targets 2, 3 and 4 of the KMGBF.

On 20 October 2023, Prime Minister Mishustin signed a decree creating the Vottovaara National Park in Russia's Republic of Karelia.⁴⁷⁵ The park will make it possible to preserve tundra and forest-tundra landscapes in the Karelian region. By taking action to preserve the ecosystem of Karelia through the establishment of the National Park, Russia has taken steps to fulfill Targets 2 and 3 of the KMGBF.

On 29 December 2023, Prime Minister Mishustin signed an order creating the Dyakovskiy Forest National Park in the Saratov region.⁴⁷⁶ The national park is aimed to preserve biodiversity in the area, including multiple rare animal species as well as over 700 plant species. By taking action to preserve ecological biodiversity through the establishment of the National Park, Russia has taken steps to fulfill Targets 2 and 3 of the KMGBF.

On 9 February 2024, Prime Minister Mishustin signed an order creating the Tambukan natural reserve in the North Caucasus Federal District.⁴⁷⁷ The reserve is aimed towards preserving the natural diversity of the allocated area around the Stavropol Territory and the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic. By taking action to preserve the local ecosystem through the establishment of the reserve, Russia has taken steps to fulfill Targets 2 and 3 of the KMGBF.

On 28 March 2024, Prime Minister Mishustin signed an order creating the Nizhny Novogorod Volga Region National Park.⁴⁷⁸ The park will create a protected natural area aimed at preserving natural complexes, archaeological, historical and cultural monuments, as well as the development of eco-tourism. By taking action to protect and preserve its ecosystems through the creation of the National Park, Russia has taken steps to fulfill Targets 2 and 3 of the KMGBF.

⁴⁷³ Правительство профинансирует мероприятия по оздоровлению рек и водоёмов в низовьях Волги, Government of Russia (Moscow) 6 September 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/49436/>

⁴⁷⁴ Виктория Абрамченко: Правительство примет необходимые меры для защиты снежного барса, Government of Russia (Moscow) 3 October 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/51272/>

⁴⁷⁵ Правительство утвердило постановление о создании национального парка в Карелии, Government of Russia (Moscow) 22 October 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/49851/>

⁴⁷⁶ Правительство утвердило постановление о создании национального парка в Саратовской области, Government of Russia (Moscow) 5 January 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/50586/>

⁴⁷⁷ Правительство утвердило постановление о создании национального парка в Саратовской области, Government of Russia (Moscow) 5 January 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/50586/>

⁴⁷⁸ Правительство утвердило постановление о создании национального парка «Нижегородское Поволжье», Government of Russia (Moscow) 30 March 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/51216/>

On 1 April 2024, Prime Minister Mishustin signed a decree creating the Vishtynetsky national park in the Kaliningrad region.⁴⁷⁹ The creation of a national park will enable the preservation of natural landscapes and water bodies, including Lake Vishtynetskoye and several large rivers belonging to the Baltic Sea basin. The creation of the Vishtynetsky national park enables Russia to better protect and preserve its ecosystems, fulfilling Targets 2 and 3 of the KMGBF.

On 5 May 2024, Prime Minister Mishustin signed a decree offering additional funding to the Volgograd and Irkutsk Regions for river clearing and bank protection work.⁴⁸⁰ Federal funding for the Volgograd Region will be used for cleaning up water bodies in 2024 as part of the “Improvement of the Volga” project, which aims to improve the ecological condition of the river by reducing the volume of polluted wastewater and restoring water bodies of the Lower Volga. In the Irkutsk Region, the funds will allow measures to be taken to strengthen the coastal areas around several villages to prevent bank destruction and protect infrastructure. By taking measures involving bank protection, Russia has taken steps to fulfill Target 11 of the KMGBF.

On 9 July 2024, the Russian Government allocated RUB330 million for the processing of secondary resources and the production of goods from secondary raw materials.⁴⁸¹ These funds are designed to promote the production of environmentally friendly products through the construction of infrastructure for eco-industrial parks in Stavropol Krai, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk, Leningrad and Moscow regions. By allocating additional funding for eco-friendly production, Russia has taken steps to fulfil Targets 14 and 16 of the KMGBF.

On 1 August 2024, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin announced that the national standard for green individual housing construction has come into force. The standard will set quality parameters for individual housing construction that increases energy efficiency, reduces energy consumption and incorporates green technologies.⁴⁸² By implementing the new standard, Russia has taken steps to fulfil Target 14 of the KMGBF.

Russia has failed to comply with its commitment to implement the global goals and targets of the KMGBF to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature. It has taken extensive action covering 6 of the 23 Targets of the KMGBF.

Thus, Russia receives a score of -1 .

Analyst: Peter Ma

India: -1

India has failed to comply with its commitment to implement the global goals and targets of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature.

On 13 October 2023, the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Climate Change announced the establishment of a Green Credit program to promote sustainable and eco-conscious practices by various

⁴⁷⁹ Правительство утвердило постановление о создании национального парка в Калининградской области, Government of Russia (Moscow) 7 April 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/51272/>

⁴⁸⁰ Правительство направит финансирование на проведение водохозяйственных мероприятий в ряде регионов, Government of Russia (Moscow) 5 May 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <http://government.ru/news/51534/>

⁴⁸¹ Правительство направит дополнительное финансирование на создание инфраструктуры экопромышленных парков (Moscow) 9 July 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 18 July 2024. <http://government.ru/news/52059/>

⁴⁸² Марат Хуснуллин: Зелёный стандарт строительства частных домов вступил в силу, Government of Russia (Moscow) 1 August 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 8 August 2024. <http://government.ru/news/52287/>

market actors.⁴⁸³ The Green Credit program's scope initially covers actions promoting afforestation and water conservation, and is open to any person or group who can apply to receive, buy and sell Green Credits. Incentivizing non-governmental action to promote eco-friendly activities is a strong action conducive to Target 16 of the KMGBF.

On 8 February 2024, the Ministry of Earth Sciences announced the launch of a Earth System Model (ESM).⁴⁸⁴ This model was consulted in the Sixth Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. By producing the ESM model that is available to decision-makers, India has taken steps to fulfill Target 21 of the KMGBF.

On 29 February 2024, the Union Cabinet approved the establishment of the International Big Cat Alliance (IBCA), a new international coalition dedicated to the conservation of endangered populations of big cats.⁴⁸⁵ The IBCA as conceived will focus on building advocacy and knowledge-sharing networks to promote big cat conservation worldwide, and will represent a "multi-country, multi-agency coalition" headquartered in India. Spearheading an international-level framework for conservation capacity-building represents a strong action conducive to Targets 4, 5, 9, 20 and 21 of the KMGBF.

On 6 May 2024, Special Secretary of the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Climate Change Jitendra Kumar led an Indian delegation to the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF).⁴⁸⁶ The Indian delegation reaffirmed its commitment to biodiversity protection and restoration, while emphasizing relevant domestic policies. India's UNFF participation represents a weak action in support of the general aims of the KMGBF.

On 26 June 2024, Union Minister of Environment, Forestry and Climate Change Bhupender Yadav launched the Fauna of India Checklist Portal at an event hosted by the Zoological Survey of India.⁴⁸⁷ The Portal represents an information repository for all forms of fauna in India. Cataloguing biodiversity in an accessible manner promotes Target 21 of the KMGBF.

On 8 July 2024, the Union Cabinet signed the United Nations High Seas Treaty, otherwise known as the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement.⁴⁸⁸ Signing the treaty commits India to a new series of international regulations and mechanisms, aimed at preserving biodiversity in the high seas. Signing onto an international agreement promoting marine biodiversity restoration and conservation represents strong action towards Targets 2 and 3 of the KMGBF.

On 14 July 2024, Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Amit Shah inaugurated a campaign to plant 5.1 million trees across India under the "Ek Ped Maa Ke Nam" campaign.⁴⁸⁹ Minister Shah inaugurated the tree-planting campaign in Indore, where participants collectively planted 1.1 million trees during the

⁴⁸³ Notification issued for Green Credit Program (GCP) and Ecomark scheme Under LiFE Initiative to Promote Sustainable Lifestyle and Environmental Conservation, Press Information Bureau (Delhi) 13 October 2023. Access Date: 12 October 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseframePage.aspx?PRID=1967476>

⁴⁸⁴ Development of indigenous climate forecasting system, Ministry of Earth Sciences (New Delhi) 8 February 2024. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://moes.gov.in/sites/default/files/PIB2004114.pdf>

⁴⁸⁵ Cabinet approves establishment of International Big Cat Alliance (IBCA), Press Information Bureau (Delhi) 29 February 2024. Access Date: 12 October 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseframePage.aspx?PRID=2010124>

⁴⁸⁶ India highlights Forest Conservation and Sustainable Forest Management initiatives at the 19th Session of the United Nations Forum on Forests, Press Information Bureau (Delhi) 12 May 2024. Access Date: 12 October 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseframePage.aspx?PRID=2020347>

⁴⁸⁷ Union Minister Shri Bhupender Yadav says, India becomes the first country in the world to prepare a checklist of its entire fauna, covering 104,561 species, Press Information Bureau (Kolkata) 26 June 2024. Access Date: 9 October 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2029681>

⁴⁸⁸ Union Cabinet approves India's signing of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, Press Information Bureau (Kolkata) 8 July 2024. Access Date: 12 October 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2031611>

⁴⁸⁹ Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah plants saplings in a program to plant 11 lakh saplings in a day under the 'Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam' campaign in Indore, Press Information Bureau (Kolkata) 14 July 2024. Access Date: 12 October 2024. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseframePage.aspx?PRID=2033156>

campaign's first day. This large-scale afforestation and reforestation initiative, organized under the larger "Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam" country-wide campaign, represents a strong action conducive to Targets 10 and 11 of the KMGBF.

India has failed to comply with its commitment to implement the global goals and targets of the KMGBF to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature. The work undertaken in the launch of ESM fall short of the breadth and depth of actionable targets represented within the Framework, having taken extensive action in 10 of 21 Targets.

Thus, India receives a score of -1.

Analyst: Lesley Isaro

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to implement the global goals and targets of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature.

On 19 September 2023, the General Administration of Customs began its year-long Action Plan to block the entry of invasive animal and plant species into city ports by closely monitoring freight transport, consignments and deliveries, cross-border e-commerce and border trade.⁴⁹⁰ By taking action to block the entry of invasive animal and plant species, China has taken steps to fulfill Target 6 of the KMGBF.

On 18 January 2024, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment released a biodiversity action plan to restore at least 30 per cent of its degraded ecosystems by 2030.⁴⁹¹ The initiative aims to increase biodiversity surveying and monitoring, compel businesses to provide information regarding their biodiversity efforts and the creation of a "compensation" system to those who cause ecological damage. By implementing the Action Plan, China has taken action to fulfil Targets 2, 3, 15 and 19 of the KMGBF.

On 25 April 2024, the State Council of the People's Republic of China approved the Xizang Territorial Spatial Plan which aims to cultivate 6 million square miles of land and preserve an area of 606,900 kilometres squared for ecological protection.⁴⁹² The spatial plan will allow for the preservation of biodiversity, create food production and mining incentives, and integrate the local population with wild species. By implementing the special action plan, China has taken steps to fulfil 1, 2, 6 and 10 of the KMGBF.

On 28 May 2024, the Government of China, the United National Environmental Program and the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund signed a cooperation agreement to establish the Kunming Biodiversity Fund. China has invested CNY 1.5 million in the Fund to help support biodiversity conservation and restoration in developing countries.⁴⁹³ By establishing the fund, China has taken steps to fulfil Target 19 of the KMGBF.

⁴⁹⁰ China launches action plan to prevent invasive alien species through border ports, State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 19 September 2023. Access Date: 3 May 2024.

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202309/19/content_WS65099f53c6d0868f4e8df928.html

⁴⁹¹ Action plan aims to amp up biodiversity conservation, CHINADAILY (Beijing) 18 January 2024. Access Date: 4 May 2024.

<https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202401/18/WS65a923b8a3105f21a507d184.html>

⁴⁹² Xizang's territorial spatial plan approved, State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 25 April 2024. Access Date: 2 May 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202404/25/content_WS662a22c7c6d0868f4e8e66cf.html

⁴⁹³ China sets Kunming Biodiversity Fund to support biodiversity conservation in developing countries, State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 31 May 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024.

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202405/31/content_WS66592541c6d0868f4e8e7b08.html

On 3 June 2024, the Ministry of Finance established a special fund to financially support the Three-North Shelterbelt Forest Program (TSFP) in creating an ecological barrier in Northern China.⁴⁹⁴ China invested CNY12 billion in the fund to fight desertification and restore the ecological environment of the meandering bends of the Yellow River, two sandy lands of Horqin and Hunshandake, and the Hexi Corridor-Taklimakan Desert region. By establishing the program, China has taken steps to fulfil Target 11 of the KMGBF.

On 8 June 2024, the Ministry of Natural Resources launched Ocean Cloud, China's first open marine big-data service platform.⁴⁹⁵ The platform is designed to improve the exchange of marine data, both between government departments and global actors. Furthermore, the platform is also designed to strengthen marine data integration services, unify technical standards for marine data sharing and circulation, and improve real-life application of marine data products. By launching the Ocean Cloud Platform, China has taken steps to fulfil Target 21 of the KMGBF.

On 26 June 2024, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the French National Center for Scientific Research created the Sino-French International Research Network on Biodiversity, which aims to address "biodiversity loss, disease transmission and ecosystem dysfunction".⁴⁹⁶ This scientific cooperation initiative will function as an exchange program for students from China and France allowing them to exchange and collaborate on biodiversity research. By establishing the research network, China has taken steps to fulfil Target 20 of the KMGBF.

China has partially complied with its commitment to implement the global goals and targets of the KMGBF to reverse and prevent further biodiversity loss and create a future where humanity lives in harmony with nature. China has implemented policies at the national and provincial levels to combat biodiversity loss, connect humans with wildlife through educational initiatives, prevent the introduction of alien invasive species, restore its degraded ecosystem, introduced sustainable initiatives in aquaculture, and strengthened scientific cooperation for biodiversity. China has complied with 12 out of 23 targets of the KMGBF.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Quanita Khan

South Africa: -1

South Africa has failed to comply with its commitment to implement the global goals and targets of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature.

On 5 December 2023, the Department of Water and Sanitation published several reports assessing the state of water and sanitation services across South Africa in 2023.⁴⁹⁷ The Green Drop Progress Assessment Report in particular noted an increase in the number of wastewater treatment works with a high risk of discharging waste into nearby rivers. The Department recently gazetted the Water Services Amendment Bill for public comment, which will help tackle the aforementioned issue. By taking action to publish data and information on wastewater spillage risk, South Africa has taken action to fulfil Targets 15 and 21 of the KMGBF.

⁴⁹⁴ China sets up fund to support Three-North Shelterbelt Forest Program, State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 3 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024.

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202406/03/content_WS665db091c6d0868f4e8e7cdb.html

⁴⁹⁵ China launches first open marine big-data service platform, State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 8 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202406/09/content_WS6665034bc6d0868f4e8e7f19.html

⁴⁹⁶ China, France join forces to protect biodiversity, State Council of the People's Republic of China (Beijing) 26 June 2024. Access Date: 16 July 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202406/26/content_WS667b8580c6d0868f4e8e894f.html

⁴⁹⁷ Water and Sanitation releases 2023 full Blue Drop Report, Department of Water and Sanitation (Pretoria) 5 December 2023. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/water-and-sanitation-releases-2023-full-blue-drop-report-05-dec-2023>

On 2 February 2024, the Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Barbara Creecy declared De Berg Nature Reserve South Africa's 30th Ramsar site under the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. The move aims to protect biodiversity, including several endangered species, and aims to ensure the local wetlands are kept free of litter and invasive alien plant species.⁴⁹⁸ By establishing the Nature Reserve, South Africa has taken action to fulfil Targets 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the KMGBF.

On 29 February 2024, in alignment with United Nations World Water Day, the Department of Water and Sanitation declared March to be National Water Month. South Africa will fund various projects regarding freshwater conservation and wastewater treatment.⁴⁹⁹ By implementing and funding projects to increase water pollution and increase access to clean, usable water, South Africa has taken action to fulfil Targets 3, 7 and 11 of the KMGBF.

On 6 March 2024, Minister Creecy announced the launch of the 3rd National Status of Biological Invasions and their Management report.⁵⁰⁰ The report discusses the impacts of biological invasions upon water security, sustainable agriculture, wildfires and biodiversity. By analyzing the impact of biological invasions through the National Status, South Africa has taken action to fulfil Targets 6 and 10 of the KMGBF.

On 14 April 2024, the Department of Water and Sanitation held a workshop of Water Services Authorities impacting the Vaal River.⁵⁰¹ Minister Senzo Mchunu highlighted the necessity of creating a National Register of Polluters and reaffirmed the role of government in combating invasive alien species and supporting research and early detection. By convening the workshop on pollution, South African has taken action to fulfil Targets 7 of the KMGBF.

On 23 April 2024, Minister Creecy announced the adoption of 19 historic Community Forestry Agreements together with various traditional leaders.⁵⁰² The agreements deal with forest management, reducing illegal activity in forests, as well as sustainable stewardship of forests by traditional and indigenous communities. By adopting the Agreements with traditional leaders, South Africa has taken action to fulfil Targets 3 and 10 of the KMGBF.

South Africa has failed to comply with its commitment to all the global goals and targets of the KMGBF to achieve its mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss and vision of living in harmony with nature. It has taken wide-ranging actions that cover 9 of the 23 Targets of the KMBGF but falls short of the required threshold for partial compliance.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of -1.

Analysts: Lesley Isaro and Grace Ho Lan Chong

⁴⁹⁸ Minister Barbara Creecy welcomes declaration of De Berg Nature Reserve as South Africa's 30th Ramsar site, Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 2 February 2024. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-barbara-creecy-welcomes-declaration-de-berg-nature-reserve-south>

⁴⁹⁹ Water and Sanitation dedicates March as National Water Month, 1 to 31 Mar, Department of Water and Sanitation (Pretoria) 29 February 2024. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-advisories/government-activities/water-and-sanitation-dedicates-march-national-water>

⁵⁰⁰ Minister Barbara Creecy launches 3rd National Status of Biological Invasions, 8 Mar, Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 6 March 2024. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-advisories/government-activities/minister-barbara-creecy-launches-3rd-national-status>

⁵⁰¹ Water and Sanitation on Vaal River pollution workshop, Department of Water and Sanitation (Pretoria) 14 April 2024. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/water-and-sanitation-vaal-river-pollution-workshop-14-apr-2024>

⁵⁰² Minister Barbara Creecy: Launch of community forestry agreements, Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (Pretoria) 23 April 2024. Access Date: 10 May 2024. <https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-barbara-creecy-launch-community-forestry-agreements-23-apr-2024>

9. Education: Mutual Recognition of Academic Qualifications

“We support the principle of facilitating mutual recognition of academic qualifications amongst BRICS countries to ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students and recognition of qualifications obtained in each other’s countries subject to compliance of applicable domestic laws.”

XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil			+1
Russia		0	
India		0	
China		0	
South Africa		0	
Average		+0.20 (60%)	

Background

Education is one of the earliest commitments outlined by BRICS at the first summit in 2009. However, education remained a low-priority commitment area for the first few years of the group. The commitment area gained focus in the 2010s as BRICS expanded its focus from economic development and regional cooperation to a greater variety of issues, with education being an increasingly important commitment area in recent years.

In 2009, during the inaugural Yekaterinburg Summit, the leaders committed to expanding cooperation in science and education with the purpose of encouraging fundamental research and developing advanced technologies.⁵⁰³

At the 2012 Delhi Summit, BRICS leaders encouraged expanding channels of communication, exchanges and person-to-person contact among the BRICS countries regarding education.⁵⁰⁴

In 2013, during a meeting of the BRICS education ministers, the ministers underscored the importance of exploring further collaboration in the fields of education and training. The ministers also proposed involving the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to further improve the vocational training aspect of such cooperative initiatives.⁵⁰⁵

At the 2014 Fortaleza Summit, leaders highlighted the importance of education for sustainable growth and economic development. The leaders agreed that ensuring access to equitable, quality and inclusive education and lifelong learning resources is an important goal for intra-BRICS cooperation.⁵⁰⁶

At the 2 March 2015 Brasilia Meeting of BRICS Education Ministers, the ministers agreed to work on a report regarding the state of vocational and technical education in order to meet popular demand.⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰³ Joint Statement of the BRICS Countries’ Leaders, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 16 June 2009. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html>.

⁵⁰⁴ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 29 March 2012. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html#actionplan>

⁵⁰⁵ BRICS Ministers Discuss Education, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 5 November 2013. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/131105-education.html>

⁵⁰⁶ The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 15 July 2014. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>

⁵⁰⁷ Declaration of the II Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Education: Brasilia Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 2 March 2015. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150302-education.html>

At the 9 July 2015 Ufa Summit, leaders noted the importance of education in fostering development and innovation. The leaders recognized the importance of vocational education, and called for implementing international best practices, as well as mutual recognition of university diplomas and degrees. The leaders also supported independent efforts to establish the BRICS Network University and the BRICS University League.⁵⁰⁸

At the 18 November 2015 Moscow Meeting of BRICS Education Ministers, the ministers declared to enhance engagement in education and research, support research networks, collaborative programs and joint research projects.⁵⁰⁹

At the 30 September 2016 New Delhi Meeting of BRICS Education Ministers, the ministers reiterated their commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG4, which demanded that states ensure inclusive and equitable quality education is accessible to all. The ministers also supported the formulation of country-specific targets set out in SDG4.⁵¹⁰

At the 2017 Xiamen Summit, leaders emphasized the importance of people-to-people exchanges in promoting development and cooperation among member states. The leaders supported further educational cooperation through efforts such as collaborative think tanks and youth exchange programs.⁵¹¹

At the 2020 Moscow Summit, the leaders emphasized the crucial role of education for improving human capital in the post-COVID 19 recovery. The leaders prioritized cooperation in the field of technical, vocational higher education through exchanges of knowledge and expertise.⁵¹²

At the 2021 New Delhi Summit, leaders recognized the changes COVID 19 brought to the delivery of education and supported the leveraging of digital solutions for ensuring equitable and inclusive education.⁵¹³

In their 2022 Declaration during the meeting in China, BRICS education ministers called for accelerating the digital transformation of education in the wake of the COVID 19 pandemic. The ministers also called for deepening cooperation through the BRICS Network University by developing an action plan for its operation and establishing the Coordinating University from among its members on a rotational basis.⁵¹⁴

Commitment Features

At the 2022 Johannesburg Summit, leaders committed to “support the principle of facilitating mutual recognition of academic qualifications amongst BRICS countries to ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students and recognition of qualifications obtained in each other’s countries subject to compliance of applicable domestic laws.”⁵¹⁵

⁵⁰⁸ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 9 July 2015. Access Date: March 18 2024. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

⁵⁰⁹ III Meeting of the BRICS education Ministers Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 18 November 2015. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/151118-education.pdf>

⁵¹⁰ 4th Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Education, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 30 September 2016. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/160930-education.pdf>

⁵¹¹ BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 4 September 2017. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/170904-xiamen.html>

⁵¹² XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 17 November 2020. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/201117-moscow-declaration.html>

⁵¹³ XIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 9 September 2021. Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210909-New-Delhi-Declaration.html>

⁵¹⁴ Declaration of the 9th Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Education, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 26 May 2022, Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/2022/2022-education-P020220607349467952397.pdf>

⁵¹⁵ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Center (Toronto) 23 August 2023, Access Date: March 18 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

Definitions and Concepts

“Support” is understood to mean to promote the interests or cause of, to assist, to help, to pay the costs of or to provide a basis for the existence of.⁵¹⁶

“Principle” is understood to mean a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine or assumption.⁵¹⁷

“Facilitating” is understood to mean to make something easier, to bring something about or to help something run more smoothly and effectively.⁵¹⁸

“Mutual” is understood to mean be directed by each towards the other, or being shared in common between the two.⁵¹⁹

Recognition is understood to mean to acknowledge, especially formal political acknowledgement from one government to another.⁵²⁰

“Qualifications” is understood to mean a standard that must be complied with.⁵²¹

“Mobility” is understood to mean the ability or capacity to move, or the ability to change one’s social or socioeconomic position.⁵²²

“Skilled” is understood to mean relating to or requiring workers or labor with skill and training in a particular occupation, craft or trade.⁵²³

“Professional” is understood to mean conforming to the technical or ethical standards of a profession.⁵²⁴

“Academics” is understood to mean of, relating to or associated with an academy of higher learning, based on formal study at an institution of higher learning.⁵²⁵

“Students” is understood to mean those attending a school.⁵²⁶

“Obtained” is understood to mean gaining or attaining something by planned action or effort.⁵²⁷

⁵¹⁶ Support, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 18 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/support>

⁵¹⁷ Principle, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 18 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/principle>

⁵¹⁸ Facilitating, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 18 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/facilitating>

⁵¹⁹ Mutual, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 18 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mutual>

⁵²⁰ Recognition, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 18 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recognition>

⁵²¹ Qualifications, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 18 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/qualifications>

⁵²² Mobility, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 18 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mobility>

⁵²³ Skilled, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/skilled>

⁵²⁴ Professional, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mobility> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/professional>

⁵²⁵ Academics, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mobility> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/academics>

⁵²⁶ Students, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mobility> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/students>

⁵²⁷ Obtained, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/obtained>

“Subject” is understood to mean one that is placed under authority or control of something or someone else.⁵²⁸

“Compliance” is understood to mean the act or process of complying to a desire, demand, proposal, or regimen or to coercion.⁵²⁹

“Applicable” is understood to mean capable or suitable of being applied.⁵³⁰

“Domestic” is understood to mean of, relating to, or originating within a country and especially one’s own country.⁵³¹

“Laws” is understood to mean a binding custom or practice of a community: a rule of conduct or action prescribed or formally recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling authority.⁵³²

General Interpretive Guidelines

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be given to BRICS members that have taken extensive action to support the principle of facilitating mutual recognition of academic qualifications amongst BRICS countries and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students and recognition of qualifications obtained in each other’s countries subject to compliance of applicable domestic laws

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be assigned to BRICS members that either have taken extensive action either to support the principle of facilitating mutual recognition of academic qualifications amongst BRICS countries or to ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students and recognition of qualifications obtained in each other’s countries subject to compliance of applicable domestic laws. A partial compliance will also be assigned if a BRICS member has taken limited action on both facilitating mutual recognition of academic qualifications and ensuring mobility of skilled professionals, academics and students.

Non-compliance, or a score of –1, will be assigned if the BRICS members have taken no action to support the principle of facilitating mutual recognition of academic qualifications amongst BRICS countries and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students and recognition of qualifications obtained in each other’s countries subject to compliance of applicable domestic laws.

Scoring Guidelines

–1	The BRICS member has taken action to both facilitate mutual recognition of academic qualifications amongst BRICS countries and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics and students.
0	The BRICS member has taken action either to facilitate mutual recognition of academic qualifications amongst BRICS countries or ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics and students, or have done minimal action in both parts.
+1	The BRICS member has not taken action to both facilitate mutual recognition of academic qualifications amongst BRICS countries and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics and students.

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Compliance Director and Lead Analyst: Peter Ma*

⁵²⁸ Subject, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/compliance>

⁵²⁹ Compliance, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/compliance>

⁵³⁰ Applicable, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/applicable>

⁵³¹ Domestic, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/domestic>

⁵³² Laws, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) 2024, Access Date: March 28 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/laws>

Brazil: +1

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS countries.

On 10 September 2023, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a bilateral meeting following the G20 New Delhi Summit. At this meeting, the two leaders discussed cooperation between their countries in business and technology, emphasizing the need for exchange between scientists and businesspeople and noted the formation of the Brazil-India Business Forum.⁵³³

On 10 September 2023, President Lula participated in the G20 Leaders' Statement at the end of the New Delhi Summit. In this statement, leaders commit to considering the development of an international classification system of skills and qualifications to facilitate mutual recognition. The statement also includes a reaffirmation in the commitment to promote scientific collaboration and student, teacher, scientist and researcher mobility.⁵³⁴

On 9 November 2023, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation participated in the fifth meeting of the BRICS Nanotechnology and Materials Science Working Group in Suzhou China. The delegation for the meeting included experts and researchers from six Brazilian research institutes as well as the ministry. The meeting saw the discussion of further cooperation through equipment and facilities sharing, and information and personnel exchange through further conferences on the subject.⁵³⁵

On 6 February 2024, the Ministry of Education organized the first technical meeting of the G20 Education Working Group, chaired by Brazil in 2024. In this meeting, Minister of State for Education Camilo Santana outlined the priorities for Brazil, these being the qualification equivalence for education professionals, among others. Minister Santana emphasized the need for more teachers and greater teacher appreciation.⁵³⁶

On 23 April 2024, the Foreign Minister of Brazil and the Foreign Minister of South Africa participated in the seventh session of the Brazil-South Africa Joint Commission, at which two acts were adopted. Firstly, the Rio Branco Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Diplomatic Academy and International School of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa agreed to cooperate through exchanging information on curricula and training, the development of joint courses and other projects as well as inviting diplomats, instructors, experts, students and researchers to engage in educational exchanges. The second act was the Final Act of the VII Session of the Brazil-South Africa Mixed Commission, which includes several reports from working groups in areas such as energy and mining; economy, trade and tourism; and science, technology and communications. The act included a report from the Higher Education working group, which endorsed the continuation of the BRICS Mutual Recognition of

⁵³³ In bilateral meeting, Brazil's Lula and Prime Minister of India discuss technology, trade and biofuels, Presidencia da Republica (Brasilia) 10 September 2023. Access date: 8 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2023/09/in-bilateral-meeting-brazil2019s-lula-and-prime-minister-of-india-discuss-technology-trade-and-biofuels>

⁵³⁴ Statement by G20 Leaders in New Delhi – New Delhi, India – September 9 and 10 2023, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brasilia) 10 September 2023. Access date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/statement-by-g20-leaders-in-new-delhi-new-delhi-india-september-9-and-10-2023>

⁵³⁵ With the participation of MCTI, BRICS hold a meeting on nanotechnology and materials in China, Culear Technology Development Center – CDTN (Brasilia) 9 November 2023. Access date: 10 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cdtn/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/com-participacao-do-mcti-brics-realizam-encontro-sobre-nanotecnologia-e-materiais-na-china>

⁵³⁶ MEC organized G20 Education GT Meeting, Ministry of Education (Brasilia) 6 February 2024. Access date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/mec/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2024/fevereiro/mec-participa-de-reuniao-do-gt-de-educacao-do-g20>

Qualification cooperation, and agreed to collaborate as part of the Troika for the G20 Education Working Group in Brazil's 2024 G20 Presidency.⁵³⁷

On 25 April 2024, the Ministries of Culture of Brazil and China met as a part of the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Concertation and Cooperation. In this meeting, the two ministries discussed increasing cultural exchanges between the two states, including the establishment of permanent Cinema Exhibitions between the countries and the upcoming Brazil tour of the Chinese Symphony Orchestra.⁵³⁸

On 30 May 2024, the Fundação Dom Cabral of Brazil signed a memorandum of understanding with the Indore Institute of Management to facilitate greater cooperation between the two institutions of higher learning.⁵³⁹ Areas of potential future cooperation include research, student and faculty exchanges, and joint programmes.

On 11 June 2024, Brazilian government officials attended the 11th Meeting of BRICS Education Ministers. Brazilian officials, alongside other officials, released and endorsed the Kazan Declaration, where the principle of mutual recognition of academic qualifications was reaffirmed.⁵⁴⁰ The Declaration also highlighted the importance of promoting academic mobility and enhancing educational cooperation among BRICS countries. The Ministers also established a working group to study the issue of mutual recognition of academic qualifications.

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS countries. Brazil has in particular made varied efforts to collaborate in bilateral and multilateral settings across disciplines to promote the mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students through agreements such as that with South Africa, as well as invitation of skilled professionals to Brazil. Brazil has also taken substantial action to facilitate the mutual recognition of academic qualifications, such as participating in G20 working group and technical meetings, bilateral cooperation with South Africa on mutual recognition of qualifications, and endorsing the Kazan Declaration.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Jonathan Dong

Russia: 0

Russia has partially complied with its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS countries.

On 3 November 2023, the 5th meeting of the BRICS Materials Science and Nanotechnology Working Group concluded in Suzhou, China. Over 100 people attended this conference, including Russian representative Vladimir Shur, and representatives from other BRICS countries. During this conference, the representatives

⁵³⁷Atos adotadosporocasião da visita da Ministra de RelaçõesInternacionais e Cooperação da África do Sul, NalediPandor, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasilia) 23 April 2024. Access date: 8 May 2024. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/atos-adotados-por-ocasio-da-visita-da-chanceler-da-africa-do-sul-brasilia-23-de-abril-de-2024

⁵³⁸Brasil e China discutem acordos de cooperação para o setor cultural, Ministério da Cultura (Brasilia) 25 April 2024. Access date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/brasil-e-china-discutem-acordos-de-cooperacao-para-o-setor-cultural>

⁵³⁹IIM-I, Russian varsity & Brazilian B-School join hands for research & exchange progs, Times of India (New Delhi) 30 May 2024. Access date: 16 July 2024. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/indore/iim-i-russian-varsity-brazilian-b-school-join-hands-for-research-exchange-progs/articleshow/110547092.cms>

⁵⁴⁰KAZAN Declaration of the 11th Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Education, BRICS Russia 2024 (Kazan) 11 June 2024. Access Date: 19 July 2024. https://brics-russia2024.content.rcmedia.ru/upload/docs/2024-06-13-Final_Kazan_Declaration_of_the_11th_Meeting_of_BRICS_Ministers_11.pdf

expressed their support for further promoting the international industry-university-research innovation development mechanism and promoting the transfer and transformation of high-quality scientific and technological achievements. By participating in the conference, Russia has demonstrated its desire to further deepen academic exchange and mobility of skilled professionals and academics, especially regarding the materials sciences and nanotechnology.⁵⁴¹

On 18 April 2024, Education Minister Valery Falkov met with education ministers from China, India and others at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)'s 8th meeting between education ministers. During the meeting, the ministers discussed key issues on several significant areas, including exchanges of overseas students, joint scientific research, higher and vocational education, language learning, youth exchanges, and digital education. The ministers' meeting at the SCO demonstrates efforts by China, India and Russia to increase mobility of overseas exchange students and youths.⁵⁴²

On 21 April 2024, Education Minister Falkov met with HuaiJinpeng, China's Education Minister. The two ministers signed a memorandum of understanding regarding interministerial cooperation, as well as witnessing the signing of cooperation agreements between prestigious Chinese and Russian universities. Furthermore, the discussions held between the two ministers saw both ministers express their desire to cooperate in joint talent cultivation, scientific research, vocational education, and digital education.⁵⁴³ This meeting, and especially the signing of memorandums between Chinese and Russian universities, will ensure greater cooperation and mobility for academics between the two countries.

On 18 April 2024, the Higher School of Economics and the University of Delhi concluded an agreement for strategic cooperation as a part of the Indo-Russian Education Summit. The agreement includes provisions for exchange programs and the opening of a research hub in New Delhi among other measures.⁵⁴⁴

On 11 June 2024, Minister Falkov participated in the 11th BRICS education ministers meeting where members reaffirmed the principle of mutual recognition of academic qualifications.⁵⁴⁵ During this meeting, the Ministers agreed to expand participating universities in the BRICS network university project to 20 per country. The Ministers also established a working group to study the issue of mutual recognition of academic qualifications.

On 21 August 2024, Minister Falkov and Chinese Education Minister HuaiJinpeng signed a protocol which created a joint institute for fundamental research between Lomonosov Moscow State University and Peking University.⁵⁴⁶ The protocol is designed to deepen and strengthen academic exchange between the two institutions and the two countries.

Russia has partially complied with its commitment to its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS

⁵⁴¹金砖国家材料科学与纳米技术工作组第五次会议暨江苏能源与材料国际产学研合作论坛在苏举行, Funsom (Suzhou) 9 November 2023. Access Date: 13 May 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://funsom.suda.edu.cn/6b/7d/c2736a551805/page.htm>

⁵⁴²第八届上海合作组织成员国教育部长会议联合公报, 上海合作组织 (Beijing) 19 April 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 May 2024. <https://chn.sectesco.org/20240419/1328879.html>

⁵⁴³ Minister of Education HuaJinpeng visits Russia, Ministry of Education (Beijing) 21 April 2024. Access Date: 12 May 2024. http://en.moe.gov.cn/news/press_releases/202404/t20240422_1127030.html

⁵⁴⁴ Russia-India signs agreement to operate large research hub in New Delhi. India Narrative (New Delhi) 18 April 2024. Access date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.indianarrative.com/india-news/russia-india-signs-agreement-to-operate-large-research-hub-in-new-delhi-156093.html>

⁵⁴⁵ BRICS EDUCATION MINISTERS MEET IN KAZAN, BRICS Russia 2024 (Kazan) 13 June 2024. Access Date: 17 July 2024. <https://brics-russia2024.ru/en/news/v-kazani-proshla-vstrecha-ministrov-obrazovaniya-stran-briks>

⁵⁴⁶ Подписан протокол о намерениях поддерживать сотрудничество в области фундаментальных исследований между вузами России и Китая, Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Moscow) 21 August 2024. Access Date: 8 September 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://minobrнауки.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/87619/>

countries. It has taken significant action, often in conjunction with other BRICS member states, to ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students. However, it has not taken strong action to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials.

Thus, Russia receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Marwa Refaician

India: 0

India has partially complied with its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS countries.

On 31 August 2023, Lucknow University and the Universidade de Sao Paulo in Brazil concluded a Memorandum of understanding in order to cooperate in joint projects such as courses, research, cultural exchange and student exchange programs between the two universities.⁵⁴⁷

On 9 September 2023, Prime Minister Narendra Modi alongside fellow G20 leaders, issued the G20 Leaders' Declaration at the end of the summit in New Delhi. The statement includes a commitment to consider the creation of an international system for qualification and skill classifications to enhance the ability of countries to mutually recognize qualifications. Furthermore, the statement reaffirmed a commitment to student and researcher mobility across higher education and research institutions.⁵⁴⁸

On 10 September 2023, Prime Minister Modi met with Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva following the G20 New Delhi Summit. In this meeting, the two discussed the newly launched Brazil-India Business Forum as well as other ways in which the two states could collaborate in the fields of business and technology, particularly in further cooperation of researchers, institutions, and the private sector.⁵⁴⁹

On 18 April 2024, the University of Delhi and Russia's Higher School of Economics concluded an agreement for strategic cooperation as a part of the Indo-Russian Education Summit. The agreement includes provisions for exchange programs and the opening of a research hub in New Delhi among other measures.⁵⁵⁰

On 18 April 2024, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its 8th meeting between education ministers of member states. Education ministers of China, India, Russia and other members of the SCO attended. During the meeting, the ministers discussed key issues on several significant areas, including exchanges of overseas students, joint scientific research, higher and vocational education, language learning, youth exchanges, and digital education. The ministers' meeting at the SCO demonstrates efforts by China, India and Russia to increase mobility of overseas exchange students and youths.⁵⁵¹

On 30 May 2024, the Indore Institute of Management signed memoranda of understanding with the Higher School of Economics University of St. Petersburg, Russia and Fundação Dom Cabral of Brazil to facilitate

⁵⁴⁷ LU signs MOU with Brazilian University. Times of India (New Delhi) 31 August 2023. Access date: 9 May 2024.

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/lu-signs-mou-with-brazilian-university/articleshow/103226132.cms>

⁵⁴⁸ G20 New Delhi Leaders' Declaration. Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 9 September 2023. Access date: 9 May 2024.

https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37084/G20_New_Delhi_Leaders_Declaration

⁵⁴⁹ India-Brazil Joint Statement. Ministry of External Affairs (New Delhi) 10 September 2023. Access date: 9 May 2024.

<https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37098/indiabrazil+joint+statement>

⁵⁵⁰ Russia-India signs agreement to operate large research hub in New Delhi. India Narrative (New Delhi) 18 April 2024. Access date: 9 May 2024. <https://www.indianarrative.com/india-news/russia-india-signs-agreement-to-operate-large-research-hub-in-new-delhi-156093.html>

⁵⁵¹ 第八届上海合作组织成员国教育部长会议联合公报, 上海合作组织 (Beijing) 19 April 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 May 2024. <https://chn.sectso.org/20240419/1328879.html>

greater cooperation with the two institutions of higher learning.⁵⁵² Areas of potential future cooperation include research, student and faculty exchanges, and joint programmes.

On 11 June 2024, Indian government officials attended the 11th Meeting of BRICS Education Ministers. Indian officials, alongside other officials, released and endorsed the Kazan Declaration, where the principle of mutual recognition of academic qualifications was reaffirmed.⁵⁵³ The Declaration also highlighted the importance of promoting academic mobility and enhancing educational cooperation among BRICS countries. The Ministers also established a working group to study the issue of mutual recognition of academic qualifications.

On 9 July 2024, Prime Minister Modi of India and President Putin of Russia met during the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit.⁵⁵⁴ During the summit, the two leaders expressed interest in further improving educational and scientific partnerships, exploring further academic mobility forms, and opening branches of Russian scientific and educational organizations in India. Additionally, both sides agreed to continue consultations on mutual recognition of academic degrees. Furthermore, they reiterated their commitment to establish a working group on higher education involving stakeholders.

India has partially complied with its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS countries. This is as India and its institutions of higher education and research have taken steps to simplify and promote the mobility of students, researchers and skilled professionals with those of other BRICS members. However, aside from the commitment outlined in the G20 declaration, little action has been taken to further the cause of mutual recognition of qualifications with other BRICS members.

Thus, India receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Jonathan Dong

China: 0

China has partially complied with its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS countries.

On 21 September 2023, China streamlined its visa application process for foreigners. In particular, the applicant now only needs to submit their highest academic qualification. The simplification is aimed at promoting China's high-quality development by ensuring and increasing the mobility of skilled professionals and academics going to China, including BRICS countries.⁵⁵⁵

On 3 November 2023, the 5th meeting of the BRICS Materials Science and Nanotechnology Working Group concluded in Suzhou, China. Over 100 people attended this conference, including Chinese representatives Li Xiaofeng, Wang Rongfang, Yuan Jingyu, and Li Shutang, and representatives from other BRICS countries. During this conference, the representatives expressed their support for further promoting the international industry-university-research innovation development mechanism and promoting the transfer and transformation of high-quality scientific and technological achievements. The conference demonstrated

⁵⁵² IIM-I, Russian varsity & Brazilian B-School join hands for research & exchange progs, Times of India (New Delhi) 30 May 2024. Access date: 16 July 2024. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/City/indore/iim-i-russian-varsity-brazilian-b-school-join-hands-for-research-exchange-progs/articleshow/110547092.cms>

⁵⁵³ KAZAN Declaration of the 11th Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Education, BRICS Russia 2024 (Kazan) 11 June 2024. Access Date: 19 July 2024. https://brics-russia2024.content.rcmedia.ru/upload/docs/2024-06-13-Final_Kazan_Declaration_of_the_11th_Meeting_of_BRICS_Ministers_11.pdf

⁵⁵⁴ Joint Statement following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit, Government of India (New Delhi) 9 July 2024. Access date: 16 July 2024. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/joint-statement-following-the-22nd-india-russia-annual-summit/

⁵⁵⁵ Visa application procedure for foreigners streamlined, The State Council (Beijing) 21 September 2023. Access Date: 13 May 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202309/21/content_WS650baae4c6d0868f4e8dfa12.html

China's desire to further deepen academic exchange and mobility of skilled professionals and academics, especially regarding the materials sciences and nanotechnology.⁵⁵⁶

On 18 April 2024, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its 8th meeting between education ministers of member states. Educational ministers of China, India, Russia and other members of the SCO attended. During the meeting, the ministers discussed key issues on several significant areas, including exchanges of overseas students, joint scientific research, higher and vocational education, language learning, youth exchanges, and digital education. The ministers' meeting at the SCO demonstrates efforts by China, India and Russia to increase mobility of overseas exchange students and youths.⁵⁵⁷

On 21 April 2024, Minister of Education HuaiJinpeng concluded his visit to Russia. During the visit, Minister Huai met with Russian Education Minister Valery Falkov. The two ministers signed a memorandum of understanding regarding interministerial cooperation, as well as witnessing the signing of cooperation agreements between prestigious Chinese and Russian universities. Furthermore, the discussions held between the two ministers saw both ministers express their desire to cooperate in joint talent cultivation, scientific research, vocational education, and digital education.⁵⁵⁸ This meeting, and especially the signing of memorandums between Chinese and Russian universities, will ensure greater cooperation and mobility for academics between the two countries.

On 11 June 2024, Chinese Deputy Minister of Education Chen Jiechu attended the 11th meeting of BRICS education ministers. During the meeting, Deputy Minister Chen called upon BRICS member states to establish a vocational education alliance.⁵⁵⁹ The Ministers also agreed to expand participating universities in the BRICS network university project to 20 per country.⁵⁶⁰ Finally, the Ministers also established a working group to study the issue of mutual recognition of academic qualifications.

On 21 August 2024, Minister Huan and Russian Education Minister Valery Falkov signed a protocol which created a joint institute for fundamental research between Lomonosov Moscow State University and Peking University.⁵⁶¹ The protocol is designed to deepen and strengthen academic exchange between the two institutions and the two countries.

China has partially complied with its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS countries. China has taken substantial action to ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics and students through its visa reform, Minister Huai's visit to China and its participation in the 8th SCO meeting of educational ministers and the 5th BRICS Materials Science and Nanotechnology Working Group meeting. However, China has not taken substantial action to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials among BRICS countries.

Thus, China receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Peter Ma

⁵⁵⁶金砖国家材料科学与纳米技术工作组第五次会议暨江苏能源与材料国际产学研合作论坛在苏举行, Funsom (Suzhou) 9 November 2023. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <https://funsom.suda.edu.cn/6b/7d/c2736a551805/page.htm>

⁵⁵⁷第八届上海合作组织成员国教育部长会议联合公报, 上海合作组织 (Beijing) 19 April 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 May 2024. <https://chn.sectosco.org/20240419/1328879.html>

⁵⁵⁸ Minister of Education HuaiJinpeng visits Russia, Ministry of Education (Beijing) 21 April 2024. Access Date: 12 May 2024. http://en.moe.gov.cn/news/press_releases/202404/t20240422_1127030.html

⁵⁵⁹ Chen Jie attends 11th BRICS Education Ministers Meeting, Ministry of Education (Beijing) 13 June 2024. Access Date: 17 July 2024. http://en.moe.gov.cn/news/press_releases/202406/t20240614_1135666.html

⁵⁶⁰ BRICS EDUCATION MINISTERS MEET IN KAZAN, BRICS Russia 2024 (Kazan) 13 June 2024. Access Date: 17 July 2024. <https://brics-russia2024.ru/en/news/v-kazani-proshla-vstrecha-ministrov-obrazovaniya-stran-briks>

⁵⁶¹ Подписан протокол о намерениях поддерживать сотрудничество в области фундаментальных исследований между вузами России и Китая, Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Moscow) 21 August 2024. Access Date: 8 September 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. <https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/novosti-ministerstva/87619/>

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS countries.

On 3 November 2023, the 5th meeting of the BRICS Materials Science and Nanotechnology Working Group concluded in Suzhou, China. Over 100 people attended this conference, including South African representatives and representatives from other BRICS countries. During this conference, the representatives expressed their support for further promoting the international industry-university-research innovation development mechanism and promoting the transfer and transformation of high-quality scientific and technological achievements. By participating in the conference, South Africa has demonstrated its desire to further deepen academic exchange and mobility of skilled professionals and academics, especially regarding the materials sciences and nanotechnology.⁵⁶²

On 23 April 2024, Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor and Foreign Minister of Brazil Mauro Vieira participated in the seventh session of the Brazil-South Africa Joint Commission. At this meeting the Rio Branco Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Diplomatic Academy and International School of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa agreed to cooperate through exchanging information on curricula and training, the development of joint courses and other projects as well as inviting diplomats, instructors, experts, students and researchers to engage in educational exchanges. The second act was the Final Act of the VII Session of the Brazil-South Africa Mixed Commission, which includes several reports from working groups in areas such as energy and mining; economy, trade and tourism; and science, technology and communications. The act included a report from the Higher Education working group, which endorsed the continuation of the BRICS Mutual Recognition of Qualification cooperation, and agreed to collaborate as part of the Troika for the G20 Education Working Group in Brazil's 2024 G20 Presidency.⁵⁶³

On 11 June 2024, South African government officials attended the 11th Meeting of BRICS Education Ministers. South African officials, alongside other officials, released and endorsed the Kazan Declaration, where the principle of mutual recognition of academic qualifications was reaffirmed.⁵⁶⁴ The Declaration also highlighted the importance of promoting academic mobility and enhancing educational cooperation among BRICS countries. The Ministers also established a working group to study the issue of mutual recognition of academic qualifications.

On 8 July 2024, South African Director-General of Basic Education Mathanzima Mveli met Russian Director of the Department of International Cooperation and Public Relations of the Russian Ministry of Education Dr Abdul Rassukhanov during the Third Meeting of the G20 Education Working Group in Rio, Brazil.⁵⁶⁵ During this meeting, Director-General Mveli and Director Rassukhanov reaffirmed their support for exchanges of teachers and educational representatives, and committed to finalize a cooperation agreement on basic education.

⁵⁶²金砖国家材料科学与纳米技术工作组第五次会议暨江苏能源与材料国际产学研合作论坛在苏举行, Funsom (Suzhou) 9 November 2023. Access Date: 13 May 2024. <https://funsom.suda.edu.cn/6b/7d/c2736a551805/page.htm>

⁵⁶³Atos adotadospor ocasião da visita da Ministra de Relações Internacionais e Cooperação da África do Sul, Naledi Pandor, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília) 23 April 2024. Access date: 8 May 2024. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/atos-adotados-por-ocasio-da-visita-da-chanceler-da-africa-do-sul-brasilia-23-de-abril-de-2024

⁵⁶⁴ KAZAN Declaration of the 11th Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Education, BRICS Russia 2024 (Kazan) 11 June 2024. Access Date: 19 July 2024. https://brics-russia2024.content.rcmedia.ru/upload/docs/2024-06-13-Final_Kazan_Declaration_of_the_11th_Meeting_of_BRICS_Ministers_11.pdf

⁵⁶⁵ Basic Education Director-General holds bilateral meetings on the side-lines of the Third Meeting of the G20 Education Working Group in Rio, Brazil, Department of Basic Education (Rio) 2024. Access Date: 19 July 2024. <https://www.education.gov.za/ArchivedDocuments/ArchivedArticles/Third-Meeting-G20-Education-Working-Group-Rio-Brazil-0724.aspx>

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to its commitment to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials and ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students amongst BRICS countries. It has taken significant action, often in conjunction with other BRICS member states, to ensure mobility of skilled professionals, academics, and students. However, it has not taken action to facilitate mutual recognition of academic credentials.

Thus, South Africa receives a 0.

Analyst: Marwa Refaeian

10. Tourism and Culture: Protection and Promotion of Cultural Heritage

“We agree to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of our cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage.”

XV BRICS Summit: Johannesburg II Declaration

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Brazil			+1
Russia			+1
India		0	
China			+1
South Africa		0	
Average	+0.60 (80%)		

Background

Cultural cooperation has been an important topic of discussion among BRICS since the third BRICS summit in Sanya, China. However, cooperation to protect heritage became a focused target of BRICS cooperation in 2015 when BRICS leaders signed the Agreement between the governments of the BRICS States on Cooperation in the Field of Culture. Since then, the protection of cultural heritage has become a consistent area of cooperation for the BRICS leaders.

On 14 April 2011, the BRICS leaders met in Sanya, where they formulated the Action Plan for BRICS cooperation in which they agreed to cooperate in the cultural field.⁵⁶⁶

On 29 March 2012, the BRICS leaders in the Delhi Declaration encouraged “expanding the channels of communication, exchanges and people-to-people contact amongst the BRICS” in the areas of culture and tourism.⁵⁶⁷

On 17 June 2015, Russia hosted the first meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Culture. The BRICS leaders shared “initiatives aimed at increasing cooperation, including in the field of cultural heritage protection” and expressed “unanimity on the issues of preservation and protection of cultural heritage.”⁵⁶⁸

On 9 July 2015, the BRICS leaders reiterated the importance of cultural cooperation between the BRICS countries in the Ufa Declaration, stating that they will “continue to encourage in every possible way direct co-operation between our countries in the sphere of culture and art.”⁵⁶⁹ In addition, the BRICS leaders adopted the Agreement between the Governments of the BRICS States on Cooperation in the Field of Culture. Article 4 of the Agreement states that the Parties “shall promote enhanced cooperation in such fields as protection, preservation, restoration, return and utilisation of cultural heritage projects” and “shall also

⁵⁶⁶ Sanya Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Sanya) 14 April 2011. Access Date: 2 February 2024.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

⁵⁶⁷ Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (New Delhi) 29 March 2012. Access Date: 2 February 2024.

<http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

⁵⁶⁸ International events: The first meeting of the Ministers of Culture of the BRICS Member States discussed the cooperation strengthening in the field of culture and tourism, Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 18 June 2015. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <https://www.prlib.ru/en/events/670774>

⁵⁶⁹ VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Ufa) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 2 February 2024.

http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.html

promote enhanced cooperation in the field of safeguarding or protection (as the case may be under the laws and regulations of the Parties' states), and promotion of intangible cultural heritage.”⁵⁷⁰

On 11 October 2019, the BRICS Ministers of Culture reaffirmed their commitment to “conserve and preserve cultural heritage, archaeological sites or remains, archives and exchange of knowledge, expertise, skills and technologies in the field.”⁵⁷¹

On 3 September 2020, the BRICS Ministers of Culture committed to exchanging information on preserving, restoring and promoting cultural and historical heritage in the Declaration of the Fifth Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Culture.⁵⁷²

On 2 July 2021, the BRICS Ministers of culture agreed to “facilitate cooperation on the safeguarding of our tangible and intangible cultural heritage through the exchange of information, experts and good practices and joint training programs.” Moreover, the Ministers reaffirmed the commitment to conserve cultural heritage and agreed to help establish the BRICS Alliance between cultural institutions in the fields of conservation, preservation and digitization.⁵⁷³

On 24 May 2022, the BRICS Ministers of Culture met for the seventh meeting and signed the 2022-2026 Action Plan for the Implementation of the Agreement between the Governments of the BRICS States on Cooperation in the Field of Culture.⁵⁷⁴

On 23 June 2022, the BRICS leaders encouraged the continuation of cooperation in cultural heritage within the framework of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Agreement between the Governments of the BRICS States on cooperation in the Field of Culture (2022-2026).⁵⁷⁵

On 21 July 2023, the BRICS Ministers of Culture agreed to “support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of our cultural heritage including both tangible and intangible heritage.”⁵⁷⁶

On 23 August 2023, during the 15th BRICS summit in Johannesburg, the BRICS leaders reaffirmed “our commitments under all the instruments and Agreements signed and adopted by the Governments of the BRICS States on Cooperation in the Field of Culture,” committed to executing the 2022-2026 Action Plan and agreed to “support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion our cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage.”⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁰ Agreement between the Governments of the BRICS States on Cooperation in the Field of Culture, BRICS Information Centre (Ufa) 9 July 2015. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-culture-agreement-en.html>

⁵⁷¹ The 4th BRICS Culture Ministers' Meeting Curitiba – Culture for an Innovative Future, BRICS Information Centre (Curitiba) 11 October 2019. Access Date: 2 February 2024. http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/190111-Declaracao_5600532_Declaracao_dos_Ministros_de_Cultura_do_BRICS.pdf

⁵⁷² Declaration of the V Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Culture, BRICS Information Centre (n.d.) 3 September 2020. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/200903-culture.pdf>

⁵⁷³ Declaration of the VI BRICS Culture Ministers' Meeting, BRICS Information Centre (n.d.) 2 July 2021. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/210702-culture.pdf>

⁵⁷⁴ Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Culture, XIV BRICS Summit (n.d.) 31 May 2022. Access Date: 2 February 2024. http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zdhzlyhjz/MM/202205/t20220531_10695029.html

⁵⁷⁵ XIV BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Beijing) 23 June 2022. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/220623-declaration.html>

⁵⁷⁶ Declaration of the VIII BRICS Ministers of Culture Meeting, Government of India (Mpumalanga) 21 July 2021. Access Date: 2 February 2024. https://www.indiaculture.gov.in/sites/default/files/Schemes/BRICS_DRAFT_DECLARATION_30102023.pdf

⁵⁷⁷ XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS Information Centre (Sandton) 23 August 2023. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/230823-declaration.html>

Commitment Features

Definitions and Concepts

“Support” refers to “the action, or act of providing aid, assistance, or backing up an initiative, or entity” and is sometimes politically binding. “Agree to support” therefore requires that the BRICS leaders commit to taking concrete actions in conformity with the commitment.⁵⁷⁸

“Protection” is defined as “the act of protecting or state of being protected.”⁵⁷⁹ “Preservation” refers to “the act of keeping something the same or of preventing it from being damaged.”⁵⁸⁰ “Restoration” means “the act or process of returning something to its earlier good condition or position.”⁵⁸¹ “Promotion” consists of “activities to advertise something.”⁵⁸²

“Cultural heritage” consists of “artefacts, monuments, a group of buildings and sites, museums that have a diversity of values including symbolic, historic, artistic, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological, scientific and social significance.” It encompasses both tangible – “movable, immobile and underwater” – and intangible – “embedded into cultural, and natural heritage artefacts, sites or monuments.” This definition does not include intangible cultural heritage related to festivals and celebrations.⁵⁸³

General Interpretive Guidelines

This commitment has two parts that are further broken down into sub-parts. The first part includes the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of cultural heritage. The second part identifies the types of cultural heritage as both tangible and intangible heritage. Compliance is assessed through action taken on the sub-parts as follows: 1) protection of cultural heritage, 2) preservation of cultural heritage, 3) restoration of cultural heritage and 4) promotion of tangible cultural heritage, and 5) promotion of intangible heritage.

“Strong” action to protect, preserve or restore entails such actions as policy, legislative, financial or the like. For “promotion” strong efforts includes actions such as public awareness campaigns or speeches.

For “protect,” “preserve,” and “restore” verbal reiterations or speeches are considered weaker actions and would count towards partial compliance. For “promotion” weaker action includes attending relevant meetings or conferences with no evidence of individual members’ contribution to promote cultural heritage.

Thus for full compliance BRICS members must take strong action in at least four of the following categories: 1) Protect, 2) Preserve, 3) Restore and 4) Promote for at least tangible or 5) intangible heritage, thus taking strong action in most of the commitment components.

For a score of 0 for partial compliance, the BRICS member took strong action in at least three of the five sub-parts or it took weaker action in over four of the five sub-parts.

For a score of -1 for non-compliance, the BRICS member took weaker action in under three of the sub-parts or took action that was explicitly and directly antithetical to the commitment.

⁵⁷⁸ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, Global Governance Program (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 2 February 2024. http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁵⁷⁹ Definition of Protection, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/protection>

⁵⁸⁰ Definition of Preservation, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/preservation>

⁵⁸¹ Definition of Restoration, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/restoration>

⁵⁸² Definition of Promotion, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/promotion>

⁵⁸³ Definition of Cultural Heritage, UNESCO Institute for Statistics (Montréal) n.d. Access Date: 2 February 2024. <https://uis.unesco.org/en/glossary-term/cultural-heritage>

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The BRICS member did not support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of tangible nor intangible heritage.
0	The BRICS member strongly supported three of the 1 protection, 2. preservation, 3. restoration and 4. promotion of 5. tangible or 6. intangible heritage OR somewhat supported at least four of these components.
+1	The BRICS member strongly supported at least four of the 1. protection, 2. preservation, 3. restoration and 4. promotion and strongly supported at least 5. tangible or 6. intangible heritage.

*Affiliated Co-Chair: Pantéa Jamsbidi Nouri
Compliance Director and Lead Analyst: Ankit Timari*

Brazil: +1

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of its cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage.

On 7 November 2023, the Institute of National Historical and Artistic Heritage (Iphan), the National Foundation of Indigenous Peoples (Funai) and the Regional Directorate of Education of Juína, held workshops to safeguard the Yaokwa Ritual of the Enawenê Nawê indigenous people, which Iphan and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural (UNESCO) consider an intangible asset.⁵⁸⁴ These workshops contribute to the fortification of the existing safeguarding plan to protect the Yaokwa Ritual of the Enawenê Nawê, an indigenous people whose traditional territory is located in the northwest region of the state of Mato Grosso.

On 24 November 2023, the National Culture Incentive Commission approved BRL600 million for the implementation of 120 cultural projects throughout Brazil.⁵⁸⁵ The cultural projects fall under multiple sectors, including cultural heritage.

On 22 January 2024 the National Library Foundation launched the video series “Memory of the World of the National Library.”⁵⁸⁶ This initiative aims to promote the Memory of the World, namely the preservation, provision of access and dissemination of the collections. The initiative ties into the goals of UNESCO, which recognizes documents, archives and libraries considered of great value for the history of humanity.

On 22 February 2024, Iphan and the Ministry of Culture signed a Term of Commitment with the City Council of Recife (PE) to transfer BRL20 million to the capital of Pernambuco for the redevelopment and restoration of the São José Market. The Term of Commitment ensures the preservation of one Brazil’s rare examples of nineteenth century iron architecture.⁵⁸⁷

On 29 February 2024, the Advisory Council of Iphan approved the registration of the cultural event “Choro” in the Book of Forms of Expression, making it a cultural heritage of Brazil. Choro is a method of expression

⁵⁸⁴Ritual Yaokwa: Iphan realizações de salvaguarda com indígenas Enawenê Nawê [Yaokwa Ritual: Iphan carries out safeguarding actions with Enawenê Nawê indigenous people]. Brazilian Ministry of Culture (Brasília) 7 November 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/ritual-yaokwa-iphan-realiza-coes-de-salvaguarda-com-indigenas-enawene-nawe>

⁵⁸⁵Lei Rouanet: CNIC aprovacção de R\$600 milhões para 120 projetos culturais, Ministry of Culture (Brasília) 24 November 2023. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/lei-rouanet-cnic-aprova-captacao-de-r-600-milhoes-para-120-projetos-culturais>

⁵⁸⁶Biblioteca Nacional lança série sobre acervos incluídos no Programa Memória do Mundo, da Unesco, Ministry of Culture (Brasília) 22 January 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 12 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/biblioteca-nacional-lanca-serie-sobre-acervos-incluidos-no-programa-memoria-do-mundo-da-unesco>

⁵⁸⁷Requalificação do Mercado São José (PE) receberá R\$20 milhões do Novo PAC, Ministry of Culture (Brasília) 22 February 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/requalificacao-do-mercado-sao-jose-pe-recebera-r-20-milhoes-do-novo-pac>

that serves to maintain “collective bonds of identity and memory that range from beginner and amateur musicians.” As a result of this recognition, Iphan aims to develop public policies to protect choro via educational programs in public schools and promotion of Choro in public.⁵⁸⁸

On 11 April 2024, the Brazilian Archaeological Heritage gained possession of the Serrote do Letreiro Site, in the Vale dos Dinossauros, the first site in the world where fossilized dinosaur footprints were found alongside with the rock art of pre-colonial people. In the pursuit of said findings, it will confirm that ancient Indigenous peoples produced knowledge about fossils and deconstruct the narrative of the knowledge and discoveries made by pre-colonial American peoples. Additionally, this discovery fortifies the relevancy and makes acknowledgement to the indigenous peoples of Brazil from thousands of years ago. Iphan is determined to “ensure the protection and preservation of this asset for future generations.”⁵⁸⁹

Brazil has fully complied with its commitment to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of its cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage. By financing the restoration of the São José Market and gaining possession of the archaeological site in Vale dos Dinossauros, Brazil has met the conditions of restoring, protecting and preserving tangible heritage. The workshops to safeguard the Yaokwa Ritual of the Enawenê Nawê and the recognition of Choro as a cultural heritage indicate Brazil’s commitment to the protection, promotion and preservation of intangible heritage.

Thus, Brazil receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Ankit Timari

Russia: +1

The Russia has fully complied with its commitment to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of its cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage.

On 31 August 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk held a meeting with Metropolitan Kornily of Moscow and All Russia of Old-Rite Russian Orthodox Church to discuss the preservation of the Russian language in Old Believer communities in foreign nations.⁵⁹⁰

On 11 September 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Viktoria Abramchenko addressed Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and deputy prime ministers to announce the development of regulations in regards to eco-tourism and federally protected natural areas. The federal law on the development of tourism in specially protected nature areas, which came into force on 1 September 2023, was acknowledged, as well as six government acts adopted under the law. Deputy Prime Minister Abramchenko announced the federal government’s plans to adopt eight additional legal acts by the end of 2023, and a pledge to promote eco-tourism while protecting the natural heritage of Russia.⁵⁹¹

On 6 October 2023, Prime Minister Mishustin met with President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev as part of his official visit to Russia. Prime Minister Mishustin expressed that Russia valued the cultural ties with Uzbekistan. He noted his appreciation of Russian Seasons, which took place in Uzbekistan, and particularly

⁵⁸⁸Choro é reconhecido como Patrimônio Cultural do Brasil, Ministry of Culture (Brasília) 29 February 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/choro-e-reconhecido-como-patrimonio-cultural-do-brasil>

⁵⁸⁹ Iphan reconhece único sítio do mundo com pegadas de dinossauro em associação com arte rupestre, Ministry of Culture (Brasília) 11 April 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.gov.br/cultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/iphan-reconhece-unico-sitio-do-mundo-com-pegadas-de-dinossauro-em-associacao-com-arte-rupestre>

⁵⁹⁰ Alexei Overchuk meets with Kornily, Metropolitan of Moscow and All Russia of Russian Orthodox Old-Rite Church, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 31 August 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/49387/>

⁵⁹¹ Meeting with deputy prime ministers on current issues, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 11 September 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/49473/>

the master class organized by the Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography and the exhibition dedicated to Rachmaninoff and Chaliapin. Furthermore, he noted that the ballet performance, *Lazgi: Dance of Soul and Love*, performed by the National Ballet of Uzbekistan, was warmly welcomed by the Russian audience in September.⁵⁹²

On 13 October 2023, the Treaty on Establishing the International Organisation for the Russian Language was signed at a session of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Heads of State Council. Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk announced that the city of Sochi was chosen to host the organisation's headquarters. This organization aims to promote and popularize the Russian language as the base of the common cultural code amongst North Eurasian populations and will cooperate with education, cultural, scientific and non-governmental organizations. The Deputy Prime Minister highlighted the international format of the organisation and promoted the membership of new members and development of international ties outside the CIS. Initiatives such as the translation of Russian classic and modern authors into other languages and international conferences, exhibitions and humanitarian projects will be held under the auspices of this organization.⁵⁹³

On 16 October 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak co-chaired the 17th meeting of the Russian-Venezuelan High-Level Intergovernmental Commission and discussed the promotion of Russian language and culture in Venezuela. Deputy Prime Minister Novak noted that over 150 enrolment applications were submitted for the Open Education Centre in Caracas, which provides free courses in the Russian language and opportunities to become acquainted with Russian culture. Deputy Prime Minister Novak also announced that the Russian Military Historical Society would be presenting a bust of Alexander Pushkin, the founder of Russian national literature, for Ezequiel Zamora Park in Caracas.⁵⁹⁴

On 31 October 2023, Prime Minister Mishustin chaired a strategic session on the development of the Far Eastern regions of the Russian Federation, highlighting the importance of preserving the natural resources, ecosystems and animals of the Far East during developmental projects. The Prime Minister announced that the most important aspect of these developmental initiatives is the feedback of the local communities living in the Far East and employing their requests and suggestions.⁵⁹⁵

On 17 November 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova announced Russia's joining of the International Institute for Central Asian Studies at the St Petersburg International Cultural Forum. Established in 1995, the institute is the largest intergovernmental organization aims to develop and preserve the history and culture of Central Asia and currently has 11 member states.⁵⁹⁶

On 13 December 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova chaired the 24th meeting of the Russian-Chinese Commission on Humanitarian Cooperation. The Cooperation Programme between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the People's Republic of China and the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation for 2024-2027 was signed at the end of the meeting.⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹² Meeting between Mikhail Mishustin and President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 6 October 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/49714/>

⁵⁹³ Alexei Overchuk: The International Organisation for the Russian Language is an effective tool to support, popularise and spread our language across the world, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 13 October 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/49798/>

⁵⁹⁴ Alexander Novak holds a meeting of the Russian-Venezuelan High-Level Intergovernmental Commission, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 16 October 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/49804/>

⁵⁹⁵ Mikhail Mishustin chairs strategic session on development of Far East, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 31 October 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/49939/>

⁵⁹⁶ Tatyana Golikova: Russia decides to join the International Institute for Central Asian Studies, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 17 November 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/50132/>

⁵⁹⁷ Tatyana Golikova chairs 24th meeting of the Russian-Chinese Commission on Humanitarian Cooperation, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 13 December 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/50402/>

On 15 December 2023, Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk addressed a plenary session of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia and highlighted the value of Russian-Armenian cultural ties, expressing his appreciation of the Days of Culture of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Armenia, the Russia-Armenia Forum of Education in Culture, the Days of Russian Cinema in Armenia, the Festival of Culture and Arts of the Peoples of Eurasia and the first Russia-Armenia Forum of Education in Culture which took place in 2023.⁵⁹⁸

On 18 December 2023, Prime Minister Mishustin attended a meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of Government focusing on the expansion of cultural and humanitarian cooperation within the Commonwealth. President Vladimir Putin addressed the meeting through a video address, expressing his appreciation of the “unique civilisational alloy of traditions and customs, languages and literature, art and folk culture” of the CIS states, and announced the importance of preserving the “common multinational heritage to the greatest possible extent and to enrich it with new content.” President Vladimir Putin stated that during Russia’s CIS presidency, beginning on 1 January 2024, the CIS would expand the practice of hosting and holding joint events focusing on art, education, and science in collaboration with the CIS Interstate Humanitarian Cooperation Fund. Russia also announced that it would be paying special attention to the preservation of the CIS common heritage of the Russian language, announcing that it aims to draft the founding documents of the newly created International Russian Language Organisation and to hold the first ministerial conference. At the end of the meeting, the heads of states signed a statement on the prospects for “cooperation in the cultural and humanitarian sphere, written to maintain and develop intercultural dialogue, cooperation in the field of education, and in the development of our national languages.”⁵⁹⁹

On 27 January 2024, the first Made in Russia festival and fair commenced in Shenyang, China, as part of the International Cooperation and Export national project, coinciding with the Chinese New Year, and opening the Cultural Cross Year of Russia and China. The event was organized by the Russian Export Centre with support from the Russian Government and the government of the Liaoning Province, and aims to promote Russian-made goods and Russian culture. The event will include tasting sessions and cooking shows, workshops on traditional Russian crafts, and a gala concert by ballet dancers from the Mariinsky Theatre, the Leonid Yacobson Ballet Theatre and the Vaganova Academy of Russian Ballet, and will conclude on 5 February.⁶⁰⁰

On 11 April 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Golikova chaired a meeting for the preparation of the Russia-China Years of Culture. It was announced that over 230 events will be held in all areas of culture, including musical and theatrical arts, museum exchanges, librarianship, cinematography, creative education and creative industries. Cultural events will be held in 51 cities in China and 38 cities in Russia, 30 museum exhibitions will be held in both countries, and forty-four Russian regions from all federal districts will take part in the Year of Culture. Furthermore, large-scale tours of the Bolshoi Theatre of Russia, the Mariinsky Theatre, the Yevgeny Vakhtangov Theatre, the Kasatkina and Vasilyov Classical Ballet Theatre will take place in 33 Chinese cities. In respect to cinema, the Russian Film Festival will be held in September 2024 as part of the Years of Culture in China. Modern Russian films will be presented to Chinese audiences. The opening ceremony of the Russia-China Years of Culture will be held in Beijing in May 2024.⁶⁰¹

Russia has fully complied with its commitment to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of our cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage. With initiatives aiming to

⁵⁹⁸ Alexei Overchuk: Developing constructive bilateral ties meets the interests of Russian and Armenian peoples, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 15 December 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/50425/>

⁵⁹⁹ Meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of Government, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 18 December 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/50443/>

⁶⁰⁰ China’s Shenyang hosts the first Made in Russia festival and fair, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 27 January 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/50706/>

⁶⁰¹ Tatyana Golikova: More than 230 events will be held as part of the Russia-China Years of Culture, The Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 11 April 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <http://government.ru/en/news/51316/>

promote various forms of Russian arts, media, and language, as well as environmental and infrastructural initiatives focusing on the preservation and restoration of Russia's ecosystems, landscapes, museums and tourist destinations, Russia has fulfilled its commitment.

Thus, Russia receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Shinyoung Kim

India: 0

India has partially complied with its commitment to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of its cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage.

On 30 September 2023, the Ministry of Tourism announced that India would be hosting the 46th edition of the Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA) Travel Mart 2023 in New Delhi. The Ministry of Tourism also announced that a designated pavilion for India would be on display at the Mart, promoting the culture of Indian States. The state governments of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Delhi, Karnataka, Telangana, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and state Ministries such as Handlooms Development Commissioner will display products promoting the heritage, culinary arts, music, and visual arts of India.⁶⁰²

On 21 November 2023, the 11th edition of International Tourism Mart in the North-East Region, organized by the Ministry of Tourism and the State Government of Meghalaya, commenced in Shillong, Meghalaya. This event served to showcase the tourism potential of the North Eastern states of India at the domestic and international levels. A project titled "Development of Infrastructure for Pilgrimage and Heritage Tourism in the State of Meghalaya" under Pilgrimage Rejuvenation and Spiritual, Heritage Augmentation Drive (PRASHAD) Scheme was inaugurated during this event. This project focuses on the development of pilgrim amenities at Nongsawlia Presbyterian Church, Nartiang Shakti Peeth, Aitnar Pool, and Charantala Kali Temple, in Meghalaya. This International Tourism Mart concluded on 23 November 2023.⁶⁰³

On 10 December 2023, Krishnaveni Sangeetha Neerajanam at Vijayawada commenced. This cultural event was organized by the Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Culture, Sangeet Natak Akademi, and the State Government of Andhra Pradesh, and highlighted the heritage of Indian classical music, ancient musical instruments, and celebrated singers and musicians. R K Roja, the Minister for Tourism, highlighted the contribution of Andhra Pradesh and Telugu language towards promotion of carnatic music. The festival included cuisine, culture, handicrafts and handlooms from the state of Andhra Pradesh.⁶⁰⁴

On 19 January 2024, the Ministry of Tourism announced the organization of a nine-day annual mega event "Bharat Parv" in New Delhi as part of the Republic Day Celebration. The event entails the promotion of cultural heritage through display of cultural performances by the Zonal Cultural Centres and presentations by cultural troupes from various States and Union Territories.⁶⁰⁵

On 24-28 January 2024, the Ministry of Tourism participated in the International Tourism Trade Fair in Madrid, Spain to tourism through promotion of Indian cultural heritage. State governments participating in the event include representatives from Punjab, Jharkhand, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh

⁶⁰² Ministry of Tourism to host PATA Travel Mart 2023 in New Delhi from 4th October, Ministry of Tourism (New Delhi) 30 September 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://tourism.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-10/PIB1962317.pdf>

⁶⁰³ Year End Review 2023: Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Tourism, Government of India (New Delhi) 21 December 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. https://tourism.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-12/Press%20Information%20Bureau_21_12_2023_1.pdf

⁶⁰⁴ Year End Review 2023: Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Tourism (New Delhi) 21 December 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. https://tourism.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-12/Press%20Information%20Bureau_21_12_2023_1.pdf

⁶⁰⁵ Ministry of Tourism to organize annual mega event "Bharat Parv" from 23rd to 31st January 2023, Ministry of Tourism (New Delhi) 19 January 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://tourism.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-01/PIB1997858.pdf>

and Karnataka. The India pavilion featured traditional, cultural and musical traditions of the country with Yoga sessions, classical dance performances and Mehendi applications.⁶⁰⁶

India has partially complied with its commitment to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of its cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage. India has mainly promoted both its tangible and intangible heritage through cultural events and tourism exhibitions and has not taken actions to protect, restore nor preserve its cultural heritage.

Thus, India receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Shinyoung Kim

China: +1

China has fully complied with its commitment to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of our cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage.

On 5 March 2024, Deputy to the 14th National People's Congress and Director of the Yungang Grottoes Research Institute Hang Kan stressed the role of technology in protecting cultural heritage, specifically for the protection of the Yungang Grottoes in the Shanxi province which is a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Site and currently threatened by geology-related conditions. Hang Kan further announced the intensification of technological investment in researching and developing protective materials for the grottoes, deemed a "treasure of traditional Chinese culture."⁶⁰⁷

On 27 April 2024, Secretary-General of the Architectural Society of China Li Cundong along with Executive Vice President and Secretary-General of the Chinese Society of Cultural Relics Huang Yuan announced the ninth batch of 20th-century architectural heritage sites. The batch of architectural sites includes "churches, schools, museums, factories, office buildings and former residence of historical figures located around China." Subsequently, a both parties held a seminar for exchanging views on how the revitalization of 20th-century architectural heritage can result in urban renewal.⁶⁰⁸

On 8 May 2024, Peng Liyuan, wife of President Xi Jinping, called for the enhancement of cultural exchanges between China and Serbia during a visit to the National Museum of Serbia. Liyuan further encouraged youth from both countries to "mutually learn about and actively engage in preserving traditional handicrafts from generation to generation."⁶⁰⁹

On 6 September 2024, Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang announced China's collaboration with UNESCO "to establish a heritage protection trust fund, aiming to enhance Africa's capacity to safeguard its cultural heritage" during the China-Africa-UNESCO dialogue.⁶¹⁰ He announced joint efforts in the fields of digital education exchanges and cooperation, youth employment and entrepreneurship and enhancing the protection of cultural heritage.

China has fully complied with its commitment to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of its cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage. China has mainly expressed

⁶⁰⁶ Ministry of Tourism participates in global travel exhibition FITUR at Madrid, Spain, Ministry of Tourism (New Delhi) 25 January 2023. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://tourism.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-01/PIB1999722.pdf>

⁶⁰⁷ Technology crucial for cultural heritage, deputy says, China Culture (Beijing) 5 March 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://en.chinaculture.org/a/202403/05/WS6604d7faa31082fc043bf226.html>

⁶⁰⁸ Tianjin event announces 102 Chinese 20th-century architectural heritage sites, China Culture (Beijing) 24 April 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. https://en.chinaculture.org/a/202404/29/WS662f3d44a31082fc043c4a4f_1.html

⁶⁰⁹ Peng calls for enhancing cultural exchanges, China Culture (Beijing) 10 May 2024. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://en.chinaculture.org/a/202405/10/WS663dbaa8a31082fc043c6688.html>

⁶¹⁰ Vice premier says China ready to advance cooperation with Africa, UNESCO, The State Council (Xinhua) 7 September 2024. Access Date: 9 September 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202409/07/content_WS66db8f85c6d0868f4e8eab02.html

verbal support for the protection, promotion and preservation of tangible cultural heritage by promising to intensify protective measures for the Yungang Grottoes, promoting a new batch of architectural sites and calling for the preservation of traditional handicrafts by youth.

Thus, China receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Ankit Timari

South Africa: 0

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to support the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of our cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage.

On 18 December 2023, the Pan South African Language Board, Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport, South African National Library and Iziko Museums of South Africa held an event to celebrate the 200-year anniversary of IsiXhosa as a written and published language. The theme of the event was ‘the role of museums in promoting cultural and linguistic diversity for sustainable societies’, during which three presenters “discussed the importance of museums as custodians of tangible and intangible heritage in assisting communities seeking to reclaim, sustain, or preserve their languages through the use of both museum collections and museum education programs.”⁶¹¹

On 14 February 2024, the National Heritage Council (NHC) in collaboration with the Castle of Goodhope and the Cape Heritage Museum hosted an Indigenous Knowledge Systems Seminar, focusing on the Khoisan community and the descendants of Cape Malay Slaves. Under the theme of ‘cultural heritage as a resource to achieve social cohesion, national building, national identity and social transformation’, this seminar represented the first engagement in determining how both indigenous communities wanted to preserve and promoted their heritage and history in South Africa. Through this event, the NHC sought to promote and highlight South Africa’s cultural diversity and origins, and encouraged participants to further explore ways to preserve and promote their heritage with the NHC.⁶¹²

On 22 February 2024, the National Arts Council of South Africa and the National Arts Council of Botswana signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to “strengthen the creative and cultural sectors in both countries.” The MOU stipulates that both countries shall collaborate to develop arts and culture practitioners with the goal of preserving indigenous and cultural heritage. Another objective of the MOU is to promote and facilitate cultural exchange programs, heritage preservation, partnerships and research opportunities.⁶¹³

South Africa has partially complied with its commitment to the protection, preservation, restoration and promotion of its cultural heritage, including both tangible and intangible heritage. Efforts included promoting the intangible heritage of its indigenous people and cooperating with Botswana towards promoting and preserving heritage. However, South Africa has not shown the same strength towards tangible heritage.

Thus, South Africa receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Acacia Philcox

⁶¹¹ Celebrating 200 years of IsiXhosa as a written and published language, Iziko Museums of South Africa (Cape Town) 18 December 2023. Access Date: 14 May 2024. <https://www.iziko.org.za/news/celebrating-200-years-of-isixhosa-as-a-written-and-published-language/>

⁶¹² Exploring Rich Heritage: Recap of the Indigenous Knowledge Systems Seminar at the Historic Castle of Good Hope, Western Cape – February 14, 2024, Iziko Museums of South Africa (Cape Town) 14 February 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.nhc.org.za/exploring-rich-heritage-recap-of-the-indigenous-knowledge-systems-seminar-at-the-historic-castle-of-good-hope-western-cape-february-14-2024/22/>

⁶¹³ The NAC and National Arts Council of Botswana Signed a Ground-breaking Memorandum of Understanding, National Arts Council (Johannesburg) 22 February 2024. Access Date: 15 May 2024. <https://www.nac.org.za/latest-news/media-statement-the-nac-and-national-arts-council-of-botswana-signed-a-ground-breaking-memorandum-of-understanding/>